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Foreword
Our pleasure in publishing John Hattendorf ’s Newport Paper on maritime strategy
arises from several sources. The Naval War College Press is pleased to republish and
make more broadly available an essay that had become a standard reference work for
those few fortunate enough to be both cleared for and fascinated by the evolution of
postwar American strategy. This edition reproduces the Hattendorf analysis as it was
first presented and published in 1989. The new elements—the now declassified NIE,
the comprehensive updating by Peter Swartz of his earlier bibliographies, and the selec-
tive time line created by Yuri Zhukov under Hattendorf ’s direction—only enhance
Hattendorf ’s original analytic core.
Even more important are the links between this essay and the Press’s broader commit-
ment to publishing and supporting the best work in maritime history. We have devel-
oped a notable series of naval biographies, most recently a splendid volume of Admiral
H. Kent Hewitt’s memoirs, edited by Evelyn Cherpak. We look forward to working with
the materials developed by the project on the Cold War at Sea, a comprehensive effort
led by John Hattendorf and Lyle Goldstein, with collaboration between the Naval War
College, the Watson Institute of Brown University, and the Saratoga Foundation. We
also hope for further historical efforts mounted by the new NWC Maritime History
Department.
We appreciate the support we have received in declassifying the Hattendorf essay and
obtaining the NIE from Peter Swartz and David Rosenberg, as well as the expert assis-
tance of Ms. Jo-Ann Parks (JIL Information Systems) in the finalization of the manu-
script. We express special appreciation also to Ms. Patricia Goodrich, guiding editor of
the Newport Papers throughout much of the last decade, for this, her last hurrah.
Perhaps most important for the Press itself and for our readers, this essay sharpens our
own sense of history. It recounts a fascinating story and also reflects the significant role
that the Naval War College, the Strategic Studies Group, and individual leaders, past
and present, played in this critical period of strategy making. It is rare to have as au-
thoritative an account of the difficult, complex process of strategy making as that
which Hattendorf produced within a very short time after the events themselves. Much
has changed in the international context since then; but the fundamental tasks of
conceptualization, assessment of ends and means, and focused implementation of
strategy remain the challenges for all those who wish to secure their nation’s safety and
security. This essay provides a valuable guide to this critical enterprise.
C A T H E R I N E M C A R D L E K E L L E H E R
Editor, Naval War College Press
April 2004
General Preface
To understand a series of events in the past, one needs to do more than just know a set
of detailed and isolated facts. Historical understanding is a process to work out the best
way to generalize accurately about something that has happened. It is an ongoing and
never-ending discussion about what events mean, why they took place the way they
did, and how and to what extent that past experience affects our present or provides a
useful example for our general appreciation of our development over time. Historical
understanding is an examination that involves attaching specifics to wide trends and
broad ideas. In this, individual actors in history can be surprised to find that their ac-
tions involve trends and issues that they were not thinking about at the time they were
involved in a past action as well as those that they do recognize and were thinking
about at the time. It is the historian’s job to look beyond specifics to see context and to
make connections with trends that are not otherwise obvious.
The process of moving from recorded facts to a general understanding can be a long
one. For events that take place within a government agency, such as the U.S. Navy, the
process can not even begin until the information and key documents become public
knowledge and can be disseminated widely enough to bring different viewpoints and
wider perspectives to bear upon them.
This volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding and
generalization for the subject of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy during the last phases of
the Cold War. To facilitate this beginning, we offer here the now-declassified, full and
original version of the official study that I undertook in 1986–1989, supplemented by three
appendices. The study attempted to record the trends and ideas that we could see at the
time, written on the basis of interviews with a range of the key individuals involved and on
the working documents that were then still located in their original office locations, some
of which have not survived or were not permanently retained in archival files. We publish it
here as a document, as it was written, without attempting to bring it up to date.
To supplement this original study, we have appended the declassified version of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Estimate of March 1982, which was
a key analysis in understanding the Soviet Navy, provided a generally accepted consen-
sus of American understanding at the time, and provided a basis around which to de-
velop the U.S Navy’s maritime strategy in this period. A second appendix is by Captain
Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and consists of his annotated bibliography of the public
debate surrounding the formulation of the strategy in the 1980s, updated to include
materials published through the end of 2003. And finally, Yuri M. Zhukov has created
especially for this volume a timeline that lays out a chronology of events to better un-
derstand the sequence of events involved.
The study and the three appendices are materials that contribute toward a future historical
understanding and do not, in themselves, constitute a definitive history, although they are
published as valuable tools toward reaching that goal. To reach closer to a definitive under-
standing, there are a variety of new perceptions that need to be added over time. With the
opening of archives on both sides of the world, and as scholarly discourse between Russians
and Americans develop, one will be able to begin to compare and contrast perceptions with
factual realities. As more time passes and we gain further distance and perspective in seeing
the emerging broad trends, new approaches to the subject may become apparent. Simul-
taneously, new materials may be released from government archives that will enhance our
understanding. New perceptions can also be expected from other quarters.
An example of this has already been made in a recent doctoral thesis completed at Kiel
University in Germany. There, in late 2000, a retired German naval officer, Wilfried
Stallmann, wrote a successful doctoral thesis on “U.S. Maritime Strategy after 1945: De-
velopment, Influence, and Affects on the Atlantic Alliance.”1 Working under the guidance
of one of Germany’s most prominent naval historians, Professor Dr. Michael Salewski,
Stallmann used his wide personal experience as a German naval and NATO staff officer
with his education as a graduate of both the Naval War College’s Naval Staff College in
1974 and of its Naval Command College in 1988 to complement his academic studies in
medieval and modern history, political science, and law. In his thesis, Stallmann made an
unusual and important contribution in German academic practice by using data from
maritime history to verify a thesis in political science that contrasted the substance of
American strategy with the academic preparation given to professional officers. He con-
cluded that the development of American maritime strategy over the fifty-year period of
the Cold War conformed only in the exceptional case to the ideal and logical path of
strategy making that is taught in U.S. and allied professional military colleges, as they link
national interests, policy, strategy, and operations in a hierarchical way.
Stallmann’s thesis is an important academic contribution that leads its readers to think
about a historical situation, but also stimulates further practical questions for profes-
sionals to ask on the basis of a specific historical experience. His work poses a double-
sided question for reflection. On the one hand, it leaves us to ask whether or not the
U.S. Navy effectively uses appropriate educational insights as its officers engage in the
process of formulating maritime strategy. On the other hand, one is left to ponder the
quality and nature of what is formulated as strategy.
vi i i G E N E R A L P R E F A C E
For a professional involved in either military education or in the development of na-
tional maritime strategy, these are very useful and profitable questions to pose in ap-
plying historical understanding to current issues. Materials such as those provided here
can help lead to a critical understanding of historical events that may possibly result in
improved professional performance and to better understanding in this professional
realm for the future. In this particular case, one can weigh the relative importance and
influence of organized educational institutions like the Naval War College and special
groups like the CNO Strategic Studies Group.
This is an example of a very specialized and professional application of historical un-
derstanding, but it is not the only one that may arise. Examination of the process in-
volved in the creation of the maritime strategy in this period can educate decision
makers in government and in Congress as to the ways the Navy has used in formulating
recent strategy.2 Further, a case study such as this is interesting and useful to those in
uniform within the naval service, as it recognizes individuals and their convictions,
showing that they matter enormously during critical and important times in American
naval history. Indeed, the study provides examples of innovation, leadership, and un-
derstanding that may make useful models for others interested in working toward in-
tellectual and organizational change of the most fundamental dimensions.
To civilian academics, there are a wide range of possible uses for the type of informa-
tion materials presented here. Among them, the story here shows how new, innovative
understanding was introduced and propagated within a bureaucracy. The historical
narrative can also provide some help in quite a different, but in an equally important,
quest as one looks to see what motivated government officials to take certain actions
and how they reacted to the Soviet Navy’s challenge and to what degree they accurately
interpreted Soviet intentions and actions.
For the general American public, a historical understanding of this same case involves
another dimension, as it seeks to understand what the role of the U.S. Navy has been in
the Cold War and what responsible government officials planned to do with the assets
under their care. A narrative such as this can raise penetrating questions as to whether
the ideas presented here were a wise use of national resources in peacetime or to in-
sightful, counterfactual speculation as to what the judgment might have been if there
had been an open conflict with the Soviet Union.
All such differing insights are to be found in the process by which we seek historical
understanding and research, write, read, and study naval history. History is a tale of
endless fascination. Not merely entertaining, it leads us to form our own understand-
ing and our own convictions about the past that form our attitudes toward the present
and the future.
T H E U . S . N A V Y ’ S M A R I T I M E S T R A T E G Y , 1 9 7 7 – 1 9 8 6 ix
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Preface to the First Edition
This study is the sixth in a series of The Newport Papers published by the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, since 1981.1 It is the full, classified version
from which the author developed the unclassified, article-length version that was pub-
lished in the Naval War College Review in 1988.2
The purpose of this history of “The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy,
1977–1986” is to provide a single study that summarizes some of the main trends in
American naval strategic thinking over the past decade and that might serve as a useful
starting point for those who are entering upon responsibilities in war planning. The
emphasis of the study is on trying to understand the origins, the rationale, and the ob-
jectives of the people who put forward the various strategic ideas, noting how various
contributions have complemented one another in a larger picture. The historian faced
with a project such as this will encounter many pitfalls and cannot expect to write a
definitive history so soon after the events. Indeed, as one pundit said, “those who follow
the heels of history too closely may well be kicked in the teeth.” Despite that warning,
we have attempted to describe the issues dispassionately, to give credit where credit is
due, and to avoid political squabbles while seeking to serve the larger purpose of con-
tributing to strategic thought. Despite all efforts, we have not been able to interview
everyone who was involved nor have we received responses from everyone to whom we
sent the drafts for review. We have also not had access to all documents, and we have
imposed our own limitation on the work by keeping it at the secret level of classifica-
tion. In order to improve future understanding, readers are encouraged to report to the
President of the Naval War College any factual corrections in the text and to provide
documents and information on any aspect that may have been overlooked
inadvertently.
October 1989 J. B. H.

Introduction
In relation to abstract analysis, this is a case study of the process by which a strategy
was developed and applied within the present American defense establishment. As one
reads this detailed study, he may evaluate the effort while bearing in mind the broad as-
pects involved in the rational development of a strategy through an understanding of
national aims, technological and geographical constraints, and relative military abili-
ties. As academic theorists have pointed out, these strictly rational calculations are
commonly offset by institutional interests, bureaucratic politics, and conflict among
decision makers. In addition, the complex task of war planning requires simplification
and organization of concepts into a framework by which an organization’s leaders can
provide a basis for the education of new participants as well as guidelines for standard
procedures and approaches to analysis. The process of using this conceptual framework
can have a tendency to introduce elements of bias into a decision maker’s perceptions
and to influence his selection of choices. This may lead to a strategist ignoring issues
that do not fit into his established categories or preferences.1
The American system of strategic planning is a pluralistic one that involves four levels
at which people make statements of strategy:
• High policy established at the level of the President and modified or supported by
Congress.
• War planning, the general conceptual plans for war, is done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
• Program planning, the system of coordinated weapons procurement, is accompanied
by statements of strategy that define the rationale for the weapons involved and is
done by each service and coordinated by the Secretary of Defense.
• Operational planning, the preparation of precise plans for wartime operations, is
done by the various unified and specified commanders in chief.
In theory, the four levels of strategy making should directly complement one another
with high policy establishing the goals and objectives for both program planning and
war planning, while they, in turn, reflect operational planning. In practice, some
academics argue that the theory has rarely, if ever, been achieved. Each level of strategy
making has its own set of needs and constraints produced by the nature of the system,
thereby producing the possibility for contradiction and disjunctions. Each decision-
making element within each of the various levels of strategy making can be led away
from a strictly rational calculation of strategy.2 This is caused by the practical necessity
to simplify complex issues involving a high degree of uncertainty and by the motivated
bias created through the interaction of bureaucratic interests. These factors, which are
present in nearly every system of governmental machinery, require constant reevaluation
and adjustment in the effort to reach a rational application of strategy. That rational cal-
culus is, however, forever changing as political events and technological developments
alter the situation on the global stage. Thus, the development of strategy is a perpetual
process of questioning, application, and reexamination.
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
The Evolution of Naval Thinking in the 1970s
The Ambiance of the 1970s
Writing in the mid-1970s, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer declared “the United States is
crossing the threshold of the last quarter of the 20th century in a mood of apprehen-
sion and confusion—confusion over America’s place in a rapidly changing world and
over the correct path to a dimly perceived future.”1 This thought reflected the anguish
and pessimism that had marked much of the previous decade for American service-
men. As former Under Secretary of the Navy Robert J. Murray later described it, “it is
hard to think of a more chaotic decade than the period between the assassination of
President Kennedy in 1963 and Nixon’s resignation in 1974.”2 There was too much to
think about during those years to deal with issues of broad national or naval strategy.
Officers were “fragged,” schools seemed to stop teaching, moral values were deprecated,
children were disaffected. Adults as well as children found it difficult to find their way
as they saw families collapsing, riots breaking out in cities, and even the sight of Wash-
ington, D.C., burning.
Then, after the United States withdrew from Vietnam, along came events in Ethiopia,
Angola, Afghanistan, and Iran, which clearly demonstrated that the American position
in international politics was not faring well, while the Soviet Union seemed to be hav-
ing great success. As these events added insult to injury, they evoked a changing mood
among leaders within the U.S. Government following the stabilizing influence of
Gerald Ford’s presidency. Beginning under President Jimmy Carter, the United States
began to move outward again, using her armed forces to complement her foreign pol-
icy and establishing a clear trend in the use of U.S. naval and military force as a politi-
cal instrument.3
Of the 71 incidents that occurred in the ten-year period between 1975 and 1984, 58, or
81 percent, involved the use of naval forces. Of those 58 incidents, 35 involved the use
of aircraft carriers. During that same time frame, strategic nuclear forces seemed to
play a declining and less obvious role, while conventional forces became much more
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important. In American foreign relations during the 30-year period 1946 to 1975, the
presence of nuclear forces played a role on 19 different occasions. By contrast, there
was no explicit political use of nuclear weapons for political purposes in the period
from 1975 to 1984.4
These trends in American foreign policy were paralleled by a number of other separate,
but interlocking, developments. First, there became evident visible signs that the con-
fusion that had developed about naval theory was coming to an end. Secondly, there
was a clear resurgence in general strategic thinking in many areas of the U.S. armed
forces as well as in the academic world. Thirdly, the U.S. Navy had been engaged for a
number of years in rebuilding its own forces to replace the block obsolescence of about
half of the U.S. surface fleet. Finally, while these developments were in progress, the So-
viet Navy had reached a new capability in its own dramatic development since 1962
and were now regarded as a global naval power. All these trends marked the central fea-
tures of the ambiance in which new American naval thinking began to take shape.
Naval Theory Refined
Theory has never been an attractive area of study for naval officers, yet naval theorists
work on an important subject that can both reflect and inform those whose concerns
are strictly practical. Up to and including World War II, American naval strategists
clearly based their fundamental theoretical concepts on the ideas that Alfred Thayer
Mahan had expressed a half century earlier. The experience of World War II, particularly
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FIGURE 1
Incidents of uses of U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*
* Philip D. Zelikow, “The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary.” Draft. Unpublished.
the decisive battles of the Pacific War, largely confirmed American faith in his ideas, but
in the years following 1945, the challenge presented by new technology, particularly by
nuclear weapons, missiles and electronics, seemed to make the old ideas inappropriate
to a new and different era. Indeed the Cold War stressed the importance of an area
which Mahan had not developed at all: the political uses of sea power in peacetime.5 In
America, the most widely read theoretical works on navies written in the postwar pe-
riod were those by academic writers such as Laurence W. Martin, Edward Luttwak, Ken
Booth, as well as the diplomat Sir James Cable, all of whom examined the political uses
of navies—short of war.
A small, but less well-known group of thinkers centered at the Naval War College con-
sistently devoted its effort to creating a thoroughly modern synthesis of major strategic
ideas for wartime. The dominant figure in this work was Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles,
who was joined by Dr. Herbert Rosinski and Dr. William Reitzel, among others. Taken
together, their work was designed to define with semantic precision the nature of naval
strategy for modern warfare and to put in writing the core of what senior naval officers
should understand intuitively and be prepared to develop into practical, operationally
sound strategic plans for naval forces.6
Eccles expanded on Rosinski’s definition that strategy is the comprehensive direction
of power to control situations and areas in order to attain broad objectives. Since strat-
egy is comprehensive, Eccles wrote, “it looks at the whole field of action. But since re-
sources are always limited, the strategist must identify those minimum key areas and
situations in relation to time and distance and the availability of tactical and logistics
resources.” As Eccles so distinctly defined the matter, in practical terms:
A strategic concept is a verbal statement of:
What to control
For what purpose
To what degree
When to initiate control
How long to control
And, in general, how to control in order to achieve the strategic objective.7
Another naval officer, Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie, took this concept one step further.
For him, the common factor in all power struggles is the concept of control. “Military
control, or military affairs in the broad sense, can seldom be taken up in isolation,”
Wylie wrote. “Military matters are inextricably woven into the whole social fabric. And
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that is why a general theory of strategy must, I believe, be a theory of power in all its
forms, not just a theory of military power.”8
Complementing these definitions, Eccles presaged much of what younger officers
would attempt to do later in formulating the Maritime Strategy of the early 1980s. In
Eccles’s mind, the term naval strategy was a term too easily used for polemic purposes
to enhance naval appropriations, the domestic political position of naval authorities,
and to protect the navy from similar polemicists in the air force and the army. How-
ever, Eccles emphatically believed that the understanding of the naval aspects of an
overall maritime strategy and of the creation and wide employment of naval forces is
vitally important. Maritime power is but one of the elements of overall national power
and of national strategy. “Maritime power is indispensable to the attainment and em-
ployment of purposeful ‘great power,’” Eccles wrote. “Seapower cannot be understood
save as a component of maritime power, and thus, naval strategy cannot stand alone.”9
The work of naval theorists within the U.S. Navy concentrated on the uses of the navy
in wartime, but extended their thinking to include not only peacetime political applica-
tions but also the relationships of naval strategy to the broader aspects of maritime and
national power. There was a clear realization within the navy that naval force must be
coordinated and related to other aspects of national power. Not the least important as-
pect in their thinking was the understanding that conventional naval forces had a role
to play in a world of nuclear deterrence, parity of forces, and deterrence. The general
trend in professional naval thought was to accept these factors as replacements for the
traditional prenuclear idea of battles between fleets on a grand scale with no holds
barred. The modern version of total war was a definition of nuclear war, yet profes-
sional thinkers had moved beyond total horror at that prospect and had begun to ex-
amine the nature of such conflicts. Clearly, there were variations in the way nuclear
weapons might be used; they might be employed either massively, selectively, or after a
preliminary phase of conventional warfare. In an age when continual crises seemed to
exist and when regional tensions between political blocs were dealt with in the context
of the strategic nuclear balance, there seemed to be a multiplicity of possible situations
in which lower level conflicts might result.10 These very situations heightened the im-
portance for concepts of strategic control and for the interrelationship of naval forces
with other types of national power.
This general trend in thinking was a significant alteration in American viewpoint. For
nearly a quarter of a century, American military and naval thinking had been based on
the notion that deterrence required the explicit threat of escalation to the nuclear level.
That threat alone was once considered to be sufficient to preclude warfare. By the 1970s,
military thinkers had returned to the idea that warfare was likely to be as frequent an
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occurrence in the future as it had been in the past. Moreover, the circumstances of con-
flict could involve a greater range and complexity than ever before.11 This understanding
implied that there was a large prospect for the use of substantial conventional forces,
even in the nuclear age. While the opposing nuclear forces were about equal, thus even
less useful for political purposes, conventional force seemed to gain utility not only in
its relation to the nuclear balance and in terms of deterrence, but also as an increment
of escalation. They contributed to the threat of escalation both horizontally through
geographical positioning, and vertically through the threat of a prolonged conventional
war in which economic and industrial strength would be the decisive factor.12
The Resurgence of Strategic Thinking in the U.S. Navy
The development of strategic thinking within the U.S. Navy goes back more than a cen-
tury. For most of that time, the navy has maintained contingency plans and analyzed
the ways in which naval power might be used in future wars. While there has never
been a clearly identified cadre of officers given specific responsibility for developing
naval strategy, the issues and ideas have been dealt with over the years by senior offi-
cials in Washington and by scattered groups of more or less intellectually inclined naval
officers working at the Naval War College, in OpNav, and on the staffs of fleet com-
manders. The entire history of the Naval War College, in fact, has been the story of re-
peated efforts to promote broad strategic thinking within the naval officer corps to
complement the ordinary, but incomplete, emphasis on technological developments
and new weapons.
In the early 1970s (1970–1974), as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt faced these same problems and took dramatic action to try to correct them.
He established the Navy Net Assessment Group to create a gauge by which the U.S.
Navy could measure its effectiveness against the Soviets and he sponsored “Project
2000” to provide a long-range review of policy beyond the five-year planning cycles
initiated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (21 January 1961–29 February
1968) in the previous decade. Paralleling this, Zumwalt fought to broaden naval think-
ing by revising the curriculum at the Naval War College.13 Carrying out this mission,
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner noted a relatively new problem when he castigated the
navy for “our increasing reliance on civilians and on ‘think tanks’ to do our thinking
for us.” While many people resented the implications of his remarks, he pointed to a se-
rious issue when he said,
We must be able to produce military men who are a match for the best of the civilian
strategists or we will abdicate control of our profession. Moreover, I am persuaded
that we can be a profession only as long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of
knowledge.14
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Despite the initiatives that Zumwalt and Turner made in this area, no dramatic change
took place in terms of a permanent effect on the officer corps. Although the Naval War
College’s curriculum improved during Turner’s tenure and was better prepared to
make a long-term contribution, at that time the most influential and most promising
officers were not being sent to Newport as students. Thus, its influence was limited. In
Washington, at the same time, a few of the studies produced under Zumwalt’s initiative
began to have influence, particularly among those who had been involved with these
studies and remained in service to work on similar projects at the end of the 1970s.
Two projects in particular that were completed during Admiral Zumwalt’s tenure had
some impact on ideas developed later: Future Maritime Strategy Study (FUMAR) and
“U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s.”15
These studies had their origins in late 1970. Following the issue of a Secretary of De-
fense memo on 16 December 1970 providing “Tentative Strategic Guidance,” Admiral
Zumwalt stated his desire to have a series of related regional studies and requested a
plan for carrying them out. These studies, as well as others in progress, were designed
to contribute to the future maritime strategy study sponsored in OpNav by OP-06.
This study was designed to examine policy and strategy, both worldwide and regional,
under conditions short of general war in the period 1975–1985.16 Significantly, the
study plan for FUMAR noted,
Strategy has traditionally been associated with war, preparation for war, and the wag-
ing of war. As war and modern societies and politics have become more complicated,
strategy of necessity has required increasing consideration of nonmilitary matters:
economic, political, psychological and sociological. Thus strategy has become more than
merely a military concept and tends toward the coordinated execution of statecraft.17
In May 1973, the Director of Navy Program Planning, (OP-090), Rear Admiral Thomas
B. Hayward, promulgated the study. In his forwarding letter, he noted that the study had
been designed to determine the complementary elements of U.S. national power and the
role and relationship between types of general purpose military forces in advancing U.S.
interests. Among other things, he noted that the study had concluded that “the optimum
type of general purpose forces for the U.S. will be forces which are politically and strate-
gically mobile and that are effectually linked to quick reaction strategic reserve forces and
to the strategic nuclear force.” Moreover, Hayward underscored the value of the study
when he concluded that it “provides many imaginative and original concepts which can
provide a basis for future analysis and refinement of naval strategic concepts.”18
The second study, which followed on from this, was “U.S. Strategy for the Pacific–
Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s.” Personally tasked by Zumwalt and carried out
in OP-605 by Captain William Cockell, who had also been heavily involved in the
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FUMAR study as well. Cockell sought to look at the Pacific–Indian Ocean area as a
single, strategic entity. Like FUMAR, the new study was broader than a military
study. With the assistance of a contractor, Arthur D. Little Inc., economic and trade
factors were included, as well as the problem of oil transport, well before interna-
tional attention was focused on these issues. Simultaneously, the study provided sup-
port for the case of building up Diego Garcia as an Indian Ocean naval base, while at
the same time looking at the entire strategic situation along the whole Asian littoral
from the Persian Gulf to northeast Asia.
About the same time, Captain Cockell and Captain Curt Shellman carried out a third
study for Zumwalt in OP-06. The subject of this study was to define the navy’s nuclear
strategy and force structure in the context of a sensible national strategy. Zumwalt saw
this as an essential bit of groundwork to assist him in developing the navy’s position in
relation to the Strategic Arms Limitation area—following Senator [Henry M. “Scoop”]
Jackson’s criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for not having done their homework for
SALT I. The Cockell-Shellman study provided the concept for Fleet Ballistic Missile
Submarine (SSBN) involvement with hard-kill capability and laid the groundwork for
the Trident II (D-5) program, which was just then coming to fruition. Throughout,
Zumwalt accepted the logic in the study, despite the fact that OP-96 and OP-90 op-
posed it, fearing that a major new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) pro-
gram would drain resources from other important programs.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the official Department of Defense statement of naval missions
did not change, yet within that same time frame, the long-term naval force goals that
the navy used did change. In 1975, the goal was set at 575 ships by Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger (1973–1975); in 1976 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1975–
1977) set it at 600; in 1977–1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (1977–1981) set
it at 425–500 ships. The variance in these number goals reflected the difference in judg-
ment as to what was prudent for the country to plan for in facing the uncertainties of
the future. The high numbers reflected estimates that focused on a future world war in-
volving the Soviet Union. The low numbers, particularly the 400-ship figures used by
the Carter administration in their 1977 DoD Consolidated Guidance, reflected the idea
that the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet should be designed for peacekeeping operations and
for conflicts in which the Soviet Union chose not to be involved, while at the same time
maintaining an edge of naval superiority over the Soviets.
In broad terms, the U.S. Navy’s budget and its plans for the future had been sharply re-
duced in the period immediately following the Vietnam War. From 1962 to 1972, the
navy had programmed the construction of 42 ships per year, but between 1968 and
1975 only 12 ships, or less than a third as many per year, were programmed. In 1975,
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given the age of ships already at sea, and the navy-expected service life for a warship of
25–30 years, the service anticipated retiring about 4 percent of the active fleet each
year. With this in mind in 1975, Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf (1974–
1977) declared, “looking ahead to 1980, for the navy to have a fleet of, say, 500 ships to
carry out its missions, we would have to triple the current ship-building average or at
least the ship-building average of the last 5, 6, 7 years.”19 In the previous ten years, the
U.S. naval force had declined from 947 active ships to 478. In Fiscal Year 1976, total de-
fense spending was 24.8 percent of the federal total, the lowest share since fiscal year
1940. Even so, President Gerald Ford’s administration (1974–1977) was determined to
maintain U.S. naval superiority. “We cannot and will not let any nation dominate the
world seas. The United States must and it will,” Ford declared.20
While President Ford was committed to a policy of reversing this decline in U.S. naval
strength, Congress refused to approve all of his proposals. Expressing his concerns over
the deficiencies in the legislation’s authorization of $32.5 billion for procurement and
for research and development programs, Ford stated:
Congress has failed to authorize $1.7 billion requested for new ship programs that are
needed to strengthen our maritime capabilities and assure freedom of the seas. In par-
ticular, they have denied funds for the lead ships for two essential production pro-
grams—the nuclear strike cruiser and the conventionally powered AEGIS destroyer—
and for four modern frigates. The FY 1977 program was proposed as the first step of a
sustained effort to assure that the United States, along with its allies, can maintain
maritime defense, deterrence, and freedom of the seas. I plan to resubmit budget re-
quests for FY 1977 to cover these essential ship building programs.21
Despite setbacks, Ford was able to establish a strong plan to rebuild the navy. This plan
for new ships, however, was cut by the (President Jimmy) Carter administration
(1977–1981).
Meanwhile within the navy staff under Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L.
Holloway III (1974–1978), thought was being given to long-range force levels and to
the question of “how to size a navy.” Studies were done for various naval force levels:
500, 600, 700, and 800 ships. Both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets required a balanced
force of combatant ships, amphibious assault lift capabilities, support ships and appro-
priate aircraft. The 500-ship navy corresponded to retaining the then-current fleet size
with a reduction to 40 SSBNs and 12 carriers. The 800-ship figure corresponded to the
1984 fiscal year force objective recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the 600
and 700-ship fleets were intermediate alternatives. The Five Year Defense Plan, which
had already been programmed, corresponded to a 588-ship fleet by fiscal year 1983
and, when extrapolated to fiscal year 1985, would be a 600-ship navy.
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A summary of the conclusion which the navy staff reached in these studies is shown in
the Table of Sea-Control Capabilities.22 Five task groups would be stretched at the
500-ship level, but
The programmed force level [600 ships] will enable control of the Northeast Pacific,
Indian Ocean, the Atlantic below the GIUK Gap, and the Western Mediterranean. It
enables the U.S. to contest control of the South Pacific and the Arabian Sea. A 700-
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NOMINAL ACTIVE FLEET SIZE (SHIPS) 500 600 700 800
CASE 1: [NATO–WARSAW PACT WAR]
Norwegian Sea ¤ ¤ - +
Mid-Atlantic CV operations # + + + +*
Atlantic SLOC (U.S.-Europe) # ¤ - + +*
Western Mediterranean - + + +*
Eastern Mediterranean ¤ ¤ - +
No Soviet bases in Mid East ¤ + + +
U.S. wartime oil SLOC ¤ ¤ - +
Philippines–Japan/Korea SLOC ¤ ¤ - +
Northeast Pacific & Valdez SLOC - + + +
Northeast Pacific ¤ ¤ ¤ +
South Pacific ¤ - + +
CASE 2: [US/PRC WAR IN ASIA]
Not studied
CASE 3: [US/USSR WAR OUTSIDE NATO REGION]
Western Mediterranean + + + +
Eastern Mediterranean ¤ ¤ - +
Arabian Sea ¤ - + +
CASE 4: [UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION BY U.S.]
Middle East/Korea ¤ ¤ - +
Elsewhere + + + +
CASE 5: [PEACETIME PRESENCE]
Generally ¤ - - +
CASE 1 and 4: ¤ ¤ ¤ -
TABLE OF SEA-CONTROL CAPABILITIES
SYMBOLS: + U.S. and Allied forces are likely to prevail.
¤ Outcome is uncertain for both sides.
- Enemy forces are likely to prevail.
* Most vital.
# We have the capability to gain ultimate control of the Atlantic below the GIUK Gap, but below the 700 and 800-ship levels, lack suf-
ficient surface combatants and V/STOL Support Ships to provide adequate protection of convoys during the 1–2 months of conflict
(prior to the attrition of Soviet submarines).
Source: Sea Control CPAM, Ser 96/S59368, 15 May 1975, p.17.
ship force would enable control of the above plus contest control of the Eastern Medi-
terranean and the Norwegian Sea. A 35 percent increase above the programmed force
level would provide an 800-ship navy which would enable control of the above plus
the Eastern Mediterranean, Northwest Pacific, and the Norwegian Sea.23
In examining the general issues, the Joint Chiefs had agreed that the planned force lev-
els would be inadequate for the United States to engage in unilateral military action
while at the same time be engaged in a NATO War with the Soviet Union.
Clearly, in the navy’s view, existing force levels were inadequate in 1975 to perform the
navy’s mission; however, increased funding to support the force levels already suggested
by the Five Year Defense Plan would meet the very basic requirements, though without
flexibility.
Continuing this analysis over the period of his term as Chief of Naval Operations, Ad-
miral Holloway focused on the 600-ship goal as a general objective. The Department of
Defense reported to Congress in January 1977 that over the following 15 years it would
need almost $90 billion more than the amount funded. With a force reaching 568 ships
by 1985, increasing to 638 in 1990, the navy could maintain both sea control and pres-
ence, but in the Indian Ocean this could not be done simultaneously with the other
theaters. In reaching this conclusion, the report stressed the basic issue in relating force
level budget decisions to strategy:
The size of a navy depends upon the wartime sea-control capabilities and power pro-
jection capacity it must possess, the forward deployment it must sustain in peacetime,
and the forces needed to maintain an appropriate U.S.-Soviet naval balance.24
To the public, it seemed as though the navy were a service in crisis, fending off zealous
advocates of systems analysis who were trying to tailor a fleet to fit a shrinking budget.
Secretary of Defense Brown seemed to be trying to bring the huge defense budget un-
der control by strengthening NATO’s land and air forces through reduction of the
navy’s role and budget. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation, Russell Murray, was quoted as saying that DoD’s short-term objective was
to ensure that NATO would not be overwhelmed in the first few weeks of a blitzkrieg
war, and he advised that the navy should be concerned with local contingencies outside
the NATO area.25
At the same time, it appeared to the public that the navy was torn within by discor-
dant parochialism between aviators, submariners, and surface ship officers. Some ob-
servers commented that the aviators dominated the navy, and because of their
presumed devotion to carrier task force operations had not maintained a balanced
outlook in judgments on shipbuilding programs.26 Under these circumstances, it was
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not surprising for academics to join the chorus. In a review of B. Mitchell Simpson’s
1977 book, War, Strategy and Maritime Power,27 a collection of essays culled from the first
25 years of the Naval War College Review, the well-known defense analyst Edward N.
Luttwak asked, “What is a navy in the absence of a strategy? It is, in effect, a priest-
hood.” Without strategy to inform and guide naval officers, Luttwak argued, it is all
merely ritual and routine. “The United States,” Luttwak declared,
unavoidably needs a positive maritime strategy, i.e., a coherent statement of its own
role in the world with a consequent delineation of the maritime requirements of this
role. (Maritime rather than merely naval, because to a large extent naval force is
merely the protective framework for the use of oceans in all its aspects.) The source of
the problem is no mystery: we have no maritime strategy because we have no national
strategy. But this in turn is no excuse for the failure of the U.S. Navy as a corporate
body to formulate a coherent strategy. It merely means that the maritime strategy
must be defined in terms of a presumptive national strategy in the hope that the nation
will indeed accept the logic of the former, even if it does not fully acknowledge the lat-
ter. But this most basic of tasks continues to be evaded.28
These public criticisms were shared by many within the navy. Similar ideas were the ba-
sis for work that was just then getting started.
During the late 1970s, several developments occurred which had an impact on the
transition to widespread offensive thinking within the naval officer corps. Admiral
James L. Holloway III’s emphasis on developing carrier battle groups and surface ac-
tion groups were concepts that became the operational basis upon which later strategic
concepts were formed. In the area of strategic thinking, there were two important early
developments. Though sharing some qualities, their origins were different. One was the
“Sea Strike Strategy” project developed by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in 1977–1978. The other was “Sea Plan 2000,” which
originated in The Secretariat in Washington.
Sea Plan 2000
With the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in January 1977, W. Graham Claytor
Jr. took office as Secretary of the Navy. In the following month, R. James Woolsey be-
came the Under Secretary. Upon taking up their responsibilities, both these men found
difficulty in accepting the naval portion of Presidential Review Memorandum–10
(PRM–10), which outlined the Carter administration’s defense policy. In their view,
PRM–10 reflected incoherence in structure and assumptions as well as disagreements
about different approaches and different naval force levels to implement strategy.
Claytor and Woolsey believed “that a naval force structure plan should be done that
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draws a clear distinction between capabilities and requirements, and which uses the
one to build on the other; that takes into account the full range of strategies and mis-
sions served by naval force; and that highlights the force posture implications of key as-
sumptions about foreign policy (e.g., Chinese-Soviet hostility, availability of Allies
forces and bases), the durability of NATO’s flanks, and other factors.”29
Specifically, they wanted a new study that would show the strategies and missions that
forces then available could fulfill, the role of naval forces in a NATO war, intervention
(with and without the need to confront the Soviets), crisis management, and peacetime
presence. They wanted the study to be structured in a way that would allow the Presi-
dent, Secretary of Defense, and other senior national security policy makers to make
explicit choices about national policy and to relate their choices to the contributions
that naval forces could make. Believing that this approach, focusing on naval forces, cut
less across military department lines than other types of issues, Claytor asked that the
Navy Secretariat be given responsibility for coordinating a new study.30
On 1 August 1977, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the navy to undertake a
naval force planning study which was “to examine the most probable range of tasks for
Navy and Marine Corps forces for the balance of this century, and how well we would
be able to perform these tasks with forces sized on reasonable funding assumptions.” In
his letter covering the resulting paper, Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor empha-
sized, “The Study linked policy objectives with warfighting capability,”31 and that is the
essence of strategy.
Based in Washington, D.C., the Sea Plan 2000 Study Group was directed by Francis J.
West, Jr., from the Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College. The group mem-
bers included ten naval officers and two Marine Corps officers with technical assistance
provided by Presearch-Incorporated. The study was completed in March 1978 and for-
warded immediately to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown by Navy Secretary Claytor.
In his forwarding letter, Claytor stated that “while the study group admits the difficulty
of predicting the outcomes of wars we have not fought, I believe the insights it contains
are substantial, balanced, and will serve you well.”32 In particular, Claytor noted four in-
sights in the study that impressed him as valuable:
• In the next 30 years, U.S. naval forces will be far more constrained in carrying out
their work than they have been used to in the years since World War II. The rise of
the Soviet Navy as well as Third World forces has created capable opponents.
• Surface ships will become increasingly survivable through AEGIS and other new ac-
tive and passive antisurface missile defense and antisubmarine warfare systems
(ASW), although action must be taken to counter a potential air threat in the 1990s.
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• It is important to have naval forces that are flexible and in balance for a wide range
of operations. There is great value in maintaining an offensive option on means
short of nuclear exchange and of carrying the war to the Soviets.
• Naval forces permit the President to respond to crises flexibly and to the degree ap-
propriate to our arms and policies.33
Looking back on Sea Plan 2000, one is impressed by its continuity with several strategic
concepts used in the Maritime Strategy, particularly with its points on deterrence of a
major war, exerting pressure on the Soviets, reinforcement of allies, and the perception
of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance.
Sea Plan 2000 pointed out the main policy-related measures that the U.S. Navy sup-
ported:34
Policy-Related Measures of Naval Capabilities
Maintain Stability
• Forward deployments
• Perceptions of naval power
Contain Crises
• Capability to affect outcome ashore
• Superiority at sea versus Soviets
Deter Global War
• Protection of sea-lanes
• Reinforce allies
• Pressure upon the Soviets
• Hedges against uncertainties
In discussing these issues in detail, Sea Plan 2000 noted in particular that the possible
tasks for naval forces were interrelated. An offensive posture for American forces draws
Soviet resources away from threatening Western sea-lanes.35 Thus, putting pressure
upon the Soviets through the threat of offensive action seemed to be an attractive op-
tion which could have impact on the equilibrium of the worldwide power balance as
well as in the more remote possibility of an actual, global war.36
As Sea Plan 2000 stated the issue:
In any major war, the destruction of the Soviet fleet and denial to the Soviets of access
to any ocean is a basic objective. This requires the close coordination of surface,
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submarine and sea-based air assets in an aggressive naval campaign. Denying the So-
viets access to the oceans provides the allies with post-hostility negotiation leverage.
The ability to achieve this objective has a significant impact on the attainment of other
important objectives, e.g., maintenance of important SLOCs [sea lines of communica-
tion] and support for allies.37
The possibility of doing this depended largely on the ability of the U.S. Navy to maintain
superiority, and the authors of Sea Plan 2000 noted ruefully, “The forward strategy link-
ing the U.S. to other continents requires use of the seas. While the perception that the
Soviets could deny the U.S. control of the seas is particularly damaging, such perception
is not warranted by the projected trends in technology. Whether it will be warranted by a
steady reduction in the size of the American fleet and the amount of forward deployment
remains to be seen.”38
After reviewing the general strategic picture, Sea Plan 2000 went on to outline three al-
ternative options for U.S. naval force levels into the 1990s. Using President Carter’s de-
cision that the overall resources for national security would require a yearly real growth
of 3 percent, the plan focused on this level, providing for 535 active ships by fiscal year
1984. Looking on either side of this base, the Sea Plan 2000 study group analyzed an
option of 1 percent growth providing for 439 ships, and 4 percent growth providing for
585 ships. The study group determined that the 3 percent growth rate would result in a
future navy more sophisticated and somewhat larger than current forces, but which
only “hovers at the threshold of naval capability across the spectrum of possible uses,
given the risks associated with technical and tactical uncertainties.” The 4 percent op-
tion, however, provided “a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider range of
military and political action at a moderate increase in cost.”39
Within the navy, Sea Plan 2000 was considered a sound foundation for structuring the
size and capability of its forces.40 Outside, however, it came under considerable criti-
cism. In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) undertook an evaluation of
the navy’s work, entitled in draft, How Good is Navy Force Planning? This report con-
centrated on Sea Plan 2000 and a study entitled “Assessment of the Sea-Based Air Plat-
form Project,” as well as the then incomplete study entitled “The Sea-Based Air Master
Study Plan.” Severely criticizing Sea Plan 2000, the GAO report pointed out that none
of the three force level and funding options it examined could be achieved because they
were based on known unrealistic funding assumptions and that it was overly optimistic
and shortsighted in considering present day and future Soviet threats postulated by the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Moreover, GAO concluded that the assumptions
behind the study were questionable or unrealistic.41 Quoting from a speech at the Naval
War College by Edward R. Jayne, the Associate Director for National Security and
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International Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget, the report went on,
“only if the Navy, applying its own goals and expertise, sets more realistic priorities can
we hope to see a fully coherent and balanced Navy program in the future.”42 Rather than
assume the carrier to be the centerpiece of future forces, GAO concluded that the navy’s
missions should be prioritized and analyses should be made of alternative ways to fulfill
its mission through land-based aircraft and surface ships armed with cruise missiles.43
In September 1979, GAO sent a copy of its draft report to the Secretary of Defense. As-
sistant Secretary of Defense Fred P. Wacker replied that DoD believed that the GAO re-
port could seriously mislead Congress because “it does not recognize that force
planning efficiency can be properly evaluated only in the context of the Planning, Pro-
gramming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the total force development process.”44
Sea Plan 2000 was written in a relatively short time by an ad hoc group convened by the
Secretary of the Navy “for the purpose of examining a special set of options,”45 Wacker
pointed out. As a result of this letter, the GAO retitled its report. Instead of “How Good
is Navy Force Planning?” it was labeled “How Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding
Future Forces?”
Project Sea Strike
Project Sea Strike had its origin in the thinking of Admiral Hayward when he was
Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, in 1976–1977. During that period, Hayward became
aware that it was not until the three-star level that a senior officer was faced with hav-
ing to make strategic decisions. As a ship’s commanding officer, one did not have the
necessary knowledge, and in most other positions one did not have the time to prepare
oneself. This insight gave Hayward the determination to do all that he could to encour-
age strategic thinking. As Seventh Fleet Commander, Hayward was disturbed that gen-
eral war planning in his fleet was Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) oriented.
The Soviet Navy did not seem to be a major concern, and there seemed to be equally
little concern for the geopolitical factors in the world situation.46
In 1977, Hayward became Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. There, he found a plan-
ning situation similar to that in the Seventh Fleet, and he set about in earnest to alter it.
He reviewed Pacific Fleet war plans, and found that those then in place required the
swing of forces from the Pacific into the Atlantic to concentrate our forces in the Euro-
pean Theater within the framework of NATO collective security, specifically for the
concept of flexible response called for in NATO’s MC 14/3. As Hayward reviewed the
international situation in 1977, he came to the conclusion that forces in the NATO area
were no longer strong enough to deter the Soviets. With nuclear parity, moreover, it
seemed to him that it was unlikely that MC 14/3 could be executed. As CINCPACFLT,
Hayward wanted to rethink naval strategy for the Pacific and in order to do this
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effectively, he reorganized his staff, reviving the concepts of organization and style that
Nimitz had employed as CINCPAC/CINCPOA in 1942–1945.47 Captain James M.
Patton and Captain William Cockell were the key figures whom Hayward brought to
the staff to deal with strategy and war plans. In addition, he brought along his Seventh
Fleet science advisor, Dr. Al Brandstein, who played a major role in the analysis that
underlay work in this area. Together, they faced a difficult task in trying to reorient na-
tional policy from the office of a distant fleet commander, but Hayward set out in 1977
by establishing a continuing project which he called “Sea Strike.” Never a published
study, it was a briefing that Hayward used to try to influence policy makers and get
across his ideas to planners. Only one copy of the briefing was made, and Hayward and
Patton together gave it about a dozen times, including presentations to CINCPAC, the
Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, State Department, and to National Security Ad-
visor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the White House.48 Patton gave the presentation by him-
self to a number of other, working-level groups.
Hayward’s objectives in Sea Strike were twofold. First he wanted to place the Pacific
Fleet within a global U.S. naval strategy as the most effective means of developing plans
for use in the event of war with the USSR. Secondly, he was concerned with the condi-
tion of the Pacific Fleet and its preparation for war. At that time there were no offensive
naval war plans, only defensive plans. Hayward believed that for the sake of flexibility,
if for no other reason, a credible offensive plan should be available.
The first idea that Hayward chose to analyze was a plan for an offensive strike against
Soviet bases on Kamchatka and in eastern Siberia. This was “the easier plan to get an
arm around,” Hayward recalled, “easier than exploring the Soviet-PRC situation, and
the easiest to think about in an isolated sense.”49 Hayward’s idea was to get the planning
process started by looking at the more isolated case of Kamchatka, then to move on to
more complicated issues. In his view, the next easiest area to look at was the Indian
Ocean and what might happen in Southwest Asia.
Sea Strike was developed initially as a plan for the Pacific Fleet in the case of conven-
tional war with the Soviet Union. The scenario was an early offensive action against
Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, and the Kuriles, using forces then currently available. One
force from the east and one from the south were to form up in a battle group at a point
500 miles from Petropavlovsk. Then four carriers would conduct air strikes in two at-
tack waves which would put about 100 strike aircraft over the target giving a 50 percent
possibility of target destruction.50
Although nominally an alternative plan to utilize the Pacific Fleet’s conventional forces,
it was also a strategy to justify not swinging Pacific forces to the Atlantic as required by
general war plans. Pacific Fleet planners showed, with the help of the Intelligence
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Center, Pacific, that the Soviets had the air capability to move quickly 101,000 men
with their equipment, from the Soviet Far East to the NATO front. By using Sea Strike
as a threat to the Soviet Union, Pacific Fleet planners argued that U.S. naval forces in
the Pacific could make a strategic difference by preventing the move of Soviet Forces to
Europe. Moreover, the plan could support America’s commitment as a Pacific power,
influencing the Chinese to deploy forces in a way that would further tie down the Sovi-
ets from reinforcing the European front. In the same way, they argued that Sea Strike
would also influence Japanese policy makers to continue allowing the United States to
have base privileges, which would allow strikes on the Soviet Union, rather than having
Japan remain neutral. Finally, Sea Strike would allow for the immediate offensive use of
Pacific Fleet forces, simultaneously protecting Alaska and the West Coast, instead of
placing those forces in a largely ineffective status for the 30 days required to make the
transit to the European Theater.51
The analyses of these forward, offensive operations using current capabilities revealed
some deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet that were surprising to many. Among other things,
they showed that there were too few F-14 aircraft. This resulted in Hayward’s order to
move up, by one year, plans to convert the carrier Ranger for handling F-14s. The im-
portance of the Phoenix missile, as shown in the analyses, led to increasing the carrier
loading capacity from 72 to more than 100 missiles. Further analyses showed that the
E-2 aircraft did not offer enough of a warning, even at a range of 250 miles detection,
for the carrier to launch aircraft effectively and to intercept bomber raids. This led
eventually to an agreement between the Navy and the Air Force for using E-3 AWACS
to obtain greater standoff detection ranges for carrier battle groups. Among other
things, the Sea Strike analyses pointed out difficulties in the defense of the Aleutians. It
showed the weakness of the Aleutians for land-based air to support antiair warfare
during the withdrawal phase after attacks against Kamchatka. Secondly, it brought viv-
idly to light the fact that Soviet attack and occupation of the western Aleutians would
put the U.S. mainland under the arc of Soviet long-range air attack. Finally, it showed
problems in conflicting operational control by various commands in defending the
Aleutians. This led to a long-term but still unsuccessful attempt to rationalize Aleutian
defense plans and command relationships. Most importantly, Sea Strike laid the basis
for a reconsideration in the war-fighting strategy for the Pacific Command, which was
based on a policy of not swinging Pacific area assets to Europe in the event of a war
with the Soviet Union. These changes reflected a change in the national strategy,
worked up by the National Security Council and eventually approved by the President.
The work done at Pacific Fleet Headquarters was very influential in moving the na-
tional strategy in the direction it took. In the process of discussion and reflection
which took place, some knowledgeable observers criticized Sea Strike as unrealistic.
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Others argued that the losses occasioned by early, offensive strikes in the Pacific would
make it an unprofitable course of action. To these criticisms, Admiral Hayward replied
that Sea Strike was not a campaign plan but an analytical tool with which one could
analyze Pacific Fleet employment in different, novel ways and assess the pros and cons of
offensive fleet action in varying circumstances. Those involved in the study learned many
lessons, both positive and negative, from the study. The result was mentioned in Sea Plan
2000, based on an early formulation of the results, then later put into the Pacific Com-
mand Campaign Plan and eventually incorporated into the Maritime Strategy.52
Conclusion
Sea Strike and the parallel work on Sea Plan 2000 were key parts in the development of
the navy’s opposition to the Carter administration’s defense policy, which called for
greater emphasis on the Central Front in a NATO–Warsaw Pact war, but a more con-
strained role for naval forces. The main point in the navy’s criticism was that the Cen-
tral Front could not be isolated from the European flanks. As F. J. West reported after a
meeting in the Defense Department in December 1977,
We highlighted our differences with PRM-10, which has assumed in a NATO war that
Norway took care of itself and that the Italian and the French [navies] secured the
Mediterranean. By definition under those assumptions, one needs a smaller U.S.
Navy. I indicated, however, that also by definition such a U.S. plan would sound the
death knell for NATO, insuring Italy and Norway would make other arrangements
and converting the central front into a bilateral US/FRG treaty. Consequently, we
showed a series of options for employing U.S. naval forces on the flanks as well as on
the SLOC and in the Western Pacific.53
These strategic ideas clearly expressed the general direction in which naval thinking
proceeded in the next decade.
In the mid-1970s, leaders such as Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Under
Secretary James Woolsey and Admiral James L. Holloway had clearly established a gen-
eral consensus within the navy’s Washington leadership that the service should strive
for superiority at sea against the Soviets and, when examining the variety of possible
wartime operations against the Soviet Navy, think in terms of forward, offensive opera-
tions as the most effective means to employ the navy to achieve the nation’s broad de-
fense policies. In promoting this view, the navy was reasserting a traditional view of its
strategic role that not only is reflected in the strategic ideas that lay behind the estab-
lishment of NATO in the late 1940s, but also the long tradition of naval thinking em-
bodied in the classical works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. In the
1950s and 1960s, the overriding national emphasis of a defense strategy based on
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nuclear weapons had left doubt that these traditional ideas had any relevance at all in
the nuclear age. On reflection, however, the Vietnam war, Afghanistan, and other
events demonstrated that conventional weapons were not irrelevant to the nuclear age
but must be reconsidered within the context of a broader spectrum of warfare. This
change in perception created the need to adapt and refine older ideas for new condi-
tions. While the more traditional ideas had never disappeared from the navy, the chang-
ing perception about the relevance of conventional weapons created a situation in which
the full range of naval strategic thought could now be utilized. The seeds of develop-
ment for further naval strategic thinking in the mid-1980s were sewn in the 1970s as the
United States came to grips with the post–Vietnam war period and with the realities of
political and military factors in international affairs. This changing ambience in the
1970s set the stage for a wide revival of strategic thinking within the naval officer corps.
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Thinking About the Soviet Navy, 1967–1981
Any serious thinking about strategy must necessarily deal with the effect that the use of
one’s own forces has on an opponent. Moreover, how an enemy uses his forces is a crit-
ical factor in any strategic evaluation. Thus, when thinking about how one might em-
ploy one’s own forces for achieving broad future goals in a war, one must also assess
the probability of how an enemy might act or react, as well as examine everything that
an enemy can do that may materially influence one’s own courses of action.
From the early 1960s, when the growth of Soviet naval power became evident, the pre-
dominant view in America was that the Soviets were building a naval force with many
capabilities similar to the United States Navy. Most importantly, the existence of a
blue-water Soviet Navy seemed to emphasize, in American minds, the capability for
peacetime power projection, the facility for wartime attack on U.S. and Western naval
forces and sea lines of communication, as well as the ability to launch strategic nuclear
strikes from the sea. Increasingly, Americans worried about the Soviet Navy as a sea-
denial force that could deprive the West of the free use of the sea, thereby creating
political, economic, and military disaster. In short, Americans tended to view the new
Soviet naval capabilities in terms of mirror-imaging and refighting World War II.
The public discussion of the issue in Congress and the press as well as in the statements
of senior naval officers stressed this interpretation. Simultaneously, however, there be-
gan to develop slowly an interpretation that attempted to move away from an ethno-
centric view of the Soviets in American terms and rather toward an interpretation in
Soviet terms on the basis of the Soviet Union’s values and the views, aims, and objec-
tives of its leaders. The first widely read book in America on this subject was Robert W.
Herrick’s Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice, published by the U.S.
Naval Institute in 1968. Herrick wrote much of the book while serving as staff intelli-
gence officer at the Naval War College in 1963–1964, basing it on his own detailed
reading of Soviet literature and his nearly 20 years of experience as an intelligence spe-
cialist in Soviet affairs. Herrick concluded that Soviet naval strategy, like Tsarist Russian
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
T
W
O
naval strategy before it, was essentially defensive. This view was so greatly at variance
with the commonly held official viewpoint, that the publisher added a preface to the
volume and enclosed a printed bookmark which drew attention to this fact, calling for
comments and articles expressing alternative views for publication in the U.S. Naval In-
stitute’s Proceedings.
It took a rather long time for a different attitude and interpretation to prevail within
the U.S. Navy. This change did occur, however, at about the same time that the Mari-
time Strategy was being formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The process by
which the U.S. Navy changed its views can be seen most clearly in two places: on one
hand in the work of the Center for Naval Analyses in the period 1967–1981, and on the
other, within the Naval intelligence community.
The Work of the Center for Naval Analyses, 1967–1981
The conclusions that The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) reached in its studies of So-
viet naval strategy have often been at the center of the debate over Soviet intentions.
Using a great deal of unclassified evidence, the bulk of which came from Soviet doc-
trinal writings supported by interpretations of Soviet exercises, deployments, and gen-
eral capabilities, CNA developed a broad interpretation. It emphasized the primarily
defensive role of the Soviet Navy in protecting its SSBNs as the Soviet Union’s (USSR)
reserve of strategic nuclear weapons. This conclusion was a controversial one which
has not always sat easily with the intelligence community, but it is one which lies at the
basis of The Maritime Strategy.1
As early as 1968, Robert Weinland pointed out that the Soviets might feel that their
submarine nuclear deterrent would be threatened by a U.S. campaign to defend its sea
lines of communication, even if the United States did not intend to attack the Soviet
SSBN force. If the Soviet SSBNs were in the same immediate area as that used for West-
ern sea lines of communication, the Soviet SSBNs ran the risk of becoming accidental
or intentional victims of the conflict. If they withdrew to port or other safe areas, they
might well compromise their own invulnerability and strike capability.2
In mid-1973, Bradford Dismukes cited evidence that the Soviets were increasingly con-
cerned about the security of their SSBN force, pointing out that maintenance of SSBNs
on station would be more important than attacking Western sea lines of communica-
tion. The linkage in the strategic situation between Western defense of its sea lines and
Soviet SSBN security was the result of geographical and technological factors that are
outside the immediate control of either side. Asking for a basic change in U.S. thinking,
Dismukes wrote in 1973, “At the least, we should include pro- and anti-SSBN scenarios in
2 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
our general purpose force planning or run the risk of structuring a force which might be
ill-suited to the most important war-fighting tasks it may be called on to carry out.”3
In 1972–1973, a series of eleven articles were published in The Soviet Navy Journal un-
der the name of the navy’s commander in chief, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. The article
bore the characteristic earmarks of new naval doctrine. CNA’s work in analyzing these
articles drew praise from the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral E. F.
Rectanus, U.S. Navy, and at the same time a request for further assistance from CNA.4
The result of Rectanus’s request was a CNA draft to support preparation of the navy’s
input to a new National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union (NIE-11-15-75).
Prepared by members of the Institute for Naval Studies, comprised of Robert G.
Weinland, James M. McConnell, and Bradford Dismukes, the CNA draft was a broad
analysis that pointed out the significant changes in Soviet thinking, including “the ap-
parent adoption of a strategic ‘fleet in being’ concept for at least a portion of their
SSBN force.”5
The unclassified Gorshkov series was an important source that seemed to reveal much
about Soviet Naval thinking, but it was not easy to interpret. James M. McConnell, in a
study prepared for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-96) and the Office
of Naval Research, listed what he considered to be the main points in what he called
“Gorshkov’s doctrine of coercive naval diplomacy.”6
• The USSR is not only a formidable continental power but also a “mighty sea power.”
• The importance of combat at sea in the “overall course of war” has grown, although
Gorshkov avoids references to the role of the navy in “decisively defeating” the en-
emy.
• In war, navies are a powerful means of achieving the “political goals” for the armed
struggle.
• The importance of fleets-in-being at the close of wars to influence the peace negotia-
tions and achieve political goals is repeatedly emphasized through historical exam-
ples.
Gorshkov specifically endorses Jellicoe’s strategy of holding back his forces at the battle
of Jutland in World War I, thereby reversing previous Soviet naval historiography in its
condemnation of the British Admiralty’s “politico-strategic” rather than “military-
strategic” approach to war, its “fleet-in-being” method, its “doctrine of conserving
forces,” and consequent reluctance to risk the main forces of the fleet in a “decisive clash”
to achieve “complete victory,” preferring instead to retain them “as an important factor at
the moment of concluding peace and also for the postwar rivalry with erstwhile allies.”
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In World War II, although “military-geographic” conditions facilitated the British
blockade, the Germans were successful, through diversion, in scattering British ASW
forces throughout the Atlantic, creating a favorable situation for German naval opera-
tions “in the coastal waters of northern Europe.”
Due, apparently, mainly to “military-geographic” conditions, Russian requirements for
naval forces have differed from those of the West.
Although the USSR gives priority to submarines, they require air and surface support
to ensure combat stability.
ASW is not very cost-effective against modern nuclear submarines, especially if the lat-
ter are supported by aviation and surface ships.
SSBNs are “more effective in deterrence” than land-based launch facilities, because of
their “great survivability.” This claim, made for the first time, occurs in a passage in which
Gorshkov, if we are to take him literally, is treating “deterrence” as a “role in modern war.”
Elsewhere, when the discussion turns, explicitly or contextually, to deterrence “in peace-
time,” Gorshkov follows the traditional formula of coupling the Strategic Rocket Troops
and the navy, in that order, as the main factors in demonstrating resolve.
The very first duty of the navy is to maintain a high state of “readiness” to carry out the
mission of “defending” the USSR against possible attacks from the sea.
This “defense” mission is the “main task” for the navy, with the implication that “deter-
rence” and offsetting politico-military pressure is the main component of “defense.”
Navies fulfill the important role of one of the instruments of state policy in “peace-
time,” including the protection of its “state interests” in the seas and oceans.
Tasks associated with protecting these state interests are “especially important” because
of the many “local wars” that imperialism “leave behind in the wake of its policy.”
Because of the “truly inexhaustible wealth” of the seas, they have become objects of
contending “state interest”; and navies “cannot take a back seat in this struggle.”
In addition to the Gorshkov series, note was also taken of points made by other Soviet
naval specialists:
SSBNs specifically (and not just “submarines”) are incapable of realizing their full po-
tential “without appropriate support from their forces.”
When the long-range Trident comes into operation in the U.S. Navy, SSBNs will be po-
sitioned in U.S. coastal waters, permitting the allocation of a “new function” to the
main U.S. ASW forces—“guarding the strategic missile forces.”7
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By the end of 1974, the most controversial conclusion arising from analysis of the
Gorshkov series, along with other evidence, concerned Soviet plans for the use of their
SSBN force during a crisis. Everyone involved with the analysis of this problem agreed
that it was a matter of inference from defective or presumptive evidence. The points
could not be found explicitly in Gorshkov’s writings, but the analysts made interpreta-
tions from what they saw as “latent content.” At CNA, analysts believed that the Soviets
would elect to use their Kiev-class ship with its capacity for aircraft operations and to
employ her with other general purpose forces to protect their SSBNs. This was a cen-
trally important task because the Soviets intended to withhold their submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force during the conventional stage of a war and
during initial nuclear strikes in order to provide either a second strike capability or to
retain a bargaining chip during negotiations.
Elaborating on this point, CNA analysts concluded in a draft “Study of Grand Soviet
Maritime Strategy” being prepared for Commander N. V. Smith of OP-60N:
It is likely that the Soviets intend to allocate some general purpose forces to the pro-
tection of SSBNs during the opening stages of a NATO–Warsaw Pact war. This prior-
ity would remain relatively high even if the war became prolonged. Only in the event
of a clearly non-escalatory situation would pro-SSBN forces be reassigned to alterna-
tive missions.8
CNA’s conclusions were quite different from those made at that time in the classified
intelligence literature. While OP-60N endorsed the CNA conclusion, they were obliged
to add qualifying language such as “this is an area about which we know little,”9 antici-
pating intelligence community objections.
Continuing this work in the following years, CNA analyst James M. McConnell made a
crucial contribution in 1977 in a draft, first chapter of Soviet Naval Diplomacy, which
corroborated earlier interpretations of Soviet intentions to withhold their SLBMs. De-
veloping evidence that the Soviet Union’s SSBNs were under the direct control of the
highest political leaders, and those forces would be used mainly in later periods of a
war, McConnell wrote, “Wars might be won by other branches of the armed forces,
Gorshkov seems to be saying, but surrenders and armistices are arranged from the sea;
and beyond that, navies have a value in influencing the course of actual peacemaking.”10
In an October 1977 contribution to James L. George’s volume, Problems of Sea Power as
We Approach the Twenty-First Century, McConnell went further and suggested that So-
viet SSBNs would operate in defended, local sanctuaries in home waters, such as the
Barents Sea for the Northern Fleet and the Sea of Okhotsk for the Pacific Ocean Fleet.
These sanctuaries would be heavily guarded by mines and fixed underwater acoustic
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surveillance systems with the air defense and introspective cover for submarines, sur-
face ships, and aircraft engaged in barrier operation.11
Looking to what the Soviets might do in a future war, McConnell wrote:
I would not expect substantial forward deployments of platforms during the con-
ventional phase of the war. Leaving aside escalation sensitivity, the counter-ASW
environment would not be favorable and—given a perceived withholding strategy
for the United States Navy to prosecute strategic ASW immediately upon entering
the nuclear phase—these factors may explain Admiral Gorshkov’s insistence that
sea control is necessary for strategic defense as well as strategic offense.12
Throughout the late 1970s, CNA analysts expressed growing concern that U.S. Navy
plans were giving insufficient attention to the implications of Soviet adoption of a
withholding strategy for their SLBM force and the assignment of their general purpose
navy to a protective mission for their SSBN force.13 In March 1980, Bradford Dismukes
reported the results of an initial investigation on the war termination mission of the
U.S. Navy. This new topic arose from an attempt to assess the implication of the Soviet
withholding strategy. In a briefing that reflected seminal ideas by James McConnell,
Dismukes declared that “our nation’s strategies require adjustment in reaction to a fun-
damental change that has occurred in maritime affairs.”14 The change that Dismukes
saw was the emphasis that the Soviet Union put on the positive use of the sea for oper-
ating a strategic reserve of SSBNs and where security, in turn, was guaranteed by gen-
eral purpose, Soviet naval forces. “If the U.S. Navy is to carry out its primary functions
in deterrence, escalation control, and war fighting,” Dismukes said, “it must attack So-
viet strategy as effectively as Soviet weapons.”15 Dismukes suggested three areas that
needed changes in the U.S. Navy. First, the further development of the U.S. Navy’s ca-
pabilities to fight a sea-control campaign with conventional weapons in the context of a
campaign involving all our forces against the Soviet nuclear-reserve SSBNs. Secondly, the
U.S. Navy needed long-range, stand-off ASW weapons that would effectively enhance, in
Soviet areas, the deterrent effect of the U.S. Navy’s general purpose forces. Thirdly, the U.S.
Navy must reevaluate its doctrines to take account of the Soviet nuclear reserve.
“What we’re dealing with here is the capacity to deprive our opponent of his perceived
requirement to answer last in the war,” Dismukes said. While careful to point out that
this strategy was not without risk, it might still be critical to have the option to use it if
Soviet ground forces occupy Europe. A secure Soviet strategic reserve would ensure their
dominance, but a threatened or insecure reserve would put them in a weaker position.16
Up until early 1981, CNA continued its role in the interpretation of Soviet intentions
and its follow-on work in developing a naval strategy for the United States that could
be used to attack Soviet strategy. In March 1981, as a part of a planned joint Naval War
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College–CNA investigation, CNA prepared an initial estimate of the Soviets’ probable
response to a U.S. campaign against their SSBN reserve.17 At this time, however, the Of-
fice of Naval Intelligence and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations began to be
concerned that for CNA to participate further, its analysts would begin handling intel-
ligence material that could not be released to private contractors and analysts. Several
intelligence collection efforts had begun to pay off, and because of the sensitivity of the
sources, new classifications of “sensitive compartmented information” (SCI) were cre-
ated; this information would be withheld in the future, available only to a small group of
intelligence analysts and senior flag officers, not CNA or the navy at large.
There had always been a tension between CNA and the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) over differing interpretations, but this had often been regarded as a healthy and
constructive difference of viewpoint. CNA analysts regretted that an exchange of views
could no longer take place on the same terms, but CNA analysts Dismukes and
McConnell continued their work after 1981 by assessing Soviet strategic responses to an
anti-SSBN campaign. Some of this later work was commissioned by OpNav and ONI,
but was not based on compartmented information. From 1981, the Office of Naval In-
telligence carried out its own assessments based on this information dealing with So-
viet naval force employment plans.18
The Development of Thinking within the Intelligence Community
In the mid-1970s, the naval intelligence community felt secure in its view of the Soviet
Navy.19 The prevailing wisdom explained the continuing Soviet naval buildup in terms
of threats to Western sea lines of communication. Soviet exercises such as OKEAN 1970
and OKEAN 1975 seemed to emphasize the correctness of the interpretation that the
Soviets thought primarily in terms of naval presence and in cutting Western sea lines.
From this, American naval officers drew the conclusion that if war with the Soviet
Union came, it would bring with it a battle of the North Atlantic and Northwest Pacific
sea-lanes. By 1977–1979 however, the points that CNA was making paralleled evidence
that the Intelligence community had already noticed suggesting that the Soviets did not
seem to have made the typical preparation one would expect for a war on Western
sea-lanes, in terms of their command and control arrangements, standby reserves, etc.
Most importantly, the publication of the revised 1976 edition of Gorshkov’s Sea Power of
the State suggested clearly that the Soviets had a different set of priorities.20
In May 1977, CNA submitted to ONI a draft of its study by James M. McConnell, So-
viet Naval Diplomacy, requesting that ONI review it and approve it for publication in
an unclassified form. The main focus of the work was on Soviet peacetime, power pro-
jection, but chapter 1 was an essay dealing with Soviet naval wartime strategy and force
employment concepts which did not agree with the official navy position on how the
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Soviets would rationally employ their navy. In particular, the chapter discussed the So-
viet concept of withholding SSBNs as a strategic reserve force in protected bastions.
McConnell’s work was based on an analysis of Soviet military and academic writings
which were unfamiliar to the naval officers in the Estimates Branch of ONI.21
In response to this new material from CNA, ONI put together a special group of offi-
cers to evaluate McConnell’s chapter. The group that was selected to do this had previ-
ously been given the task of analyzing the Gorshkov book, and consisted of ONI
analyst Ted Neely, Commander Stephen Kime, and Captain William H. J. Manthorpe,
Jr. Since the idea was new to them, they undertook the task of locating and reading all
the recurrences that McConnell had used. This opened up an entirely new body of lit-
erature that had been previously little known and unexploited by naval intelligence.
However, in the process of this investigation, the ONI group came to the conclusion
that McConnell’s work showed a pattern of misquotes, exaggerations, and unwarranted
interpretations. Therefore, the group recommended to the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence that the chapter containing McConnell’s analysis on the Soviet concept of with-
holding SSBNs be deleted prior to ONI approval for publication. In 1979, discussions
between CNA and ONI on this subject resulted in a much abbreviated chapter 1, with-
out any reference to this matter. In this revised form, the McConnell study was pub-
lished in 1977, but the substance of his ideas on the SSBN withholding strategy did not
appear in an unclassified form until much later with McConnell’s essay in James L.
George’s volume, Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century.22
McConnell had succeeded in introducing naval intelligence officers to the material they
should be studying, but at the same time, the reception that his conclusions received
had sowed the seeds of caution and disbelief for officials in dealing with the work of
CNA. However, in the long run, McConnell’s conclusions were born out by later evi-
dence. The main problem at the heart of the issue was one of analysis. In retrospect, of-
ficers came to the conclusion that McConnell and others at CNA were doing their
analysis and describing Soviet strategic plans on the basis of the literature of Soviet
military science. This was academic and theoretical work designed to examine potential
changes in future strategy and doctrine. It was not yet accepted or in use, but might
possibly be an indication of a future direction or emphasis in those areas. While CNA
was examining this theoretical literature, officers in naval intelligence were doing their
analysis and description of Soviet strategy and fleet employment plans on the basis of
observed Soviet fleet exercises. In contrast to the theoretical writings that CNA was ex-
amining, the exercises reflected past and current strategy, not future strategy. Reflecting
on this dilemma for analysts of Soviet strategy, Captain W. H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., sug-
gested that those who would try to predict whether the changes suggested by theory
will actually occur are as likely to be wrong as right, since the transformation of
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military science into doctrine is as much a function of party and bureaucratic internal
politics in the USSR as other factors. However, those who wait for the hard evidence
from fleet exercises that strategy has actually changed are likely to be the last to recog-
nize that the change has taken place. “The moral is,” Manthorpe wrote, “if you want to
be early you may be wrong, but if you want to be right you’ll surely be late in recogniz-
ing changes to Soviet strategy.”23
In the late 1970s, the best tentative conclusion that could be reached was that
McConnell’s ideas could well be right, but that actual practice did not confirm that any
such change had taken place. Neither side in the debate had solid evidence to confirm
their views on the actual course that Soviet strategy would follow, but as a result of the
debate, each side took increasingly hard stands in the face of an opposing interpreta-
tion. The first good evidence that Soviet naval strategy had actually changed was the
absence of a worldwide OKEAN exercise in 1980, similar to the ones that had occurred
in 1970 and 1975; at the same time, several intelligence collection efforts paid off and
sources were beginning to provide insight into Soviet naval force employment plans. At
first, this data and the interpretation of it was incomplete and tentative, but during the
latter half of 1980 and early 1981, a clear picture began to emerge through the compart-
mented information being used by ONI analysts. These analysts clearly appreciated the
significance of the SSBN withholding strategy on the basis of the new evidence and saw
its implications for American naval strategy.24
Meanwhile, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, decided
that something should be done to resolve a second issue: the dichotomy between the
apparent increase in Soviet naval deployment to challenge the U.S. Navy in peacetime
and the suggestion that, in wartime, the Soviet Navy would be employed to defend So-
viet SSBN bastions close to home waters. This raised the question as to whether the
same Soviet forces could fulfill both roles without being placed in a disadvantageous
position in the event of war, whether the Soviet Navy would expand its general purpose
forces in order to carry out this dual role, or whether this dual role would limit Soviet
peacetime deployment in order to be ready in the event of war. At the suggestion of
Captain Thomas A. Brooks, Rear Admiral Shapiro convened the first of three annual
summer symposia to discuss this issue. The first symposium met at the Naval Academy
in Annapolis. The participants included among others, ONI analysts, CNA analysts, ac-
ademic experts and representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and De-
fense Intelligence Agency. The discussions were held at the secret classification level,
and the whole range of views about future Soviet navy employment were presented and
discussed, while the conference was moderated by Captain Stephen Kime and summa-
rized by Captain William Manthorpe. 25
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The consensus of the conference was that the Soviets planned to retain their general
purpose forces close to home waters in wartime in order to defend the homeland as
well as to protect the SSBN force. Because of this, the peacetime employment of Soviet
general purpose forces would probably not increase significantly in the future. These
conclusions were ones that would not be widely applauded within the U.S. Navy. The
conclusions implied that there would be a lessened Soviet peacetime presence that
needed to be matched by Soviet forces and that in wartime, there would be a lessened
threat to Western sea lines of communication, the protection of which was the princi-
pal mission for the navy envisaged by the Carter administration.26
By the winter of 1980–1981, the available intelligence began to present a picture that
confirmed these general conclusions. One could begin to see signs that the concept was
in the early stages of introduction into the fleet as the strategy for the future. It showed
clearly that the new pattern involved SSBN bastions in northern waters protected by
the bulk of Soviet general purpose forces, and these concepts were being developed and
tested in war games and in exercises. The dissemination of this compartmented intelli-
gence was made on a very restricted basis, piece by piece as it arrived. It was restricted
to senior flag officers, in particular, Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, the Director of Na-
val Intelligence; Admiral Thomas Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Ad-
vanced Technology Panel (ATP), consisting of Admiral James Watkins, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations; Rear Admiral Kinnard McKee, the Director of the Office of Naval
Warfare (OP-095); Rear Admiral Carlisle Trost, Director Navy Program Planning
(OP-090); Vice Admiral Nils Thunman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Sub-
marine Warfare (OP-02); and the Director of the Office of Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (OP-098). Also privy to this information was Captain William A.
Cockell, Executive Assistant to Admiral Hayward. Cockell quickly recognized the impli-
cations of this intelligence for U.S. strategy and, with Captain Thomas A. Brooks, an in-
telligence specialist, drafted a memorandum for Admiral Hayward’s signature directing
the Office of Naval Intelligence to establish an organization for the continuing study of
Soviet doctrine and strategy to complement the traditional ONI focus on equipment
and capabilities. Captain Cockell was the catalyst within the organization that got the
bureaucratic system moving to accommodate the new direction in intelligence analysis.
His initiative was sustained by Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro and his deputy Director
of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral John Butts, through the creation of a new branch
within the Office of Naval Intelligence, OP-009J, headed by Richard Haver with the as-
sistance of Theodore Neely and Commander Michael Kramer. Paralleling this initiative,
Rear Admiral Kinnard McKee saw that the new intelligence also had implications for
the warfare capabilities of the U.S. Navy. In order to monitor these developments,
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McKee created within OP-95 a special group, first called Team C, and later Team Z, for
this purpose.27
During the winter of 1980–1981, ONI analysis of the new issues moved into high gear.
Rear Admiral Shapiro clearly recognized that the analysis of Soviet intentions was an
area that had been neglected and that the issue should be worked how the United
States could learn to fight the Soviets most effectively. The focus of the new analytical
effort was first directed by Captain Thomas A. Brooks, commanding officer of the
newly established Naval Fleet Operational Intelligence Office at Fort Meade, and then
shifted to the Pentagon under the direction of Richard Haver in OP-009J. By the spring
of 1981, the initial ONI analysis had been completed, and by summer the first major
presentations of the analysis and conclusions were made. As a result of this, Haver pre-
pared a memorandum for Vice Admiral McKee to forward to the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations recommending new considerations for countering Soviet strategy. Shortly
thereafter, in August 1981, Captain Brooks briefed the new analysis of Soviet strat-
egy and force employment concepts to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Fleet
Commanders in Chief at their conference in Annapolis. This briefing marked a critical
turning point in the development of the analysis. After listening to the briefing, Admi-
ral Hayward found the concepts of Soviet strategy so completely different that he ex-
pressed disbelief that the Soviets could possibly operate their navy in such a manner.
Several of the other four-star officers, including Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Direc-
tor of the CIA, shared Hayward’s view and questioned the validity of the analysis. The
most knowledgeable officers present, Vice Admiral McKee and Admiral James Watkins,
previously the Vice Chief, but then the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not
speak up to defend the ONI analysis.28
On the day after the Fleet CINCs’ conference, Rear Admiral Shapiro called in Haver,
Manthorpe, and Brooks to assess the setback to their work and to discuss what to do
about it. From these conversations, it was decided that the best arrangement would be
to use Captain William Studeman, an intelligence specialist who had just become the
executive assistant to the new Vice Chief, Admiral William N. Small, and to keep him
fully informed. Small, through this connection, quickly saw the implications of the new
intelligence and revitalized the largely dormant mechanism of the Advanced Technol-
ogy Panel as the means of reviewing intelligence and endorsing analysis of it, then
bringing it to the direct attention of the CNO. With this, a major effort began within
the navy staff to educate key officers in the new appreciation of Soviet strategy. This ef-
fort took several forms. As initially planned between the fall of 1981 and spring of
1982, the Advanced Technology Panel was fully briefed on the evidence for change in
the Soviet concept of naval force employment. Then Admiral Small, as senior member,
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was able to report to Admiral Hayward that the ATP had endorsed the ONI analysis and
began to move forward in examining the development of a U.S. “anti-SSBN strategy.”29
In other areas, the intelligence analysis began to be worked into broader staff docu-
ments. For example, in the Navy Net Assessment, which had been prepared in the sum-
mer and fall and approved in December 1981, Captain Manthorpe had prepared a
section which read:
The principal additional role gained by the Soviet Navy . . . has been the responsibility
for protecting submarine strategic strike forces while war proceeds at less than nuclear
level or while those forces are being withheld from a limited nuclear exchange as a
second strike force.30
At the same time, ONI set out to get the intelligence community to produce a National
Intelligence estimate which would endorse the ONI analysis of Soviet force employ-
ment concepts. In November 1981, the Intelligence community completed an inter-
agency Intelligence memorandum on “SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
FOR INTERDICTING SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN A WAR WITH NATO.”
This memorandum expressed the general agreement of Intelligence analysts that Soviet
military planners regarded the wartime interdiction of NATO sea lines of communica-
tion as a secondary mission. According to the memorandum, a few submarines would
be employed in attacking commerce in the North Atlantic in the opening stage of a
NATO–Warsaw Pact war, but the majority of naval forces would be deployed close to
the USSR to defend its SSBN force and to protect the homeland from NATO’s nuclear-
armed naval strike force.31 Following on from this, Captain James Eglin and Mr. Charles
Summerall of ONI were given the task of making the navy contribution to the National
Intelligence Estimate. The estimate itself was drafted by Mr. Gene Sullivan of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and was ready for review in its first draft by March 1982. It was
published in an SCI version in the fall of 1982, which was followed by a wider distribu-
tion at a lower classification. Paralleling these efforts, Rich Haver from ONI began a se-
ries of briefings to influential people in the Navy Department. Haver became, as Rear
Admiral Thomas Brooks recalled, “the Saint Paul of the movement, going forth among
the Gentiles (read unrestricted line) and preaching the gospel. The conversion rate was
astounding.”32
By December 1981, The Advanced Technology Panel had fully developed an interpreta-
tion of Soviet intentions, which cast serious doubts on the conventional U.S. Strategy
based on Soviet attack of Western sea lines of communication. The new interpretation
stressed the importance of the United States being able to defeat the mission of the So-
viet Navy. Originally characterized as “anti-SSBN operations,” Admiral Small broad-
ened this definition so that the issue could be seen in terms of vital Soviet interests at
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sea as they used their general purpose navy to protect their SSBNs, and connecting this
with the strategic situation in the key flank areas, the Norwegian Sea, and the eastern
Mediterranean.33 Over the next two years, between 1982–1984, the Vice Chief and the
ATP focused their efforts on the creation of an “anti-SSBN” strategy both in terms of
deterrence and war avoidance, and for war fighting. This work was based on continu-
ing intelligence analysis and was supported by a number of other efforts. Admiral
Small devoted much of his own time to assessing the pros and cons of the “anti-SSBN
strategy.” In connection with Small’s personal interest, Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost
commissioned a study from the Center for Naval Analyses entitled “Assessing Soviet re-
sponses [to an anti-SSBN campaign].” The study was directed by Rear Admiral W. J.
Holland, director of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division (OP-65), and
his deputy, Captain Linton Brooks, assisted by Richard Haver and Captain Manthorpe.
Using the basic work of this study, Small, Holland, and Brooks held weekly meetings to
continue to develop the strategy.34
The final step in the process of selling the new analysis of Soviet strategy was a series of
war games, the most important of which were those sponsored by the ATP to assess
various aspects of the “anti-SSBN strategy.” Unlike some war games that are played,
this was a “no holds barred, true all-source war game with the highest level of partici-
pation.”35 In April 1982, this dealt with anti-SSBN concepts; in October 1982 with
anti-SSBN and SSN deployment concepts; and in February 1983 with anti-SSBN war
termination concepts. During these games, many useful insights were obtained for the
use of submarines that were directly used in the strategy. Another aspect of the games
touched on the utilization of aircraft carriers. In this, these games found that the most
significant utilization of the aircraft carrier was as a “tactical nuclear reserve” to tie
down significant numbers of Soviet air assets while remaining beyond their effective
reach just below the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, until that point in a war
when it became necessary to negotiate with the Soviet Union whether the war could be
terminated or would escalate to a nuclear war. In this sense, the carriers became a nu-
clear bargaining chip. In the formulation of the strategy, however, the role of the carri-
ers was overlooked, while most of the effort was concentrated on the submarine
campaign.36 Through this kind of tabletop war gaming with the participation of senior
flag officers in positions of responsibility, the concepts behind the strategy and the rela-
tionship of intelligence analysis to strategy were clearly brought out and developed and
integrated into other aspects of naval planning.
Following the April 1982 war game, Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman became
aware of this work while the debate was in progress over the desirability of a strategy
against SSBNs. The idea was compatible with the forward strategy air strikes, the criti-
cality of Japan, the employment of the Tomahawk missiles, Marine Corps thinking, and
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other considerations, but the skepticism of some made it clear that an anti-SSBN cam-
paign could only be one of the options available for the navy, not its principal focus.37
As the process of strategy development continued, the security sensitivity of the associ-
ated intelligence information created some difficulty in handling, but Admiral James
Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations from June 1982 to June 1986, ordered that each
major fleet staff set aside a cell cleared to know what was going on and to reflect as
much as possible on this new thinking. It took time to do this, and for a period, certain
commanders and certain staffs had the information while others did not. Not surpris-
ingly, there were some imbalances. Vice Admiral Nils Thunman, as Deputy CNO for
Submarine Warfare (OP-02) and a member of the ATP, moved quickly to set up the
first cell on the staff of the Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic. This, however, was
in advance of the cell established on the staff of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic.
In July 1982, Captain Thomas A. Brooks was assigned to the staff of Admiral Harry
Train, Commander in Chief, Atlantic. The new cell was activated within several
months, but not fully manned until well into the first year of Admiral Wesley
McDonald’s tenure as CINCLANT. With the assistance of this cell, McDonald began to
utilize the new intelligence data in flag level conferences and through special briefings.
Similar cells were established in other fleet areas, at later dates. In the Atlantic Fleet, the
initiation of an intelligence cell on the staff of Commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic,
marked the beginning of reevaluation and rewriting of the existing war plans. Not sur-
prisingly, this began with the submarine force, but shortly became widespread through-
out the fleet. It quickly worked into the thinking of the navy in general through the
various threads of changing personnel assignments among the key individuals in-
volved, the discussions among the Fleet commanders in their annual strategy confer-
ences, war games, and the discussions involved in the work of the CNO’s Strategic
Studies Group (SSG) based at the Naval War College.38 In these ways, the new insights
and analyses about Soviet naval force employment were spread throughout the navy
and became a key element in strategic analysis.
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From the CNO’s Strategic Concepts to the
Work of the SSG, 1978–1986
The appointment of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as the 21st Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in June 1978 marks an important stage in the transition of thinking within the na-
val officer corps. Not only was it an affirmation of the strategic thinking that Hayward
had done for the Pacific, but it marked the opportunity for different approaches to
strategic problems within the navy. Up to this point, much of the debate about naval is-
sues centered around the navy’s budget. The confusing mass of unit costs and program
alternatives tended to be confused with strategy. Unrealistic strategies were sometimes
employed for no other reason than to justify larger shares of money for one program
or another, and in this way the budget tended to drive strategic concepts. “This is why,”
Hayward explained, “academics and others say the Navy doesn’t have a strategy.”1 To
combat this problem and to remove the misperceptions, Hayward sought to change the
terms of the debate from a budget battle to an analysis of the strategic issues for a
global maritime power. Under Hayward, the navy’s leadership agreed not to fight for
particular force levels, but to work for a highly ready navy with adequate manning and to
let Congress worry about how big the navy should be. In particular, Hayward put his pri-
ority on spare parts, ammunition, pay, and benefits as the means to increase readiness.
Then, he went on to point out that the Central Front in Europe was not the only prob-
lem for the United States. The country needed a war-winning strategy.2
Hayward’s most immediate strategic concern was to create a worldwide maritime strat-
egy to provide the framework for such thinking within the navy. Hayward and his exec-
utive assistant, Captain William A. Cockell, worked together over a three-month period
to develop an outline. Together they examined each principal maritime area, theater by
theater, and produced a 20–30 page paper, in point-paper format, that dealt with sig-
nificant strategic issues: the Soviet threat, U.S. naval capabilities, and appropriate naval
operations for the U.S. Navy. The final thought for each section was to ask the ques-
tion, “what difference would it make if the U.S. Navy were not able to succeed, and
what complications for national strategy would flow from this?” In thinking through
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these questions, the most obvious problem was that there were not enough forces avail-
able. To deal with this, Hayward and Cockell developed the concept and coined the
term “sequential operations.”3
CNO Strategic Concepts
Hayward and Cockell completed their work in January 1979 and circulated the results
in a memorandum entitled “CNO Strategic Concepts.”4 In his preface, Hayward made
two important points.
While he did not argue over the priority given to NATO, he hypothesized that the
Carter administration’s Central Front orientation failed to take into account the criti-
cality of other regions of the world to NATO’s vital interest. Moreover, war in Europe
is the least likely contingency, and a broader based view of national security require-
ments is needed.
The terms “sea control” and “power projection” were poorly understood by senior
decision makers and were sometimes adroitly misapplied by analysts in order to hold
down naval force requirements.
The CNO’s strategic principles contained 17 major points, which may be summarized
as follows:5
A NATO–Warsaw Pact war will be global. The view that U.S. and Allied naval forces
are needed solely to protect the sea-lanes to Europe is highly simplistic and seriously
misleading.
The U.S. Navy must be offensively capable. The Soviet Navy is sophisticated and
highly capable, but the U.S. Navy can only assure control of essential sea areas by the
destruction or neutralization of the Soviet Navy’s capability to challenge that control.
This requires taking the war to the enemy and retaining residual power after the
battle.
The U.S. Navy is clearly outnumbered and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
Our present principal margin of superiority lies in carriers and in at-sea sustainability.
To maintain this we must not mirror-image the Soviets, but develop further the capa-
bilities this margin of superiority represents.
The U.S. Navy must maintain technological superiority.
The U.S. Navy must draw on sister services and allies.
The U.S. must capitalize on the Soviet Union’s geographical disadvantages and its de-
fensive mentality. This means maintaining a potential U.S. Navy threat to the Soviet
Union, making the Soviets understand that in a war there will be no sanctuaries, and
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drawing the Soviets into a preoccupation with homeland defense and operations close
to the Soviet Union which will preclude the availability of Soviet forces to attack
Western sea lines of communication.
The U.S. Navy must plan to fight with what it has on hand; there will be no opportu-
nity to mobilize reserves or to build or to activate major naval units.
The U.S. Navy must employ tactics that will ensure favorable attrition ratios. In order
to maintain control over time, place, and the calculated risk of engagements, the U.S.
Navy needs to have an offensive, not a reactive, strategy.
The northern flank of NATO represents a large land, sea, and air region which has a
direct strategic impact on whether or not NATO has the ability to carry on successful
defensive operations on the Central Front. The area is important not only in wartime,
but also in peacetime to demonstrate that NATO has the will to operate in the most
demanding of all maritime scenarios.
The Swing Strategy of reinforcing Europe by using forces from the Pacific is an anach-
ronism dating from the time when Pacific Fleet force levels were higher and the im-
portance of the People’s Republic of China not as critical.
Present U.S. Navy force levels are not sufficient to permit simultaneous control over
the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, Western Pacific, and Indian
Ocean, therefore the United States must put priorities on the key areas and choose an
order for their sequential control.
Beyond these major points, there were some additional considerations. First, why and
where a war starts could have a critical influence on the capability of the U.S. Navy to
respond properly in a timely manner. The pattern in which the fleet is deployed at the
time that a war breaks out might complicate American response, and therefore, the So-
viets might attempt to draw the U.S. Navy into a maldeployment at such a critical
point. Secondly, there is great uncertainty as to whether the Soviets would use tactical
nuclear weapons at sea. The U.S. Navy needs to understand Soviet doctrine better in
order to think through how we would deter the Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons,
or if necessary, how we would wage a war involving tactical nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the
strategic concepts that Hayward and Cockell developed dealt with the role of conven-
tional forces in a global war against the Soviet Union; it did not include a consideration
of nuclear strategic forces or of contingencies involving other nations and areas.6
Flag Officers’ Conferences on Strategy
In the spring of 1979, Admiral Hayward began to circulate his “Strategic Concepts.”
Among other approaches, he asked Rear Admiral Leland S. Kollmorgen, Director,
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System Analysis Division (OP-96) to arrange a briefing for flag officers and to have a
discussion with them. Five eight-hour seminars were held at the U.S. Naval Academy
during the period between 7–11 May 1979. Each was chaired by an admiral or vice ad-
miral and attended by 12 to 20 rear admirals, involving a total of about 100 flag officers
from the Washington, D.C. area. In September–October 1979, similar sets of meetings
were held in Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego. The purpose of these meetings was
to collect opinions and insights concerning both the CNO’s strategic principles and the
state of the navy.7
The results of these conferences demonstrated that flag officers throughout the navy
were seriously concerned about the long-term trends and doubted that the United
States could maintain its strength in the future. As one officer expressed it:
Given the money situation, ship and aircraft levels are going to fall. We’re going to get
a lot smaller while the Soviets are going to be more capable. Our business-as-usual
approach is not hacking it. We keep projecting we’re going to get well through big
bucks in the out-years. So we take marginal cuts across the board each budget year
and kid ourselves about the cumulative effects by projecting large growth in funny-
money out-year programs. It’s time to get serious, take some painful vertical cuts and
give up, or at least seriously reduce some missions.8
Yet, there seemed no agreement about how to reduce, or which programs to trade off.
The only common thread in the discussion was that too much emphasis was being
given to convoy protection for a long war, given Defense Department priority on a
short war and the relative strength of the NATO allies in the convoy escort role. Over
all, the general organization of the navy for strategy and procurement appeared to be in
disarray to many flag officers. The OpNav staff seemed too busy, too large, and accom-
plishing too little, while only a few people, the CNO, the Vice CNO, OP-06, and OP-090
saw the overall view of the navy. Most believed that better integration was needed.
In considering the CNO’s strategic concepts, most flag officers liked the idea of a set of
principles that could provide rallying concepts for the navy, but they felt that the U.S.
goal was naval superiority. This was a point upon which Hayward was in agreement,
and the one that he made a central theme in his initial posture statement, submitted to
Congress in January 1979. The principles that Hayward had provided were a step in the
right direction, but they did not represent a complete theory. As a group, the flag offi-
cers felt that naval strategy should not start with a focus on a future NATO war but on
the basic geographical fact that the United States is tied to a forward defense strategy,
by culture, by trade, and by historical association to a set of nations in Europe and in
Asia. “We seek an international balance of power, not just the defense of a region. If the
United States is to be a world power and maintain links to Europe, she must control
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the sea when and where needed. Thus, naval superiority relates to perception in peace-
time and performance in crisis, as much as it does to deterrence of a world war.”9
Most flag officers agreed that a NATO war would be a global war. A few pointed out
that it would be in the best interest of the Soviet Union to limit the war to the area in
which it would be strongest, but the rejoinder to that observation was that the U.S.
Navy could counter this by retaining the option of opening other theaters should it be
in our best interest to do so. Basic national policy required forward deployment of na-
val forces, which had been done for many years. But these objectives had not been pub-
licly stated by the State Department and other agencies so that the navy appeared to be
using forward deployment merely as an excuse to build forces. The flag officers be-
lieved this should be changed. They emphasized that the public needed to perceive that
the navy was responding to policy requirements.
All flag officers agreed that offensive capabilities for the navy were required. Because of
the need for two battle fleets to operate in five theaters (Norwegian Sea, Atlantic, Medi-
terranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific), many argued that the U.S. Navy must
have a strong offensive capability in order to defeat the Soviets in one region, then shift
to defeat them in another. However, as one participant in the Annapolis seminar noted,
naval forces were essentially irrelevant if the national policy was limited to planning for
a 30-day-long Central Front war in Germany. There was very little function for the
navy in a short, nuclear, land war. The navy’s major value lay in conducting a longer
war with conventional weapons, employing forces in ways that caused the Soviets to di-
vert resources from the Central Front. This concept of a future war was not at all what
current national policy expressed. Most participants agreed that the CNO’s strategic
concepts could be rejected on these grounds, as they implied costs which clearly ex-
ceeded their worth in terms of national policy. Therefore, several participants pointed
out that the navy must discuss its strategic perceptions more thoroughly with the Joint
Chiefs and in the office of the Secretary of Defense to bring the options which the navy
could provide into a direct reflection of national policy. From Hayward’s point of view,
this reasoning had the issues backward. His point was that national policy was nonexis-
tent, and that was the situation that needed to be changed.
In the discussions, all the flag officer participants understood that in dealing with So-
viet superiority in numbers, it was a matter of meeting it with U.S. and Allied quality.
However, many felt that there was a need for more precision of expression, since in na-
val warfare, like forces do not fight like forces. Many expressed concern that the Soviets
could, under current rules of engagement, make an effective surprise attack using
weapons that would be of much less use once a war was well underway. However, all
agreed that it was necessary to exploit Soviet disadvantages.10
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Some participants in the discussion expressed strong skepticism that the concept of
utilizing the capabilities of the Allies and other U.S. services could be relied upon for a
significant contribution to navy needs. The other American services were viewed as be-
ing so overcommitted that they had to give low priority to naval missions. Some felt
that the Allies lagged behind the United States in capabilities by 5–10 years in ASW and
perhaps by more than that as Aegis became an effective antimissile defense. The NATO
trend had been to increase land forces and decrease sea forces, and this had been com-
pounded by the reluctance of the United States to transfer new technology to the Allies,
because we feared compromising our capabilities and wished to reduce costs by pro-
curing one-of-a-kind items. Since the Allies had largely moved toward convoy escorts,
we had already planned to utilize their capabilities; however, the U.S. Navy remained
America’s worldwide instrument of naval power and must, therefore, retain indepen-
dent capabilities. In general, the participants felt “that this principle may be a politically
necessary nod toward Washington or DoD sensitivities. But it doesn’t count for much
in the real world.”11
In addition, there was great skepticism among the flag offices that the U.S. Navy could
fight a war on short notice, with existing forces. Most agreed that U.S. supply levels in
1979 were not sufficient. “Like a Greek chorus, the flag officers in the fleet kept saying,
don’t try it—you won’t like the results.”12
Combined with skepticism about supplies, many saw the idea of employing the navy
with calculated risk as merely a means of offsetting criticism the navy was planning for
some impossible mission, such as sailing into the Barents Sea on D-day. Some pointed
out that when the idea of calculated risk was combined with the current rules of en-
gagement, it would encourage timid behavior and defensive attitudes in peacetime.
Since the U.S. Navy would fight in war as it had trained in peace, there were those who
felt that this strategic concept could be counterproductive.
Hayward was pleased with the lively reaction of the flag community and felt that if they
had accomplished nothing else, the symposia served the useful purpose of stimulating
constructive thought about naval strategy in a community of officers not accustomed
to thinking about such subjects. While recognizing that the response from the flag offi-
cers covered a wide range of diverse viewpoints, Hayward felt it was generally suggestive
of the direction in which he was trying to take the navy. He encouraged flag officers to
write to him directly with their thoughts on strategy and related topics, an invitation
which a number of them accepted.13
Reinforced by the flag community response, Hayward continued to use his strategic
concepts as the basis for thinking about naval force. He gave briefings to Congress, to
the Joint Chiefs, the Defense Science Board, the CNO Executive Panel as well as other
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groups, and used the concepts as the basis for the first part of his annual Posture State-
ment to Congress. An unclassified version was published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s
Naval Review 1979 in an article by Hayward entitled, “The Future of U.S. Sea Power.”14
Drafted for Hayward by Captain William Cockell, the article was based on Hayward’s
unclassified Congressional Testimony, but cast in a new format. It was, as Cockell later
described it, “some simply stated principles . . . simple, not simplistic, and simple, by
design.”15 It lacked the sophistication and depth of the classified version, but the article
did express Hayward’s basic concepts on how to think about naval force. For the read-
ers of the Naval Review, Hayward made his point clear: classical naval theory is still
valid. Among those who commented on the article, William S. Lind, legislative assistant
to Senator Gary Hart, wrote “it signals a turn away from the historically French objec-
tives of power projection and sea control and a return to Mahanist outlook.”16 Ap-
plauding that trend, Lind pointed out that, in his view, it was still no justification for
building more aircraft carriers. Captain R. A. Bowling, U.S. Navy (Ret.), viewed the sit-
uation from the opposite side when he declared that Hayward had clearly demon-
strated that “. . . debunked Mahanian concepts are being applied in the U.S. Navy
today.”17 But Captain W. J. Ruhe retorted, “Today’s reality shows that Mahan is not ob-
solete.”18 Some academic observers, however, found this entire discussion far too sim-
plistic. Dr. Thomas H. Etzold of the Naval War College suggested that much of this
discussion rested on inadequate familiarity with Mahan’s writings. “There is also a ten-
dency to discuss the question of Mahan’s validity in current naval contexts too much
on its own terms,” Etzold wrote, and “to search for direct analogies and mechanical ap-
plication of concepts from another technological and political era.”19
Recognizing that Mahan and other classic writings on naval strategy are indispensable
to our own understanding, Etzold concluded, “we need to do better than he did in
thinking through the purpose of any given war as a whole.20
Bureaucratic Refinements
While Hayward’s strategic concepts were being discussed in various fora, the CNO was
directly concerned with making some organizational changes within the navy that
could assist the navy’s leaders in thinking about strategy. First, he wanted to establish a
focal point within the navy staff for discussions on the broad aspects of naval warfare.
In order to do this, in mid-January 1980, Hayward changed OP-095 from the Anti-
Submarine Warfare Directorate to the Directorate of Naval Warfare. The idea behind
this move was to create a directorate that could coordinate the work of the various
platform sponsors, the Deputy CNOs for Air, Submarine, and Surface Warfare, and to
be sympathetic to them while at the same time being the main contact point for the
fleet commanders and their concerns for future war-fighting developments.21 Much of
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the work of OP-095 dealt necessarily with the integration of the various program
plans, but under its first director, Vice Admiral Kinnard R. McKee, it developed a direct
link to strategic thinking. From his viewpoint, a starting point for assessment in the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process is a realistic examination of how the
navy would be used in a future war. In order to do this, McKee also needed to coordi-
nate his work with the Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations (OP-06). Here,
Hayward had established the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division (OP-65),
under Rear Admiral Powell F. Carter, to be the central point of contact for policy and
planning for nuclear warfare. More importantly, the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603)
was soon to become the key office in responding to OP-095’s need to coordinate the
Navy’s Program Planning process with concepts for future plans and policy. The
briefing, which OP-603 prepared for OP-095 to use in this process of coordination,
was what later became known as The Maritime Strategy. This line of development is
followed, in further detail, in chapter four of this study.
Hayward saw another need within the navy staff. For many years the navy had under-
taken long-range planning, and the various groups which had undertaken this work
had varying degrees of success and influence on naval policy.22 In January 1980, Hayward
established the Long Range Planning Group (OP-00X), under Rear Admiral Charles R.
Larson on the CNO’s personal staff, and this group reported directly to Hayward. The
group was designed to be a permanent fixture on the CNO’s staff and to have the same
administrative status as the CNO Executive Panel of outside experts, which had been
established exactly a decade earlier by Admiral Zumwalt. A small group of highly quali-
fied officers, OP-00X, took as its mission the assessment of resource limitations on future
naval capabilities and the analysis of alternative strategies for achieving long-range goals.
The Long Range Planning Group had an important area to consider, but Hayward saw
that there was still another aspect of strategic thinking that needed to be carefully ex-
amined: the interplay between strategy and tactics. In order to deal with this aspect,
Hayward wanted to break away from the program planning process that seemed to
dominate so much of the navy’s thinking and to focus on a realistic and effective strat-
egy for fighting at sea. Hayward wanted to form a group made up of extremely capable
and successful naval officers with recent fleet experience, and who themselves would
be the future leaders of the navy, to work toward this new strategy. In the area of tac-
tics, Hayward created Tactical Training Groups in the two fleets to train senior officers—
flag officers, captains and commanders—en route operational commands in naval tac-
tics and the broad issues of force employment. This initiative was a very important one
in raising senior officer sensitivity and professionalism in tactics. Hayward saw the
need for a similar approach for strategy.23
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The CNO Strategic Studies Group Formed
As a leader, Hayward thrived on the interplay of sharply divergent views, and he wanted a
variety of sources and viewpoints to assist him. He felt that no one group had a mo-
nopoly of wisdom, and for that reason he did not want to replace any group but in-
stead chose to create another to fill a gap in perspective, which he felt was missing in
the range of views expressed collectively by the OpNav staff, the CNO Executive Panel,
and others. At the same time, Hayward had two parallel interests: to create a core of fu-
ture naval leaders who were well versed in the role of naval forces in national policy
and strategy and to reestablish the Naval War College, in everyone’s view, as the pinna-
cle for education in naval strategic thinking. As Hayward told the Current Strategy Fo-
rum at the Naval War College in April 1981, “there is no dearth of strategic thinking
going on these days in your navy. What is lacking is a more useful way to capitalize
upon that abundant talent with more alacrity.”24 As a step in this direction, Hayward
announced the establishment of “a prestigious Center for Naval Warfare Studies” at the
Naval War College. Along with this, he announced “the creation of a small but impres-
sive cell . . . a group of the best and brighter of our military officers.” Making his point
clear, Hayward declared, “Our objective is to make this Naval War College respected
around the globe as the residence of the finest maritime strategic logic of our time. A
related objective is to provide the Chief of Naval Operations and our senior military
officers with stimuli relative to strategy and tactics in order to make certain that re-
gardless of the perception of those less informed, our navy will never, never be found
‘sailing backwards.’”25
In selecting the first group of officers for the Strategic Studies Group, Hayward re-
ceived nominations from a wide variety of sources within the navy, and then he per-
sonally reviewed the service jackets of candidates, spending hours on them in an
attempt to find the men he felt would certainly be the best future choices for flag
rank.26 The first director of the Strategic Studies Group and the first director of the
newly established Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College was
Robert J. Murray, then just leaving office as Under Secretary of the navy. The Strategic
Studies Group was designed to be one element of an organization that included ele-
ments brought together from several parts of the Naval War College: the Advanced Re-
search Department, the Naval War College Press, and the Naval War Gaming Department.
Although the Strategic Studies Group reported directly to the CNO, it was located in
Newport in order to take advantage of the academic atmosphere and resources at the
Naval War College and to use the distance from Washington as insulation from the bu-
reaucratic traumas of Pentagon life. “In July 1981, nobody knew what the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies was to be, including me, . . .” Murray recalled. “There was noth-
ing that we could call all encompassing as to how the navy would operate in war. We
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didn’t even have a system for producing such a concept.”27 In thinking about the prob-
lem, Murray saw that a coherent strategy could not be developed in isolation at the
Naval War College. What was needed was “kibitzing,” talking to responsible admirals
and generals, testing ideas, meshing their ideas with others, and “murder boards” for
concepts. Through this process, Murray saw that everyone could have a stake in the is-
sues discussed and that, most importantly, the process could spawn broad ideas that
could merge narrow concepts together. As the process developed, Murray saw that it
was not a question of gaining recognition or glory for one element within the navy, but
to eliminate parochialism and to find some consensus, not only about how several
parts of the navy would work together in wartime, but how the navy would fit within
the broader context of national strategy.28
In thinking about how to approach the work that the Strategic Studies Group would
do, Murray considered carefully the example of previous groups and examined the
process by which a strategy is adopted within the U.S. armed forces. He saw that others
had failed for one or more of a number of reasons:29
• Poor-quality people.
• Insufficient contacts with influential and responsible people.
• Failure to have an integrated effort.
• Failure to do the legwork in getting the correct input.
• Too involved with the budget process.
• Not being in tune with the concerns of key players.
• Too diverse an effort.
• Parochial in outlook.
• Failure to have a marketing approach.
• Failure to be heard by key people.
• Too much time expended in research.
Murray believed that the Strategic Studies Group could not be all things to all people.
One needed to pick one’s opportunities and focus, while at the same time using tie-ins
with other institutions, such as those with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Naval
Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College. At the same time, the Group needed
to systemize war-gaming results into a body of analysis. Next, he was convinced that it
was essential that the Group produce something concrete, not just roam off working
on a nebulous project. Murray clearly saw that writing up the study would help to clar-
ify the group’s thinking, focus the effort, and limit the range of subjects dealt with.30
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From this work, briefings could be developed that reflected the careful in-depth, ana-
lytical rigor imposed by a written study.
In choosing a topic, Murray wanted something upon which a general consensus could
be developed and which could be used to say something about how the navy could be
used. In addition, Murray wanted the Strategic Studies Group to travel and to talk di-
rectly with the key military and naval commanders. In order to do this, he needed a
topic of importance and of direct interest. Fighting the Soviet Union in the event of a
future world war was certainly such a topic, but even that topic was so broad and so
complex that it could not be dealt with effectively by a single group in one year of
study. From the outset, Murray saw that the issues must be dealt with sequentially and
over a period of years.31
The first Strategic Studies Group assembled in Newport, R.I. on 31 August 1981. It
consisted of Lt. Col. Richard P. Bland, USMC; Cdr. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN; Capt.
Franklin D. Julian, USN; Capt. Stuart D. Landersman, USN; Capt. Rene W. Leeds,
USN; Cdr. William A. Owens, USN; Col. Joseph D. Ruane, USMC; and Capt. Daniel J.
Wolkensdorfer, USN. Assisting Murray on the staff were Professor Thomas Etzold,
Lt. Col. Orville E. Hay, USMC, and Cdr. Kenneth McGruther, USN. Starting with an in-
tense indoctrination schedule, the Group moved quickly through a series of readings,
briefings, and lectures from Naval War College faculty, and at the same time, defining in
the first ten days the work that they would undertake. In developing this plan, Murray
and his staff suggested two key areas for work: A near-term offensive strategy and an
offensive strategy of the future. After considering the issues in detail, the Group devel-
oped an initial topic and then began a series of discussions in Washington and with the
major commanders in chief. Meeting with the CNO on 19 October, Admiral Hayward
told the Group that there was a lack of strategic thinking even at the fleet commanders
level. Hayward told them that he wanted the Strategic Studies Group to fill the void
and to convince the leadership of the armed forces that the navy is thinking and that
the Naval War College is the place for that thinking. In viewing the Washington scene,
Hayward believed that there was a need for global perspective in looking at a possible
war with the Soviet Union, one that was not oriented toward SIOP. He felt quite
strongly that no sensible strategy had been developed. “There was no imagination,” he
said, “but only reaction.” Even OP-603, the Strategic Concepts Branch in the navy staff,
was only “crashing for tomorrow.” What Hayward wanted was not an instantly created
strategy, but a well-framed understanding of the issues with possible resolutions. With
these ideas available, Hayward wanted to market them to fleet staffs and through the
operational chain of command, in an effort to impact the two-star level and up. In par-
ticular, he wanted three and four-star officers themselves to think about strategy and
not to be trapped by OP-plans. Hayward believed that flag officers in general had a
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tendency to wait for Washington to take the initiative, and he believed that they should
be operating more independently and innovatively in the area of strategy. This was why
he had gone to such lengths earlier to involve the flag community in the preparation of
his Strategic Concepts. In conducting his discussion with the Strategic Studies Group,
Hayward told them to consider carefully the uncertainties involved in thinking about
future strategies and to think in decisive terms, not gradual ones. It was not a question
of formulating a strategy to give a signal but to achieve broader strategic aims. “We can
afford a war of attrition,” he told them. “Don’t be timid.”32
The Ambiance for Strategic Thinking in 1981
The Strategic Studies Group did not operate in a vacuum. Its first mission was to edu-
cate itself in the strategic thinking of the day and to move forward, unencumbered by
the friction of bureaucracy, to stimulate flag officers who held positions of responsibil-
ity for executing strategy in wartime. In the 1970s, one of the characteristic problems
of the naval bureaucracy was the way in which it tended to isolate thought within cer-
tain communities within the navy, preventing the exchange of views that was a neces-
sary prerequisite to the formation of a generally accepted opinion. Like the Naval
Warfare Directorate with the navy staff, the Strategic Studies Group was designed to try
to surmount the natural and artificial barriers to a free exchange of thinking that had
developed over the years. In many ways, the Strategic Studies Group acted like a small
swarm of honeybees, migrating from one flag officer to another, discussing issues, ex-
changing views, and carrying the pollen of stimulating thought from one widely sepa-
rated command to another. Charged as they were with thinking, in global terms, about
how to win a future conventional war with the Soviet Union, the viewpoints that they
carried were so different from what had previously been heard, that they shocked some
listeners. As Captain Rene Leeds recounted, “the first reaction was to shoot the messen-
ger.”33 However, once the initial defensive reaction was overcome, a fruitful exchange of
opinion developed that was both educational and constructive.
The various viewpoints that were expressed to the Strategic Studies Group were impor-
tant factors in bringing those ideas directly into the forefront of strategic perceptions
within the Navy Department. At Marine Corps Headquarters, for example, the Group
was told it would get strong support for its approach and goals. Looking at the issues,
Major General Bernard Trainor advised that future naval operations must include use
of all appropriate U.S. forces and must integrate the Air Force into naval operations,
thereby preventing the Air Force from assuming control of naval tasks. In OpNav, Vice
Admiral Gordon Nagler, Director, Command and Control (OP-094), advised that the
Soviets were most vulnerable due to centralization of command and control, while the
United States was very dependent upon communication and was weak in the area of
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interconnectivity. In the Office of Naval Warfare, Vice Admiral Kinnard McKee advised
the Group that naval strategy could be attempted without national strategy and em-
phasized his view that there is only one principle of war: concentration of force. Rear
Admiral William R. Smedberg IV, the Director of the Force Level Plans Division,
pointed out that in reality, we are driven in our strategy by what we can build, due to
fiscal constraints, and then we devise how we can best fight with what is provided. But
McKee responded that despite that, the navy should press for a naval strategy in isola-
tion from political and fiscal constraints. Vice Admiral Robert Walters, Deputy CNO
for Surface Warfare (OP-03) reminded the Group that one year is too short a time to
finish the development of a complete strategy. Fully supporting the work of the SSG,
Walters thought that its approach to strategy was correct and that it was on the proper
course of development. He pointed out that the Reagan administration laid great stress
on the necessity to have sustainability in a long war as opposed to the Carter adminis-
tration’s stress on short war. This change, however, had not yet been reflected in a fleet
organization that emphasized fighting capabilities. In developing a strategy to go along
with this, Walters said that risk acceptance must be weighed.
Some of the most important issues that the SSG faced were brought clearly into focus
in discussions with various officers in OP-06. Echoing early advice, one planner asked
the Group whether the SSG might “develop strategy in a vacuum” unless it first had a
good understanding of national goals, national strategy, vital interests, and so forth,
which are “inherently squishy.” In response, Vice Admiral Sylvester Foley defended the
SSG’s position by pointing out that in any war, the role of the U.S. Navy was to first
“take care” of the Soviet Navy. Therefore, the goal of the United States is “maritime su-
premacy” through defeating “the next-best navy.” The Strategic Studies Group is right,
Foley said. Approaching the issue from another angle, Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth, Di-
rector of the Political Military Policy Branch (OP-61) asked the Group whether it
would not be more useful to focus on strategy for lesser situations, the ones that we
could expect to have to deal with every day rather than for the less likely event of a gen-
eral war. Kurth’s deputy, however, supported the SSG’s approach by pointing out that
one had to be sure to be able to deal with the Soviet Navy—or the United States would
not be able to maintain itself as the best navy and, therefore, could not maintain
American maritime superiority.34
The various visits and discussions continued throughout the year for the Strategic
Studies Group. As they became acquainted with the various segments of American na-
val thinking, they also learned about the Soviet Navy. As they became aware of the gen-
eral trend in Soviet naval developments and strategic thought (see pp. 23–36), they
were concerned primarily with how they would fare in a war with the Soviets. A key in-
fluence on the SSG’s thinking in this regard was the work of the Navy Net Assessor. In a
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briefing to the SSG in Newport, Captain W. H. J. Manthorpe reflected the latest intelli-
gence analysis when he told them:
• Overall the Soviet Navy outnumbers the U.S. Navy 3.5 to 1.
• In open ocean warfare, the Soviets still have an advantage by 1.8 to 1.
• The quality of the two navies appears about equal.
• The Soviet advantage lies in frigates and conventional submarines, while a signifi-
cant portion of the U.S. Navy open-ocean tonnage is in aircraft carriers, amphibious
ships, and supply vessels.
• The U.S. Navy is well poised for dealing with crises without warning, but the Soviet
Navy can “outsurge” the U.S. Navy within 4 to 5 days, to a ratio of 1.6 to 1.
• Sheer numbers suggest that if the U.S. Navy is to operate close to Eurasia, it will need
the support of NATO’s naval force, including France, in order to have the potential
for equal strength.
In short, Manthorpe stressed to the Group that the two navies were so equally matched
that it was no longer possible for mere brute force to count. The key factors in a war
were how the forces would be used, what allies, missions, and force multipliers em-
ployed, and who shoots first. The areas of critical importance will be initiative, sur-
prise, and analysis of weakness. In this the SSG had a role in initiating the process of
navy-wide thinking on how the U.S. Navy would be used in a war against the Soviets.35
In considering naval strategy, the influence of political leaders also played a key role. In
office less than six months, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman met with the SSG for a
luncheon. During the course of their meeting, Lehman told them that the driving con-
sideration behind development of the 600-ship navy was geographical, not war-time
specific. In addition, the basic measure must be of the war-time capabilities of the So-
viet Navy with the demand of naval presence and crisis operations as lesser included
cases. A key factor in developing the U.S. Navy is to ensure that the rest of the world
perceives that the U.S. Navy is capable of coping with the Soviet threat to American in-
terests. In Lehman’s view, 600 ships was a minimum to support the 15 carriers that are
required for dealing with the geopolitical situation.
In looking at naval strategy in this early period of his administration, Lehman saw that
there was too broad a gap between naval operations and the “armchair strategists.” He
believed that the navy needed coherent and institutionalized thinking about how a
600-ship navy could be used. Those ships and weapons are only tools, he emphasized,
the question is “how do you fight with what you are going to get?” The creative think-
ing that had already been done dealt with peacetime crises, not war, Lehman believed.
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We need to raise a generation of warrior admirals, he told the Group, not program
managers. We need to focus on the battle of, say, the Norwegian Sea, rather than the
battle of the budget. As Lehman himself thought about a maritime strategy for the
United States, he believed that any war between the United States and the Soviet Union
would be a global one. As he looked at different regions, he thought that the United
States should cut back its sights in terms of how much should be invested in the Per-
sian Gulf area during a major U.S.-USSR war. He felt that it would be a great mistake
to be overly involved in a ground war in that region, even if the oil resources were
closed off without a U.S. presence in southwest Asia. With less than 500 ships, Lehman
believed that the United States could not fight a global war, but would have to abandon
one or more key areas and allies. In this situation the Soviets would be readily able to
block later attempts by the United States to reenter the areas it had abandoned. In sum-
mation, Lehman remarked that it was conceivable that the United States could lose the
battle for Europe and still not lose the war, but it was inconceivable that the United
States could lose at sea and avoid losing the war.36
Another important influence on the development of the Strategic Studies Group’s
thinking came from its early decision to use war gaming as one of its key analytical
tools. First, the Strategic Studies Group used the advantage of being at the Naval War
College in close contact with the War Gaming Department. Several staff members in
the newly formed Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Professor Etzold, Commander
McGruther and Lieutenant Colonel Hay, had been closely involved with the Global War
Games, which had been started in 1979 through the initiative of Captain Hugh Nott,
Commander Jay Hurlburt, and Professor Francis J. West, Jr.
The Global War Games were created to identify issues that required attention in plan-
ning a global strategy. Their purpose was to gain a better understanding of those na-
tional command authority decisions that were needed early on in a global war. In
addition, the games sought to consider the issues involved in escalation, the relation-
ship among regional requirements, constraints created by logistics factors, and the ef-
fects of varying strategy during a war. Professor Richmond Lloyd described the Global
War Game as “a jellyfish with all its ganglia hanging down for everyone to look at and
examine,” and Bud Hay suggested further that “it exposes the bad with the good, our
weaknesses along with our strengths. The good guys don’t always win, the bad guys
aren’t always ten feet tall and there are a lot more guys who don’t like either the good
guys or the bad guys.”37 By the time the first Strategic Studies Group assembled in New-
port in the summer of 1981, three Global War Games had been played and insights had
already been established along the very same perspective that the SSG wished to ex-
plore. The war games provide insights along many avenues of thought at the matrix of
world events, military capabilities, and technical boundaries. Reflections on the games
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varied from individual to individual. For Fred Ikle, the experience of the first Global
Game in 1979 led him to conclude that:
Short of a concept for victory, the overarching concept that is needed is some idea
about the assets that the United States and the Alliance should protect or secure, so as
to terminate the fighting and to prevail in the long drawn-out competition that would
follow a cease-fire.38
In the following year, another participant concluded, “the game tended to bear out that
command of the seas tends after all to be a zero sum matter, and that for a maritime
nation such as the U.S., command of the seas is the sine qua non for a ‘forward strategy’
in any type of war.”39 Another participant in the same game concluded that the United
States needed a large, high-quality strike capability for an extended campaign. “This is
where Navy can play,” he concluded, “because submarines, warships, and other vessels
can be survivable in general war and can have the firepower and endurance necessary
to continue the fight.”40
By the spring of 1981, the themes that had been developed in the early Global War
Games were beginning to be echoed in Washington. The Secretary of Defense’s Policy
and Capabilities Review concluded in April–June 1981 that planning for a global war
required a new pattern of thinking that developed an integrated regional approach,
with revised strategy and force priorities. Offensive combinations of force were needed
to exploit vulnerabilities and to unbalance Soviet strategy. In this, anti-SSBN opera-
tions, anti-LRA/SNA, and ASAT appeared to be promising. In considering a global war,
it would be important, however, to deny the Soviets means of escalating the conflict.
This would be a key factor in controlling the war to the advantage of the United States,
keeping it global, but conventional. Investing in conventional force will in the longer
run have a higher payoff than nuclear forces. Prolonging the war by keeping it a con-
ventional war offers the advantage of improving the U.S. industrial defense base. This
policy will be long, hard, and expensive, involving many government agencies, but the
change to an offensive conventional capability and increased force structure would re-
sult in changes to the strategic balance over time, emphasizing American flexibility,
mobility, and sustainability, the Review concluded.41
In the fall of 1981, the Strategic Studies Group was able to reflect on the major insights
that had emerged from the first three Global War Games. The Naval War College staff
summarized them as follows:42
• Strategic lift and allies’ consent are all-essential to U.S. flexibility.
• In a global war, Southwest Asia winds up as a strategic backwater.
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• Naval force may offer the sole means of getting at core Soviet vulnerabilities short of
intercontinental missiles.
• Need to consider the “value added” of naval forces in getting out of a Central Front
syndrome and to think about how to win wars.
• U.S. power plays more heavily in longer wars:
º but early force employment serves deterrence and helps reassure allies.
º results in a critical dichotomy in how to use the navy in the early days of a war.
º initial rules of engagement are critical to survivability.
• Escalation aspects need to be part of all systematic thinking:
º U.S./NATO “first use” concept is to deny Soviets political advantage.
º Adverse perceptions of the nuclear balance constrain options at all levels.
º “Tit-for-tat” escalation usually works to Blue’s disadvantage.
The Strategic Studies Group began its own series of seminar war games as a means to
develop further insights. During two games in October and November 1981, they ex-
amined current war plans cumulatively to determine current naval war-fighting capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities in a global war. These games reinforced the idea that a
long-war strategy warranted attention in the overall American strategic approach. In
addition to preventing the Soviets from winning by an early move or foreclosing the
option for Western rearmament, the games suggested that long-term strategy would
compound Soviet calculations for the correlation of forces in the early period of a war
and increase the uncertainty for them in taking any dramatic or destabilizing moves
that could cause the United States to begin to move toward a major wartime produc-
tion effort. “However,” the Group noted, a long-war strategy is “expensive, politically
dangerous on both a domestic and international basis, and has substantial warfighting
shortfalls.” In the course of the game, the SSG members noted that they had not yet as-
certained how the navy could make a strategic difference. At the outset of their work,
they could see that the navy provided support to the land battle and secured the
sea-lanes of communication over which reinforcements and resupply must pass. “But
is that enough?” they asked. It still left the navy in the role of supporting ground forces
in an attrition war on a single front. “It still needs to be asked whether there might not
be some better way to influence the outcome than merely [by] helping the Army to lose
more slowly.”43 In making that observation, they determined that the most important
aspect of their work was to seek “a maritime strategy that subsumes the continental
strategic approach embodied in the Central Front focus.” Viewed regionally, they saw
that the development of strategic objectives by which the navy could make a difference
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might include the ability to operate with relative impunity in the upper reaches of the
Norwegian Sea, against Soviet SSBNs, and against the Balkan industrial base from the
Eastern Mediterranean.44 About this same time, SSG staff member Commander Kenneth
McGruther reflected on the issues involved in a draft memo entitled, The Essence of Stra-
tegic Thinking. “We must continuously reinforce in the Soviet mind the perception that
it could not win a war with the United States, both before a war, to enhance deterrence,
and at all phases of the war should it occur,” McGruther wrote. “The key point here is
that the desired prospect must be as perceived and measured in Soviet terms.”45 The basic
issue, as he had summarized it, was to take the defeat of Soviet strategy as the central
frame of reference for American military strategy rather than to derive a strategy from
American national interests alone.
As each succeeding group of officers worked within the Strategic Studies Group, it de-
veloped and refined a progressively better articulation of the nature of the Soviet threat
and a more coherent approach for using naval forces to achieve national aims. Each
group found the need to examine the best use of all national resources to understand
the role of naval forces, putting the navy in the forefront of thinking about joint and
combined strategy. The first Strategic Studies Group established the basic tenets and
conceptual feasibility of a forward maritime strategy, focusing on Soviet missions and
sensitivities, and using a theater-wide combined arms approach to exploit Western ad-
vantages. The first Strategic Studies Group developed a concept for a forward Maritime
Strategy, which they explained in the following way:
A U.S. Maritime Strategy of Forward Area Power Projection
Naval forces can contribute to deterring the start of war and, deterrence failing, to ter-
minating war with the Soviet Union on terms favorable to the United States and its al-
lies through a maritime strategy of forward area power projection.46 Whereas naval
forces are currently intended to achieve sea control in the Atlantic and the Pacific in or-
der to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to Europe and Asia, a naval
strategy that projected forces quickly into forward areas on multiple fronts would not
only protect those lines of communication but would also upset the Soviets’ war-fighting
calculations, help break their concentration on the Central Front, and frustrate their
ambitions for swift victory.
The purpose of this forward naval strategy is, first, to deter war by convincing the So-
viet Union, in political circumstances leading toward war, that a successful combat out-
come would be uncertain or unlikely and, therefore, an attempt would be unwarranted;
second, in war, to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its naval objectives, thereby
encouraging an early end to hostilities; and, third, to ensure that at fighting’s end,
whatever the outcome, there remain afloat no significant Soviet naval forces able to
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threaten the United States and its surviving allies or to protect Soviet shores for years
to come.
Although subject to some political constraints, this is a strategy that begins with the
rapid placement of forces capable of slowing or halting Soviet expansion inside the So-
viet defensive arcs prior to the start of hostilities. The positioning of these forces is sup-
ported by intensive surveillance of Soviet force movements to ensure that Soviet
actions are consistent with the estimate of Soviet intentions used as the premise for this
strategy. Intensive surveillance also demonstrates an intention to assume the initial en-
gagements at the start of war. These actions will cause the Soviet calculations to predict
a worse and more uncertain outcome than if the actions were not taken and, therefore,
will have a deterrent effect.
Should the USSR continue along the path to war, U.S. and NATO forces would be posi-
tioned both to prevent Soviet/Warsaw Pact expansion on the maritime flanks and to
destroy promptly the ships and aircraft of the Soviet Navy while they are still close to
their home waters and fields. Victories in the initial stages of the war are extremely im-
portant for solidifying alliances and for convincing allies that they are on the winning
side. The visible loss of major Soviet surface ships early in the war is important not only
to NATO but also in the Pacific, where China and Japan may be watching carefully for
U.S. successes. In addition, the loss of these major surface ships should impress Soviet
allies. Moreover, their loss will be a loss to the Soviets themselves of strategic early warn-
ing, command and control, air defense, and antisubmarine defense of strategic forces.
The SSG then went on to discuss, at a higher classification, the stepped up antisubma-
rine warfare campaign in forward areas that would follow the removal of Soviet surface
vessels. This included an option to attack Soviet SSBNs with conventional weapons
from U.S. and British nuclear submarines. The SSG believed that losses in Soviet SSBNs
would affect the Soviets’ calculation of forces required for nuclear war fighting and
shake their confidence in the stability of their strategic nuclear forces. While the Soviets
seemed to expect to lose some SSBNs, the key issue is the rate at which those losses
would occur. Slow attrition would not affect their calculations, but a high attrition be-
fore the nuclear threshold was approached would tend to raise that threshold even fur-
ther as the Soviets calculated that they could not “win” in an exchange of nuclear
weapons. It would seem that the Soviets would choose to terminate a war if a signifi-
cant portion of their SSBNs were sunk—unless they believed that the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union was being seriously threatened.
Stripping the surface and anticarrier submarine forces from the Soviets would leave
their flanks vulnerable and forestall any sizeable sortie on their part into the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. Placing U.S. and allied air defense aircraft at bases on the flanks
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would limit Soviet naval and long-range aviation approaches to carrier battle groups;
placing U.S. and allied attack aircraft at the same bases would present a threat that the
Soviets could not ignore. This should cause them to divert resources to attack these
bases with consequent attrition of their air armies.
At the same time, the SSG pointed out that the anti-SSBN campaign, the U.S., British,
and French SSBNs remained a “redundancy of resolve” to use nuclear weapons, giving
further doubts to Soviet calculations on their ability to go on the offensive.
Faced with (1) the rapid deployment of forces that are stronger than anticipated, (2)
aggressive land and sea defense that slows their expansion on the flanks, (3) stripped
naval and air defenses that leave the Soviet homeland threatened, and (4) loss of strate-
gic nuclear systems to conventional forces without any ability to retaliate in kind, it is
anticipated that the Soviets would seek war termination prior to increasingly intensive
assaults by Marines and CVBGs on the Soviet flanks and not risk nuclear war.
The SSG concluded its statement of the overall strategic concept by noting that this
proposed naval strategy did not pretend that war can be deterred or won by naval
forces alone. The war will be essentially lost if the Central Front does not hold. Naval
achievements, although great in themselves, may well prove insufficient should the So-
viet Union be able, or think herself able, to achieve a quick and overwhelming victory
on the Central Front. Even though it is likely to continue longer, war games and studies
indicate that the war will probably be decided in the first 20 days. The resupply of Eu-
rope cannot be conducted within 20 days. A successful national strategy, therefore, will
have strong conventional ground and air components that can hold at least long
enough for the maritime pressure on the flanks to make a difference.
Looking into the application of the strategy, the SSG concluded that there was one the-
ater in which the major missions of the Soviet Navy in protecting its strategic naval
forces (SSBNs) and attacking U.S. and allied strategic naval forces (carriers and SSBNs)
are carried out simultaneously. This is in the Norwegian Sea. The northern tier of Eu-
rope also is the most sensitive for the Soviets, because it provides direct access to the
Soviet heartland. After careful study, the SSG concluded that it was possible for the U.S.
and NATO forces to control the sensitive Norwegian Sea area, thereby putting greater
pressure on the Soviets, altering their perceptions of risk and of the likelihood to
achieve their theater and war objectives. Combined with pressure on the southern and
Pacific fronts, U.S. and allied success in the northern tier should influence the Soviets
to end the war, even on terms favorable to the United States and NATO.
A U.S. and NATO strategy that included control of the Norwegian Sea would reduce
the area in which Soviet naval forces could operate east of the Svalbard Islands–North
Cape line. Previously, U.S. and NATO forces seldom ventured beyond the Greenland-
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Iceland-Norway line, and waters north of that line were considered, at best, “contested,”
and at worst, Soviet-dominated. Moving north of the line, U.S. and NATO forces would
decrease Soviet ability to defend the homeland, restrict Soviet SSBN operating areas,
and complicate Soviet interdiction of the sea lines of communication further south of
the Atlantic.
U.S. and NATO success in the northern tier can be achieved through the use of com-
bined arms and forward battle force operations, the SSG concluded. The employment
of total capabilities in all U.S. forces would take advantage of mismatches in Soviet ca-
pabilities and provide a superior concentration of force.47
CINCs Conference in Newport, October 1982
On 28 October 1982, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins, con-
vened the first of the annual conferences of navy commanders in chief during his ten-
ure as CNO. He chose Newport, R.I., rather than the traditional locale of Annapolis or
Washington, because he wanted to stress the role of the Naval War College as a premier
site for strategic thinking within the navy. On 17 August, Admiral Watkins met for the
first time, as CNO, with the Strategic Studies Group. The first group had already left
Newport for their duty assignments, and the second group had been gathered shortly
before to begin its work for the new academic year 1982–1983. In the course of the
meeting, Watkins heard the SSG’s general approach and its initial plans for the coming
year. “I like what I am hearing,” he told the Group, “this will be the focal point of naval
strategic thinking.”48 Going on, he pointed out that there was a great disparity in the
understanding of fleet commanders in the area of naval strategy. Therefore it was im-
portant for the strategic concepts to be fully explained. “Let the stuff hang out,”
Watkins told the Group. “The basic systems of the navy are fundamentally OK, but we
need a strategic overlay and confluence of thoughts.” Encouraged by what he had
heard, he told the SSG II, “You guys make sense.” Carrying on from this discussion,
Watkins asked Strategic Studies Group Director Robert Murray to prepare a brief
memorandum that would outline the framework within which U.S. naval forces could
best be utilized toward the objective of defeating Soviet strategy.
The memorandum was drafted by Commander Kenneth McGruther and members of
the Strategic Studies Group, then reviewed and approved by the CNO and the Fleet
commanders in chief at their Newport conference. As the CINCs listened to the first
draft of the briefing by Commander McGruther, they had varying reactions. Admiral
William J. Crowe felt that the concepts needed to be fleshed out for the particular
problems of the Mediterranean and would be hard to employ there. He felt also that
the intelligence estimate overestimated the rigidity of Soviet thinking and practice. Ad-
miral Foley suggested that the concept reflected some intellectual arrogance on the part
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of the Navy. Admiral Watkins emphasized that it was necessary to deal with the United
States as a whole, not just the navy alone. In the absence of a general strategy, it was
necessary to create one. He felt that what had been presented was thought provoking,
had a great deal of meat to it, and was not far off from the conceptual framework that
was wanted. Admiral Small, the vice chief, commented that it is a global strategy to pre-
vent global war. “In most of the world, it is primarily naval. This is a framework for
where we are moving.” Every one of the commanders in chief had to buy off on it; the
concepts of the CINCs must fit within it, Small stressed. “Confidence in ourselves is
important; we have to say we’ll win. This must become a framework within which we
work. We need to build in sufficient flexibility, but also specifically,” Small advised.49
The final 14-page “Memorandum on Maritime Strategy” that the CINCs agreed to at
their Newport meeting, after their initial discussions about it and recommendations
concerning its revision, was published in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, New-
port Papers series.50 The final statement concluded:
Our first task is to secure access to the battle theater, ensuring needed supplies and re-
inforcements can arrive and helping to keep our lines of communications to our allies
open so that they will stay with us. Second, we need to operate aggressively at sea to
secure our own flanks and expose those of the enemy. Principally this is the task of
sinking the Soviet fleet and securing essential lodgements. Third, our naval forces can
help stabilize the front by contributing directly to the land battle, or do so indirectly—
and in conjunction with tac air, amphibious, allied forces—by exerting leverage
against the enemy’s flanks or rear or allies. Finally, the navy can contribute impor-
tantly in the time dimension by being able to attack his strategic assets so that the So-
viets find what they consider their ultimate strategic leverage being reduced over time.
Beyond that, the CINCs agreed that what was necessary was to flesh out the compre-
hensive approach to strategy by developing a family of regional concepts of opera-
tions. These should be tested in war games and amplified with rigorous analysis, being
brutally honest in the assumptions used, analyzing the results and applying them. The
frame of reference should be implemented, in part, by making better use of the Naval
War College. At the same time, the comprehensive approach to strategy must be evo-
lutionary, taking account of evolutions in Soviet strategy as well as changing technol-
ogies, vulnerabilities, and force levels.
Strategic Studies Group II
During the academic year 1982–1983, the second Strategic Studies Group adopted the
tenets of forward defense and immediate pressure on the Soviets, which had been
used in the previous year, but went further to apply them to the southern European
and Pacific theaters, continuing the development of a worldwide integrated maritime
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employment strategy. In its work, the SSG II sought fresh options for initial employ-
ment, by examining how, in the critical period of imminent hostilities through the
early weeks of combat, we might wrest the initiative from the enemy and score a signif-
icant, early Allied victory in the maritime theaters. While its principal task was the de-
velopment of war-fighting concepts, they took heed of the point Admiral Watkins had
made during the October 1982 CINCs conference. Naval forces, Watkins had stressed,
must help achieve “deterrence to the last” in a time of rising tensions and potential
hostilities. Carrying this concept forward, the SSG II saw that the foundations of deter-
rence must be laid in peacetime, through forward deployment of forces, national and
multinational exercises demonstrating proficiency, and “surge” deployments which
demonstrate the U.S. capabilities to reinforce Europe.51
In a single theater crisis, naval forces have excelled in rapid deployment to the scene.
The global crisis, however, presented a less familiar and less certain situation for deter-
rence. What one side perceives as a deterrent can as easily be seen as war posturing and
provocation by the other. Evaluating that issue carefully, SSG II concluded “that coor-
dinated force deployments in the maritime theater have a potentially synergistic impact
which can help deter war, in part because the maritime theaters have the potential for
directly threatening the Soviet homeland.”52
If global deterrence failed and a general war began, the best strategy would be to attack
all Soviet forward-deployed forces within hours of the commencement of hostilities. A
continuing, coordinated effort to fight forward, SSG II concluded, would significantly
reduce the Soviet offensive strategic reserve while reducing homeland defenses. This,
they believed, would provide an integrated strategy for all the maritime theaters “that
involves a difference.”
Examining the Mediterranean theater, SSG II looked at the full range of possibilities,
ranging from withdrawal of the carrier battle groups entirely to “a full forward press”
into the eastern Mediterranean. They concluded that a full forward posture was prefer-
able, since the United States routinely operates in the eastern Mediterranean in crisis.
Such a presence signals both commitment to our allies as well as determination to an
enemy. This concept involved risk, and SSG II concluded that earlier studies, which had
determined that even a two-carrier battle group could not long survive, were too pessi-
mistic. They went on to develop a tactical concept of carrier havens that could be used
to allow carriers to survive in the forward areas and to let them strike at the Soviets
from the onset of war. In the Mediterranean this involved an antisurface warfare cam-
paign that rapidly destroyed the Soviet Mediterranean squadron as an anticarrier
threat. Then, using deception and target denial as the basis for a campaign against
Soviet long-range bombers, these would also be paralleled with early carrier and
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land-based forces in the southern flank that would slow the Soviets’ growing force ad-
vance, focus Soviet attention away from the Mediterranean, and tie down Soviet air
forces. In achieving these objectives, the defense of both Greece and Turkey would be
essential.
This strategic plan envisaged two related and feasible naval campaigns which would
contribute greatly to the overall strategic objectives:
(1) The destruction of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, and possibly its operating
bases in Libya and Syria.
(2) The organization of a “gauntlet defense” of the Aegean Sea which, even if the
Dardanelles were to fall, would deny entrance to the Mediterranean to all Soviet ships
in the Black Sea. This would involve both U.S. and allied air, surface, subsurface, and
mining forces.
In looking at the Pacific theater as a third campaign, SSG II identified four objectives:
• Defending U.S. territory.
• Defending the Pacific sea lines of communication.
• Sinking the Soviet Navy.
• Putting direct pressure on the USSR.
To SSG II, all but the last seemed easily scheduled in the Pacific. Beyond participation
in a worldwide campaign of attrition against Soviet SSBNs, they saw few targets within
reach from the Pacific that could pose a fundamental war-stopping threat to the Soviet
Union. However, China was a potential lever to the extent that if U.S. military actions
weakened the Soviet position against China, then the United States would put pressure
on the Soviets.
In a war in the Pacific, Soviet military forces would be highly dependent on the role of
Japan, SSG II concluded. The simultaneous movement of U.S. forces along the Aleu-
tians and north from the Philippines would be designed to force Soviet forces away
from the Chinese border or to grant U.S. air superiority over the battle area. The final
movement to seize the Kurile Island chain, thereby opening the Sea of Okhotsk, Sakhalin
Island, and the northern Belkin coast to further attack would be strongly dependent on
Japanese participation, although some options would still remain if Japan chose to stay
neutral in a U.S.-Soviet war.
Upon completion of SSG II’s work, Robert J. Murray left the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies to take up a position at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. Just before leaving Newport in September 1983, Murray wrote to Admiral
William N. Small, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, sending him
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the first three Newport Papers, consisting of reports of the first two Strategic Studies
Group and the memorandum on Maritime Strategy. In his letter, Murray reflected on
the work of the previous two years, and concluded that these three documents repre-
sented “an agreed concept” of naval operations—a maritime strategy—for general war.”
In short, there was general agreement between the Fleets, OpNav, and Headquarters
Marine Corps on the overall approach that they proposed.
Summarizing the outlook that had been developed, Murray wrote,
The principles espoused here cut across the bow of prevailing opinion in some in-
stances, but the strategy is not radically different from long-held conceptions of the
proper employment of naval forces. The principles would not be unfamiliar to
Mahan. In particular, our work confirms the value for national strategy of naval
forces designed, trained and intended for offensive operations, and rejects as imprac-
tical and undesirable the notion, sometimes espoused outside the Navy Department,
of a defensively organized and equipped navy. It is clear to us that the best defense re-
mains a good offense.53
“The concept of forward defense, adopted as NATO strategy and applied to land and
air forces already is equally applicable to naval forces,” Murray wrote, “it adds much to
deterrence and places naval forces in preferred positions if deterrence fails.” Going fur-
ther, Murray noted that the SSG found no instance where it was necessary for U.S. na-
val forces to employ nuclear weapons to achieve their objection. “While it is necessary
to understand how to operate in a nuclear environment,” Murray concluded, “it is not
necessary to take the initiative in using nuclear weapons for naval purposes; on the
contrary, the use of nuclear weapons at sea appears to be to our clear disadvantage.”54
Strategic Studies Group III
In the summer of 1983, Dr. Robert S. Wood was appointed Dean of the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies and Director of the Strategic Studies Group. An academic, Wood had
been professor of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia and then
chairman of the Strategy Department at the Naval War College from 1980 to 1983.
When Wood took charge of the SSG, the group was faced with three major issues that it
might explore. Since the first two Strategic Studies Groups had examined the issues in-
volved in how to use forces in the early stages of a global war, the strategy that had
been developed was a war-fighting strategy. Having established that, one could then ex-
amine how such a war-fighting strategy could be used in peacetime as an effective de-
terrent to war, complementing work being undertaken in OpNav. Alternatively, the
SSG could go forward in its examination of global war and examine the issues involved
in terminating a war. Or thirdly, quite apart from a global war against the Soviet
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Union, which was the focus of The Maritime Strategy, one could examine how in crisis
the navy might be used so that should a crisis deteriorate into war neither the navy nor
the country would be awkwardly placed. When these various choices were presented to
Admiral Watkins for his decision as to what direction the Strategic Studies Group
should take, he chose the third option.55
The third Strategic Studies Group devoted its work during the academic year 1983–
1984 to examining strategies for handling outlying Soviet client states during the crisis
preceding a NATO–Warsaw Pact war and strategies for employing naval forces in the
types of regional crises to which the U.S. Navy must frequently respond. In doing this,
they focused on three cases: Cuba, Libya, and Southwest Asia.
The case studies on Libya and the Persian Gulf touched on issues that came to pass
later in the U.S. strike against Libya in 1986 and in the Persian Gulf in 1987. Neither of
these studies dealt directly with the problem of a regional crisis which would directly
affect a global war against the Soviets. The case study on Cuba did do this. In looking at
Cuba, SSG III noted that while Atlantic Fleet forces might be deployed in strength
against Cuba at the outbreak of a war with the Soviet Union, they could not both do
this and “defend forward” in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Mediterranean as postu-
lated by The Maritime Strategy. The foreseen problem is one of inopportune positioning
or “maldeployment.”56
The Forward Maritime Strategy requires that virtually all U.S. naval forces be posi-
tioned well forward within striking range of the Soviet Union in order to deter the start
of a war and to be positioned to seize the initiative should war start. In order to prevent
maldeployment in meeting this objective, the United States must rely on economy of
force in outlying areas. SSG III concluded that it was not possible to destroy or neutral-
ize outlying Soviet client states. However, sufficient force must be positioned to deter
them from participating in the war or to prevent them from affecting the war effort,
should they attempt it. The United States would need less force in outlying areas if it
confined its objectives to protecting the sea and air lanes of communication in the war
against the Soviet Union. Should destruction or neutralization of these client states be
required, then the ability to sustain the Forward Maritime Strategy would be reduced,
risking failure of that strategy. Conversely, as the Forward Maritime Strategy succeeds,
outlying client states would be cut away from the Soviet Union and would be unable, if
not unwilling, to support it.
In its final conclusion, SSG III summarized its work into three main points:
1. Crisis responses are not interceptions to our normal business; they are an integral
part of it.
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2. Crises are primarily political events, not military ones, and naval forces cannot be
applied without accommodating political considerations within military operations.
The military effort cannot be separated from the political objectives.
3. The Forward Maritime Strategy can be expanded to include suitable responses to
crises. If we plan ahead, our strategies for handling those crises can be executed with-
out degrading our ability to carry out that Maritime Strategy.57
In addition, SSG III recommended that regional strategies be developed using carefully
sized, even modest forces. “The defeat of the Soviets must be the primary objective; we
take forces from that objective at our peril,” they concluded. At the same time, they
warned, “for a CINC to have only one course of action planned may be insufficient . . .
no single plan can be expected to fit all enemy actions. A range of alternatives is clearly
necessary.”58
Strategic Studies Group IV
During the 1984–1985 academic year, SSG IV turned to study the issues of deterrence
posed by The Maritime Strategy. Where SSG I, in particular, had found that the threat
posed by naval forces in war might not be enough to terminate a war, SSG IV devel-
oped further ideas on what would be required to use naval forces to create the credible
prospect of prolonged conventional war. In the era of nuclear parity, conventional forces
are a part of the larger issues involved in deterrence. SSG IV carefully studied the instabil-
ity created by reinforcement of Europe during a crisis. In a discussion with SSG IV mem-
bers, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, noted that forward
deployed naval forces played an important role and could “prime my NATO pump.”59
SSG IV recognized that our day-to-day actions shape Soviet calculations to a greater
extent than the actions that we might take in a crisis. They concluded that the situa-
tions the Soviets fear most are those that they can control least, such as prolonged
conventional war. The Soviets recognize that there is no particular territory that they
can capture that would allow them to defeat NATO, but that the USSR must destroy
the will of the Alliance to fight. To counter this, NATO demonstrations of solidarity
and capability create an environment in which the Soviet Union is unlikely to risk
direct military confrontation—unless not to do so risks Soviet survival. To support
this, SSG IV recommended increased demonstrations of solidarity in the Western al-
liance, a prepared forward defense with a demonstrated capitalization for sustained
interoperability among forces.60
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Strategic Studies Group V
At the beginning of the 1985–1986 academic year, a new director was appointed for the
Strategic Studies Group, Marshall Brement, a career diplomat and former U.S. Ambas-
sador to Iceland, 1981–1985. This division of labor between the two positions of direc-
tor of the SSG and the Center for Naval Warfare Studies allowed Dr. Robert Wood to
focus more closely on the work of the Center as a long-term, stable complement to the
transient year-long strategic study groups. Brement, in his turn, was able to focus fully
on the work required by the direct personal relationship of the CNO to the Strategic
Studies Group. Under Brement’s leadership, SSG V focused on the employment of na-
val forces to support peacetime foreign policy objectives.
The Group concluded that the effective employment of military forces to induce re-
gional stability and respond to acts that threaten national objectives requires great at-
tention, both within the navy and at the National Security Council level. On the
national level, they noted that coordinated interagency planning is required to produce
regional strategies based on clearly stated policy objectives. SSG V developed a process
to deal with events in a crisis and to assist in formulating a reaction without losing fo-
cus on the broader objective. They also developed a series of force options to improve
response, and a process to account for the difference in criteria in targets for peacetime
and in wartime. In the following year, 1986–1987, SSG VI examined Soviet thinking.
Conclusion
In the eight years of evolutionary development between Admiral Hayward’s announce-
ment of his strategic concepts in 1978, through the cumulative work of the CNO’s Stra-
tegic Studies Group in 1986, American naval strategic thinkers had revived classical
naval theory and placed it clearly within the context of both the peacetime use of naval
force and the context of the nuclear age. In the process, a common approach and view
was developing at the highest levels of the navy’s leadership, leaving room for future
modifications and evolution to take place on a firm, conceptual foundation.
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The Work of the Strategic Concepts Branch,
(OP-603), 1982–1986
The publication entitled The Maritime Strategy,1 prepared in the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, is the official statement of what is sometimes called the “Forward
Maritime Strategy” or “The Maritime Component of National Military Strategy.” The
immediate origins of the CNO/SECNAV-approved Maritime Strategy are clearly defin-
able and lead directly from three memoranda written by the Vice Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral William N. Small.
In December 1981, Small wrote a memo to the Director of Navy Program Planning in
which he said:
I think it is high time we take a formal, critical look at how we do the analysis that
leads to our appraisals of Navy Programs. Our current methodology is very suscepti-
ble to adverse interpretations, not only by those outside the navy who wish to attack
navy programs and strategy, but even within the navy where we are professionally
misled by both the scenario displayed and the conclusion which may logically be
drawn therefrom.2
Small objected to the typical thinking within the navy staff in Washington which
tended not to consider strategy in discussing programs for ship and weapon construc-
tion. The programs often seemed to drive the strategy, he thought, and he wanted to
reverse this situation so that serious and responsible thought about the naval part of
national strategy would eventually become the basis upon which the United States built
its navy for the future.3
In Small’s view, a major deficiency in naval thinking was a worst-case mentality. “We
assign the best capabilities to the enemy and the worst to our own forces,” he wrote. In
analyzing engagements, we put our forces “into tactical situations which no prudent
planner or responsible commander would countenance.” Moreover, the U.S. Navy
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seemed to have adopted a defensive outlook, not an offensive one. “Naval forces are in-
tended to seek out and destroy the enemy,” Small declared, “not defend themselves.”4
Within the Pentagon’s Navy staff, Small saw the parochialism of each of the platform
sponsors and the failure of the OpNav staff to integrate the analyses, appraisals, re-
quirements, and programs in planning the future navy. “None of the characteristics of
a naval engagement are played in isolation from each other in the real world, as they
seem to be in our current methods of analysis,” Small declared. “If affordability were
injected early into analysis, which is itself based on national forces employment against
realistic threats, we would have fewer and better supported combat systems.”5 Small be-
lieved that the practices which were then current in the Pentagon led to exotic re-
sponses to extreme requirements, resulting in insufficient forces for realistic needs.
Almost three months later, Small took up the issue again with another memo to the Direc-
tor of the Office of Naval Warfare and the Deputy CNO for Plans and Policy. Noting that he
had heard little discussion of how naval forces might be employed in wartime, Small said:
A review of maritime strategy may well change many of the assumptions currently ex-
plicit in our systems requirements. I guess the responsibility for this type of thinking
lies somewhere between (or among) OP-06 and OP-095, but seems dormant.6
At the bottom of the memo, Vice Admiral Sylvester Foley, then Deputy CNO for Plans
and Policy (OP-06), wrote a note to his executive assistant asking him to get some of
his staff members to discuss the issues. “We can start with the broad maritime strategy
script by Lehman,” Foley said “and go from there.”7 Rear Admiral W. R. Smedberg IV,
Director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095), followed up Small’s suggestion with
a note to Foley, recommending that OP-06 take the lead in this action.“The Strategic
setting and operational concept should be spelled out more explicitly as the backdrop
of our POM development,” Smedberg wrote.8
Concurring completely, Foley reported to Small that OP-06 would take the lead in de-
veloping a presentation on maritime strategy and employment options. Foley sug-
gested that the briefing should focus on initial points; among them were:
• The political uses for which maritime forces are to be employed against a potential
enemy.
• How we expect U.S. maritime forces to be employed against potential enemies.
• What “ground tactics” are believed to be associated with these employments.
• What forces might reasonably be available.
• Whether the strategy is supported by current programs and whether alternatives
should be developed.
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Small agreed with Foley’s proposal and wrote a note by hand at the bottom of Foley’s
memo emphasizing the basic problem in strategic thinking. “One of the important
findings of our Strategic Studies (Review) Group at NWC [Naval War College] and the
OOX [CNO Executive Panel] folks here, during their fleet visits and discussions with
navy leadership, is that there is a great deal of confusion about strategies and analysis
relating to force acquisition and strategy for winning wars. Much of the analysis done is
more related to the first than the latter.”9
Although a general consensus had been formed by Small’s first two memos, the docu-
ment that actually triggered the immediate action to prepare a briefing, which eventu-
ally became the CNO/SECNAV-approved Maritime Strategy, was a memo written for
Small’s signature in OP-96, headed by Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin. This memo ex-
pressed what was on everyone’s mind in the navy staff. Written by Vice Admiral
Carlisle Trost on the memo cover sheet that went along the clearance ladder before
Small’s signature was “We really need this to get the entire OpNav staff moving in the
same direction.”10
The memo was signed on 2 August 1982 by Small and sent to all four flag officers di-
rectly concerned with the preparation of the upcoming annual Program Objective
Memorandum or POM. The POM is a complete line-by-line list of every appropriation
item that the navy requires for the next five years, within fiscal limits. Comparable
memoranda are submitted each May by every service to the Department of Defense
and are the key inputs in the budget request to Congress. The POM ties the multiple
planning functions within the navy together in a single document and serves as the ba-
sis upon which a budget can be constructed in support of the defined goals and objec-
tives of the navy. In starting the annual process, which would lead to the submission of
the POM in May 1983, Admiral Small repeated his view that a strategy appraisal was
needed “at the outset of the POM process with respect to how naval forces will be em-
ployed in wartime and their disposition both in the sense of our CINC war plans and
in the DG [Defense Guidance] scenario.” Action on Admiral Small’s memo was passed
to the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), then headed by Captain Elizabeth Wylie.
Within that office, Captain Wylie selected an action officer, Lieutenant Commander
Stanley Weeks, to carry out the required work. Weeks, although the junior officer in
that group, had an unusual background, marked by academic depth as an Olmstead
scholar in Spain and a Ph.D. in international relations from American University. In
addition, he had broad experience at sea, having just spent a year on board British and
Dutch ships as the at-sea operations officer for the Commander of NATO’s Standing
Naval Force, Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). Weeks eagerly took the assignment because
he thought it would be a great challenge to try to pull together and articulate a gen-
eral statement of U.S. naval strategy. Weeks felt that such a statement could be very
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valuable, not only in the program appraisal process, but also as a war-fighting frame-
work for naval officers and a reply to critics who continued to claim that the United
States did not have a strategy. When Weeks was given this task, it seemed only another
routine chore in OP-603; neither he nor others realized how quick or extensive would
be the success of their project.11
As the scope of the work became plain, Commander W. Spencer Johnson was assigned
to join Weeks in the project and to produce a draft as soon as possible, focusing his ef-
forts on the “front end” connection of national strategy and defense programming.12 A
surface warfare officer with an advanced degree in international relations from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Johnson was the key OP-605 officer who coor-
dinated the policy work of OP-06 with the offices concerned with programs and the
budget process at the Joint Chiefs’ and DoD level. Within three weeks, these two offi-
cers pieced together a draft briefing, classified secret, which answered Admiral Small’s
request.13 As Weeks and Johnson began work on developing a statement of a national
maritime strategy, they were aware of the general issues and took note of the informa-
tion and problems suggested in the public literature, but sometimes drew quite differ-
ent conclusions.14 Weeks was well aware of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s views.
Weeks had been the action officer in OP-603 for staffing Lehman’s annual Posture
Statement, which the Secretary had delivered to the House Armed Services Committee
on 8 February 1982. Certainly Secretary Lehman’s views and proposals to develop a
600-ship navy based on 15 battle groups provided a clear background for the strategy
Johnson and Weeks were developing,15 although they did not explicitly consider his
statement as a sole source.
Following Admiral Small’s explicit instructions, the strategic discussion for the POM
85 CPAM was based on current forces, rather than projected future forces. In Small’s
view this was a correction to a basic flow in earlier analyses,16 and it brought the oppor-
tunity for a more realistic discussion of strategy. As Weeks explained,
The current-force nature of strategy CPAM allows OP-06 to “wrap” the CPAM in the
cloak of the CINCs’ current strategy/general war plans, thereby giving greater cre-
dence to the overall strategy, and leading to greater receptiveness to the strategy than
would be the case if it were seen as the whole cloth product of some “06 smart guys.”17
Indeed, the OP-603 action officers made a great effort to make a consolidated state-
ment of the various CINCs’ current war plans within the context of basic national pol-
icy and strategy. By coincidence, the CINCs were making a series of direct briefings on
their current concepts of operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the months of Au-
gust and September 1982, and Weeks and Johnson had direct access to these “up-to-
the-minute” overviews of war plans as well as the plans themselves. In addition, they
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wanted to piece together a general and coherent statement of the maritime portions of
these briefings that was consistent with national policy and strategy. To do this, they
used four basic documents for the general background to the overall strategy consoli-
dating CINCs’ maritime plans:
• The Presidential Directive that established national global objectives and priorities:
National Security Decision Directive-32 (NSDD-32), issued on 20 May 1982.
• The Secretary of Defense’s annual directive to the services, which is reviewed and re-
vised each year, the then most recent being Defense Guidance for Fiscal Years 1984–88, is-
sued by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on 22 March 1982.
• The document that is the principal method by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recom-
mend changes to the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Guidance: The Joint Strategy and
Force Planning Document (JSPD). The latter, for the fiscal years 1985–1991, had been
approved on 1 September 1982.
• And finally, the latest analysis of actual midterm programmed force capabilities,
which identified special areas of strategy and force mismatch and which highlights
the risks: The Joint Program Assessment Memorandum for 1984. (JPAM-84).
Using these sources, Weeks and Johnson developed a statement of maritime strategy
that was focused on the broad aspects of strategy and quite intentionally avoided get-
ting bogged down in specific scenarios, time lines, and tactics. The scenarios in some of
the general guidance had already become a source of contention. If The Maritime Strat-
egy were tied simply to the illustrative scenario used in Defense Guidance, then as
Weeks stated, “I was sure the PDRC/CEB [Program Development Review Committee/
CNO Executive Board] would spend so much time debating the (debatable) arrival
date of this or that CVBG that the big picture would be totally lost.”18
Piecing together the requirements of national strategy and policy with the regional re-
sponsibilities and the perspectives of the various maritime commanders in chief in
mind, Weeks and Johnson defined a basic statement: “The essence of our National
Strategy is global forward deterrence,” they wrote.
The global element here suggests that, . . . our maritime strategy plans should be based
on the premise that we will not have the luxury of ceding any major region to the So-
viets by default . . . the forward aspect here means that our maritime strategy plans
must keep the SLOCs open to Eurasia, and cooperate fully with the other services and
the allies. The third element—deterrence—must be viewed not only in its peacetime
or strategic nuclear context, but also in terms of reinforcing deterrence in a crisis or
restoring deterrence in wartime.19
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From the very outset, the purpose of the maritime strategy was to articulate a strategy
for deterrence. “In the simplest sense, to deter is to threaten,” Weeks and Johnson
wrote.20 The maritime strategy thus had to be able to apply pressure on those places
that the Soviet Union valued most highly—its homeland, bases, and both its conven-
tional and nuclear forces. In this way, The Maritime Strategy would make a direct con-
tribution to “our military and political/psychological strategy objectives.”21 At the same
time, it anticipated Congressional critics who would call for more “maneuver warfare”
without appreciating that it was inherently part of the nature of war at sea. Maritime
forces were to be employed in a “forward pressure” strategy, designed to influence the
Soviets to restore a balance of power relationship, even if conflict had already erupted.
As Weeks wrote for the first draft strategy presentation, “Our Maritime Strategy should
help ensure favorable war outcome terms by using our ideally suited (inherently flexi-
ble and mobile) battle group and amphibious forces in maritime maneuver initiatives
to seize territory and strike Soviet vulnerabilities, with the result that we have some ne-
gotiating advantages of our own and can preclude the Soviets just “sitting on” their ini-
tial territorial gains.”22
This kind of thinking required appreciation of Soviet naval strategy. At that time, So-
viet Naval Strategy was itself a matter of much debate within the navy. The first Mari-
time Strategy briefing dealt with this only subject in a single viewgraph slide, which
graphically illustrated Soviet intentions.23 Behind this brief exposition, however, lay a
great deal of the new analytic work on the Soviet Navy. Lieutenant Commander Weeks
brought this work into The Maritime Strategy through several knowledge sources. His
initial source was Captain William Manthorpe, then head of (OP-96N). In addition, he
was highly influenced by a report written by Rear Admiral R. Welander, U.S. Navy
(Ret.), for the BDM Corporation,24 the work of Bradford Dismukes at the Center for
Naval Analyses, and discussions with Commander Kenneth McGruther on the staff
supporting the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group located at the Naval War College. Weeks
incorporated into his briefing what he considered to be their better insights.
After discussion with McGruther and Manthorpe, Weeks decided to couch the section
on the Soviet threat in terms of the new assessment of Soviet intentions, which empha-
sized the Soviet priority in holding back forces to ensure the survivability and mission
readiness of the Soviet SSBN force. Weeks had some misgivings about this and would
have liked to have seen more explicit discussion of how the U.S. Navy would counter
the Soviet Navy, should it confound our expectations and surge SSN forces into the At-
lantic, particularly in a prolonged crisis phase. Privately, he thought that the intelli-
gence community’s assessment tended to ignore the possibility that the Soviets might
well surge forward with their naval forces for political reasons during an extended,
prewar crisis. To deal with this, Weeks wanted to add the concept of what he called
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“Maritime Exclusion Areas,” but he found little high-level support for this concept. In-
stead, he positioned on his briefing slides three Carrier Battle Groups in the North At-
lantic and Pacific so that they could be “linebackers,” moving north or south of the
Greenland-Iceland-Norway line in the Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific, depending on
the Soviet submarine threat.25 In short, the strategy was to be a “forward strategy,” but
the degree of forwardness was seen as a more tactical decision to be made by the mari-
time commander, based on the political and military situation at the time.
The global perspective of The Maritime Strategy demonstrated some serious problems
for the navy when the war plans from the various commanders in chief were put to-
gether. Each commander in chief ’s war planners had written their plans on the basis
of a “worst case” war starting in their own theater. They assumed full availability and
priority in their theater for major force deployments, including aircraft carriers. As a
result, when the forces in each plan were added up, they revealed the need for a total of
22 carrier battle groups: 10 in Europe, 3 in Southwest Asia, and 9 in the Pacific. With
fewer than 13 carrier battle groups available at that time, “the obvious conclusion as
shown here is that our current force maritime strategy for a near-simultaneous global
war cannot be the sum of existing CINCs’ plans.”26 Looking at the situation from
OpNav, the Strategic Concepts Branch wanted to incorporate the best elements of the
CINCs’ current or preferred general war strategies, but the problem of dealing with
current force levels for a “come-as-you-are” global war meant that they had to trim the
presumed force requirements written into the current CINCs’ plans and the JSCP. The
“worst case” presumptions and resulting force mismatch were not new, Weeks noted in
the first draft—as Winston Churchill had remarked on the requests of his CINCs on
3 November 1941: “all experience shows that all Commanders in Chief invariably ask for
everything they can think of, and always represent their own forces at a minimum.”27
Despite the need to trim the numbers to match reality, the strategy highlighted a strik-
ing symmetry between many of the key elements in Atlantic and Pacific strategies.
There was a clear similarity in the way the different plans looked at the Aleutians and
Iceland, Japan, and Norway, the Greenland-Iceland-Norway Gap and the northwestern
Pacific. “Both CINCs placed fundamental importance on a forward defense pivoted on
key northern islands that control access to the U.S. and lie above the vital transoceanic
sea-lanes. If these islands are lost, the roof collapses on our links with NATO and the
key Pacific Allies,” Weeks wrote.28 In addition, the 1981 concept of maritime operations
by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe for the Mediterranean was con-
sistent with the basic forward, offensive disposition in the Atlantic and the Pacific
CINCs’ strategies. Although forward submarine barriers were not as applicable in the
Mediterranean area, the strategy there was consistent with the Atlantic and Pacific
strategies in emphasizing full cooperation with allies, early coordination with the
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Marine Corps and Air Force Tactical Airwings, positioning battle groups to survive ini-
tial Soviet strikes, then moving fully augmented naval forces forward to keep pressure
on the Soviets, and if need be, eventually to seize or regain territory to use as leverage
in terminating a war.29
In 1982, the first version of the CNO/SECNAV approved statement of The Maritime
Strategy began as an internal OpNav effort to state clearly the strategic background
upon which naval force planning and budget decisions should be made informed. But
almost immediately, the Weeks-Johnson Maritime Strategy began to develop a wider
significance. By late September 1982, the new Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy and Oper-
ations (OP-06), Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, had reported and immediately approved
the basic Weeks-Johnson Maritime Strategy briefing, deleting only the backup “Mari-
time Exclusion Areas” concept. Then, in early October, the briefing was presented to
the Program Development Review Committee (PDRC), the most junior of the three
oversight committees in the navy programming process. This committee of rear admi-
rals was chaired by the Director of the General Planning and Programming Division
(OP-90) Rear Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, and the PDRC flag officers decided that The
Maritime Strategy briefing should be presented “as is” and within a week to the most
senior oversight committee—the CNO Executive Board (CEB), consisting of the CNO
and all his deputy CNOs and principal assistants. This “instant CEB” review was ar-
ranged by Rear Admiral Metcalf, and when Weeks and Johnson made their presenta-
tion to it, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins and the other senior flag
officers reacted positively. In the discussion following the briefing, Watkins emphasized
the need to keep The Maritime Strategy focused on cooperation with allies and with
other services, particularly the U.S. Air Force.
On 7 October, Admiral Watkins issued a message to the Fleet CINCs looking back over
his first 90 days as Chief of Naval Operations and identified the areas in which he
wanted to focus with a new sense of urgency. Among the several areas he identified
were war-fighting readiness, the revitalization of the Naval War College as the crucible
for strategic and tactical thinking, the integrating of the Naval Reserves into our
war-fighting thinking, and improvement of interservice cooperation and greater un-
derstanding.30 The idea behind this was to unify the work of the CINCs and to bring
their collective knowledge and understanding to bear on the broad issues of the navy,
particularly in using naval forces for deterrence. The briefing, which Weeks and
Johnson had developed during August and September 1982 in the Strategic Concepts
Branch for helping decision makers in the budgetary process, played into Watkins’s
broader goals.31 It quickly began to take on a larger significance and to build on a wider
process of thinking within the navy.
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At Watkins’s request, The Maritime Strategy briefing was presented to the Fleet CINCs’
conference, which met at the Naval War College on 26–29 October. In order to imme-
diately gain the CINCs’ support, the OP-603 team used in their briefing some of the
very same viewgraph slides that the CINCs themselves had used in their presentation
earlier.32 At the same meeting, Richard Haver of the Office of Naval Intelligence filled in
the detailed background and the basis that substantiated the intelligence analysts’ con-
clusions as to Soviet intentions.33 With the CINCs’ approval, Vice Admiral Arthur
Moreau, then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations)
(OP-06), was directed to give the briefing to Secretary of the Navy John Lehman with
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General P. X. Kelley, in attendance.
Vice Admiral Moreau made the presentation on 4 November 1982. At the conclusion
of his remarks, Secretary of the Navy Lehman announced, “Bravo, you have just given
us a handbook that can be used in our deliberations with the third deck [Office of the
Secretary of Defense], with Congress, with OMB, and the joint arena.”34 Admiral
Watkins agreed and noted that he planned to use the briefing as a basis to lay the struc-
ture for future explorations of strategy. General Kelley was equally impressed and re-
marked, “it is an aggressive way to do business.” It is something people can identify
with—“it’s fighting wars.” What had begun only two short months before as Lieutenant
Commander Weeks’s and Commander Johnson’s briefing was now the Navy’s Maritime
Strategy.
After hearing the briefing, Lehman, Watkins, and Kelley agreed that they would keep
the document an internal one for the time being. Admiral Watkins wanted to update
NWP-1 in line with the thinking of the CINCs before following up Kelly’s suggestion
to war-game the strategy with civilian officers at Newport. Secretary Lehman pointed
out that this briefing had been the first real session of its kind and was a good avenue
to pursue in the POM development. “We can use this as a backdrop for the
affordability issues,” he said. “We can demonstrate a sound strategy and can readily
identify risk areas to many audiences.” During the discussion, the three men agreed on
some basic points to make in the briefing:
• Use 15 carriers on all force-level issues.
• Incorporate the Surface Action Groups built around battleships.
• Explain the incremental approach to the employment of forces.
• Caveat regional priorities for wartime resource allocation.35
Following the Secretary of the Navy’s approval of The Maritime Strategy, the first con-
cern was to find a means to inform all the people who needed to understand the basic
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view that it presented. This was no small task given the way the navy staff was spread
out bureaucratically in the Pentagon, and because it was so highly structured in its flow
of information and concepts. With this in mind, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Small, directed Vice Admiral Moreau to brief The Maritime Strategy to the
“Captains, etc., who really work the POM and Program Plan during the rest of the
year. . . . I doubt it will feed down from the 3-star level otherwise.”36 Moreau responded
that he would “solicit wide attendance from OpNav/NAVMAT officers in order to get
the information to those who need it,” but Small was rather doubtful about merely re-
questing attendance. “Maybe [it should be] stronger than solicit, I don’t know,” he
wrote to Moreau.37
Shortly thereafter, The Maritime Strategy briefing was presented to the CNO Executive
Panel (CEP) by Rear Admiral Robert E. Kirksey, Director of the Strategy Plans and Pol-
icy Division (OP-60). Interestingly, the CEP was the only internal audience that reacted
negatively to the briefing. Professor Albert Wohlstetter pointed out that The Maritime
Strategy presentation was an important departure for the navy in terms of strategic
thinking and future force planning. The “current force” limitation, he noted, posed
fundamental problems for the navy in terms of identifying and procuring force multi-
pliers that would reduce the present significant risk our country faced when comparing
Soviet capabilities with our own. Along the same line, Rear Admiral Eli Reich recalled
that several years previously, Admiral Hayward had testified to the effect that we have a
one and one-half-ocean navy for a three-ocean commitment. Reich felt that the brief-
ing bore that point out for him.38
During the winter and spring of 1982–1983, The Maritime Strategy briefing was given
widely. In February 1983, it figured largely in Admiral Watkins’s posture statement be-
fore the House Armed Services Committee. During his testimony, Watkins summarized
the basic premises in the strategy briefing, and he stressed in particular the broader in-
stitutional interplay within the navy, which the concept of The Maritime Strategy im-
plied. In particular, he noted that the strategy relied on the contributions of other U.S.
air and land forces and the forces of friends and allies. He mentioned his enthusiastic
support for the efforts of General John W. Vessey, Jr. as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in
nurturing interservice measures in an integrated air defense of NATO Europe, a bal-
anced program for nonstrategic nuclear forces, and the continual development of
cross-service interoperability in military intelligence resources and the cruise missile
program. Complementing this, he noted that he had signed agreements with the Air
Force Chief of Staff during the fall of 1982 to increase combined Navy–Air Force effec-
tiveness. In particular he stressed, “We also depend on contributions from our allies,
such as their 140-plus diesel submarines which are well versed in their local waters and
best employed in executing special missions in those areas.”39
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Watkins’s own concept of how strategic and tactical thinking was being improved
within the navy was important and reflected the emphasis he placed on certain organi-
zations and their work. He mentioned in his Posture Statement three key elements in
his thinking: 40
• The effort to develop a better understanding of the Soviet thought processes and in-
herent strengths and weaknesses in order to counter and to exploit them.
• The revitalization of the Naval War College as a crucible for Strategic and Tactical
thinking and the parallel effort to expose the finest, tactically proven professionals to
strategic thinking as a means of testing professional thought as well as creating a
cadre of sound-thinking educated commanders ready for key assignments; the use of
combined-arms war games explicitly designed to avoid a parochial, navy-only point
of view.
• The use of the semi-annual Navy Commanders in Chief Conference as a forum for
discussing national strategy and The Maritime Strategy flowing from it, to help es-
tablish the basis for organizing fiscal programming considerations related to the
CINCs’ employment plans.
In Watkins’s view, the teachings of Mahan were vital, but they needed modernization
and revalidation. An understanding of history is not enough for strategy, it must be dy-
namic and related to the technological developments that are outrunning us. Strategy
cannot be emotion, he said, nor can it be developed alone by a single person or group
in a short time. It is an iterative process in which deep thought must be given to each
segment of the strategy as it is developed. In order to move ideas and put teeth in them,
the strategy needed to supply “the same set of sheet music” for the CINCs, the budget
process, the intelligence community, those working on new concepts, and those work-
ing out arrangements with other services and allies. In short, The Maritime Strategy for
Watkins is what “surrounds the employment of Maritime forces.” For that reason,
Watkins saw The Maritime Strategy as his most important contribution to the navy.41
For Watkins, the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College would pro-
vide the all-important original thinking on new aspects for the strategy. The officers of
the SSG were all senior experienced men who had great potential for the future. Lo-
cated at the Naval War College, the SSG reported only to the CNO and had direct ac-
cess to him and the other CINCs. By having this direct link, without the interference of
any other chain of command or tasking, and by keeping the group at a distance from
the daily brush fires of life in the Pentagon, Watkins tried to ensure that the group fo-
cused on the areas that needed in-depth investigation in the gradual evolutionary pro-
cess of making the strategy. Toward the end of his term as CNO, Watkins reflected that
the work of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) was in some ways an adversarial
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one. Ultimately, its role was to bring the original, new concepts of the Strategic Studies
Groups into the broad general statement of The Maritime Strategy, as appropriate, and
to reconcile their ideas, pointing out flaws, gaps, and disparities as they worked
through what had become an annual strategy review and presentation process. Thus,
they modified the strategy as it dealt with new technology, new assessments of threats,
and considered CINCs’ plans in relation to national policy guidance.42
The work of the OpNav Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) was no less important.
First, it made a key contribution in the initial work by Weeks and Johnson in coalesc-
ing and articulating a coherent broad statement of strategy, and secondly, through the
subsequent work of later action officers assigned to the Group—who annually refined
it, wrote it down, and adapted it to a variety of audiences both inside and outside the
navy. The initial work in both the briefing and the written version required a great deal
of analytical and creative thought to synthesize the various concepts and ideas of naval
strategic thought. Subsequently, as The Maritime Strategy was adopted and publicized,
the process widened with a spill-off into academic, professional journals and discus-
sions with other services and friendly nations. The challenge of packaging and presen-
tation was added to the need to maintain the strategy as an evolving one, sensitive to
changing intelligence assessments and naval capabilities.
By early 1983, Commodore Dudley L. Carlson, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Plans
and Policy Division (OP-60B) had become the navy’s principal briefing officer for major
presentation. Already The Maritime Strategy had begun to be used whenever a general
statement about naval strategy was required. A milestone in this wider presentation of
the strategy came on 24 February 1983, when Commodore Carlson and Lieutenant
Commander Weeks gave the briefing to the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic
and Critical Material of the House Armed Services Committee on Maritime Strategy.
This was the first time that the full briefing had been given to Congress, and that event
happened to be the last briefing in which Lieutenant Commander Weeks served as the
primary Maritime Strategy action officer. The version given to the House subcommit-
tee was essentially the same as that first prepared five months earlier, but its language
and slides had been polished and improved under the guidance of Commodore
Carlson. The version given to Congress had one important new element added to it,
which remained with the briefing thereafter: a public relations type of tutorial on the
basic uses and unique qualities of naval forces.43
The new emphasis on a wider role and wider audiences for the strategy briefing, the
departure of Weeks for duty as a shipboard executive officer, and the subsequent as-
signment of Commander Peter Swartz as a replacement for both Weeks and Johnson
coincided with the appointment of Captain Roger Barnett as the new Branch Head in
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OP-603 and the beginning of the next phase in support of the POM-86 testimony on
navy budget and programs. The new key actors were Barnett and Swartz. Captain
Roger Barnett was a surface warfare officer with a Ph.D. in international relations from
the University of Southern California. He had experience on the U.S. SALT delegation
as well as on the 1980–1981 Defense Department Transition Team. He had also been
head of the navy staff ’s Extended Planning Office (OP-965) and Deputy Director of
Political Military Planning (OP-61). Swartz was a general unrestricted line officer on
his second tour of duty in OP-60. With a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, he had just completed three years of ad-
ditional graduate work at Columbia University.
Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06) took a
great personal interest in the plans for the new revision, although he himself would
shortly be transferred. In all his twenty-some years in the navy up to 1982, he had not
heard the navy articulate a strategy for global warfare. He felt that the navy had not re-
thought through all the time-tested theories and examined their applicability to the
present. Moreau spent a great deal of time with Barnett, working evenings and Satur-
days directly with him and also with Swartz. Moreau saw the first version of a Maritime
Strategy briefing as a categorization of the priorities of naval tasks in global warfare.
Through it, the navy had been able to portray the relative importance of tasks and to
begin to see that there was a problem in positioning for the navy during a pre-conflict
period. “In every scenario, there is always a set of naval tasks to accomplish with com-
peting assets,” he said. “Fundamentally, naval tasks are a given. Beyond that it is a ques-
tion of recognizing Soviet strategy and tactics and dealing with them.”44 The same
point was echoed by Captain Roger Barnett when he said “Strategy is not a game of
solitaire.”45 For Moreau, however, it was important to take the conceptual underpin-
nings of the first version and to begin the process of advancing them step by step,
prioritizing them, then going on to examine the most probable course of action within
this analysis. Moreau saw that there was a danger in this and that it could lead to an ab-
solute vision of strategy unless the concepts were continually open to challenge.46
Moreau discussed the substance of the strategy directly with Barnett and Swartz and
directed them to build upon the earlier version and to develop an architecture for the
strategy that would expand upon it and give it more depth. In essence, the old version,
which focused on the carrier battle groups, needed more focus on other naval forces—
on allied navies and air forces and on joint U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strategy. This
new version needed to be connected more clearly and in greater depth with our under-
standing of Soviet naval strategy in both wartime crisis and war. This kind of thinking
carried with it the need to look more carefully at Norway, the subject of the Strategic
Studies Group’s first in-depth work, the whole question of naval support of NATO, and
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the relation of navies to the Central Front as well as on the sea lines of communication
in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. At the same time, less was needed on the “front
end” national strategy and programming details of general policy guidance; and the
preferences of the commander in chief, which had figured so largely in the first brief-
ings, although a shorter, updated segment was nevertheless retained.47 As Swartz
explained, the difference between the Weeks-Johnson version of The Maritime
Strategy briefing and his own was “more: more explanation, more forces, more
joint, more allied. . . .”48
As action officer for The Maritime Strategy, Commander Swartz undertook his task
with the strong belief that it should not appear to be the product of some brilliant and
ethereal strategic thinker, but rather the collective thought of the high command of the
entire navy. Influenced in his general approach by Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie’s
book, Military Strategy,49 Swartz tried to employ Wylie’s basic thesis that strategy is a
form of control that cannot be seen in isolation from other factors. In developing fur-
ther the Weeks-Johnson statement of the strategy, he tried to use this concept in apply-
ing a wide variety of sources including the resources of the Naval War College’s Global
War Games, the thinking of the Strategic Studies Group, the speeches of Secretary of
the Navy Lehman, NATO war plans, and the CINCs’ current concepts of operations. As
he studied these various sources, he found that they were, for the most part, mutually
reinforcing and reflected the “operate well forward” atmosphere in an offensive stance
that seemed attractive to naval officers at that time.50
Working to establish a broad statement of this approach, he saw clearly that the differ-
ent and separate branches of thinking within the navy fundamentally complemented
one another. Swartz saw his fundamental task as one that would bring these lines of
thinking together in a way that would be acceptable to all interest groups within the
navy. Having become thoroughly acquainted with strategic thinking throughout the
navy, Swartz concluded that the Pacific Command Campaign Plan formulated under
Admiral Robert Long, U.S. Navy, as CINCPAC, provided the basic model that could
be applied globally. It had also been one of the CINC briefings used by Weeks and
Johnson and was compatible without the first version of The Maritime Strategy. For
Swartz, this was the “main recent antecedent” to his work as the action officer on The
Maritime Strategy.51
Thus, Swartz’s task was to fit together the diverse, but fundamentally complementary
strategic thinking that had been going on in the navy into the basic concept proposed
in the PACOM Campaign Plan. Directly using the script of the briefing used by
CINCPAC staff, Swartz laid the groundwork for his own briefing on The Maritime
Strategy, filling it in from the plans of the other CINCs, while tailoring it to a global
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perspective. Swartz wanted to co-opt as many key officers on the navy staff as he could,
reflecting a wide variety of interests and perspectives. His purpose in this was “to par-
take of their knowledge and not get knifed later” as well as “to make sure of a baseline
that would last.”52 To achieve these goals, he focused at the working-level of captains
and commanders rather than flag officers, trying out his ideas and modifying his ap-
proach in the Summer and Fall of 1983, through numerous informal, off-the-record,
“murder board” sessions. During these sessions, a wide variety of strategically minded
officers criticized the ideas and concepts that Swartz synthesized; following the ses-
sions, Swartz’s briefing was presented widely, gaining in its concepts and modifying its
phraseology as a result of nearly every session.53
The first major briefing for the Swartz version of The Maritime Strategy came on 13
September 1983 when Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott presented the briefing to Ad-
miral Watkins and six former Chiefs of Naval Operations: Admirals Arleigh A. Burke,
George W. Anderson, David L. MacDonald, Thomas H. Moorer, James L. Holloway,
and Thomas B. Hayward, on board the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Chase off Newport.
The CNOs, along with Rear Admiral John L. Butts, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Commodore David E. Jeremiah, Commodore Clarence E. Armstrong, and Captains
William A. Owens and J. S. Hurlburt of the Strategic Studies Group, had embarked in
Chase to watch the America’s Cup race, but since calm weather forced cancellation of
the race, the majority of the day was spent in Chase’s wardroom discussing strategy.
The morning session began with Marryott’s briefing, but the format of a discussion in-
stead of a briefing was quickly established as Admiral Watkins amplified Marryott’s
comments and the former CNOs questioned and commented.54
After the briefing on the Coast Guard Cutter Chase, the next briefings were for the Pro-
gram Development Review Committee (PDRC) and the Program Review Committee
(PRC) in October 1983. Their response was overwhelmingly positive. Especially note-
worthy were the accolades heaped on the strategy at the PRC by Vice Admiral Carlisle
Trost (OP-090), Vice Admiral Lee Baggett (OP-095), and Vice Admiral James A. Lyons
(OP-06). From Swartz’s point of view, The Maritime Strategy had done what Admiral
William Small had set out to do and did in fact reflect the consensus of the navy’s high
command. So unanimous was the approval that it was decided that it was unnecessary
to present the briefing at the CNO Executive Board (CEB), which is normally the most
senior oversight committee for guidance and resource decisions. Following the presen-
tation to the PDRC and PRC, and the comments received there, Swartz and Barnett
proceeded to make a significant addition to the strategy. Up to this point, the briefing
had only discussed global conventional war with the Soviets. Their new work added a
preliminary discussion, which dealt with the role of the navy in peacetime and in crisis
leading up to war.55
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Reactions to the briefing were varied. On 20 October 1983, Rear Admiral Huntington
Hardisty, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06B), presented The
Maritime Strategy to the CNO Executive Panel. He reported that the briefing was well
received and that the CEP considered it a marked improvement on the previous year’s
brief. There were four general themes in the comments made by panel members:56
• Some panel members viewed the purpose of the strategy to be an attempt to predict
the strategy rather than what it was actually intended to be—a statement of the
navy’s preferred strategy.
• Some panel members wanted a precise order of sequence to be stated in the briefing
rather than to deliberately avoid doing this and thereby avoid a specific scenario pre-
diction.
• Other members agreed that the preferred strategy should be close-in defense of the
sea lines of communication and convoys as the Nation’s primary responsibility
rather than a strategy of forward defense and offensive operations.
• Finally, some panel members believed that a war at sea with the Soviet Union would
probably be a limited war and not inevitably the global war that the briefing sug-
gested.
Among the critics who were uncomfortable with the strategy was Captain Linton
Brooks, Deputy Director, Strategy and Nuclear Warfare Division and a veteran of nu-
merous Maritime Strategy murder boards. While the strategy was the best of those that
the navy wanted to follow, “we might not be able to carry it out,” he said. Secondly, he
wondered if it might be a strategy that would lead to escalation. Although operations
against Soviet SSBNs were not yet explicitly a part of the strategy, there had been dis-
cussions about them in relation to the strategy. These and U.S. carrier operations in
Soviet-controlled sea areas, and conventional warfare attacks on the Soviet homeland,
seemed to Brooks to run a huge risk of preemptive attack. Particularly in looking at
that third phase of the strategy, Brooks felt that the policy and strategy goals should be
explained and made clear for the full, forward attack concept. Moreover, he said, “if the
strategy you describe cannot stand the shift to nuclear use, it is bankrupt and we may
as well face up to it.”57 Brooks saw that there was no general agreement about the stra-
tegic meaning of submarine operation in the third phase, particularly in regard to war
termination and escalation into nuclear war.58 Rear Admiral Clyde R. Bell, Director
Force Level Plans Division, was equally direct. The briefing “waffled,” he said. “I believe
that our anti-SSBN capability is the highest leverage item in the entire naval strategy
for global war against the Soviets. Our ability to conduct offensive ASW/ASUW in So-
viet position areas should be a centerpiece. Even if the battle forces don’t get into the
fight until late in the game, the Arctic campaign gives the navy the opportunity to both
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sink the Soviet Navy and make a strategic difference.”59 However, Admirals Trost,
Baggett, and Lyons had explicitly stated that The Maritime Strategy briefing should not
discuss anti-SSBN operations explicitly, but at the same time, it should not disavow
them either.60
On 19 January 1984, Secretary of the Navy Lehman and Chief of Naval Operations
Watkins presented the briefing to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and on 14
March, the two men presented it to the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee. Finally, on 4 May 1984, Admiral Watkins signed the final version
of the Fiscal Year 1984 version of The Maritime Strategy for publication in both classi-
fied and unclassified forms. An unclassified version of The Maritime Strategy was also
prepared by OP-603 and approved by Admiral Watkins, but it was not published at the
time due to the inability to obtain approval for it through the Joint and OSD clearance
process, and to OP-60’s preoccupation with institutionalizing the classified version.
Nevertheless, a declassified version was released to the public as part of the Congressio-
nal Hearings on appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985.61
Between October 1983, when the first full draft briefing was given, and May 1984 when
the final version was signed, some 75 briefings were given to audiences ranging from
OpNav offices to War College students, allied chiefs of naval strategy, representatives of
other services, and members of Congress.62 Nearly every meeting had produced a nu-
ance that led to further polishing and clarification. This very process bothered some
observers. As Commander Bruce L. Valley wrote harshly:
My frank view is that The Maritime Strategy brief basically reflects the lowest common
denominator approach commonly developed through a committee effort. . . . My
reaction to the brief—and the strategy it proposes to develop—is that we genuinely
expect the Soviets to do exactly what we want them to do, and that somehow “Right
will make Might,” enabling us to carry out our plans successfully despite severe under-
nourishment in such areas as sustainability, sea-lift, and dare I say it—strategic thought.63
Although a rather hostile comment, Valley’s remarks touched on an essential aspect of
The Maritime Strategy: it was a widely held, generally accepted view of strategy in the
process of development. As Commander James R. Stark, who followed Roger Barnett as
interim Director of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) commented, “Valley is
right that The Maritime Strategy has a lowest common denominator problem. But it
has to be agreed upon.” Moreover, the view the Strategy presented of the Soviet Navy
was based on the National Intelligence Estimate, [see Appendix I, pp. 101–183]
which at that time was the only view that all agencies within the U.S. Government
had agreed upon.64
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Further Developments, 1984–1986
The distribution of The Maritime Strategy during the summer of 1984 as a classified
document within the navy was a major step in the effort to educate naval officers in
the various considerations involved in thinking about a future war with the Soviet
Union. At the same time, it opened a new series of developments for the further refine-
ment and examination of the navy’s strategic ideas. Most importantly, a larger number
of officers were being educated in current strategic concepts. Ideas about strategy were
beginning to be widely exchanged, both inside and outside the navy. Using the central
focus of The Maritime Strategy, officers throughout the naval service were beginning to
ask the essential question: What does the navy need to achieve in wartime, and how
does it use its forces to achieve those ends?
Through the widespread dissemination of the basic strategic concepts involved in The
Maritime Strategy, a wide variety of contributions were made to its further develop-
ment, while the Strategic Studies Group at Newport and The Strategic Concepts
Branch in OpNav continued their work. The staffs of the various commanders in chief
continued to reexamine and refine their war plans, discussions were held with the
other services and with the allied forces, and new campaign concepts were examined at
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, at the Center for Naval
Analyses, and at other institutions. In short, there was a blossoming of maritime and
naval thinking in a variety of ways and places. As this is being written, it is too close to
the events to know which of the various ideas will become essential elements in the fu-
ture, as The Maritime Strategy continues to be developed. The general trends of devel-
opment, between 1984 and 1986, however, were quickly reflected in the work of
OP-603 and the Strategic Studies Group, while an increasing number of other staffs
and individuals became involved in the process.
The Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Complementing the work of the Strategic Studies Group in 1984–1986, the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies under Dr. Robert S. Wood was involved in a number of activities
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related to the development of The Maritime Strategy. Particularly important in this re-
spect was the development of various new campaign options within the context of the
broad national Maritime Strategy. This effort was an attempt to help fill the gap in
American naval thinking between the broad issues of maritime strategy and those of
fleet tactics, that area which the Soviets term “operational art,” but for which no widely
accepted term has yet been used in English. Among the projects were amphibious cam-
paign options, and some possible campaigns in Jutland and in the Balkans. In addition, a
program of bilateral navy-to-navy strategy discussions were conducted, in cooperation
with OpNav, to encourage the development of a shared concept of maritime strategy and
joint operational exercises. For these purposes, discussions were held with officers and
officials from Japan, Italy, Germany, Turkey, and several Latin American countries.
At the same time, the annual series of Global War Games at the Naval War College in-
teracted with other insights into The Maritime Strategy. As the various players worked
through a series of plays in a potential future global war against the Soviet Union, sev-
eral concepts within The Maritime Strategy seemed to be proved out, while others were
brought into serious question. In the games, the ability of the United States Navy to
operate well forward and to seize the initiative when war broke out seemed to have the
desired effect of keeping the Soviet Navy in its bastions, thus serving to prevent the en-
emy from making a massive attack on the Western sea lines of communication. The
further phases of the strategy called for the U.S. Navy then to carry the fight to the en-
emy and proceed to use naval forces as an element in terminating the war. The teams
that played in the Global War Game found difficulty, however, in finding ways by
which the navy could carry the fight to the enemy in a productive way. In the process,
they observed that it was exceedingly difficult for a navy to operate in the narrow seas
that border the Soviet Union. Moreover, the attack, which was envisaged against Soviet
SSBNs, failed in the games to have the hoped-for result, leading some of the Soviets to
terminate a war. What seemed to be more effective to the players was the massing of
conventional forces in a carrier battle group in a manner that made the risk too high to
attack it without the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, it was suggested through the Global
War Games that conventional forces played a key role in deterring nuclear war, even af-
ter a war had broken out, and could be used as a lever to persuade the Soviets to termi-
nate a war.1
The Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603)
While the SSG and the Naval War College, along with others, explored various issues in
depth during the period 1984–1986, the Strategic Concepts Branch in OpNav contin-
ued its work in correlating the new thought and bringing the ideas that had come to be
widely accepted into The Maritime Strategy. In order to see this parallel, but separate
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development, one must step back to the summer of 1984 and follow forward from that
point the work in that Branch.
By August 1984, following the publication of the first Maritime Strategy booklet, a new
team of officers had been installed in OP-60; Commodore T. J. Johnson, Captain Larry
Seaquist, and Commander T. Wood Parker considered that it was time to begin the cy-
cle of reflection and revision again. With the booklet in hand, Admiral Watkins looked
for further, more detailed development of the strategy. He set the Strategic Studies
Group the task of looking into developing further insights into peacetime use of na-
vies, emphasizing in particular that The Maritime Strategy was primarily designed to be
a deterrent strategy whose purpose was to help prevent war. Its effectiveness for such a
task, of course, came from the U.S. Navy’s ability to be ready for war if deterrence failed
and to fight and to help win such a war. With that in mind the Vice Chief of Naval Op-
erations, Admiral Ronald Hays, sent a personal message to the three Navy CINCs say-
ing “the CNO needs to understand fully your views on our present baseline strategy as
we gear up to POM-87.”2 Commodore Jerome L. Johnson traveled from OP-06 to each
of the CINCs’ headquarters for follow-up discussions.
Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, Commander in Chief, Atlantic and Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic, was the first CINC to reply. It was obvious from his reaction that
though the CINCs would have differing views on certain aspects of The Maritime Strat-
egy, they agreed to it in general. As he read McDonald’s message, Watkins wrote a note
to his staff along the margin: “make sure we include where we agree and resolve where
we disagree. I don’t want to have more than one strategy.”3 The effort to resolve these
differences and to collate the detailed views of the CINCs in the light of new develop-
ments and further thinking became the main continuing task of the action officers as
they prepared new versions of the booklet and briefing. These issues were detailed ones
that involved primarily the assessment of the Soviet bastion strategy, judgments
whether one should emphasize Soviet intentions over Soviet capabilities in assessing an
enemy, the risk of forward carrier battle group strikes against the Soviet Union, and the
difficulty of dealing with the phasing and the timing of the various operations laid out
in the strategy.4
In the process of discussing the strategy, it became obvious that some officers ques-
tioned the propriety of the CNO’s role in creating a strategy. One of the outspoken
critics on this point was Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., the Commander in Chief, Pa-
cific. When Commodore Johnson presented to him the latest version of the strategy,
Crowe remarked, “I’m not sure why CNO needs a Maritime Strategy. I need one, but he
doesn’t.”5 For him, and others who shared his views, it was appropriate as a plausible
case to present in the procurement process, but not as an actual, operational strategy.
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In pointing this out, Crowe was right in the sense that neither the CNO nor the fleet
CINCs have responsibility for developing strategy. That is the domain of the President,
the Secretary of Defense, The Joint Chiefs, and the Unified Commanders. The recog-
nized instruments were the national strategy, approved by the President, which con-
tains military elements; a national military strategy, prepared by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Then
there are theater strategies approved by the Unified Commander for accomplishing his
assigned mission. The Maritime Strategy lay outside this structure and had no formal
status in relation to it. Nevertheless, it did influence the strategic thinking of those offi-
cers who had responsibility for developing the national military strategy, while at-
tempting to link the procurement process to strategy.
While he was briefing the CINCs, Commodore Johnson also briefed fleet flag officers
in operational positions. Many of them had a negative reaction to it, making comments
such as “brochuremanship,” “PR job—not a strategy,” “not executable,” “lacking opera-
tional insight.” Their reaction showed a sophistication about strategy and strategic
thinking that had not been present among flag officers a few years earlier, suggesting
that they now had much higher expectations and demands in this area.6
In OpNav, Commander T. Wood Parker was assigned as action officer for The Maritime
Strategy in September 1984. He and Captain Larry Seaquist, who had come from the
Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College to be the new head of the Strategic
Concepts Branch (OP-603), agreed on three primary objectives: (1) to enhance the
substance of the strategy, (2) to get the OpNav and Headquarters Marine Corps staffs
to use it as the starting point for all of their efforts in policy, strategy, tactics, budget,
and procurement; and (3) to “spread the gospel” throughout the navy by widespread
briefings and writings.
While having great respect for Commander Peter Swartz’s earlier work in carrying the
briefing through and turning it into a widely circulated publication, Parker began his
work with the clear impression that Swartz had made compromises in order to get the
strategy accepted by all the various interest groups within the navy staff. Now that the
strategy had been fully approved by the CNO and accepted by the staffs as well as the
CINCs, Parker felt it was time to correct the shortcomings he saw in the strategy. He
immediately started working on a new version, which he hoped would enhance the
substance of the strategy. To achieve this, Parker tried to accomplish several things:
• Get the CINCs much more involved in the development of the next version by trav-
eling to them as well as meeting with their staffs regularly.
• Explicitly include anti-SSBN operations.
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• Describe what is meant by the vague term, “war termination on favorable terms.”
• Alter the first part of the briefing and publication by expanding on the parts that
deal with peacetime operations, crisis control operations, and transition to war.
• Include the U.S. Navy’s SSBN operations as part of the overall concept of strategy.
• Deal with the issues of time phasing and nuclear war which had been omitted earlier.
• Explain, rather than just list, the uncertainties with which the strategy must necessarily
deal, and try to explain them in terms of their impact in the case of a war.7
In his effort to get the OpNav and Marine Corps Headquarters to use the strategy as
the basis for all their work, Parker saw that what was needed was a direct link between
the strategic and the POM process. This, of course, had been an objective from the be-
ginning with Admiral Small’s memoranda, which had begun the development of the
maritime strategy briefing in 1982. However, it was no easy task to place conceptual
concerns as the governing factors in a budget and procurement process. For years, the
two areas of concern had tended to operate in separate spheres.
In order to try to make this linkage, Vice Admiral J. A. Lyons, the Deputy CNO for
Plans and Policy (OP-06), came up with the idea of “Strategy Stoppers.” This was a la-
bel that Lyons started to apply in the autumn of 1984 to identify those issues and prob-
lems in the procurement area which, if not properly funded or supported, could lead to
a weakening in the navy’s ability to execute the strategy fully. The term “Strategy Stop-
pers” was criticized by some who thought that it would be misconstrued to mean that
the strategy could not be executed at all. For this reason, the term was eventually
dropped, but for a time, Vice Admiral Lyons insisted on using it because it was pithy
and recognizable.
Although the use of the term had a short history, the concept behind it became estab-
lished at this point. The purpose of it was to make the strategy identify what must be
analyzed, considered, and appraised in the procurement process. At first this was a very
difficult process to get across. As Parker described it “every office in the Pentagon and
Henderson Hall perceived this as a power grab by the OP-06 organization, and they did
not want anyone or anything telling them what must be included in their respective
programs.” However, after a series of briefings to various officers to convince them that
this was a proper use of the strategy and that it would help to provide much needed
guidance and cohesiveness to the overall POM process, the idea was presented by Vice
Admiral Lyons to the CINCs conference and then to the CNO Executive Board. Admi-
ral Watkins then directed that every program appraisal address the strategy stoppers
that had been identified, thus establishing a formal and direct connection between the
Strategy and the POM process.
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In trying to “spread the gospel,” as Parker termed it, his goal was to have The Maritime
Strategy accepted as a strategic framework.8 Many people derisively described it as
merely a budget document designed to augment naval forces, but Parker and Seaquist
concentrated their efforts on combating this view. Doubling their efforts for this pur-
pose, the briefers asked for comments and corrections from all the commanders in
chief, not only the Navy CINCs. In particular, they briefed General Bernard Rogers,
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and all his component U.S. commanders; and
Admiral W. J. Crowe, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and his component commanders.
They also briefed CINC Readiness Command, CINC Southern Command, CINC Cen-
tral Command, and several former commanders in chief, including Admiral Robert
Long, former CINCPAC, and General Alexander Haig, former SACEUR. Through all
of these briefings, Parker and Seaquist worked to explain the strategy as the mari-
time component of a national strategy, which dovetailed naval aspects to those of the
other services.
In addition to the series of briefings to the CINCs, Parker briefed the professional staff
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 January 1985. Then, on 30
January 1985, Vice Admiral Lyons and Commander Parker presented the briefings to
Senator Barry Goldwater and the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
This was followed by another briefing to Congress when Lyons and Parker presented
the briefing to Congressman Charles E. Bennett and members of the House Subcom-
mittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials. These briefings to members of
Congress were particularly important since, as Parker described it, “we took on some
of our most ardent critics head to head.”9 These briefings were very successful. In his
report to Congressman Les Aspin later in the year, Congressman Bennett wrote,
The subcommittee finds that the maritime strategy is, in fact, a proper naval compo-
nent to national-level military strategy, and that the 600-ship navy as currently de-
scribed is a reasonable and balanced approach to meeting the force structure
requirements of that strategy.10
Through widespread emphasis on the concept as that of a strategy rather than just a
budgetary argument, Admiral Watkins frequently became personally involved. During
the period between January and June 1985, Watkins was most actively involved with
the further development and “selling” of the strategy. It was during this period that the
idea was developed to publish an unclassified article on “The Maritime Strategy” and a
first draft was made at that time. However, it was not until January 1986 that it ap-
peared as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The supple-
ment included the lead article by Watkins, “The Amphibious Warfare Strategy” by
General P. X. Kelley, “The 600-ship Navy” by John Lehman, and Captain Peter
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Swartz’s “Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography”11 [see Appendix II, pp.
185–277]. In Parker’s view, it was the direct involvement of Watkins in the strategy’s
development in OP-603 at this point that was the most salient contribution to his work
in that office.12
By July 1985, the bulk of the creative work for the third version of The Maritime Strat-
egy had been completed by Seaquist and Parker. It was at this point that Commander
Albert C. Myers was assigned to OP-603 as Parker’s relief while Parker went on to the
Office of the Secretary of the Navy. What remained to be done was to collate the final
recommendations and changes from the various CINCs and Washington offices as well
as to shepherd the document through a conference of OpNav and Fleet staff planners
in a working-level conference. After this was completed, the draft document had to be
submitted up the chain of command for the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations.
This was completed on 1 November 1985 when Admiral Watkins formally signed the
third version of The Maritime Strategy.13
The next major phase was begun by Seaquist’s successor as Head of the Strategic Con-
cepts Branch, Captain Thomas M. Daly. Daly saw his task as capitalizing on the mo-
mentum of his predecessors and broadening familiarity with The Maritime Strategy
both within and without the navy, while keeping the strategy responsive to the realities
of the developing capabilities of the navy and changes in Soviet armed forces. An ag-
gressive briefing schedule was developed, which included expanded contacts and dia-
logue with civilians at the unclassified level, at both universities and institutions such
as Brookings, Georgetown University, CSIS, etc. As this developed, it created significant
comment and discussion among academies concerned with strategic issues.
By the end of 1986, there was a large amount of discussion, not only in the Proceedings
and in the Naval War College Review but in newspapers, magazines, and journals. Im-
portant comments were made by John J. Mearsheimer in International Security, which
were paired with an article by Captain Linton Brooks.14 In addition, in his Maritime
Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defense of the West15 Dr. Colin S. Gray made some interest-
ing comments on the criticisms of Ambassador Robert Komer about The Maritime
Strategy. As the public debate grew wider, it became the basis of discussion in univer-
sity lecture courses, such as that offered by Professor Paul M. Kennedy at Yale,
“Seapower Past and Present,”16 and even in the works of novelists Tom Clancy and
Larry Bond in their best selling book, Red Storm Rising.
In January 1987, President Reagan delivered to Congress a public and unclassified
statement of National Security Strategy of the United States. Rear Admiral W. A. Cockell
developed this document while serving as Special Assistant to the President for Defense
Policy. It was based on the classified update to the NSDD on National Security completed
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in the summer of 1986. Sweeping widely across the spectrum of American strategy, a few
paragraphs clearly reflected the development of The Maritime Strategy that had been the
focus of a decade’s effort by navy strategists. Most significantly, the report stated:
Maritime superiority enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographical vulnerabilities
and to pose a global threat to the Soviets’ interests. It plays a key role in plans for the
defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie
down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile sub-
marines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland, and thereby to mini-
mize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe by sea.17
By the end of 1986, the public and professional discussion of the issues surrounding
The Maritime Strategy had taken a sophisticated form. The issues of naval strategy
could be, and were, understood and being debated widely. This contrasted starkly with
the absence of such discussion a decade earlier, and at the same time, seemed to dem-
onstrate a widespread appreciation of strategy within the officer corps. The formative
phase for The Maritime Strategy had clearly ended in the years between 1984 and 1986.
Its development was closely associated in the mind of the public with the names of
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and Admiral James Watkins who, in the Reagan
administration, had been the catalysts who successfully brought the issues and ideas to
the fore as the public spokesmen for them. Within the navy, many individuals made
claim to having been the “father” of the Strategy. As this study shows, the ideas in The
Maritime Strategy have long roots that were in fact the cumulative and complementary
contributions of many naval officers over many years and several administrations.
Among the many contributions that have resulted in The Maritime Strategy, one can
point to several key influences beginning with the strategy studies under Admiral
Zumwalt’s tenure as CNO in the early 1970s, the efforts of the navy staff under Admiral
Holloway to come to grips with ways to “size the Navy,” the contributions of the ana-
lysts at the Center for Naval Analyses in identifying a new area for research on Soviet
strategic thinking, and the further development and refinement of that basis in the Of-
fice of Naval Intelligence. Admiral Hayward’s contributions were widespread and in-
cluded the Sea Strike Study, which complemented the Navy Department’s Sea Plan
2000, and later his Strategic Principles, his organization of the navy staff, an intensified
effort to understand Soviet naval strategy, and the creation of the Strategic Studies
Group. Then, there was Admiral Small’s key effort to rationalize the budget process in
terms of strategic purposes, and with this comes the contributions of the Naval War-
fare Directorate, OP-603 and the Strategic Studies Group in formulating ideas and
breaking down the barriers that hindered discussion of strategy within the navy. These
contributions were particularly important in facilitating the cross-fertilization of
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strategic thought, which was essential in the development of a widely accepted strategic
concept based on current assessments of both Soviet capabilities and intentions as well
as in terms of U.S. goals for a peacetime strategy of deterrence that could be effective in
war, if needed. In this context, Lehman and Watkins clearly deserve credit for their ef-
forts in further coordinating ideas and helping to bring the diverse segments of the
navy together, focusing on the basic and continuing strategic issues. The appointments
of Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost as Chief of Naval Operations in 1986, of James Webb as
Secretary of the Navy in 1987, and of General Alfred Gray as Commandant of the Ma-
rine Corps coincided with the transition to a new phase in the further development of
American naval strategic thinking.
As one looks back over this decade, it is apparent that various levels of government
worked in the development of strategy. A process of education and the development of
a heightened interest in strategic issues within the naval officer corps paralleled the de-
velopment and application of strategic concepts. One may see here an attempt to apply
some of the abstract, theoretical ideas of writers such as Mahan, Eccles, and Wylie. At
the same time, one can see the natural stresses between various levels of decision mak-
ing as they dealt with strategy in terms of the different needs, constraints, and func-
tions that come into play at different levels. For example, one can clearly see this in
strategic analysts’ examination of the issues in terms of geopolitical studies or in Sena-
tors’ and Congressmen’s reactions in terms of domestic political issues. Within the De-
partment of Defense itself, other issues were raised as broad budgetary constraints
were applied to weapons procurement matters in terms of strategy, while at the same
time, elements of the bureaucracy took initiative or reacted to one another explaining
their positions in terms of strategy, war plans, and exercises in preparation for wartime
operations.
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Preface
During the eight years since publication of NIE 11-15-74, the last estimate devoted to
the Soviet Navy’s strategy and programs, there have been many notable developments
in that force, particularly concerning new weapon systems. The Soviets have, for
example:
• Deployed long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).
• Deployed their first sea-based, fixed-wing tactical aircraft and probably decided to
construct their first aircraft carrier capable of handling high-performance aircraft.
• Achieved significant developments in the application of nuclear propulsion to war-
ships.
• Continued the modernization of their fleet through the deployment of a new class of
ballistic missile submarine, four new classes of general purpose submarines, and
four new classes of principal surface combatants.
• Begun testing a long-range land-attack cruise missile capable of being launched
from a variety of submarine, surface, and air platforms.
The substantial allocation of resources for such programs indicates a continued, and
probably growing, recognition by Soviet leaders of the value of naval forces in the at-
tainment of wartime and peacetime goals. These programs also raise questions about
the future use of such forces and whether their development indicates basic changes in
Soviet naval doctrine and strategy.1
Many aspects of Soviet naval developments have already been addressed in publica-
tions by individual departments and agencies, particularly technical studies and
short-term assessments. The subject is also treated as portions of recent estimates
(11-14, 11-10, and 11-3/8) and in memorandums (on readiness and on sea lines of
communication). In contrast to those studies, the major focus of this Estimate is on the
overall significance of current and projected programs for Soviet naval strategy in the
late 1980s and the decade of the 1990s, including some of the major options open to
the Soviets for performing critical naval tasks. (Nonnaval responses to the maritime
threat facing the USSR, such as air defense against sea-launched land-attack missiles,
are treated only peripherally in this Estimate.) The groundwork for this assessment is
laid by outlining the navy’s current status—its major tasks and the forces that would
seek to accomplish them. In addition to providing a basis for examining future devel-
opments, an understanding of current forces is especially important for naval estimates
because of the long time needed to develop naval systems and the long service life of
ships and aircraft. Most of the submarine and major surface combatant classes and
many of the aircraft that will be in the Soviet Navy of 1995 are already in service today.
The Soviets recognize that their navy is facing severe challenges to the performance of
its missions as a result of improvements in Western naval forces, particularly quieter
submarines, longer range SLBMs, greater numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles, and
improving defensive systems. To meet these challenges, the Soviets support a variety of
research and development efforts. Many of these programs have been identified, and
we can make some evaluation of their capabilities based on knowledge of past Soviet
programs and current technological state of the art. By extrapolating from such infor-
mation, the general nature of future Soviet naval weapons and sensors can be dis-
cussed. Such extrapolations may prove wrong, however, because assessments of
evolutionary technical progress may be upset by “breakthroughs” that cannot be pre-
dicted on the basis of an understanding of the current state of the art. This is particu-
larly important in those aspects of the Soviet research effort, such as nonacoustic
antisubmarine warfare and space-based ocean reconnaissance/targeting, that involve
innovative solutions to naval problems. This Estimate considers some of the potential
consequences of such breakthroughs in key areas and speculates on how the Soviets
might attempt to exploit such successes.
Finally, the development of the Soviet Navy will occur within the broad context of
changes in the Soviet system and the international environment. Although a detailed
treatment of such subjects is beyond the scope of this Estimate, some of the possible
relationships among such factors as the post-Brezhnev succession, economic problems,
arms control negotiations, and an increased emphasis on influencing developments in
the Third World have been sketched out, especially as they might affect force
procurement.
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Key Judgments
Over the past decade, the role of the navy within the USSR’s national strategy has
continued to evolve, supported by additional operational experience and an ambi-
tious naval construction program. This program, emphasizing larger ships with in-
creased endurance and technologically advanced weapon and electronic systems, has
enhanced the navy’s capability for sustained conventional combat and distant area
deployments.
Within the Soviets’ overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the
navy remain:
• To deploy and provide protection for ballistic missile submarines in preparation for
and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes.
• To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines
and aircraft carriers.
Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of the
Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland seas, the seas of Japan and
Okhotsk, and the Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea-denial operations be-
yond those areas to about 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. We believe that virtu-
ally all of the Northern and Pacific Fleets’ available major surface combatants and
combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would be
committed initially to operations in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks are:
support of ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations (includ-
ing countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as Norway),
and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
We believe this wartime strategy will remain essentially unchanged over the next 15 to
20 years. Strategic strike—including protection of nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs)—and strategic defense against enemy SSBNs, aircraft carriers,
and other major platforms capable of striking Soviet territory will continue to be the
Soviet Navy’s primary initial wartime tasks. We expect these requirements—particu-
larly the need to counter Western units armed with the new Tomahawk land-attack
cruise missile—will drive the Soviets to expand the area in which their navy would ini-
tially deploy the bulk of its Northern and Pacific Fleet forces for sea-control/sea-denial
operations—possibly out to 3,000 kilometers from Soviet territory.
A principal portion of the strategic defense task—the destruction of enemy SSBNs
before they can launch their missiles (SLBMs)—will pose increasing difficulties for
the Soviets. The deployment of hard-target-capable US SLBMs, improved British
and French SSBNs, and the first Chinese SSBNs probably will increase the impor-
tance of this task. The Soviet Navy’s ability to detect and track US SSBNs in the
open ocean, however, probably will decline, at least over the next 10 years. This is
primarily because we believe that the increased patrol areas of SSBNs carrying Tri-
dent SLBMs will more than offset the increased coverage that could be provided by
improved Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) platforms. We therefore expect that
Soviet naval anti-SSBN operations will continue to be modest, with relatively few at-
tack submarines stationed in choke points or in the approaches to Western or Chinese
submarine bases.
We believe that Soviet procurement of naval weapons platforms and systems over the
period of this Estimate will be driven primarily by requirements stemming from the
strategic offensive and defensive tasks outlined above:
• The size of the modern ballistic missile submarine force will probably remain
roughly constant at about 60 units throughout the 1990s. In the absence of new
arms control restrictions, the number of SLBM warheads is likely to increase.
• The Soviets will develop long-range nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missiles capa-
ble of being launched from a variety of naval platforms. In the absence of arms con-
trol restrictions, we believe they will be deployed primarily on newer
nuclear-powered attack submarines for use in theater strike roles and possibly for
strikes against some targets in the continental United States.
• The first unit of a new class of nuclear-powered aircraft carrier probably will become
operational by about 1990.
• The number of principal surface combatants probably will decline somewhat, but
the trend toward larger average size, greater weapon loads, and more sophisticated
weapon and electronic systems will continue.
• The overall number of general purpose submarines will decline, but the number of
nuclear-powered units probably will grow substantially.
• The navy’s overall amphibious lift capability will increase gradually. We expect an in-
crease in the size of the naval infantry from some 14,000 to about 18,000 to 20,000
men.
• One or more new classes of underway replenishment ships will be introduced, but
construction of such ships probably will continue to receive a relatively low priority.
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• The number of fixed-wing naval aircraft probably will increase somewhat, with the
major change being the first at-sea deployment of high-performance, conventional
takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The continued production of Backfire bombers
and the introduction of a follow-on in the 1990s will be an essential element in the
Soviets’ attempts to expand their sea-control/sea-denial efforts against Western sur-
face forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean seas and
the Northwest Pacific Basin. Naval aviation bombers will also remain a principal fea-
ture of Soviet antisurface capabilities in other areas such as the Arabian Sea.
• Major technical improvements in Soviet fleet air defense are likely. New surface-to-
air missiles, guns, and laser weapons will probably be introduced. Fighter aircraft
operating from the projected new aircraft carriers will add a new dimension to the
navy’s air defense resources.
• Expansion of both sea-control and sea-denial operations will be supported by grad-
ual improvements in Soviet capability to surveil Western surface units and provide
targeting assistance for antiship missiles. Much of the improvement probably will in-
volve space-based systems.
In addition to its wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy will continue to play important peace-
time roles, ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to support for distant-area
client states during crisis situations and limited wars. Given the likelihood of continued
instability in the Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power projection
techniques probably will increase during the 1980s and 1990s.
The most notable change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate prob-
ably will be the introduction of its first aircraft carriers equipped to handle high-
performance CTOL aircraft. We believe that the primary mission of such carriers will
be to help expand Northern and Pacific Fleet sea-control operations during a general
war. The carriers will also give the Soviet Navy for the first time an ability to project
power ashore effectively in distant areas in a limited war. Together with other force im-
provements, they will provide the Soviets the option of using naval force in a number
of Third World situations against all but the most well-armed regional powers. We be-
lieve that major Soviet Navy task force participation in Third World conflicts would,
however, be restricted to limited war situations in which the Soviets judged the risk of
escalation to war with the United States or NATO to be small.
Our best estimate on the future of the Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the
trends we have observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and strategy over the past
20 years will continue. Among the variables that could dictate a different course for the
Soviet Navy of the 1990s are:
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• A major ASW breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and
track enemy submarines in the open ocean. Although unlikely throughout the pe-
riod of this Estimate, such a breakthrough would substantially increase the navy’s
ability to perform the critically important strategic defensive task of destroying
enemy ballistic missile and land-attack cruise missile submarines before they
launched their missiles. It would probably lead to major changes in the way the So-
viets would deploy their general purpose naval forces before and during general
war.
• Arms control negotiations, which could play an important part in determining the
role within Soviet strategy and the force composition of the Soviet Navy in the
1990s. For example, severe restrictions on sea-launched cruise missile characteristics
and/or deployment would alleviate a serious maritime threat to the USSR and elimi-
nate much of the pressure to conduct sea-denial operations at greater distances from
Soviet territory.
• Severe economic problems, which could lead to a reduction of Soviet defense spend-
ing in the 1990s. Such a reduction would be likely to result in cuts in the navy’s bud-
get, perhaps falling heaviest on major surface ship programs such as the expected
new aircraft carrier, projected nuclear-powered cruisers, and large amphibious and
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SOVIET NAVAL COMMANDER
One change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate will be the depar-
ture of Sergei Gorshkov, an admiral since 1941, who became commander of the
Soviet Navy in 1956.
replenishment ships. The net result of such cuts would be a navy with less capability
than the one projected in our best estimate to control waters beyond the range of
land-based tactical aircraft and to project power in distant areas. Programs considered
essential to the navy’s primary strategic offensive and defensive tasks—such as ballistic
missile submarines, attack and cruise missile submarines, land-based strike aircraft,
and ASW-oriented surface combatants—probably would suffer few, if any, cuts.
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Discussion
I. Current Naval Strategy and Programs
A. Introduction
1. By the mid-1970s, when this Estimate was last produced, the Soviet Navy had
evolved from a force primarily oriented to close-in defense of maritime frontiers
to one designed to undertake a wide variety of naval tasks, ranging from strategic
nuclear strikes to worldwide peacetime naval diplomacy. Since then, Soviet naval
employment within an overall national strategy has continued to evolve, sup-
ported by an ambitious naval construction program and additional operational expe-
rience. This chapter describes our understanding of Soviet programs and current
naval strategy, particularly how Soviet forces would be employed initially during a
general war.
B. Force Composition, Organization, and Readiness
2. The primary forces of the Soviet Navy consist of 85 ballistic missiles and 278 gen-
eral purpose submarines, 284 large surface combatants, and some 1,200 naval
combat aircraft. They are organized into four fleets—the Northern, Baltic, Black
Sea, and Pacific Fleets (see figure 1). The Soviet Navy maintains two standing de-
ployed forces, the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean Squadrons, which draw their
forces primarily from the Northern and Black Sea Fleets and the Pacific Fleet,
respectively.
3. Control of the armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries in wartime would be trans-
ferred to a Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK), with the Soviet General Staff
as its executive agent. To give this centralized command structure some flexibility,
the Soviets have divided areas of anticipated military action into geographical en-
tities called theaters of military operations (TVDs), including probably four
ocean TVDs (see figure 2). High commands established in these TVDs probably
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would directly control those forces within their respective areas, except for those
forces, including SSBNs, remaining under the control of the VGK:
• We believe the Northern Fleet commander controls all general purpose
military operations in the Arctic and Atlantic TVDs. Some units, such as those
involved in amphibious operations, probably would be subordinate to the
command of the Northwestern TVD, emphasizing operations against Norway.
We believe that, for efficient command and control, a high command would be
created for this TVD. We also believe that the bulk of the Northern Fleet’s
forces would operate within the Arctic Ocean TVD—this TVD would probably
encompass all sea areas north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
(GIUK) gap. Strategic forces, including SSBNs and aircraft on strategic
missions, operating in these ocean TVDs would be under the direct control of
the VGK.
1 1 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Fleet Headquarters
Vladivostok
Kaliningrad
Severomorsk
Sevastopol’
*MOSCOW
Soviet Union
BALTIC FLEET
Major Surface Combatants
Kiev-Class Aircraft
Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates1
11
29
Aircraft
Bombardment
Ground Attack
ASW
98
38
48
Submarines
Ballistic Missile
Cruise Missile
Torpedo Attack
6
5
25
NORTHERN FLEET
Major Surface Combatants
Bombardment
Ground Attack
ASW
Ballistic Missile
Cruise Missile
Torpedo Attack
Submarines
1
12
13
49
75
21
128
46
33
102
BLACK SEA FLEET
Major Surface Combatants Aircraft
Kiev-Class Aircraft
Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Bombardment
ASW
Submarines
Ballistic Missile
Cruise Missile
Torpedo Attack
1
11
22
48
102
118
1
3
25
PACIFIC FLEET
Major Surface Combatants
Kiev-Class Aircraft
Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Aircraft
Bombardment
Ground Attack
ASW
Submarines
Ballistic Missile
Cruise Missile
Torpedo Attack
1
13
16
56
122
16
144
32
23
62
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Aircraft
FIGURE 1
Major Soviet Naval Forcesa
a. Information as of 1 July 1982. These figures do not include units in reserve. Among the other units in the Soviet Navy are some 160
patrol combatants, 85 amphibious warfare ships, 145 mine warfare ships, 80 underway replenishment ships, and 250 other combat
aircraft (reconnaissance, refueling, etc.). Black Sea Fleet figures include the units of the Caspian Sea Flotilla. Naval infantry consists of
a division in the Pacific Fleet and one brigade in each of the three western fleets.
• The subordination of Pacific Fleet forces and the responsibility of the fleet
commander probably are similar to those of the Northern Fleet. We believe
that the Pacific Fleet Commander would control all general purpose military
operations in the Pacific Ocean TVD. Some units, such as those planned for
operations against China and the Japanese islands, probably would be
controlled by the high command of the Far East TVD. The Indian Ocean
Squadron would be subordinate to the Pacific Fleet—possibly in a separate
Indian Ocean TVD—unless a high command were formed in the Southern
TVD, in which case, the squadron would be responsive to the high command.
As in the Northern Fleet, forces performing strategic missions in the Pacific
Ocean TVD would be under the direct control of the VGK.
• The Baltic Fleet, as part of a combined fleet with the Polish and East German
navies, would be subordinate to the high command of the Western TVD. This
theater would encompass primarily operations against West Germany, Denmark,
the Benelux countries, and France, and NATO forces in the Baltic and North Seas.
• The Black Sea Fleet, as part of a combined fleet with the Bulgarian and
Romanian navies—as well as the forces of the Mediterranean Squadron—
would be subordinate to the high command of the Southwestern TVD,
encompassing primarily operations against Turkey, Greece, and Italy, and
NATO forces in the Mediterranean.
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FIGURE 2
Probable Soviet Ocean Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs)
4. Readiness Philosophy. Although Soviet naval presence has expanded globally in the
past two decades, only a relatively small portion of the Soviet Navy is still regu-
larly deployed away from home waters. This is due largely to the Soviet approach
to readiness, which differs markedly from that of Western navies. Generally
speaking, the Soviet readiness philosophy stresses readiness to deploy for combat
on relatively short notice rather than routine deployment of large forces. To
achieve a maximum force generation capability in times of crisis, the Soviet Navy
emphasizes maintenance and in-port/in-area training rather than extended at-sea
operations. Even Soviet naval units deployed out-of-area spend much of their
time at anchor or in port. To the Soviet mind, it apparently is more important to
be ready to go to sea than to be at sea. Under this system, operational experience
and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to achieve high material avail-
ability. As a result of this readiness philosophy, the Soviets probably would have
more than half of their submarines and major surface combatants available for
combat within a few days and some 70 percent within two weeks. We estimate
that, given several days’ warning, Soviet Naval Aviation would have more than 90
percent of its aircraft available, although this percentage could be sustained for
only a short time.
C. Key Aspects of Naval Doctrine
5. Soviet View of General War. The Soviets’ military writings indicate that they
believe a war with the West would be decisive, be global in scope, and probably
escalate to a nuclear conflict. They probably expect that such a war would begin
in Central Europe following a period of rising international tensions and
would spread to the Far East, as China enters to take advantage of Soviet in-
volvement in Europe. In the Soviet view, the conflict would probably evolve
through four stages:
• A conventional phase in which a NATO offensive is checked by the Warsaw Pact.
• A period of limited theater nuclear war in which the Pact detects NATO
preparations to use nuclear weapons and preempts.
• A decisive phase with large-scale use of nuclear weapons, both
intercontinentally and within theater.
• A concluding phase in which residual nuclear and conventional forces come
into play.
There have been recent indications that the Soviets expect a more protracted con-
ventional war phase than was anticipated in the 1960s and early 1970s.
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6. Regardless of the length of the conventional phase, the Soviets probably doubt
that a war with the West would be decided at the conventional level. Therefore,
initial conventional operations would be conducted with an eye toward escala-
tion. During the initial phase of operations, the Soviets probably would attempt
to destroy with conventional munitions as much as possible of the enemy’s the-
ater and sea-based nuclear weapons and supporting facilities. We do not believe
the Soviets consider that the destruction of potential strategic assets, such as
SSBNs, during the conventional phase would by itself trigger an escalation to the
use of nuclear weapons.
7. [TEXT DELETED]
8. Soviet Wartime Tasks. Our examination of Soviet naval writings, exercises, and
construction trends allows us to estimate the Soviet Navy’s initial wartime tasks
with a good deal of confidence. It also permits an understanding of the Soviets’
relative priorities in fighting a war with the West. Since the 1960s, naval exercises
and writings have consistently emphasized specific offensive and defensive tasks
to be performed concurrently during the first stages of a war with NATO. These
tasks are:
• To deploy and provide “combat stability”(that is, protection and support) for
ballistic missile submarines in preparation for and conduct of strategic and
theater nuclear strikes.
• To defend the USSR and its allies from enemy sea-based strike forces.
• To support ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations,
including protecting Pact sea lines of communication and preventing naval
support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as Norway.
• To conduct some interdiction of enemy sea lines of communication.
9. The pattern of implementation of these tasks undoubtedly would vary from fleet
to fleet. The Northern and Pacific Fleets would initially be concerned with de-
ploying and protecting their SSBNs. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, on the other
hand, would initially concentrate on supporting operations in the land theaters.
Combating enemy strike groups, especially carrier battle groups, approaching the
USSR would also be a major initial concern of all four fleets.
10. The Soviets realize that a conflict may not unfold as they expect. In this case, they
would be prepared to reexamine their initial force allocations in these tasks. How-
ever, readiness to conduct strategic strikes, including the protection of their SSBN
forces, and to attack enemy sea-based nuclear forces would be likely to remain
their major concerns, regardless of scenario. The following paragraphs examine
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the navy’s principal tasks in the context of the standard scenario, as evidenced by
their writings and military exercises.
D. Strategic Strike
11. The Soviets regard strategic strike against enemy land targets as the primary naval
mission. This priority stems from the Soviet belief that a war with the West would
probably escalate to the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and from the capability
of SLBMs to strike strategically important targets. According to Fleet Admiral of
the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, SLBMs give navies, for the first time in history,
the capability to directly affect “the course and even the outcome” of a war. The
Soviet Navy’s 62 modern SSBNs, over half of which are D-class units capable of
striking the continental United States while remaining in home waters, carry a
total of 920 SLBMs.
12. The day-to-day disposition of Soviet SSBNs is governed by the wartime require-
ment to generate maximum force levels on short notice. The Soviet Navy seeks to
maintain 75 percent of its SSBNs in an operational status, with the remaining 25
percent in long-term repair. [TEXT DELETED] Every operational SSBN could
probably be deployed with three weeks’ preparation time. To maintain this high
state of readiness, a relatively small portion of the modern SSBN force—typically
about 25 percent or 14 units—is kept deployed at sea. However, additional D and
Y-class units are probably kept in a high state of readiness in or near home port in
order to be ready to fire their missiles on short notice.
13. We believe most SLBMs would be targeted against administrative centers, com-
munications facilities, and industrial and soft military targets, largely because
they do not now have the combination of accuracy and yield to destroy hardened
military targets. Some SSBNs, particularly the forward-deployed Ys, probably
would participate in initial strikes against the continental United States. Many
SSBNs, however, probably would be withheld for subsequent strikes or as a resid-
ual strategic force. It is feasible that by using the three Amga-class missile support
ships, the Soviets could reload some SSBNs that had participated in the initial
strikes. SLBMs are ideally suited for follow-on strikes, since they are more likely
to survive initial nuclear operations than ICBMs in fixed silos, and will remain
less vulnerable to subsequent strikes.
14. Protection and Support for SSBNs. The Soviets have long been concerned with the
vulnerability of their submarines to ASW forces. Soviet authors frequently cite the
experience of the two World Wars to reject the notion that submarines can ensure
their own survival through concealed operations. Rather, since at least the 1960s,
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they have discussed the need to use general purpose forces, including large surface
combatants, to protect and support or provide “combat stability” to ballistic mis-
sile submarines. Such writings strongly imply that providing combat stability to
SSBNs is an integral part of the strategic strike mission and the most important
initial wartime task of a significant number of Northern and Pacific Fleet general
purpose forces.
15. We believe that the Soviets plan to support and protect their SSBNs through an
echeloned defense in-depth. This defense would likely begin while the SSBNs are
still in port and continue as they are dispersed and enter assigned operating areas.
Surface combatants, mine warfare ships, and ASW aircraft [SIDEBAR DELETED]
probably would be used to sanitize SSBN transit routes. General purpose subma-
rines probably would escort transiting SSBNs and, along with aircraft, establish
barrier patrols in the approaches to SSBN operating areas. Surface combatant task
groups also would probably operate in the vicinity of such areas to assist in com-
bating enemy SSNs and ASW aircraft.
16. Protection of SSBN operating areas entails attempts to control all or large por-
tions of the Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland seas as well as
the seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the area off the Kamchatka Peninsula. It also
involves sea-denial operations beyond these areas to about 2,000 kilometers from
Soviet territory. Some facets of the echeloned defense, such as the operation of at-
tack submarines in proximity to SSBNs and protection of the waters near the ice
edge, would serve only one main purpose—the protection of SSBNs—because the
only Western units likely to be in such areas would be those attempting to attack
the SSBNs. Most of the units involved in the echeloned defense, however, would
also contribute to other important tasks, particularly the defense of Soviet terri-
tory from attacks by Western forces and the prevention of naval support to Allied
operations in peripheral areas such as Norway and Korea. Attack submarines, air-
craft, and any surface combatants operating near the GIUK gap, for example,
would seek to destroy any Western submarines or major surface combatants de-
tected, thereby protecting both the SSBNs and the Soviet homeland. Forces oper-
ating in these waters, therefore, would be accomplishing several important tasks
at the same time.
17. We believe that virtually all major surface combatants and combat aircraft avail-
able in the Northern and Pacific Fleets and some three-quarters of their attack
submarines would be initially committed to conducting “sea-control” and “sea-
denial” operations in these waters (see figures 3 and 4 and accompanying text in-
set), leaving relatively few units available for operations in areas such as the North
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Atlantic and Central Pacific. Given the likelihood that many SSBNs will be with-
held from initial strikes, the requirement to protect SSBNs could tie down sub-
stantial assets for an extended period. The Soviets probably would be reluctant to
release substantial forces from this task until most missiles had been launched,
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FIGURE 3
Current Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Western TVDs
The outer edge of the initial Northern and Black Sea Fleet sea-denial areas generally conforms to the 2,000-kilometer naval defense
thresholds. These initial sea-denial areas undoubtedly would expand or contract to take into account geographic features in each
fleet area, such as the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap and the Strait of Sicily. Initial sea-denial operations by the Baltic
Fleet probably would be limited to the North Sea and Baltic approaches.
they perceived that the threat had significantly lessened, or the course of the con-
flict dictated increased emphasis on other tasks.
18. There are indications that suggest that during wartime a fleet’s assets not assigned
to deployed squadrons or “independent” operations relatively far from the Soviet
Union would operate as “mixed force” groups. We do not fully understand how
the operations of the general purpose forces, normally under fleet control, will be
meshed with those of the SSBNs, a VGK asset. The fleet commander probably
would be responsible for coordinating the operations of the separate groups. The
Soviets probably intend that this structure would result in simplified transition to
a wartime posture, improved responsiveness to rapidly developing situations, and
increased flexibility in resource allocations, particularly in the support and pro-
tection of SSBNs.
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FIGURE 4
Current Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Pacific Ocean
E. Strategic Defense
19. Anti-SSBN. The Soviet Navy’s most critical defensive task is the destruction of en-
emy SSBNs before they can launch their missiles. The Soviets probably recognize,
however, that there is a wide gap between the importance of this task and the ca-
pability of their current forces to carry it out. Soviet writings acknowledge the
enormous firepower present in even a single Western SSBN, and we believe they
recognize the desirability of attacking such units during the conventional phase of
hostilities. They also probably recognize, however, that they do not now have the
capability to detect US SSBNs operating in open-ocean areas or to maintain con-
tact or trail if a chance detection occurs. The deployment of the US Trident mis-
sile system, whose greater range opens up even larger ocean areas that must be
searched, further complicates the Soviets’ task. The Soviet Navy, realizing the
magnitude of the problem and its shortcomings, probably will concentrate its
anti-SSBN efforts on choke points and the approaches to enemy SSBN bases
rather than attempting to search larger ocean areas. On occasion, surface combat-
ants, attack submarines, intelligence collectors (AGIs), and aircraft have con-
ducted joint ASW operations off the Rockall Bank, west of the US and British
SSBN bases near Holy Loch, Scotland, during major exercises. We have also seen
joint AGI-SSN operations off SSBN bases in the United States. We therefore be-
lieve that the Soviets would station intelligence collection ships, nuclear attack
submarines, and possibly even surface combatants off Western bases in the period
preceding hostilities and attempt to detect and trail SSBNs leaving port. Once
hostilities commenced, they would attack any submarine they held in contact.
Some of their best ASW submarines probably would be used in this effort, al-
though the number would be small relative to the number committed to protect
Soviet SSBNs.
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SEA-CONTROL AND SEA-DENIAL OPERATIONS
The terms “sea control” and “sea denial” are subject to a variety of inter-
pretations. Generally a state is considered to have “sea control” in an area
if it is able to sustain surface combatant and merchant ship operations
there with relative security. It is considered to exercise “sea denial” if it pre-
vents such use of the area by its opponent.
The terms “sea control” and “sea denial” are used in this Estimate to indi-
cate the type of naval effort the Soviets probably expect to conduct in vari-
ous maritime areas at the beginning of a NATO–Warsaw Pact war. Areas
labeled “sea control” are those in which the Soviets probably intend to
operate surface forces, as well as submarines and naval aircraft, for an in-
definite period. Areas labeled “sea denial” are those in which the Soviets
probably expect the major share of the combat to be conducted by sub-
marines and land-based strike aircraft. Surface ship operations in these
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waters will be either nonexistent or of a short duration at the initiation of
hostilities. The term “less intensive sea denial” is used to indicate a lower
level of effort, primarily by submarines.
The delineation of these areas is heavily influenced by the impact of geog-
raphy on Soviet naval operations. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are sepa-
rated from open-ocean areas by narrow straits that would be under
Western control at the beginning of hostilities. Northern Fleet units would
have to transit the GIUK gap if they wished to reach the North Atlantic.
Most of the Pacific Fleet units are in a similar situation, with only
Petropavlovsk having direct access to the open Pacific.
The Northern Fleet. A major consideration in Northern Fleet operations
is NATO control of the passages between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes,
and the United Kingdom. Soviet wartime operations in the region of these
waters would be likely to involve primarily submarines, which would at-
tack NATO forces attempting to enter the Norwegian Sea through these
passages. Operations in this area would contribute to several tasks, includ-
ing protecting Soviet SSBNs and territory and countering Western naval
support to NATO forces in Norway. This area probably would also be a fo-
cus for antiship operations by Backfire bombers, which are much better
suited than the older Badgers to deal with the likely air defense environ-
ment in this area. Also, Backfire and other bomber attacks can be ex-
pected on ASW, early warning, and air defense facilities in the gap area.
Operations within the sea-control area are likely to involve surface ships,
submarines, and strike aircraft. Farther north the Soviets probably intend
to use geographic features such as the ice edge and Soviet islands such as
Novaya Zemlya to facilitate the operation of their forces, particularly their
SSBNs and supporting general purpose forces.
The Baltic Fleet. Operations of the Baltic Fleet in wartime would be
heavily influenced by Western control of the narrow Danish straits and by
the proximity of the Baltic to major ground and air operations in Central
Europe. It is likely that the major effort of the Fleet and the East German
and Polish navies would be directed at controlling the Baltic through the
use of surface units, submarines, and a variety of aircraft, including naval
fighter-bombers. The Pact would also attempt to deny NATO the use of
the North Sea as an operating area for aircraft carriers and a transit area
for amphibious groups and logistic units. The principal weapon in such op-
erations probably would be medium bombers, although they would have
to overfly NATO territory to reach their targets. Because of its narrow
straits and shallow waters, the Baltic is a particularly good area for the em-
ployment of mines.
The Black Sea Fleet. The Soviets and their Romanian and Bulgarian allies
would employ surface, submarine, and air assets in sea-control operations
within the Black Sea. Sea-denial operations by the Soviets in the eastern
Mediterranean could involve prehostilities reinforcement of their Mediter-
ranean Squadron. Unless the Pact actually controlled the Turkish straits,
however, Soviet attempts to continue sea-denial operations in the eastern
Mediterranean would be hampered by the difficulty of reinforcing the
Mediterranean Squadron with additional surface ships and submarines
once hostilities had begun. Air operations in the Mediterranean would
also be constrained by the need for aircraft based in Pact territory to pene-
trate Western air defenses. Although significant numbers of Soviet surface
20. Anticarrier. The Soviets continue to have great respect for the aircraft carrier’s im-
portance in US naval strategy. They regard the aircraft carriers not only as the
backbone of American general purpose naval forces, but also an important nu-
clear reserve force that could play a significant role in determining the outcome of
the final phases of hostilities. Writings and exercise activity indicate that the Sovi-
ets expect US carrier battle groups to undertake vigorous offensive actions in the
maritime approaches to the USSR. They believe that carrier battle groups would
attempt to use the Norwegian, the North, and the eastern Mediterranean seas and
the northwestern Pacific Ocean to attack Warsaw Pact territory, deployed naval
forces including SSBNs and their supporting forces, and Pact ground force opera-
tions. Destruction of aircraft carriers, therefore, is a critical element of several im-
portant Soviet naval tasks.
21. Cruise missile submarines and strike aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles
(ASMs) are the Soviets’ primary anticarrier weapons. In addition to more than 300
naval Backfire (see inset, p. 128, and figure 5) and Badger strike aircraft, some ele-
ments of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) and Air Armies of the VGK (AAVGK) are also
assigned maritime strike tasks (see figure 6). AAVGK Bear B/C aircraft have been in-
volved in simulated strike missions against naval targets during recent Northern
and Pacific Fleet exercises. One Bear squadron has been modified to carry the AS-4
ASM—the same missile carried by the Backfire. We believe that all of the 65 to 70
AAVGK Bear B/Cs will be modified for this capability by the mid-1980s. SAF
Badgers and Blinders have also been involved in antiship exercises.
22. In wartime, these forces would attack carrier battle groups crossing fleet defensive
thresholds, generally some 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. Antiship-missile-
equipped surface combatants would also be used in areas where they are in prox-
imity to US carrier battle groups at the outset of hostilities or as carrier battle
groups approach Soviet sea-control areas. Soviet doctrine emphasizes
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units would be involved in initial operations in the Mediterranean, the So-
viets probably do not expect these would survive more than a few days.
The brunt of the subsequent sea denial effort would be carried by subma-
rines and aircraft.
The Pacific Fleet. Soviet control of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of
Okhotsk would depend on sealing off several narrow waterways, ranging
from the Korea Strait in the south to the Kuril Strait at the tip of the
Kamchatka Peninsula. Sea control operations would also be conducted
east of the Kamchatka Peninsula to protect the approaches to
Petropavlovsk, the only major Soviet naval base with direct access to the
open ocean. Sea denial operations would also be conducted in the Yellow
Sea and the northwestern Pacific. The outer edge of the sea-denial area is
less easily defined than in other fleet areas because such efforts cannot be
focused on narrow waterways through which Western units must pass.
preemptive or “first salvo” strikes against carriers before they can launch air
strikes. The Soviets would attempt to use tactical surprise and coordinated multi-
ple missile strikes on different threat axes to overwhelm battle group defenses.
F. Support for Land Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs)
23. Although the Soviet Navy has acquired increasingly important strategic offensive
and defensive tasks, support for combined-arms operations in the continental
TVDs remains a major responsibility of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and a sec-
ondary responsibility of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. In wartime, the Baltic
and Black Sea Fleets would join with navies of other Warsaw Pact nations to form
the Combined Baltic and Combined Black Sea Fleets, respectively. The broad ob-
jectives of these combined fleets would be to gain control of the Baltic and Black
seas and to help secure access to the North and Mediterranean seas. In the Baltic,
initial naval operations would focus on destruction of NATO submarines, missile-
armed patrol combatants, and naval aviation forces. Western carrier battle groups
would become primary targets as they moved into the North Sea. Amphibious
landings in support of ground and airborne attacks on West Germany and Den-
mark also are likely. In the Black Sea, initial naval operations would focus on sup-
porting the movement of ground forces along the western littoral and assisting in
seizing the Turkish straits. Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces would be pri-
marily responsible for patrol duties along their own coasts. The Soviet Black Sea
Fleet would assist Mediterranean Squadron operations against Western carrier
battle groups and amphibious forces. The Northern Fleet would also conduct am-
phibious operations in support of ground forces operations against northern
Norway. The wartime role of the Pacific Fleet’s amphibious forces is less well
understood. These forces could be used for the seizure of key straits such as La
Perouse or could be retained to defend Soviet coastal regions.
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FIGURE 5
TU-22M Backfire Bomber with AS-4 Antiship Missile
G. Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
24. The Soviets view SLOC interdiction as a less urgent task than providing combat
stability for their SSBNs and defeating the West’s nuclear-capable naval strike
forces. They believe that Warsaw Pact forces would defeat the main grouping of
NATO forces in Central Europe or the war would escalate to theater nuclear con-
flict before NATO’s seaborne reinforcement and resupply of Europe or US forces
in the Far East became a critical factor. Only a few forces—primarily diesel sub-
marines—would therefore be allocated to open-ocean SLOC interdiction from
the outset of hostilities. The Soviets probably plan to use such units for attacks on
shipping primarily to disperse and tie down NATO naval forces and to reduce the
efficiency of NATO military shipping. Some mining against European ports,
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THE BACKFIRE
The introduction of the Backfire bomber in 1974 into the navy significantly
improved Soviet strike capability against NATO surface forces. Because of
the modern, higher speed air-to-surface missile it carries, its variable flight
profiles, its maneuverability, and its high-speed capabilities and electronic
countermeasures (ECM) equipment, the Backfire has a greater probability
of penetrating or avoiding NATO naval air defenses and attacking targets
in the open ocean than does the Badger. Some 90 aircraft are in service
with Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), and additional aircraft are being intro-
duced at the rate of about 15 per year. SNA Backfires are currently orga-
nized into four complete regiments (two in the Baltic Fleet, one in the
Black Sea, and one in the Pacific). A fifth regiment is being formed in the
Pacific Fleet. For wartime operations the Soviets probably would deploy
aircraft from their peacetime locations to those areas from which they
could best operate against Western surface units, especially US carrier bat-
tle groups. The Soviets often deploy Backfires from one fleet area to an-
other for exercises; in particular, Baltic Fleet aircraft annually deploy to
Northern Fleet bases.
Although the Backfire is capable of carrying a variety of ordnance—includ-
ing bombs and mines—its principal antiship weapon is the AS-4 missile.
The AS-4 can be armed with either a conventional or nuclear warhead, has
a speed of Mach 3 plus, and has a maximum range of some 400 kilome-
ters. In wartime each SNA Backfire probably would carry one or two of
these missiles. To concentrate their firepower, the Soviets probably would
attack carrier battle groups with at least one regiment (20 aircraft) and
preferably two. Although Backfire operations over ocean areas have been
rare, the aircraft has participated in some antiship exercises against Soviet
units. In September 1982 the first use of the Backfire in a simulated strike
against a US carrier battle group occurred when Pacific Fleet units oper-
ated against two US carriers east of the Kuril Islands.
The Soviets undoubtedly view the Backfire as a vital part of their strategic
defense forces to keep Western carrier battle groups from striking important
targets within the Soviet landmass. The Backfire will continue to be an essen-
tial feature of Soviet antisurface capabilities in areas such as the Norwegian,
Mediterranean, and Arabian seas and the northwest Pacific Ocean.
primarily by aircraft, also is likely. Such actions probably would be intended to
complicate NATO naval operations and facilitate performance of the Pact’s more
critical initial tasks. The Soviets could increase their emphasis on SLOC interdic-
tion before or during a war with the United States and its allies in response to
their perception of a changing strategic situation. One circumstance that would
motivate the Soviets to widen their emphasis on SLOC interdiction would be the
lengthening of a war into a protracted conventional conflict. Another circum-
stance might be a conflict that began after a prolonged period of mobilization
during which NATO began the reinforcement and resupply of Europe by sea. In
such a case, the Soviets might see interdiction as an urgent task at the beginning
of hostilities, but an increased interdiction effort would be at the expense of SSBN
protection and the defense of the Soviet homeland.
H. Naval Diplomacy in Peacetime and Limited War
25. In addition to its wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy is assigned the important peace-
time role of serving as an instrument of state policy or, in more traditional terms,
conducting naval diplomacy. Today, Soviet naval forces maintain a continuous
presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic off West Africa,
and the South China Sea. They also conduct deployments to the Caribbean (see
figure 7). Although the level of presence has fluctuated within and between geo-
graphic areas (growing in the Indian Ocean and Pacific and declining in the Med-
iterranean), the overall level of Soviet surface ship and submarine presence in
distant areas has remained relatively stable since 1974. Operations by Soviet naval
aircraft have increased considerably since 1979 (see figure 8). The out-of-area op-
erations of the navy continue to reflect the Soviets’ interest in strengthening their
position in the Third World (especially in areas of potential Western vulnerabil-
ity), balancing Western presence, and countering potential strategic threats. Al-
though strategic military concerns remain prominent in Soviet distant
operations, particularly in the Mediterranean, the navy is performing increasingly
important tasks related to the projection of Soviet power and influence in the
Third World.
26. In addition to routine show-the-flag deployments and port visits, Soviet naval
forces have demonstrated support for friendly nations and sought to inhibit the
use of hostile naval forces against Soviet allies. During recent Third World crises,
the Soviets have augmented their naval presence in the areas of conflict: the An-
golan civil war in 1975; the Ethiopian-Somali conflict in 1977–1978, the Sino-
Vietnamese conflict in 1979; and the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979–1980. Such
use of Soviet naval forces is likely to continue in future distant-area crises. We do
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not believe, however, that the Soviets would deploy major naval forces in response
to a Third World crisis in an area other than the Mediterranean and possibly the
Indian Ocean, if they judged the crisis involved a high risk of escalation to general
war with the West. The Soviets would probably fear that, if war broke out, such
forces would be out of position to perform the initial wartime tasks of protecting
SSBNs and the sea approaches to the USSR.
1 3 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Deployment Fuselage
Length
(meters)
Maximum Speed
at Optimum
Altitude (knots)
TU-22M Backfire CIA Assessment Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
Armies
Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
Armies
Naval Aviation
and VGK Air
Armies
39 1,050
DIA/Army/Air
Force Assessment
39 1,150
TU-16 Badger C
C (Modified)
G
Naval Aviation
Naval Aviation
37
37
35
535
510
510
TU-95 Bear B/C VGK Air Armies 43.9 500
TU-22 Blinder B VGK Air Armies 39 790
FIGURE 6
Selected Soviet ASM-Carrying Strike Aircraft
a. These radii are achievable only under optimum conditions and they would be unrealistic in most wartime situations. They allow for
only a minimum fuel reserve, and they do not allow for such variables as loitering, high-speed flight, indirect routing, low-altitude
flight, or combat maneuvering. Allowances for such variables reduce combat radius, usually substantially. Realistic maximum radii for
theater missions under wartime conditions probably would be some 30 to 50 percent lower.
b. Assumes that aircraft are refueled by a Bison A tanker at the optimum point for maximum distance.
c. Backfires technically could carry three AS-4s. With three missiles, however, Backfire performance—including range—would be
substantially degraded, and we do not consider such a payload likely in wartime.
27. Power Projection. Although Soviet amphibious forces were developed to conduct
assault landings on the maritime flanks of the USSR in support of ground theater
operations, they could undertake assault operations against limited opposition in
many areas of the Third World. The amphibious exercises conducted on Socotra
Island in May 1980 and in cooperation with the Syrians in July 1981 demonstrate
an interest in and a modest capability for distant-area projection. The Soviet Navy
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Normal
Payload
Maximum Unrefueled
Radius (nm) a
Maximum Radius
With Prestrike
Refueling (nm) a b
1 AS-4 or 2 AS-4s or
bombs or mines c
1 AS-4 or 2 AS-4s or
bombs or mines c
1,825–2,150 with bombs
1,750–2,075 with 1 AS-4
1,400–1,650 with 2 AS-4s
d
d
d
2,825–3,200 with bombs
2,700–3,100 with 1 AS-4
2,500–2,800 with 2 AS-4s
d
d
d
2,900 with bombs
2,800 with 1 AS-4
2,550 with 2 AS-4s
e
e
e
4,000 with bombs
3,850 with 1 AS-4
3,650 with 2 AS-4s
e
e
e
1 AS-2
2 AS-6sf
2 AS-5s or 2 AS-6s or
bombs or mines
1,540
1,170
1,220 with 2 AS-5s
2,150
1,780
1,850 with 2 AS-5s
1 AS-3 or 2 AS-4s 3,950 5,050
1 AS-4 1,370 2,460
FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED)
Selected Soviet ASM-Carrying Strike Aircraft
d. The longer radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed aerody-
namic design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter radius values are based on an assumed compromised
design. CIA has considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and lower bounds of the Backfire’s subsonic cruise
efficiency. [TEXT DELETED]
e. [DELETED]
f. Probably more that 80 percent of the Badger Cs have been modified to carry two AS-6s. The Badger C (Modified), however, retains
the capability to carry a single AS-2, and it may carry AS-5s in place of the AS-6s.
has never conducted large-scale amphibious landings away from the periphery of
the USSR. Exercise ZAPAD-81 in the Baltic, however, included a large-scale am-
phibious exercise that for the first time used ships drawn from all four Soviet
fleets. Units involved included the aircraft carrier Kiev, the helicopter carrier Le-
ningrad, and the amphibious assault ship Ivan Rogov. We believe one of the pur-
poses of this unusual gathering of forces was to test planning concepts for
amphibious operations in distant areas. It is still doubtful that a Soviet amphibi-
ous task force could carry out a successful landing abroad against substantial op-
position, in large part because of the lack of adequate tactical air support, either
land or sea-based.
I. Trends in Naval Programs
28. The Navy’s share of the growing Soviet defense budget has remained basically un-
changed in recent years—about 20 percent. Much of this share has been devoted
to ship construction programs, including a variety of surface platforms ranging
from small patrol craft to large cruisers. The lion’s share of the construction bud-
get, however, continues to be devoted to submarines (see figures 9–11).
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Pacific Ocean
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1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
FIGURE 7
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region, 1974–81
a. West African ship-days are not available for 1974–1975 and are included in Atlantic Ocean data.
29. The most notable trend over the decade has been an evolution toward what Ad-
miral Gorshkov calls a “balanced fleet”—that is, a navy capable of fighting at both
the nuclear and conventional levels as well as protecting state interests in peace-
time. As late as the mid-1970s, the Soviet Navy could be described as a fleet with
capabilities maximized for a short, intense war that rapidly escalates to the use of
nuclear weapons. The small weapons loads and limited endurance of most surface
combatants severely limited the Soviet Navy’s ability for sustained combat. In the
1970s, however, new classes of generally larger, more sophisticated ships incorpo-
rating greater endurance, larger weapon loads, and extensive communication and
electronic warfare systems began to enter service, resulting in enhanced capabili-
ties for sustained conventional combat and distant-area deployments.
30. SSBNs. Beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing through the late 1970s, the
Soviets allocated considerable resources to the construction of SSBNs. During
this period, the construction rate of Y and D-class SSBNs averaged about five
per year and accounted for more than half of Soviet nuclear submarine con-
struction. Although construction rates have tapered off and SSBN force levels
have stabilized to accommodate the level agreed to in the SALT I Protocol of 62
units and 950 launch tubes, the SSBN force still receives significant emphasis, as
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FIGURE 8
Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation, 1976–81
evidenced by the continued construction of the D-III and the new Typhoon-class
(see figure 12).
31. The D-class series (the D-III being the latest modification) is basically an exten-
sion of Y-class SSBN technology. Fourteen D-IIIs have entered the fleet, and an
additional two to three are expected. The Typhoon, on the other hand, is the
USSR’s first entirely new SSBN design since the Y-class was introduced in 1966. It
is probably somewhat quieter than earlier SSBNs and incorporates features that
indicate an intention to conduct underice operations, including surfaced launches
from within the ice pack. The Typhoon is designed to carry 20 SS-NX-20 SLBMs.
The SS-NX-20 is a three-stage, solid-propellant missile with multiple indepen-
dently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) [TEXT DELETED] that will probably
give it improved accuracy over other Soviet SLBMs. The first Typhoon is on sea
trials and probably will achieve initial operational capability (IOC) when its mis-
sile finishes its test program, probably in 1983, but certainly by 1984. The second
Typhoon was launched in September 1982, and another two or three units are un-
der construction. As many as 12 units could be operational by the early 1990s.
32. To maintain the number of launch tubes permitted under the terms of the SALT
Interim Agreement, as new SSBNs have begun sea trials, the Soviets have disman-
tled nine Y-I-class SSBNs by removing the entire missile compartment. One
unit has been reconfigured by the insertion of a new midsection, and another is
undergoing probable conversion/modification. There is insufficient evidence at
this time to indicate the purpose of this conversion/modification or the plans
for the other Ys. Reconfiguration of some as SSNs is one option; conversion as
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FIGURE 9
Soviet Naval Spending
a. These graphics are based on estimated Soviet defense costs in rubles prepared by the Econometric Division of CIA’s Office of Soviet
Analysis, using the methodology customarily employed in calculating the costs of Soviet defense activities.
sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) carriers is another. Additional Ys will be
dismantled if the Soviets decide to continue adherence to the SALT I accords.
33. Attack Submarines. The Soviets are currently producing two classes of SSNs, the
V-III and the A-class. The V-III, an extensive modification of the earlier V-I/II de-
sign, first became operational in 1979. It may become the first Soviet submarine
class with a towed passive sonar array, greatly increasing its passive detection
range over that of existing hull-mounted sonar arrays. V-III construction may
continue through 1984 for a total of as many as 18 units.
34. The A-class SSN is the world’s fastest submarine and probably the deepest diving
[TEXT DELETED]. The first unit was launched in early 1969 in Leningrad but
was subsequently dismantled because of initial technical difficulties. By mid-1982,
six units had become operational in the Soviet Northern Fleet. In addition to the
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Major
Armament
Propulsion Full-Load
Displacement
(metric tons)
Year
Operational
Units in
Operation
Kiev Class
Aircraft Carrier
26–30 ASW helicopters
and VSTOL fighters
SS-N-12 antiship
cruise missile
SA-N-3, SA-N-4 SAMs
SUW-N-1 ASW rocket
(Unit 4 extensively
modified; new SAMs,
radar)
Steam 37,000 1976 3
Kirov Class
Guided-missile cruiser
SS-N-14 ASW missile
SA-N-6 SAM
SS-N-19 antiship
cruise missile
4 helicopters
(Unit 2 extensively
modified)
Combined
nuclear and
steam
About 28,000 1980 1
Sovremennyy Class
Guided-missile destroyer
SA-NX-7 SAM
130-mm guns
SS-NX-22 antiship missile
1 helicopter
Steam About 8,000 1981 2
Udaloy Class
Guided-missile destroyer
SS-N-14
Possible SAM
2 ASW helicopters
Gas turbine About 8,000 1981 2
BLK-COM-1
Guided-missile cruiser
SS-N-12
SA-N-4
SA-N-6
130-mm guns
Gas turbine About 12,500 1982 1
Krivak Class
Guided-missile frigate
SA-N-4
SS-N-14
Gas turbine 3,900 1970 32
FIGURE 10
Major Soviet Surface Combatants in Production a
a. Major surface combatants of more than 3,000 metric tons displacement.
use of titanium alloy for A-class pressure hulls, an improved reactor and im-
proved propulsion system have been installed. The energy required to drive the A
at a speed of 42 to 43 knots suggests a machinery power density on the order of
twice that of earlier Soviet SSN designs. A-class production is continuing at two
shipyards, and a total of 10 or 11 units is expected.
35. A submarine under construction at the United Admiralty Shipyard in Leningrad
is estimated to be the lead unit of a new SSN class that could reach IOC in 1984.
This new submarine probably represents a production follow-on to the present
V-class SSN series; it is likely to have a steel hull and a submerged displacement
greater than that of the V-III.
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Armament Propulsion Submerged
Displacement
(metric tons)
Year
Operational
Units in
Operation
D-III Class SSBN 16 SS-N-18s Nuclear 13,250 1978 14
Typhoon Class SSBN 20 SS-NX-20s Nuclear 27,000–29,000 1983 or
1984
0a
O Class SSGN Torpedoes
SS-N-19 antiship
cruise missile
Nuclear 12,000–14,000 1981 1
V-III Class SSN Torpedoes
Probable SS-NX-16
ASW missile
Possible SS-NX-21
SLCM
Nuclear 6,250 1979 13
A Class SSN Torpedoes
ASW missile
Nuclear 3,680 1978 6
New Class of SSN Torpedoes
Probable ASW missile
Possible SS-NX-21
SLCM
No drawing available
Nuclear Est. 7,000 1984 0
Tango Class SS Torpedoes
Probable ASW
missileb
Diesel 3,900 1973 17
K Class SS Torpedoes Diesel 3,000 1981 2
FIGURE 11
Soviet Submarines in Production
a. Typhoon unit 1 has joined the fleet, but its missile probably will not be operational until 1983, certainly by 1984.
b. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, believes the Tango SS is not equipped with ASW missiles. These
submarines have been operational since 1973, and in these nine years there has been no evidence to suggest that Tango submarines
are equipped with such missiles. These submarines have been observed in ASW exercises and weapon firings on numerous occasions,
and they have never used ASW missiles.
36. Series production of the Tango SS and introduction of the new K-class SS are in-
dicative of the Soviets’ intention to retain diesel-powered submarines while phas-
ing out the W and Z-classes of the 1950s. The Tango (18 produced to date) is the
largest new-construction class of Soviet diesel-electric-powered attack submarine
and is a production follow-on to the F-class SS. Tango has approximately 70 per-
cent more pressure hull volume than the F-class, permitting increased submerged
endurance and improved sensors and weapons. The first K-class was launched in
1980 and became operational in 1981. At 3,000 tons’ submerged displacement, the
K is 20 percent larger than the F, but considerably smaller than the Tango. We es-
timate the K-class SS will fill Soviet requirements for a medium-range diesel sub-
marine replacing the W and R-classes and may also be produced for export.
37. SSGNs. In April 1980, the Soviets launched a new nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarine (SSGN), the O-class (see figure 13), that is twice as large as any of their
previous SSGNs. It has 24 missile launchers (three times the number carried by
the E-II or C-class) for the SS-N-19, a new antiship supersonic cruise missile with
a range of about 270 to 300 nautical miles (500 to 550 kilometers). The O-class is
quieter than earlier Soviet SSN/SSGNs. A total of 10 units is expected to be com-
pleted by the mid-1990s.
38. Principal Surface Combatants. The Soviets currently have active building pro-
grams for at least seven classes of major surface combatants. The fourth and
probably last unit of the Kiev-class aircraft carrier is in the final stage of construc-
tion. It differs significantly from earlier units of the class in the improved arma-
ment and early warning radar suits to be installed. The second and probably last
unit of the Kirov-class guided-missile cruiser is also fitting out. Unlike the first
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FIGURE 12
Typhoon SSBN Firing SS-NX-20 SLBM
unit, it is equipped with an as-yet-unidentified vertically launched weapon sys-
tem, probably a surface-to-air missile (SAM). Three units of the BLK-COM-1
guided-missile cruiser are under construction. Like the Kirov and Kiev classes, the
BLK-COM-1 ships are multipurpose platforms armed with a mix of antisub-
marine, antiship, and air defense weapons. Two classes of guided-missile de-
stroyer, the Sovremennyy and the Udaloy, are also in series production. The
Sovremennyy is best suited for antisurface warfare. It is equipped with the
SS-NX-22, a high-performance antiship cruise missile nearing the end of its test
program, the SA-NX-7 SAM system, and a new 130-mm gun possibly capable of
firing guided munitions (see photograph on figure 14). The Udaloy is best suited
for antisubmarine warfare using its SS-N-14 missiles and two Helix helicopters.
Production of BLK-COM-1, Sovremennyy, and Udaloy ships will probably con-
tinue through the decade. Construction of the Krivak-class guided-missile frigate
and the Grisha-class light frigate is drawing to a close.
39. Amphibious Forces. Amphibious forces in the Soviet Navy have a lower priority
than the submarine, air, and surface combatant programs. Nevertheless, the Sovi-
ets continue to make gradual improvements in these forces. Construction of the
Ivan Rogov class, the Soviets’ largest amphibious ship, proceeded at a very slow
pace and probably ended after the recently launched second unit. The Ivan Rogov
has several unique features, however, that may indicate the direction of future im-
provements in Soviet amphibious capabilities. These include the ability to carry
helicopters and air-cushion vehicle landing craft. The Soviets have an active pro-
gram for the development and production of air-cushion vehicles. Construction
of Ropucha-class amphibious ships for Soviet use has resumed in Poland. In addi-
tion, the two KASP B wing-in-ground vehicles being developed in the Caspian Sea
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are probably naval subordinated. While such units could have a wide range of
maritime applications because of their high speed and load capabilities, use in
amphibious warfare is among the more likely intended missions. A development
in recent years has been the use of commercial roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo
ships during amphibious exercises. There has also been a reorganization in the
Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI), primarily to improve firepower, which has resulted in
a moderate increase in personnel strength and the upgrading of the three western
fleets’ SNI regiments into brigades. The Soviet Navy does not have enough am-
phibious ships to lift all of the SNI. If, however, amphibious ships were combined
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with merchant Ro-Ro’s and barge carriers, all of the naval infantry and nearly
three motorized rifle divisions could theoretically be carried. Some ground force
units routinely train either for amphibious assault landings or, more usually, as
follow-up forces.
40. Replenishment Ships. Construction of logistic support ships is sporadic and also
has a lower priority than that of surface combatants and submarines. The most
important unit built in recent years is the Berezina, a 40,000-ton multipurpose re-
plenishment ship, completed in 1977. No further units of this class have been
built, nor are any other underway replenishment ships known to be under
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construction. The number of logistic support ships capable of transferring strate-
gic and tactical missiles to combatants remains small. The generally low priority
accorded replenishment ships probably is linked with several aspects of Soviet na-
val practice and doctrine, including a heavy reliance on merchant tankers to sup-
port naval operations, the intention to operate many naval units relatively close to
Soviet territory, and a belief that the war is unlikely to be so prolonged that re-
plenishment at sea would affect its outcome. The Soviets probably also prefer to
improve the sustainability of their naval combatants by changes in the units
themselves rather than by emphasizing the construction of auxiliary vessels. Thus
new-construction surface combatants such as the Kirov and BLK-COM-1 include
features such as nuclear power (Kirov) and larger missile loads.
41. Small Combatants and Mine Warfare Units. The Soviets continue to regard small
surface combatants and mine warfare units as important elements of their navy.
These units are particularly useful in the confined waters of the Baltic and Black
seas, but they are also assigned important roles in the echeloned defense of Soviet
territory and SSBN operating areas in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. Small
surface combatants now in series production include the Nanuchka, Matka, and
Tarantul (see figure 15) guided-missile patrol combatants, equipped primarily for
antiship operations, and the Pauk and Muravey boats, whose major role is ASW.
Mine warfare units in production include the Natya and Sonya-class minesweep-
ers, and the Soviets are also continuing to develop a helicopter mine countermea-
sures capability. A large number of naval units are also capable of minelaying.
42. Naval Aviation. The most significant recent development was the beginning in 1977
of construction of a catapult and arresting gear test facility at the Saki naval base in
the Crimea. This project probably will be completed in 1983, with the first aircraft
launches occurring in mid-1984. It is a major indicator of Soviet intentions to
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construct an aircraft carrier capable of operating conventional takeoff and landing
(CTOL) high-performance aircraft (see figure 16). Construction of such a ship
may soon begin at Nikolayev on the Black Sea. Another facility at Saki, begun in
1979, has recently been identified as an aircraft ski jump. A ski jump, such as that
on the British carrier Hermes, is used to increase the payload and/or combat ra-
dius of vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft. The ski jump facility
may be related to the development of an improved VSTOL aircraft, primarily for
use on Kiev-class aircraft carriers.
43. The Soviets are also continuing the gradual introduction of Backfire medium
bombers and Bear F long-range ASW aircraft into their land-based naval aviation.
Forger fighter-bombers are being built for service on Kiev-class ships, and deploy-
ment of a new shipborne helicopter, the Helix, has begun (see figure 17). Al-
though most of the Helix helicopters probably will be used for ASW, some will be
configured to provide targeting data for antiship missiles, and others will be am-
phibious assault and transport versions.
J. Command, Control, and Communications
44. The Soviet Navy, subject to the same centralization of authority that characterizes
most Soviet military operations, depends on a smoothly functioning command,
control, and communications system. The Soviets nonetheless recognize the po-
tential weakness in such a highly centralized system. Consequently, Soviet naval
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commanders of general purpose forces at the fleet and group levels probably en-
joy some greater latitude in tactical command and control to accomplish their
warfare tasks. Naval forces are integrated into a theater concept, but the control of
strategic elements of the navy remains centralized. Soviet doctrine stresses the
need for reliable, flexible, redundant, and survivable control of naval forces. Thus,
the Soviet Navy’s command, control, and communications structure includes fea-
tures such as the hardening of command posts and communications facilities and
the use of mobile command posts and communications units. Recent efforts to
further improve this structure have included:
• The continued construction of bunkered command posts at echelons ranging
from the Main Naval Staff to flotillas.
• The availability of large numbers of communications vans at the national and fleet
levels to augment communications and support field-deployed command posts.
• Equipping major naval ships with communications capabilities that provide for
flexible seaborne command and control.
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• The modification of submarines for communications relay. Three former
G-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBs) [TEXT DELETED] have been
modified for such use. Further, we believe that the Soviets are interested in
development of submarine command posts.
• The development of probable airborne naval command posts. The first such
platform, a modified IL-22 Coot, was identified in 1978.
• Testing of a modified TU-142 Bear F as an airborne maritime communications
relay platform.
• Development and use of new and sophisticated communications that offer
increased efficiency, reliability, and security.
• Increased use of automation to improve the efficiency of command and
control.
45. One major problem area in the command, control, and communications system is
the lack of continuous communications with deployed submarines, especially
SSBNs. To deal with this problem, the Soviets are probably developing an ELF sys-
tem that will act as an ideal altering system enabling Soviet submarines to remain
at safer patrol depths during a crisis.
46. Automated Battle Management. Soviet doctrine stresses the commander’s respon-
sibility to achieve the maximum possible combat effectiveness from his limited re-
sources. Soviet naval commanders at all echelons are expected to achieve this by
the detailed management of forces in battle. For this battle management, the So-
viet Navy seems to be relying increasingly on computer-aided mathematical com-
bat models as decision aids. Such models were probably first used at the Moscow
level during the OKEAN-70 exercise. By 1978, they were in use at lower echelon,
short-based command posts, and their cautious introduction into operational use
at sea was probably beginning. Potentially, they offer significant improvement in
the quality and timeliness of naval command and control, although there are nu-
merous practical problems in their implementation. The future availability of
small, high-speed large-memory computers and of sophisticated computer com-
munications networks is likely to alleviate some of these problems.
K. Soviet Ocean Surveillance
47. The Soviet ocean surveillance system (SOSS) is designed to provide information on
the location, identity, and movements of foreign naval forces, especially those pos-
ing a threat to the Soviet homeland or forces. The most important elements in the
system are land-based SIGINT stations, space-based ELINT and radar satellites,
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AGIs, and reconnaissance aircraft. Ships of the merchant and fishing fleets can
also be tasked to conduct surveillance. Among the recent improvements in the
system are:
• The addition of land-based SIGINT stations in Vietnam and South Yemen.
• The construction of the Soviet Navy’s largest and most capable AGI, the
Balzam. Two units of this class are in service, and a third is being built.
• An increase in the number of naval units capable of receiving targeting data
directly from satellites.
• Growing access to and use of foreign facilities—in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia,
South Yemen, Vietnam and Libya—for Soviet naval air reconnaissance
operations.
Such improvements have reinforced the major strength of the SOSS, its ability to
detect and identify surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, operating in or ap-
proaching waters from which they could strike the Soviet Union. Its value against
surface ships can still be reduced by Western cover and deception techniques such
as emission control (EMCON) against SIGINT collection. Radar satellites are also
limited by weather and by the difficulty of identifying contacts. The major weak-
ness of the SOSS, however, remains its lack of any significant capability to detect
deployed submarines, especially in open-ocean areas such as the central Atlantic
and Pacific.
L. Radio-Electronic Combat
48. The operations of Soviet naval forces and the design of their electronic equipment
are deeply influenced by the Soviet concept of radio-electronic combat (REC).
This concept emphasizes the importance of both denying the enemy the use of his
electronic systems and of protecting Soviet systems from disruption. The REC
concept applies equally to sensors and to command, control, and communica-
tions systems. This concept has broader application than the Western notion of
electronic warfare (EW) and includes widespread, integrated use of:
• Attacks on enemy electronic emitters.
• EMCON.
• Surprise.
• Multisensor integration.
• Redundancy of command, control, and communications.
• Active electronic countermeasures (jamming).
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• Passive electronic countermeasures (chaff).
• Deception, to include decoys.
The prime focus of this concept is to ensure that Soviet forces can operate more
effectively than their opponents in a common EW environment. Ideally this
would be accomplished by ensuring the reliability of Soviet command, control,
and communications systems exposed to hostile EW through jam proofing and
redundancy of the Soviets’ own equipment, together with offensive EW and co-
vert tactics to degrade enemy electronic systems. Although the Soviets have en-
countered problems with both REC equipment and training, they regard REC as a
fundamental principle of modern electronically dependent warfare and vital to
the success of naval operations.
II. Factors Bearing on the Future of the Soviet Navy
A. Political and Economic Changes
49. As Soviet leaders formulate their naval plans for the period of the late 1980s and
1990s, they face major political and economic uncertainties. They view the fluid
international situation as requiring a strong naval posture, both to protect estab-
lished Soviet interests and to exploit situations in which the use of naval forces
can increase Soviet influence. Soviet perceptions of Western and Chinese naval
improvements and of opportunities for the use of naval forces in the Third World
are likely to be among the arguments for continued qualitative improvement in
Soviet maritime power. On the other hand, problems in the Soviet economy prob-
ably will increase the opportunity costs associated with defense. To maintain even
a modest rate of economic growth the Soviets must allocate more resources to
capital investment and improve labor productivity. The competing demands for
economic resources could be reflected in domestic political tension, particularly
during a period of leadership transition.
50. International Environment. The Soviets view the international arena as a shifting
combination of threats and opportunities likely to last indefinitely. They will con-
tinue to be concerned about the prospect that the United States will augment its
defense efforts, including major improvements in both strategic and general pur-
pose naval forces. They probably do not anticipate any substantial improvement
in relations with China and believe that instability is likely to persist in border
areas such as Iran and Poland. They probably will continue to view the Third World
as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet influence and will align themselves
selectively with states and insurgent movements in that area. On the whole, the
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Soviets’ expectations regarding international developments probably will support
their traditional belief in the value of military power as a cornerstone of foreign
policy. Such expectations probably will favor the continued development of Soviet
naval power, for both its nuclear and conventional wartime value and for its
peacetime role in promoting the image of the Soviet Union as a global power and
projecting power and influence in distant areas.
51. Economic Environment. Soviet leaders in the late 1980s and 1990s will probably be
operating in an environment characterized by severe economic resource con-
straints. Poor agricultural performance, a slower increase in labor productivity, a
low rate of GNP growth, labor shortages, and shortfalls in energy production will
require tougher choices among defense, investment, and consumption. If defense
spending continues to grow at its historical rate (4 percent annually since 1965),
the defense share of GNP could increase from about 14 percent to approach 20
percent by 1990. Such growth would drastically reduce the extent to which addi-
tional resources could be allocated to investment and consumption and would
also erode future increments to GNP. Such increments have been important in the
past in easing political tensions that arise from the competition for resources.
While there is insufficient evidence as yet to predict a change in the current rate
of growth in defense spending, economic pressures could result in a slower rate of
growth. While less likely, a zero growth rate or even a net reduction is possible. In
any case, within the amount allocated to defense, any competition among the ser-
vices for resource allocation would be likely to increase.
52. The Soviet Navy’s case for justifying its share of resource allocation is likely to in-
clude arguments based primarily on its evolving role in a NATO–Warsaw Pact
war—the need to counter a growing Western naval threat to Pact territory and
forces and to improve the Soviet Navy’s capability to strike the United States and
its allies. Naval programs will also be supported in terms of their contribution to
the USSR’s capability to defend and expand Soviet influence in the Third World
during peacetime and limited war situations, but any programs that cannot be
solidly defended as essential to the NATO-Pact scenario are likely to be more sus-
ceptible to pruning.
53. Domestic Political Environment. It is unlikely that Leonid Brezhnev will be in of-
fice during the period of greatest interest to this Estimate. His departure probably
will result in a struggle for power that could be reflected in defense policies. It is
not possible to predict the nature and timing of changes in military policy that
might result from changes in national leadership, particularly because Brezhnev’s
immediate successor is likely to be himself succeeded by a new generation of
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E 1 4 7
leaders in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Information is sparse concerning the atti-
tude toward defense of leading contenders in the succession. Insofar as such in-
formation exists, it suggests that they would continue to place a strong emphasis
on military spending. We have no specific information on the attitude of leading
contenders concerning naval issues. During any succession period, variations in
policy could occur. It would, however, be difficult to change basic priorities until a
new leader could consolidate power. During the jockeying for power the defense
effort probably would not be significantly redirected. Few aspirants for leadership
would risk antagonizing the military or placing themselves in a position to be ac-
cused of selling defense short. Once power is consolidated, however, severe eco-
nomic pressures could contribute to sharp changes in the direction of the Soviet
defense effort such as those that took place under [Nikita] Khrushchev.
54. During the same period of transition in the Soviet political hierarchy, there will
also be changes in the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Whoever succeeds Admiral
Gorshkov is unlikely to acquire immediately the high degree of authority that
stems from Gorshkov’s continuity as commander of the Soviet Navy since 1956.
The views of a new leader, moreover, are likely to have been affected by a different
operational background. Although any officer succeeding Gorshkov probably will
have had experience as a fleet commander and will thereby have become familiar
with all types of naval platforms and operations, it is possible that he will favor
some shifts in emphasis in Soviet naval programs and policies. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the personalities or individual backgrounds of a new Soviet naval lead-
ership would cause major near-term changes in the strategy and programs
underlying the navy’s role in Soviet military strategy.
B. Key Issues Facing Soviet Naval Planners (1982–2000)
55. Protection and Use of the SSBN Force. The ability to conduct strategic strike opera-
tions will continue to be the single most important mission of the Soviet Navy
throughout the period of this Estimate. Although sea-launched cruise missiles
will expand the number of potential naval strategic platforms, the bulk of the So-
viet Navy’s strategic capabilities will remain in the SSBN force. We expect this
force to be further modernized and upgraded through the continued production
of Typhoon-class units and the introduction of a new class in the 1990s. By the
late 1990s, Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs will have largely replaced the Y-class
force, resulting in:
• A substantial increase in the number of sea-based strategic warheads because
the Y-class SSBN typically carries only 16 warheads while one Typhoon carries
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20 SS-NX-20 missiles, which could have as many as 280 warheads by the late
1980s.
• A less vulnerable SSBN force because almost all units could strike targets in the
continental United States from within the Arctic icecap and/or from home
waters.
56. The size of the SSBN force in the 1990s will be governed largely by the status of
East-West arms limitation agreements and developments in strategic offensive
and defensive technology. If the SALT I limit of 950 modern submarine launch
tubes remains in effect, the number of SSBNs would decline somewhat in the
1990s because Y-class units would have to be retired on a more than one-for-one
basis to compensate for the greater number of tubes carried by new classes of
SSBNs. In the absence of arms limitation restrictions, we believe the Soviets
would increase the size of the SSBN force along with increases in the rest of their
strategic arsenal. Moreover, the Soviets may increase the proportion of the overall
strategic arsenal assigned to SSBNs if:
• Improvements in the accuracy of Western ICBM/SLBMs lead the Soviets to
judge that their SLBMs are increasingly more survivable than ICBMs.
• Soviet SLBMs obtain a hard-target kill capability.
57. On the other hand, the Soviets probably would reduce the number of SLBM
launchers if arms control negotiations resulted in a treaty requiring substantial
cuts in the overall strategic arsenal. SLBM reductions probably would be propor-
tionate to cuts in the ICBM force, but could be more severe if:
• The Soviets perceive that the West has achieved an ASW breakthrough that
increases the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs.
• Soviet SLBMs do not achieve sufficient hard-target kill capability.
• The survivability of the land-based element of Soviet strategic forces is
enhanced through the introduction of mobile ICBMs and/or ABM protection.
58. We believe that the Soviets will continue to regard their SSBN force as vulnerable
to enemy ASW forces through the 1990s. In this time frame, the SSBN force will
consist primarily of older D and Y-class units—in the 1990s, Y and D units will
compose over three-quarters of the force; in 2000, D-class units will still consti-
tute well over half of the force. The perceived requirement to protect and support
these SSBNs is unlikely to change. Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs will be quieter
than Ys and Ds and thus less vulnerable to acoustic detection. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the Soviets will regard them as capable of ensuring their own surviv-
ability. The Soviets probably foresee no slackening in Western interest in ASW
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and expect that the positive effects of their quieting programs will be at least par-
tially negated by improvements in Western ASW capabilities. Moreover, the Sovi-
ets’ concept of SSBN protection is based on their apparent judgment that all
submarines are inherently vulnerable to ASW prosecution, particularly as they
exit and enter port, if they are not protected by friendly forces. The Soviets, there-
fore, do not regard SSBN vulnerability as a short-term problem that will disap-
pear as new, quieter classes are introduced. The requirement to protect and
support SSBNs will thus remain an integral part of the strategic strike mission
and the most important initial wartime task of a large portion of Northern and
Pacific Fleet general purpose forces through the remainder of the century.
59. We expect that Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs would be deployed in wartime in
much the same fashion as D-class SSBNs—primarily in “havens” close to Soviet
territory. Other measures to decrease the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs probably
would include:
• More extensive use of patrols under the icecap.
• Introduction of an ELF communications system (perhaps in 1983), making it
possible for units to receive communications while remaining at patrol depth
or under ice.
60. Although such a move is unlikely, the Soviets might choose to deploy a few Ty-
phoons to open-ocean areas in more southerly latitudes. The Soviets might use
such open-ocean deployments to complicate the US defensive problem by requiring
ASW forces to conduct open-ocean search in vast areas where sound surveillance
system (SOSUS) coverage is limited. This could increase the survivability of SSBNs
in havens by dispersing enemy ASW forces. Notwithstanding this potential benefit,
the disadvantages of deploying SSBNs to distant areas would make this an unlikely
option for wartime deployment. In particular, the transit through potentially
enemy-controlled waters argues against SSBN deployments to southern latitudes.
61. We do not believe that likely changes in Soviet SLBM capabilities or in the Soviet
perception of NATO’s ASW capability will lead to significant changes in the way
Soviet SLBMs would be employed in wartime. A substantial number of SLBMs
probably would still be withheld from the initial strategic nuclear exchange for
subsequent strikes and as a residual force. One consequence of such a withhold-
ing policy is a need to sustain SSBN protection operations during the nuclear as
well as the conventional phase of the war. The greater endurance features that we
believe the Soviets will continue to build into their general purpose units will be
useful in this task. Such improved endurance is likely to stem from factors integral
to the combat units themselves—such as nuclear power for surface ships, larger
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magazine capability, and improved damage control—rather than from a major
increase in the size of the naval auxiliary force.
62. The Soviets will probably continue to allocate SLBMs for initial strike operations
against the United States for targets such as soft command, control, and commu-
nications facilities and bomber bases. SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 SLBMs launched from
D-class units and possibly SLCMs from forward-deployed attack submarines
would assume more of the Soviet Navy’s initial strike role as Y-class SSBNs are re-
tired or converted. The Soviet Navy’s ability to participate in counterforce strikes
would be enhanced considerably if the accuracy of SLBMs could be improved to
the point where they would be effective against hardened targets such as ICBM si-
los. All agencies agree that the Soviets place a high priority on achieving improved
accuracy for the SLBMs planned for testing in the middle and late 1980s. There
are different interpretations as to whether and when the Soviets would opt to de-
ploy SLBMs with a hard-target capability. One view holds that this capability
probably will be achieved in the late 1980s.1 Another view holds that such a capa-
bility could not be achieved before the early 1990s and that it would require ma-
jor efforts, which the Soviets may not be willing to undertake because of costs in
system reliability and the number of deliverable reentry vehicles (RVs).2 All agen-
cies believe that, despite the increased utility for initial nuclear strikes that a
hard-target capability could provide, many such SLBMs, if deployed, would prob-
ably still be withheld from the initial exchanges for use in subsequent strikes or as
a residual force.
63. Soviet Naval Land-Attack Cruise Missile. The Soviet Navy is developing a sea-
launched, land-attack cruise missile similar to the US Tomahawk. This missile,
designated the SS-NX-21, is expected to become operational by 1983 or 1984. It is
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estimated to be compatible with the torpedo tubes of all Soviet submarines and
possibly for employment on a variety of surface combatants. We believe it is designed
to carry a nuclear warhead, probably has a terrain contour matching position up-
date system (TERCOM), and is probably capable of 2,700 km at subsonic speeds.3
64. We believe that the primary application of the SS-NX-21 will be as a submarine-
launched weapon for nuclear strikes against theater targets, but it might be used
during a first strike against targets in the continental United States, such as com-
mand, control, and communications facilities and naval and bomber bases, de-
spite its range and speed limitations. We believe the Soviets will choose to
concentrate nuclear-armed SS-NX-21s in a few of their newest SSNs. The best
candidate for such a role is the projected new class of SSN, which we believe will
be quieter and larger than current Soviet SSNs and have the command, control,
and communications and fire control capabilities necessary for employing
SLCMs. V-IIIs (see figure 18) would also be suitable. Another possible candidate
would be those few dismantled Y-class SSBNs, which presumably will retain their
sophisticated ship’s internal navigation system and require the least modification
of existing classes to carry SLCMs. If the Soviets opt for a dedicated SLCM sub-
marine, they may initiate periodic peacetime SLCM patrols off the US east and
west coasts. Patrols by SLCM submarines could eventually replace Y-class SSBN
patrols in the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific. In Soviet eyes, such SLCM pa-
trols could offer the dividend of forcing the United States to invest in an ex-
panded early warning/air defense system to counter the new threat.
65. Concentration of the missiles on a few units, however, would place them in the
same category as the early SSBNs—platforms that were high-value targets for
Western ASW and which, because of their missile range, had to operate relatively
close to Western territory. The Soviets therefore could deploy the SS-NX-21 as
part of the weapons load of a large number of submarines. Assuming that the
missile is compatible with the standard Soviet 53-cm torpedo tubes, the
SS-NX-21 could be employed in modified SSNs/SSGNs such as the V-I, V-II, A,
and O-classes or even possibly in diesel-electric units. We believe this use of a
larger number of submarines would be less likely because these submarines are
required for important ASW and antisurface warfare (ASUW) tasks, and some of
them—particularly the diesel-electric units—may not have sufficient command,
control, and communications capabilities or space for necessary additional fire
control and navigation systems.
66. We do not know whether the Soviets are developing a version of the SS-NX-21
with a nonnuclear warhead. [TEXT DELETED] SLCMs armed with nonnuclear
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warheads would be useful against theater targets (such as US SOSUS facilities)
and for concentrated attacks on Iceland, the United Kingdom, Spain, the Philip-
pines, Guam, and other important targets that would be difficult to reach and
costly to attack with Soviet land-based aircraft. Nonnuclear-armed SLCMs could
be employed on current attack submarines with fire control system modification.
Such deployment, however, would involve some trade-offs for general purpose
submarines, reducing their capability to perform their traditional antiship and
antisubmarine tasks because:
• Each SS-NX-21 carried will reduce the number of torpedoes carried by one
or two.
• In some instances the operating areas required for land-attack cruise missile
launches would differ considerably from those required for optimum ASW
and antiship operations.
The Soviets probably recognize that proliferation of SLCMs could also represent a
significant impediment to future arms control agreements since it would be virtu-
ally impossible to verify which submarines were strategic arms carriers.
67. The Soviets may also be considering placing SS-NX-21s on some of their princi-
pal surface combatants. [TEXT DELETED] Surface-launched SS-NX-21s proba-
bly would be limited to strikes against theater targets, although occasional
peacetime deployments of SLCM-armed surface combatants off the US coasts
(for example, to Cuba) might be viewed by the Soviets as having significant politi-
cal value.
68. The successful development and deployment of the SS-NX-21 is undoubtedly an
item of high interest to the Soviet national leadership as well as the naval com-
mand. If, as we expect, it is to be deployed primarily as a nuclear weapon aboard
dedicated submarines, the Soviet Navy’s strike capability, particularly against the-
ater targets, will be enhanced considerably with minimal impact on its other mis-
sions and capabilities. By giving the Soviet Navy yet another nuclear-capable
land-attack system, the SS-NX-21 could increase the stature and utility of the
navy within the Soviet military/political establishment and conceivably result in
the provision of additional assets to protect the SS-NX-21–carrying units. At the
same time, the SS-NX-21 is a weapon system with significant potential political
value to the Soviet leadership in future arms limitation negotiations. In fact, it is
conceivable that the Soviet SLCM has been developed partly as a bargaining chip
for US nuclear land-attack cruise missiles. If it is deployed, the SS-NX-21 would
add a new dimension to Soviet Navy capabilities and would complicate the defen-
sive tasks of Western forces.
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E 1 5 3
69. Strategic ASW against Ballistic and Land-Attack Cruise Missile Submarines. The
Soviets recognize that their strategic ASW task will become not only more impor-
tant but increasingly difficult during the 1980s and 1990s. During this period they
almost certainly expect:
• Longer range SLBMs to enter service in the US, French, and British navies. The
US/UK Trident II D-5 (6,000-nm range), for example, will greatly increase the
ocean areas from which such missiles can strike Soviet territory (see figure 19).
• Western SLBMs such as the US Trident II D-5 to achieve sufficient accuracy
for use against hard targets.
• Western general purpose submarines to be armed with long-range, nuclear
land-attack cruise missiles such as the US Tomahawk.
• Western programs to improve SSBN survivability through noise reduction,
more reliable communications, and better sensors.
• China’s first SSBNs to enter service.
70. We expect that the Soviets will seek to improve the ASW capability of their sub-
marines, surface ships, and aircraft in several ways, especially:
• Improved sonar systems, most notably the deployment of towed passive arrays,
low-frequency sonobuoy systems, and associated signal processing equipment.
• Increased emphasis on quieting of attack submarines.
• Development of nonacoustic sensors.
Such efforts probably will significantly improve Soviet capability to conduct ASW
in relatively small areas. They could, therefore, be vitally important for the protec-
tion of Soviet SSBN havens against intrusion by Western SSNs. Such improve-
ments also could enhance the capability of Soviet SSNs to detect Western SSBNs
as they exit their bases or pass through choke points. We do not believe, however,
that such efforts will substantially improve the Soviet capability to counter West-
ern SSBNs effectively, because none of them are likely to solve the Soviet Navy’s
major problem—the inability to detect SSBNs in open-ocean areas.
71. We believe the Soviets will continue to seek such a detection capability through
the development of sensors whose range or search rate can cover broad ocean
areas. Approaches that the Soviets may explore in developing such a capability
include:
• A system of fixed passive sonar arrays installed in Western SSBN operating
areas, comparable to the US SOSUS system. A major problem in creating such
a system probably would be the large number of arrays needed to have a
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reasonable chance of detecting SSBNs, which will be even quieter in the 1990s.
Another problem would be the probable requirement for several shore
facilities in Third World countries to serve as initial processing points for the
data. The Soviets’ use of fixed sensors has thus far been limited to equipment
installed near their own territory. We have no evidence that they are planning a
worldwide system, which would take several years to install.
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FIGURE 19
Soviet Navy’s View of Potential Search Areas for Its ASW Operations
• Aircraft or a space-based system relying on nonacoustic sensors. To be effective,
such a system would have to be able to cover broad ocean areas rapidly and to
relay detection data both to shore facilities and ASW platforms. The develop-
ment of such a system would be a logical evolution of current Soviet use of
satellites in monitoring the activity of Western surface units. It would, how-
ever, require a breakthrough in nonacoustic sensor development that cannot
be predicted. The Soviets are continuing their research into the use of non-
acoustic sensors, despite a long history of apparent failure. Our limited knowl-
edge of their program’s precise nature [TEXT DELETED] makes it impossible
to predict with confidence their chances of success.
• The development of towed passive acoustic arrays with increased performance
due to array and signal-processing improvements. Such arrays could be
developed by the 1990s. If deployed in large numbers, such as on hundreds of
research ships and intelligence collectors, these arrays could theoretically
provide initial detection of older Western SSBNs. The arrays, however,
probably would not be effective against the quieter Ohio-class SSBNs, and their
capability against even the older Western SSBNs while patrolling would be
very limited. In addition, tactical and technical countermeasures could further
reduce the vulnerability of older units.
72. We do not believe the Soviets will be able to solve the initial detection problem
during the period of this Estimate. For this reason, we expect that the Soviet Navy
will continue to focus its anti-SSBN efforts on attempting to detect and attack
Western SSBNs as they exit their bases or pass through choke points. If, however,
through some technological breakthrough the Soviets were able to detect Western
SSBNs in the open ocean, they would then have a new problem of how to attack
them. Such attacks might be conducted by the traditional technique of deploying
surface, submarine, and/or air units to the datum. This approach would require
that the Soviets deploy larger numbers of general purpose naval units at greater
distances from Soviet territory than is currently anticipated. In addition to attack
submarines, these operations might involve surface combatants, including carrier
battle groups. ASW aircraft operating from Third World airfields could cover at
least some SSBN operating areas if access rights were granted and the host coun-
try were willing to risk becoming a belligerent. Unless there were a substantial in-
crease in the size of the Soviet Navy or the detection breakthrough enabled the
Soviets to provide SSBNs protection with fewer general purpose units, such a
change in naval wartime deployments would require sacrificing some of the capa-
bility to protect the SSBN havens.
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73. The Soviet Navy’s strategic ASW problem will be further complicated by the
United States’ plan to arm its newest classes of attack submarines—potentially
over 70 units—with the land-attack version of the Tomahawk SLCM. Although
there are plans for a conventional variant, the Soviets are undoubtedly most con-
cerned with the strategic implications of nuclear-tipped SLCMs. The employment
of such SLCMs will complicate the Soviet ASW problem in two ways:
• The number of US strategic-missile-firing submarines will triple.
• The range of the nuclear Tomahawk will allow SLCM-armed submarines to
strike Soviet territory from areas where it will be difficult for the Soviets to
concentrate ASW forces.
74. Much of the defensive requirement against Tomahawk-armed submarines would
coincide with and overlap other ASW efforts against Western units within Soviet
sea-control/sea-denial areas. To reach targets deep within the USSR from the Nor-
wegian Sea or Northwest Pacific, for example, Tomahawk-armed submarines
would have to approach Soviet territory. In doing so they would pass through at
least some of the echeloned ASW defenses the Soviets would establish to protect
their SSBNs. Some targets near the Soviet coast, on the other hand, could be
reached by SLCMs fired from the outer edges of the Northern and Pacific Fleets’
defensive thresholds. SLCM-armed submarines operating in these areas would be
able to avoid the bulk of the Soviet ASW defenses in the Norwegian Sea and Pa-
cific Ocean.
75. One option available to the Soviets to counter this threat could be to extend the
area of sea-denial operations, possibly out to about 3,000 kilometers. The Soviets
probably believe that a capability to conduct more extended sea denial will largely
depend on their ability to contest the air superiority and ASW capability afforded
NATO by carrier and land-based aircraft in areas such as the GIUK gap. They
probably also believe that their ability to contest such airspace will necessitate op-
erations by future surface combatant task groups, including CTOL aircraft carri-
ers, at greater range from Soviet territory than currently planned. Any extension
of the area for sea-denial operations therefore will probably be accompanied by a
corresponding extension of initial sea-control areas—possibly as far as 2,000 kilo-
meters. This would be more feasible for the Northern Fleet than for the Pacific
Fleet. Given improved air cover from carrier-based aircraft in the 1990s and/or
from captured airfields in Norway, the Northern Fleet could shift the focus of its
ASW efforts away from the SSBN havens in Arctic waters southward to the GIUK
gap. Control of the gap would both significantly increase Soviet capabilities to
contest Western use of the Norwegian Sea as an SLCM launch area and help
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protect Northern Fleet SSBNs from enemy ASW forces. Access to the Northwest
Pacific Basin, on the other hand, is not restricted by any choke points that would
facilitate a more forward-oriented ASW strategy. The Soviets, however, probably
do not believe that the threat from SLCMs would be as great in the Pacific as in
the Norwegian Sea. They probably expect that the majority of US SLCM-armed
submarines would be deployed in European waters from which the more numer-
ous military and economic targets located in the western USSR could be engaged.
76. The Soviets believe submarine-launched cruise missiles can also reach targets in
the western USSR when fired from the central Mediterranean and North seas,
areas where the Soviets plan sea-denial operations against carrier battle groups
but probably only limited ASW efforts (see figure 20). Countering SLCM subma-
rines in these areas could pose some tough choices for the Soviets. Any additional
submarines deployed to these areas would lessen force allocations for other mis-
sions such as SSBN protection, prosecution of Western SSBNs, and interdiction of
Western sea lines of communication. If the Soviets do opt for increased ASW ef-
forts in the North and Mediterranean seas, they probably would allocate more
diesel submarines for barrier patrols in the northern entrance to the North Sea
and in Mediterranean choke points such as the Straits of Gibraltar and Sicily.
77. The Soviets could ultimately decide that the required allocation of resources and
the opportunity costs involved in countering SLCM-armed submarines in their
patrol areas were too costly. Given their limited ASW detection capabilities, more-
over, the Soviets probably would be pessimistic about their ability to counter
SLCM-armed submarines in areas such as the central Mediterranean and the
North Sea, even if substantial forces were deployed there. An alternate strategy
might limit efforts specifically aimed at the cruise missile submarine to deploying
a few attack submarines in the approaches to Western attack submarine bases—
efforts similar to the Soviets’ anti-SSBN tactics. Major emphasis would then be
placed on countering the missiles themselves through a combination of improved
land-based air defense systems.
78. Antisurface Warfare (ASUW). Although the Soviets view Western submarines as
the major naval threat to their territory and SSBN havens, their perception of the
threat from Western surface forces and the importance they attach to ASUW are
likely to increase during the next two decades. Carrier battle groups will continue
to be perceived as major threats to Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory, SSBN ha-
vens, and operations in the land TVDs. Concern with carrier battle groups will re-
main high because of:
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• Soviet expectations that the number of carriers in NATO will at least remain
constant and probably increase as the result of US plans to expand to a
15-battle-group navy, the reemergence of sea-based, fixed-wing aviation in the
Royal Navy, and French and Spanish plans for new carrier construction.
• Expected improvements in the offensive capability of carriers by equipping
their aircraft with cruise missiles such as Tomahawk.
• Improvements in the ability of carrier battle groups to defend themselves
against attack through such programs as the AEGIS air defense system.
79. Further, the Soviets will no longer be able to concentrate on aircraft carriers as the
only Western surface units posing a significant threat to their territory. The Sovi-
ets are fully aware of US plans to equip battleships, cruisers, and destroyers with
the land-attack version of the Tomahawk missile. They realize that this would re-
sult in a substantial increase in the number of Western surface combatants capa-
ble of striking the USSR with nuclear weapons. This would greatly complicate
their strategic defensive task because any surface combatant would have to be
considered a potential nuclear threat.
80. To meet this threat the Soviet Navy will continue efforts to improve its ASUW ca-
pabilities. Of particular importance will be:
• Construction of general purpose submarines equipped with advanced antiship
torpedoes and cruise missiles. Construction of the O-class SSGN, with its 24
SS-N-19 missiles, is likely to continue into the 1990s, as will that of torpedo-
equipped SSNs and SSs. The tactical distinction between cruise-missile-
equipped submarines (SSGN, SSG) and torpedo attack units (SSN, SS) would
become less clear if the Soviets introduced antiship cruise missiles that can be
fired from torpedo tubes.
• Construction of surface combatants equipped with antiship missiles. The
number of major surface combatants armed with such missiles is likely to
increase substantially as a result of current construction programs (Kirov, Kiev,
BLK-COM-1, Sovremennyy) and their projected follow-ons. There is evidence,
moreover, that the SS-N-14 ASW cruise missile may have a secondary antiship
capability.
• Continued production of Backfire bombers for Soviet Naval Aviation and a
probable new bomber in the late 1980s to early 1990s to replace the Badgers
and Blinders, as well as a possible increase in the number of SNA missile
regiments. In addition, aircraft introduced in the 1990s may incorporate
Stealth technology to make them less susceptible to detection.
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• Deployment of more capable sea-based fighter-bombers, both VSTOL aircraft
operating from Kiev-class ships and CTOL aircraft operating from a new class
of carrier.
The introduction of these new platforms will greatly increase the number of mis-
siles available for attack and will coincide with other efforts to improve ASUW ca-
pability. In particular:
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FIGURE 20
Soviet View of Tomahawk
• Improvements are likely in antiship missiles, especially in target discrimination
capability, survivability, and reaction times. The SS-NX-22, for example, is
much faster (Mach 2+) and can approach the target at lower altitudes [TEXT
DELETED] than such currently operational missiles as the SS-N-2 and
SS-N-9. We believe the SS-NX-22 will be operational on Sovremennyy and
Tarantul-class units in 1983.
• The capability of the radar ocean reconnaissance satellite (RORSAT) to detect
ships and distinguish target size probably will be enhanced.
• Evolutionary improvements are likely in the electronic-intelligence ocean
reconnaissance satellite (EORSAT) directed toward increased longevity,
enhanced probability of detection, and continuous targeting capability
through higher orbits, better sensors, and a wider field of view. We expect the
Soviets will continue to convert older submarines and equip new surface and
submarine units with the capability to use real time EORSAT (and RORSAT)
data to support antiship cruise missile systems.
• The development of a synthetic aperture radar oceanographic satellite to
provide improved all-weather, worldwide naval surveillance is possible during
the latter period of this Estimate.
• Some new AAVGK bombers, possibly including a version of the Blackjack,
could be configured for a maritime strike role. With an estimated radius of
some 3,200 to 4,000 nautical miles, the Blackjack could attack Western surface
targets in the central Atlantic from Soviet territory.
81. The execution of the ASUW task probably will continue to be primarily concen-
trated in areas such as the Norwegian and North seas, the eastern Mediterranean,
and the northwestern Pacific—the principal areas from which carrier aircraft and
sea-based cruise missiles could be launched against Soviet territory. Coordination
of Soviet submarine and surface ship operations with those of land-based me-
dium bombers is improved by concentrating ASUW in these areas. Soviet
ASUW doctrine is likely to continue its emphasis on “first salvo” attacks—
tracking Western surface units during the prewar period of tensions and attack-
ing the most important of them with maximum force at the outset of hostilities.
The Soviets undoubtedly recognize that this goal will become more difficult to
achieve as the number of important targets grows through the introduction of
the nuclear Tomahawk and increases in the number of NATO surface battle
groups and improved missile defensive systems such as AEGIS. The prolifera-
tion of high-value targets is likely to contribute to a greater emphasis on ASUW
operations of extended duration (days and weeks rather than minutes and hours).
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Indications of such emphasis are already visible in exercises and in weapons-loading
features of new units.
82. Although most ASUW operations will be concentrated relatively close to Soviet
territory, the Soviets probably will seek by the mid-1980s to extend the outer edge
of the Northern and Pacific Fleet sea-denial area somewhat beyond the current
threshold of roughly 2,000 kilometers to counter the long range of Western
SLCMs. Some attacks at much greater distances from Soviet territory are possible.
Among the options they might find attractive for such operations are the deploy-
ment of missile-equipped aircraft to bases outside the USSR—if the host country
were willing to risk becoming a belligerent—and equipping SNA with long-range
bombers such as the Blackjack A now under development. A less likely possibility
is the use of ballistic missiles against surface ships at sea. [TEXT DELETED] Al-
though the Soviets probably do not consider the ASUW problem to be as difficult
as ASW, they apparently expect it to remain a major and growing challenge
through the 1990s.
83. Antiair Warfare at Sea. The Soviets recognize that the ability of their surface ships
to conduct ASW and ASUW operations and project power beyond the range of
land-based air cover is heavily dependent on their capability to defend themselves
against air attack. The successful use of sea-skimming antiship missiles in the
Falklands crisis probably has increased the already evident Soviet concern over
the proliferation of these weapons in Western navies. The Soviets also realize that
Western use of radar-cross-section reduction techniques will further complicate
defense efforts against cruise missiles. In the past, the Soviets’ air defense efforts
concentrated primarily on point defense and self-protection weapons. Recent
Gatling and dual-purpose gun systems, the new SA-NX-7 SAM, and the probable
Udaloy SAM system continue this philosophy.
84. The SA-N-6 SAM being deployed on cruisers of the Kirov and BLK-COM-1
classes, however, is a long-range system that could provide the Soviets their first
genuine area air defense capability against aircraft. There is disagreement within
the US Intelligence Community on the capability of the SA-N-6 to engage low-
altitude, low-radar-cross-section antiship cruise missiles. Some4 believe the
SA-N-6 has such a capability. Others5 believe that the SA-N-6 may encounter severe
guidance and fusing problems when used against cruise missiles, such as the Har-
poon, which have a small radar cross section [TEXT DELETED]. We expect that the
SA-N-6 or follow-on area air defense weapons will be deployed on all future cruisers.
85. The Soviets also probably will improve their defensive systems’ signal process-
ing capability and will continue to improve radar performance. Other likely
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developments in naval air defense will include improvements in handling multi-
ple targets, better low-altitude fusing and target detection in a sea clutter environ-
ment, and additional electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic
counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
86. In addition to continued work in gun and missile technology, the Soviets are ex-
ploring the potential value of laser air defense weapons. It is likely that the Soviet
Navy now has an R&D facility test area for high-energy lasers to explore
shipborne air defense applications. It is possible that a prototype laser weapon,
perhaps a low-energy system designed to counter electro-optical systems, will be
installed on some new ship classes in the mid-to-late 1980s. We also believe a na-
val high-energy laser weapon may be operational by 1990. If laser weapons prove
practical in a naval environment, we expect them to be deployed on many Soviet
principal surface combatants by the year 2000, particularly for close-in and
low-level defense against cruise missiles.
87. Soviet fleet air defense capability will be further enhanced by the introduction of
high-performance fighter aircraft on the projected new class of aircraft carrier
(see next paragraph). The overall effectiveness of the Soviets’ efforts to protect
their surface fleet, however, will depend on their ability to integrate the opera-
tions of carrier and land-based aircraft with shipborne SAM, gun, and laser sys-
tems. We believe the Soviets are working on a system to coordinate their air
defense assets through the use of airborne warning and control system (AWACS)
and possibly carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft in conjunc-
tion with shipborne air warfare control centers to provide a communications/
navigation/identification net (CNI). This will allow exchange of command and
control and reliable IFF data (a system to differentiate between friendly and hos-
tile units) and provide a common navigation baseline for participants in a more
integrated and effective air warfare system. During the period of this Estimate,
however, we believe Soviet efforts will evolve slowly, primarily because of lack of
experience in the complex management of fleet air defense operations involving
both aircraft and ships.
88. Air Power at Sea. The most notable change in the Soviet Navy in the next 10 to 20
years probably will be the introduction of its first Western-style aircraft carriers—
that is, ships equipped with catapults and arresting gear and thereby capable of
handling CTOL high-performance aircraft. We expect that the first of these ships,
probably a 60,000-ton unit with nuclear propulsion, will become operational by
about 1990 and that three or four could be in service by the end of the century.
Each ship probably could carry an air group of some 60 aircraft.
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89. Although aircraft carriers will enhance Soviet capabilities to project power and
influence in distant areas, we believe their primary mission will be to help expand
the area of Northern and Pacific Fleet wartime sea-control operations. During a
general war, Soviet aircraft carrier operations probably will focus initially on pro-
viding air defense for surface groups supporting Soviet SSBNs and defending the
sea approaches to the USSR in the Norwegian Sea and Northwest Pacific Basin.
The air cover provided by carrier-based fighter aircraft probably will allow the So-
viets to operate surface units at greater distances from Pact territory than cur-
rently envisioned. Other tasks of Soviet carrier aircraft could include:
• Conducting ASW with embarked helicopters.
• Attacking Western surface units.
• Escorting land-based reconnaissance, strike, and ASW aircraft during part of
their operations.
• Attacking Western land bases and facilities.
• Attacking Western aerial resupply efforts.
In conducting such operations, Soviet carriers will operate with other surface
units and possibly submarines and land-based aircraft. Their lack of experience in
such complex operations, however, suggests that it will be at least the mid-1990s
before a reasonable standard of operational proficiency can be attained.
90. Although the construction of a new class of aircraft carrier is apparently the pol-
icy of the present Soviet political and naval leadership, it is the type of program
that could suffer from changes in such leadership and from economic problems.
The enormous costs involved, not only for the ships themselves but for the air
group, supporting vessels, and shore-based infrastructure, could make the pro-
gram vulnerable to cancellation or delay if the Politburo seeks to reduce the bur-
den of defense expenditures.
91. Regardless of Soviet decisions concerning CTOL aircraft carriers, the Soviet Navy
probably will introduce improvements in its VSTOL aircraft units aboard the four
Kiev-class ships. Such improvements are likely to involve a replacement for the
Forger that has greater endurance, speed, payload, and air defense capability.
92. Protection of State Interests in Peacetime and Limited War. Although the primary
emphasis in Soviet naval developments will continue to be on improving capabili-
ties in a war with NATO, Soviet writings, construction programs, and exercises in-
dicate a growing recognition of the value of naval forces in situations short of
general war. Programs currently identified or projected by the US Intelligence
1 6 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Community will result by the mid-to-late 1990s in substantial improvements in
the Soviet Navy’s capability to project power and influence in distant areas.
93. The most important improvement will stem from the construction of aircraft car-
riers capable of handling high-performance aircraft. The lack of adequate air sup-
port has been the major operational weakness of Soviet naval forces in distant
areas. A force of two carriers with a total of some 120 aircraft would eliminate
much of this weakness. Although much smaller than the US carrier force, it
would provide the basis for establishing air superiority in many Third World situ-
ations in which the West did not become involved. Soviet writings concerning the
use of carriers emphasize their value in show-the-flag and limited-war situations.
94. Projected improvements in Soviet amphibious forces will also contribute to an
improved capability to project power in distant areas. We expect continued grad-
ual construction of naval amphibious ships, including additional LPDs (Landing
Ship, Personnel Dock) as well as smaller units. The Soviets also will continue ex-
ploring the use of advanced cargo ships such as roll-on/roll-off and ocean-going
barge carrier (LASH) ships in amphibious landings. The Soviet naval infantry
(now at a strength of about 14,000) will grow, perhaps to some 18,000 to 20,000
men. Additional amphibious assault forces will be available from ground forces
units trained in such operations.
95. We do not believe that these estimated improvements will be sufficient to enable
the Soviets to conduct amphibious operations in distant areas during a war with
NATO. Such wartime operations will continue to emphasize areas on the Soviet
periphery. Nor will such improvements make it practical to conduct landings in
situations in which Western forces would be in opposition. These improvements,
however, will provide Soviet leaders with a much-improved capability to over-
come the opposition that could be offered by most Third World countries, espe-
cially those that were intrinsically weak or beset by internal divisions. Such
improvements could also be used to support client states involved in military op-
erations against other states or internal opponents. We believe that certain aspects
of the recent exercise ZAPAD-81 suggest an interest in testing planning concepts
for amphibious operations in the Third World.
96. The amount of time spent by Soviet general purpose units outside home waters is
likely to increase only slightly in the 1980s and 1990s. Constraints on a major in-
crease in regular out-of-area deployments probably will continue to include:
• The need to retain most naval forces close to Soviet home waters and in a
readiness condition for rapid deployment to major wartime operating areas
such as the Norwegian Sea.
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• The fuel, maintenance, and personnel costs of out-of-area deployments, even
at the low levels of activity typical of Soviet units.
• A possible recognition by the Soviets that the usefulness of deployed naval
forces is not necessarily a direct correlation of size, but also involves capability
and the value of any naval presence as a signal of Soviet interest in an area.
Changes in out-of-area deployments are likely to be most significant in terms of
the capabilities of the units involved (new aircraft carriers, Ivan Rogovs, Kirovs,
and so forth) and the areas in which they will operate. The areas in which the So-
viets maintain a permanent naval presence (Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, South
China Sea, West Africa) are likely to undergo further gradual expansion in re-
sponse to political imperatives, primarily a desire to support the maintenance of
established “socialist” regimes and the creation of new ones. Among the most
likely candidate areas for such permanent naval presence are the Caribbean and
the Philippine Sea. To support such operations, the Soviets will continue their at-
tempts to achieve increased access to foreign facilities.
97. In addition to supporting peacetime naval operations, the Soviets probably would
seek to use facilities in Third World countries in both a war against NATO and
other lesser conflicts. The most likely role of such facilities in wartime would be as
positions from which Western force movements can be monitored during the pe-
riod of tension before the outbreak of war. We therefore expect to see continued
efforts to obtain the use of airfields to support reconnaissance flights, as well as
the establishment of SIGINT, communications, and possibly submarine-tracking
facilities. The Soviets probably will continue to regard the use, especially the sus-
tained use, of facilities in Third World countries in wartime as questionable be-
cause of their vulnerability and the possible unwillingness of host governments to
risk becoming belligerents. The advantages to the Soviet Navy, however, of using
such facilities are potentially substantial, particularly in operations against SSBNs
and carrier battle groups. We think it likely, therefore, that efforts will be made to
develop relations with Third World countries that will make wartime use of facili-
ties, especially by aircraft, a more realistic possibility.
III. Prospects for the Soviet Navy
98. We believe that an examination of the current role of the Navy in Soviet military
strategy, naval R&D, and construction programs, and the key issues facing Soviet
planners enables us to make a judgment as to the most likely course of develop-
ment for the Navy over the remainder of this century. We recognize, however, that
an estimate covering such a long period of political, economic, and technological
1 6 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
changes must be viewed with caution. An examination of some less likely but still
feasible courses of development is therefore included as well. These alternative
courses of development are not meant to be exhaustive but rather to indicate
some of the types of variables that could change our baseline estimate.
A. Baseline Estimate
99. We believe that the wartime strategy of the Soviet Navy will remain essentially un-
changed over the next 15 to 20 years in terms of major tasks and the composition
of forces to carry out those tasks. The requirement to counter advances in West-
ern naval offensive capabilities, however, probably will cause the Soviets gradually
to expand the areas in which their forces would be deployed for sea-control/sea-
denial operations. They will introduce new weapon platforms and systems into
the Navy and will seek an improved capability to use those weapons. We believe,
however, that these changes will occur within the framework of the Soviets’ pres-
ent strategy because they probably will continue to view it as offering the best
chance of accomplishing their vital wartime tasks.
100. The single most important mission of the Navy will continue to be strategic
strike, primarily using SLBMs and possibly SLCMs. The importance of sea-based
nuclear strike assets within the USSR’s overall military strategy could grow
because:
• The percentage of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads assigned to SSBNs will
increase as Typhoons with MIRVed SLBMs enter service.
• New Soviet SLBMs could be sufficiently accurate to be used effectively against
hardened targets.
• Soviet silo-based strategic systems may become more vulnerable.
The combination of increased SLBM accuracy and fixed intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) vulnerability could provide powerful incentives for the Soviet Union
to move an even larger portion of its strategic strike capability to sea. Although
such a shift probably would be resisted by other elements within the Soviet armed
forces, especially the Strategic Rocket Forces, it will continue to be advocated by
the Soviet naval leadership and has a reasonable chance of gaining political
endorsement.
101. We nonetheless believe the Soviets will continue to regard their SSBNs as vulnera-
ble to enemy ASW forces throughout the period of this Estimate. Protection and
support for Soviet SSBNs, therefore, is likely to remain the most important con-
sideration in the initial wartime deployment of a large portion of general purpose
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naval forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Pacific Fleet forces would be con-
centrated in the Northwest Pacific Basin, the Sea of Japan, and the Sea of Okhotsk
area. The Northern Fleet would deploy the bulk of its forces to the Barents,
Greenland, and northern Norwegian seas, although the outer edge of what we de-
scribe as the Northern Fleet sea-control area probably will expand gradually to in-
clude the southern Norwegian Sea, primarily to facilitate an extension of sea-denial
operations beyond the GIUK gap. This would be intended principally to counter
Western SLCM-armed ships and submarines, but would also support other oper-
ations in the Atlantic (see figure 21). Pacific Fleet sea-control operations would
also expand somewhat (see figure 22). The major mission of Soviet CTOL aircraft
carriers will probably be to assist in expanding these areas. Concentrating forces
there will continue to appeal to the Soviets because it will enhance integration of
their submarine and surface units with the land-based air support which, even af-
ter the introduction of a few aircraft carriers, will continue to constitute the bulk
of the forces of SNA.
102. The Soviets probably will continue to view Western SSNs as the primary threat to
their SSBN force and will conclude that the best chance of detecting such SSNs
lies in waiting for them to enter relatively confined areas where the Soviets will
have a concentration of forces and where their short-range sensors can be used to
best advantage. Expected improvements in Soviet ASW platforms, tactics, and
fixed-sensor technology, such as Cluster Lance, and increased use of under-ice pa-
trols probably will improve—perhaps substantially—the Soviet Navy’s ability to
protect its SSBNs. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will view such improve-
ments as sufficient to allow a lessened initial commitment of forces for SSBN
protection.
103. Northern and Pacific Fleet operations for the protection of SSBNs will coincide
with those for a portion of a second important task, strategic defense. Such op-
erations, together with some of those of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, will
seek to destroy Western aircraft carriers and strategic cruise missile platforms as
they cross Soviet defense thresholds, now generally some 2,000 kilometers from
Soviet territory. We expect such operations to be of growing importance to the
Soviets because of their expectations concerning the proliferation of Western
strategic cruise missiles. To counter Western cruise missiles launched from sur-
face ships and submarines and the added range these missiles afford carrier-
based strike aircraft, the Soviets probably will seek to extend the outer edge of
the sea-denial areas of the Northern and Pacific Fleets to approximately 3,000
kilometers.
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104. Another portion of the strategic defense task—the destruction of enemy SSBNs
before they can launch their missiles—will pose an increasing dilemma for the
Soviets. The deployment of hard-target-capable US SLBMs, improved British and
French SSBNs, and the first Chinese SSBNs probably will increase the importance
of achieving such destruction. The Soviet Navy’s ability to detect and track US
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FIGURE 21
Future Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the Western TVDs
SSBNs in the open ocean, however, probably will decline, at least over the next 10
years. This assessment is based on our belief that:
• The increased patrol areas of SSBNs carrying Trident SLBMs will more than
offset the increased coverage that could be provided by improved Soviet
conventional ASW platforms.
• The Soviets probably will be unable to deploy a broad-ocean acoustic or
nonacoustic sensor.
• Soviet SSNs will not be sufficiently quiet—at least throughout the next
decade—to engage in covert trail, and Soviet ASW aircraft will not be deployed
in sufficient numbers or have adequate range to maintain contact in US SSBN
patrol areas.
• Overt trail will continue to be technically feasible—particularly in choke
points and relatively confined areas—but the Soviets will not have sufficient
platforms to threaten the US SSBN force. A decision to use a substantial
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FIGURE 22
Future Initial Sovet Operating Areas in the Pacific Ocean
number of SSNs in this manner, moreover, would divert them from other
missions, such as protecting Soviet SSBNs.
We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-SSBN operations will continue to be
modest, with only a relatively few attack submarines stationed in choke points or
in the approaches to Western or Chinese submarine bases.
105. We believe that Soviet procurement of naval weapon platforms and systems over
the period of this Estimate will be driven primarily by requirements stemming
from the strategic offensive and defensive tasks outlined above. The importance
of these tasks should provide a solid basis for the navy to continue receiving at
least the same share of the defense budget that it has received since the 1960s.
Such an allocation of resources means that the Soviet Navy will continue to re-
ceive new platforms, including new classes of large surface combatants, attack
submarines, and aircraft. The production rate will not completely offset the re-
tirement of older units. The accelerating cost per ton of new combatants would
make ship-for-ship replacement prohibitively expensive. Indeed, considering
manpower/maintenance constraints, this may not be feasible. The force in the
year 2000 will therefore be somewhat smaller than that of today. Newer units,
however, will generally be larger than those being replaced and will be equipped
with more sophisticated weapon systems:
• The size of the modern ballistic missile submarine force will probably remain
roughly constant at about 60 units throughout the 1990s. The size of the
overall force (now 85 units) will decline by approximately 30 percent as older
units (G-class SSBs and H-class and older Y-class SSBNs) are converted or
retired. The new units will be larger and will carry more missile tubes than
most or all of those units retired. In the absence of an arms control or
reduction treaty, the number of SLBM launch tubes as well as the number of
warheads carried by the SSBN force is likely to increase.
• The first unit of the new class of 60,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
probably will become operational by about 1990. A total of three or four is
expected by the year 2000.
• The number of principal surface combatants probably will decline
somewhat—to about 260 units. New construction programs are likely to
include two or three new classes of nuclear-powered guided-missile cruisers
(CGNs); two new classes of guided-missile destroyers (DDGs); and three or
four new classes of frigates. As a result of these programs, the trend toward
larger average unit size, greater weapons loads, and more sophisticated air
defense and antisurface weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare systems will
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E 1 7 1
continue, thereby improving the Soviet Navy’s capability for sustained
operations.
• The overall number of general purpose submarines probably will decline to
about 260 units, but the number of nuclear-powered units probably will grow
substantially. New classes will include follow-ons to the C-class and possibly to
the O-class SSGN and A-class SSN, as well as the V-class SSN follow-on we
expect to reach IOC in 1984. These units should continue the trend toward
quieter platforms with improved sensors and increased command and control
capability. Construction of improved diesel submarines with greater
submerged endurance will also continue.
• The Soviet Navy’s overall amphibious assault lift capability will increase
gradually. A follow-on to the Ivan Rogov–class assault ship (LPD) and two new
classes of tank landing ships (LSTs) are likely to be introduced. Construction
of smaller units, including air-cushion vehicles (ACVs), will also continue.
Emphasis on amphibious utility in merchant ship construction—especially for
Ro-Ro and similar ships—will remain unchanged. Soviet interest in the use of
helicopters in amphibious assault may lead to construction of a helicopter
assault ship (LPH or LHA) in the 1990s. We expect an increase in the size of
the naval infantry from about 14,000 to about 18,000 to 20,000 men.
• The Soviet Navy’s underway replenishment capabilities should be enhanced by
the introduction of one or more new classes of multipurpose replenishment
ships. Construction of such ships, however, is likely to continue receiving a
lower priority than the construction of the ships they are intended to support.
• The number of fixed-wing naval aircraft probably will increase somewhat,
with the major changes being the first deployment to sea of high-performance
CTOL aircraft as part of the air group on the first aircraft carriers and the
introduction to Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) of the Blackjack A bomber or, more
likely, a Backfire follow-on. SNA will be an essential element in the Soviets’
attempts to expand their sea-control/sea-denial efforts against Western surface
forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean seas and
the Northwest Pacific Basin. SNA bombers will also remain a principal feature of
Soviet antisurface capabilities in other areas such as the Arabian Sea.
This projected Soviet naval construction program was subjected to econometric
analysis, which determined that it would be consistent with current Soviet bud-
getary trends in ship and aircraft construction.
106. We believe that major technical improvements in Soviet fleet air defense are likely
during the period of this Estimate. New SAMs, guns, and laser weapons will
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probably be introduced and radio-electronic combat measures will continue to
receive a high priority. Fighter aircraft operating from the projected CTOL carri-
ers of the Northern and Pacific Fleets, probably in cooperation with AWACs and
possibly AEW aircraft, will add a new dimension to the Navy’s air defense re-
sources. We cannot confidently assess the net effect of these changes on the ability
of Soviet surface forces to defend themselves against air attack during a war with
NATO. Such an assessment is highly dependent on tactical variables. The perfor-
mance characteristics of key systems, such as the SA-N-6, are not yet fully under-
stood. Changes in the Soviet Navy’s air defense systems will be occurring
simultaneously with those in Western antiship capability, including the introduc-
tion of large numbers of cruise missiles. Despite these uncertainties, the major So-
viet commitment to the construction of large surface combatants persuades us that
the naval leadership probably judges the overall result of changes in air defense ca-
pability as sufficient to support the wartime deployment of surface units farther
from Soviet territory in a gradual expansion of their intended sea-control areas.
107. Expansion of both sea-control and sea-denial operations would be supported by
gradual improvements in Soviet capability to surveil Western surface units and
provide targeting assistance for antiship missile attacks. Improved over-the-
horizon targeting would allow individual Soviet units to make better use of the
range of their missiles, thereby covering a broader ocean area. Much of the improve-
ment we expect in surveillance and targeting will involve satellite systems. We be-
lieve that the Soviets will introduce by the early 1990s an improved EORSAT with
the capability to detect and identify additional types of radars. By the late 1990s,
further improvements in the EORSAT are likely to result in near-continuous tar-
geting capability by use of higher orbits, better sensors, and expanded fields of
view. Probably a new RORSAT will also be introduced with improvements in
probability of detection and a wider field of view. It is also possible the Soviets
will produce a synthetic aperture radar satellite for improved all-weather sur-
veillance. We expect that the improved EORSAT and RORSAT may be used in
cooperation with a new satellite data relay system to provide real-time battle
management information to command authorities ashore. In addition, during the
period of this Estimate, advances in maritime surveillance from manned space ve-
hicles can be expected. The use of satellites, however, cannot be considered exclu-
sively in the context of Soviet naval operations. Such use will continue to provide
one of the many linkages between naval operations and overall Soviet military
strategy. The Navy’s ability to use satellite systems in wartime would depend on
such nonnaval factors as the extent to which antisatellite warfare would be con-
ducted at the outset of war and the ability of satellites to survive Western attack.
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Recognizing the danger of being dependent on any single system, the Soviet Navy
will continue to integrate surveillance and targeting support from satellites with
that from traditional platforms such as manned aircraft and possibly from new
systems such as reconnaissance drones.
108. The Soviets probably recognize that future operations in areas such as the south-
ern Norwegian Sea will place greater demands on the navy’s command, control,
and communications system because of factors such as larger operating areas,
more emphasis on the integration of diverse platforms, and the need to counter a
greater number of high-value targets. We expect the Soviets to respond to this
challenge by improving their capabilities in technical areas such as satellite com-
munications, very-low-frequency communications support to submarines, and
low-probability-of-intercept systems, and by striving for greater automated data
system compatibility. Another major trend will include increased automation to
support battle management at all levels of the command structure. We believe
that the major emphasis in the command, control, and communications system
will continue to be on highly centralized control of wartime operations, but there
are indications of an intention by the fleet staffs to delegate a larger portion of
their battle management responsibilities to the flotilla and squadron-level
commands.
109. In addition to its primary wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy also will continue to be
responsible for supporting ground forces in the land TVDs and for interdicting
sea lines of communication. Antiship and ASW operations by the Baltic Fleet in
the North Sea and the Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean probably will receive
increased emphasis to counter the growing capability of Western naval forces to
strike targets in the land TVDs from increased ranges. The relatively low priority
of open-ocean SLOC interdiction in Soviet naval strategy probably will not
change radically unless the Soviets foresee a protracted conventional war with
NATO or are responding to major changes in NATO’s force structure or strategy for
the reinforcement and resupply of Europe. Despite increased capabilities for power
projection in distant areas, Soviet amphibious forces will continue to be structured
primarily for landings close to Warsaw Pact territory during a war with NATO.
110. Soviet naval out-of-area operations in peacetime will continue to focus on main-
taining permanent presence in areas such as the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea,
the South China Sea, and off the west coast of Africa. We expect the Soviets will
attempt to expand their level of naval activity in areas such as the Caribbean Sea,
the Philippine Sea, and the southwest Indian Ocean islands. They also are likely to
step up efforts to acquire access to foreign naval support facilities. The new ships
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entering service undoubtedly will be used in the traditional techniques of Soviet
naval diplomacy ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to demonstra-
tions of support for client states during crisis situations and limited wars. Given
the likelihood of continued instability in the Third World, the use of such naval
diplomacy and power projection techniques probably will increase during the
1980s and 1990s.
111. We believe, however, that the most significant change in the Soviet Navy during
the period of this Estimate will be the achievement for the first time of an ability
to project power ashore effectively in distant areas in a limited war environ-
ment—that is, one that does not involve a confrontation between the USSR and
NATO. Although we believe that Soviet naval programs are motivated primarily
by requirements for a general war with the West, new platforms and weapon sys-
tems will help to close some of the current gaps in Soviet capability to conduct
such distant area operations. In particular, the ability to form a task force around
two or three CTOL aircraft carriers will give the Soviet Navy its first significant
capability to provide tactical air support for ground force operations and am-
phibious landings by Soviet or client forces in distant areas. The new medium-
caliber gun and air defense systems on new classes of surface ships and the
probable acquisition of additional large amphibious ships and a seaborne as-
sault helicopter (perhaps Helix B) will also improve the Soviet Navy’s capability to
conduct opposed landings.
112. These enhanced capabilities will give the Soviets the option to use naval force in a
number of Third World situations against all but the most well-armed regional
powers. Because the Soviets probably will have, at most, four CTOL carriers by
the year 2000, they would have to draw heavily on the assets of more than one
fleet—as they did during the large amphibious portion of exercise ZAPAD-81—to
assemble a force sufficient to conduct an opposed distant-area landing. The as-
sembly of such a force at a great distance from the USSR would seriously under-
mine the Soviet Navy’s ability to perform its priority strategic offensive and
defensive missions in the event of escalation to general war. We believe, therefore,
that major Soviet naval task force participation in Third World conflicts will be
restricted to limited war situations in which the Soviets judged the risk of escala-
tion to a war with the United States or NATO to be small.
113. Perhaps the most compelling argument against a more ambitious power projec-
tion strategy during the period of this Estimate is our judgment that programs
directly supporting the Navy’s strategic offensive and defensive missions—nuclear-
powered ballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack submarines, land-based
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strike aircraft, and ASW-oriented surface combatants—will continue to receive
top priority in the allocation of the Soviet Navy’s budget. Other factors that cast
doubt on a significantly increased power projection commitment in the near
term include the following:
• The naval infantry’s growth has been modest. Since its reestablishment in 1963
it has grown to a current strength of about 14,000.
• The pace of LPD construction has been slow.
• Only one Berezina AOR has been built and no other large replenishment units
are known to be under construction.
114. The likelihood of an ambitious naval power projection strategy during the period
of this Estimate is further reduced by the practical difficulties involved in rapidly
constructing a large number of CTOL aircraft carriers, the most important in-
struments of such a mission. We estimate that the Soviets will construct such car-
riers at the same Nikolayev shipyard on the Black Sea at which Kiev-class aircraft
carriers are built. This facility has been specially configured at great expense (in-
cluding the installation of the USSR’s largest overhead gantry cranes) for the con-
struction of such large warships. We estimate that this yard, if operating at a
normal construction pace, will be able to produce one large CTOL aircraft carrier
every four years, with the first unit being delivered about 1990. It is possible for
the Soviets to construct carriers at a faster rate, by using additional, less suitable
shipyards or by placing construction at Nikolayev on a crash basis. Such practices
would, however, be inconsistent with past Soviet practice when constructing new
types of large combatants. (The construction of the first unit of the Kirov-class
CGN, for example, began in 1973 but was not completed until 1980.) We believe
that the Soviets recognize the complexity of building and operating CTOL carri-
ers and are likely to develop this capability at a slow-but-sure pace. For these rea-
sons, we reject the concept of a Soviet Navy in which power projection by major
naval task forces plays a dominant role.
B. Alternate Courses of Development
115. Our best estimate on the future of the Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the
trends we have observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and strategy over
the past 20 years will continue. The following paragraphs discuss three variables
that could precipitate major changes in the Soviet Navy of the 1990s: a major So-
viet ASW breakthrough, a strategic arms reduction treaty, and a severe economic
crisis that forces a cut in military spending.
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116. An ASW Breakthrough. The development that would result in the most profound
change in Soviet wartime strategy from that outlined above would be an ASW
breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and track enemy sub-
marines in the open ocean—a breakthrough derived from one of the many re-
search efforts they are conducting on acoustic and nonacoustic sensors. Although
unlikely throughout the period of this Estimate, such a breakthrough would sub-
stantially increase the Soviet Navy’s ability to perform the critically important
strategic defensive tasks of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land-attack
cruise missile submarines before they launched their missiles. It would also in-
crease the Soviets’ ability to protect their SSBNs, because enemy attack subma-
rines could be identified and attacked long before they closed Soviet SSBN
havens.
117. We believe an ASW breakthrough would lead to major changes in the way the So-
viets would deploy their general purpose forces, particularly attack submarines,
before and during a general war. During the prehostilities phase, the Soviets prob-
ably would opt to deploy substantial numbers of SSNs to suspected enemy SSBN
operating areas, in choke points, and in likely transit lanes near enemy submarine
bases. These nuclear-powered attack submarines would attempt to gain contact
and maintain trail on detected Western submarines. As a consequence, fewer sub-
marines would be available for SSBN protection, unless the Soviet SSN order of
battle were increased. Surface and air units probably would also be deployed far-
ther forward. Planning for these operations probably would lead to a greater ef-
fort to acquire foreign facilities, particularly to support ASW aircraft.
118. The development of a reasonable capability to detect and trail Western SSBNs in
the open ocean would provide the Soviet Navy with a powerful argument for in-
creased budgetary allocations. The Navy could argue persuasively that it could not
effectively counter enemy strategic submarines and ensure the survivability of its
own SSBNs without a substantial increase in forces, especially in SSN production
rates. Given this choice, the Soviet leadership could grant the Navy increased
funds for a greater SSN construction effort, perhaps twice as many units per year
as the five to six we currently expect.
119. If there were an initial detection breakthrough, we cannot rule out the possibility
that the Soviets would explore techniques for destroying submarines, especially
SSBNs, by means other than the traditional reliance on general purpose naval
platforms. There have, for example, been vague references in Soviet writings to
the possible use of land-based ballistic missiles against submarines in the open
ocean. Exploring such a technique would be consistent with past Soviet interest in
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innovative solutions to naval problems [TEXT DELETED]. It would also be con-
sistent with Soviet doctrinal emphasis on a multiservice approach to the accom-
plishment of wartime tasks. The Soviets are probably aware of the myriad
technical problems likely to be encountered in any such use of land-based ballistic
missiles including:
• The need to develop a remote sensor that could precisely locate SSBNs
patrolling in the open ocean and constantly update that position.
• The need to develop a system that could rapidly update the trajectory of a
ballistic missile in flight to compensate for target movement.
• The need to solve fusing problems associated with a warhead surviving water
impact from high altitude.
We are skeptical that such problems could be overcome, at least during the period
of this Estimate, and believe the Soviets would be unlikely to pursue seriously
such a course unless they had high confidence that the initial detection problem
would soon be solved. This example is mentioned, however, to illustrate that a
breakthrough in ASW detection could lead to radical changes, not only in the
Navy, but in overall Soviet military strategy.
120. Strategic Arms Control. Arms control negotiations, such as the ongoing strategic
arms reduction talks (START), could play an important part in determining the
role within Soviet strategy and the force composition of the Soviet Navy in the
1990s. For example, severe restrictions on SLCM characteristics/deployment, or a
ban, would alleviate a serious maritime threat to the USSR and eliminate much of
the pressure to conduct sea-denial operations at greater distances from Soviet ter-
ritory. Provisions governing strategic ballistic missile force levels could have a sig-
nificant impact upon general purpose force programs because a substantial
portion of those forces will remain dedicated to protecting Soviet SSBNs. A
START provision simply limiting or freezing SSBN/SLBM levels probably would
have little impact upon Soviet general purpose programs, although SSGN/SSN
construction could increase slightly as facilities dedicated to SSBNs shifted to gen-
eral purpose programs. Plans to protect Soviet SSBNs probably would not be af-
fected by such a freeze/reduction. On the other hand, a START provision calling
for a sharp reduction in land-based ballistic missile systems, which would be
likely to encourage both the United States and the Soviet Union to move a greater
percentage of their strategic arsenals to sea, could provide strong justification for
increased production of ASW-capable general purpose forces to protect the in-
creased number of Soviet SSBNs. If a treaty encouraging a “move to sea” were
signed, we would expect increases in the production of SSNs, Bear F, or follow-on
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ASW aircraft, and ASW-oriented surface ships such as the Udaloy. Although a US
move to sea could also justify an increased Soviet anti-SSBN effort, we do not be-
lieve the Soviets would allocate increased forces against Western SSBNs unless
they had first achieved a significant ASW breakthrough allowing them to detect
and trail enemy submarines in the open ocean.
121. Severe Economic Stringencies. The Soviets’ ability to sustain the ambitious naval
program we project in our baseline estimate may ultimately depend upon the
health of the Soviet economy and the willingness of future leaders to continue
the Brezhnev policy of favoring guns over butter. We have no evidence of a
Khrushchevian inclination within the next generation of Soviet leaders to bolster
the economy by cutting military spending. Indeed, we believe such a cut would be
unlikely, at least through the 1980s. It nonetheless is conceivable that the post-
Brezhnev elite would be more willing to curb military spending, especially if agri-
cultural performance and the economic growth rate continue to falter through
the 1980s and/or arms control agreements allow significant economies.
122. With the possible exception of the Strategic Rocket Forces, budgetary cuts driven
primarily by economic stringencies probably would fall on all branches of the So-
viet armed forces. Within the Navy, programs considered fundamental to its pri-
mary strategic offensive and defensive tasks, such as SSBNs, attack and cruise
missile submarines, and land-based strike aircraft, probably would suffer few, if
any, cuts. Rather, some cutbacks or slowdowns in programs relating more to
distant-area power projection and sea-control capabilities—such as large surface
combatants, amphibious ships, and naval auxiliaries—could be expected. It is
conceivable, however, that through a combination of factors, budget cuts could
fall more heavily on the Soviet Navy, resulting in substantial cuts in surface ship
programs. These factors include:
• A new political leadership that lacks Brezhnev’s apparent commitment to
building a large balanced navy and/or is less inclined to use naval forces as
instruments of foreign policy to project Soviet power and influence in
distant areas.
• A new chief of the Soviet Navy who lacks Admiral Gorshkov’s influence within
the political and military hierarchies and/or does not fully share his vision of a
blue-water navy in which large surface combatants play a prominent role.
Gorshkov’s successor, for example, could be a submariner and could be more
inclined to push for the construction of additional attack submarines.
• Technical advances in antiship weaponry and targeting convince the Soviets
that large surface ships are too costly and vulnerable, and that ASW and
N A T I O N A L I N T E L L I G E N C E E S T I M A T E 1 7 9
ASUW tasks assigned to large surface combatants can be done more effectively
by smaller combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft.
123. It is doubtful that the interim collective leadership we expect to follow Brezhnev
will be inclined to make major policy departures such as cutting defense spend-
ing. A decision to make significant reductions in military spending probably
would be impossible until the next generation of Soviet leaders is firmly in place
and one man has emerged as first among equals. Since this process is likely to take
several years, a decision to cut naval programs could not be made until the late
1980s. By that time, most of the major surface combatant programs currently
under way—the BLK-COM-1 cruisers and the Udaloy and Sovremennyy guided-
missile destroyers—should be nearing completion. Any reductions then probably
would come in Soviet programs we project for the late 1980s and 1990s. Programs
that probably would be deleted or sharply reduced in order to comply with a sig-
nificant cut in naval spending include:
• The 60,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The first unit of this class,
and possibly the second, may be too near completion to be affected by a
budgetary decision made in the late 1980s. The projected third and fourth
units, however, probably would be deleted, and any plans for a follow-on class
canceled.
• New class(es) of nuclear-powered cruisers.
• New classes of large amphibious ships (LPDs and LPHs) and underway
replenishment ships.
In addition, the Soviets may opt for early retirement of some older destroyers and
frigates and construct fewer units than originally programed of new classes to fol-
low the Sovremennyy and Udaloy DDGs. Programs clearly identified with coastal
ASW and SSBN protection, such as the projected follow-on classes for the Krivak
and Grisha frigates, probably would be least affected by a sharp budgetary
cutback.
124. The net result of cuts in surface ship programs such as those outlined above
would be a navy with much less capability than the one projected in our baseline
estimate to control waters beyond the range of land-based tactical aircraft and to
project power in distant areas. By the mid-1990s, such cuts could reduce the over-
all size of the surface navy by as much as 20 percent, lessening Soviet capabilities
to sustain current peacetime deployment levels in areas such as the Mediterra-
nean, the Indian Ocean, and off West Africa. The Soviets probably would attempt
to compensate for any reduction in naval capabilities to perform key strategic de-
fensive tasks by relying even more on advances in antiship missiles that could be
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launched from aircraft, submarines, and land and receive targeting information
from satellites. In addition, they might stress nonnaval solutions to maritime
threats, such as land-based antiballistic missile and air defense systems—to counter
SLBMs and SLCMs, respectively—and an increased maritime role for the Soviet
Air Force.
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Notes
Preface
1. The terms “naval strategy” and “naval doc-
trine” are used in this Estimate in the general
sense of principles by which forces are
guided in their actions. In Soviet usage,
“military doctrine” and “military strategy”
have very specific meanings. Neither term is
applied to an individual service. Military
doctrine comprises the views of the leader-
ship of the Soviet state on the nature of fu-
ture war and the tasks of the state and the
armed forces in preparing for and conduct-
ing such a war. Military doctrine is a starting
point for military strategy, which directs the
armed forces as a whole in a complex system
of interdependent large-scale strategic oper-
ations. Individual services execute strategic
missions but always do so under the overall
unified military strategy. The Soviet Navy’s
missions are firmly defined by this overall
military strategy and cannot be properly un-
derstood outside that context.
Discussion
1. The holders of this view are the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, and the Director
of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
2. The holders of this view are the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Director, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State.
3. Other land-attack cruise missiles under de-
velopment may be for naval use. Evidence
available as this Estimate went to press sug-
gests that the reconfigured Y-class submarine
launched in October 1982 may be intended
as a test platform or as the lead unit in a
class of submarines retrofitted to employ
SLCMs.
4. The holders of this view are the Director, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, and the Director
of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy.
5. The holders of this view are the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Director, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State.
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Compiler’s Preface
This is the fifth published edition of the annotated bibliography on The Maritime
Strategy. Drafting and circulation of annotated bibliographies have been a feature of
The Maritime Strategy process within the U.S. Navy since the early 1980s. The earliest
editions were internal documents generated within the Strategic Concepts Branch
(OP-603) of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). They were designed
both to aid the leadership of the Navy to keep track of the policy debates over The Mar-
itime Strategy as they progressed, and to stimulate further internal Navy research and
analysis of issues related to the strategy by publicizing relevant source materials.1
At the suggestion of the leadership of the U.S. Naval Institute, the first publicly released
edition was published in The Maritime Strategy, a supplement to the January 1986 Pro-
ceedings.2 The second edition was published in 1987 by the Naval Institute.3 The third
edition was published in 1988 by the Naval Postgraduate School.4 All three editions ad-
hered to the same chronological format, to enable users to follow the progress of the
debates. A fourth edition was published by the Naval Postgraduate School in 1989, this
time with an alphabetical format.5
This fifth edition returns to the format and text of the earlier editions. Essentially, as nec-
essary to retain its authenticity as a product of 1980s U.S. naval thinking, it is only a
slightly updated version of the third edition. The differences are the addition of this Pref-
ace and an Epilogue and the deletion of some entries in section III, “The Debate Con-
tinues: 1987 and Beyond.” The entries deleted from section III are those describing works
planned but as yet unpublished when the third edition went to press. Those works that
were subsequently completed and published are included in the Epilogue.
It is fitting that the various editions of the annotated bibliography on The Maritime
Strategy have been published by the U.S. Naval Institute, the Naval Postgraduate
School, and now the Naval War College. All three institutions were instrumental dur-
ing the 1980s in ensuring that the debates on The Maritime Strategy—both within the
U.S. Navy and beyond—were unvarnished, well informed, sophisticated, and spirited.
Those debates accounted for much of the power, vitality, and influence of The Mari-
time Strategy during the last decade of the Cold War and beyond.
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Introduction
This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U.S. Navy–
Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and mili-
tary leaders of the U.S. Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes
criticisms of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating The Maritime
Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical precedents. In
addition, it covers both how the strategy was developed and who developed it, and the
important role of war gaming.
The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the de-
bate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that strategy. Absent are discussions
of naval affairs that do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—
the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.
In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items are listed chro-
nologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Au-
thoritative official statements of The Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*).
Explicit direct commentaries on The Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double aster-
isk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various issues or aspects of The
Maritime Strategy or with its immediate antecedents.
Publications on sister-service and allied contributions to The Maritime Strategy are
listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher. (Admittedly, this and other artificial ty-
pological devices run against a central theme of The Maritime Strategy: its global,
“seamless web” character). Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strate-
gic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately be cited
as evidence that such thinking was lacking.

I. Maritime Strategy Debates: 1979–1985
American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the
foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns cen-
tered around peacetime presence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy’s role in
nuclear strike warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the fo-
cus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of
Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt’s formulation of the “Four Missions of the Navy”—
strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. (A major
body of literature on presence began to be created at that time.) In the mid-1970s, sea
control seemed to dominate discussions.
In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on
strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet commander
and Pacific Fleet commander in chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral
Hayward’s focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted glob-
ally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union
and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval
officers of the first post–World War II decade. That era’s focus on nuclear strikes, how-
ever, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, primarily
conventional.
Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 testimony before Con-
gress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance
and the resultant debate he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the
statements and policies of the Reagan administration, especially its first Secretary of
the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.
The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had largely taken the
form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national se-
curity periodicals. This debate had focused on two themes: the general forward strate-
gic principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated
repeatedly by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., and a perceived “Maritime
Strategy versus Coalition Warfare” dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under Sec-
retary of Defense Robert Komer and others.
At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps—in conjunction with officers of their sister services and
allies—had been tasked to develop for internal use a detailed description of The Mari-
time Strategy component of U.S. national military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rig-
orously integrated into one clear, consistent document a number of long-held views of
Navy and Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in the
fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic
principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan administration officials,
and a thoughtful discussion of the variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the
strategy.
Concepts developed by the Navy’s warfare communities and fleets, as well as by Army,
Air Force, joint, and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as appropri-
ate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limita-
tions were identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts
Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603).
The U.S. Navy–Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus
Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been
underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testi-
mony in 1983 released an initial edition of The Maritime Strategy to the public. A
classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the Navy’s Program Re-
view Committee (chaired by then Vice Adm. Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and
signed and distributed Navywide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval
Operations, in 1984.
Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way into naval-affairs
journals, especially the Proceedings. Writings on naval strategy that did not take The
Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative con-
gressional testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and letters to the editor—
penned by senior naval officers and well-placed civilian commentators—had appeared
for the essential elements of The Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. Public
commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press conferences, speeches, and
articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Robert W. Komer to discussions on as-
pects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed largely by military officers from na-
tional and alliance guidance and approved by civilian leadership.
Promulgation of The Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public and government dis-
course. Within the Navy, the interplay among The Maritime Strategy, force-level plan-
ning, fleet plans and operations, and professional education and training became a
governing dynamic. In the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose
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from a handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of govern-
ment documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies distributed
of the Proceedings’ watershed The Maritime Strategy January 1986 supplement alone.
This quantitative leap was accompanied by qualitative changes in both the background
of the commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.
Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s, The Maritime
Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one—albeit a vital—component of the na-
tional military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of
that national strategy. Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy em-
bodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and ci-
vilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now
speaking with one sophisticated voice to—and increasingly for—the nation and its allies.
Hayward, Adm. Thomas B. “The Future of U.S. Sea Power.” Naval Institute Proceedings
[hereafter Proceedings]/Naval Review (May 1979): 66–71; see also Zumwalt, Adm.
Elmo R., Jr. “Total Force”: 103–106; and “Comment and Discussion” (July 1979): 23–
24; (August 1979): 87–89; (September 1979): 89–91; (October 1979): 21; (December
1979): 88; (January 1980): 82–86. Public debate on the new era of U.S. Navy strategy
begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman Friedman, et al. See also Hayward
“Posture Statement” testimony before Congress, 1979–1982.
Moorer, Adm. Thomas H., USN (Ret.), and Cottrell, Alvin J. “Sea Power and NATO Strat-
egy.” In NATO: The Next Thirty Years, edited by Kenneth A. Myers. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1980, 223–236. (Detailed arguments on the necessarily global nature of any
major future war with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the
Kola Peninsula, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970–1974 Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967–1970 Chief of Naval Operations.) Arguments against a
“swing” strategy from the Pacific are also echoed in “For Want of a Nail: The Logistics
of the Alliance” by Adm. Isaac Kidd, USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO com-
mander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same volume (pages 189–
205).
Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.). “Thinking About the Future of the Navy.” Proceed-
ings (August 1980): 66–69. Also “Comment and Discussion” (October 1980): 101;
(November 1980): 124–127; (January 1981): 77. (Admiral Turner questions role of
power projection in general war strategy.)
U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be
Secretary of the Navy. 97th Cong., 1st sess., 28 January 1981. (“I think the major need
of the Navy today is the establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly
articulated naval strategy, first and foremost.”)
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Prina, L. Edgar. “Budget Increases Reflect ‘A Major Change in Naval Strategy.’” Sea
Power (April 1981): 13–22. (Best coverage of Secretary Lehman’s press conference of 3
March 1981, when he unveiled his “major change.”) See also page 1 of the Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, and Baltimore Sun, 4 March 1981, and
George, James L. “U.S. Carriers—Bold New Strategy.” Navy International (June
1981): 330–335. (Compare with Hayward and Moorer/Cottrell pieces above.)
Hart, Senator Gary. “Can Congress Come to Order?” In The Tethered Presidency, edited
by Thomas Franck. New York: New York University Press, 1981, 242–243. (A call for
a national maritime-only strategy and “obvious and indisputable naval superiority.”
The U.S. Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first.)
Betts, Richard K. Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1981, 537–540. (Sees discussion of carrier penetration of Soviet
waters as “peacetime deterrent rhetoric” about risky “missions that could turn into a
naval Charge of the Light Brigade.”)
Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control. Challenges for U.S. Na-
tional Security: Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces: A Pre-
liminary Report, Part II. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1981. (Chapter 3: 99–148, assesses the naval balance and identifies key issues.
No policy recommendations. Comprehensive and evenhanded. Unlike The Maritime
Strategy, purely budget oriented.)
Lehman, John F., Jr. “Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy.” Strategic Review (Summer 1981):
9–15. (For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strat-
egy. See also Lehman “Posture statement” testimony before Congress, 1981–1987, es-
pecially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.)
Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo R., Jr., USN (Ret.). “Naval Battles We Could Lose.” International
Security Review (Summer 1961): 139–155. (By the 1970–1974 U.S. Navy CNO. Argues
for more stress on the U.S. Navy as “geopolitical cavalry” for low-to-middle-level
conflict, and for a “distributed force” building program as optimum for the full spec-
trum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear war at sea.)
Stockman, David. The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed. New York:
Harper and Row, 1986, 280–281. (Anonymous “experts” ridicule “the theory of ‘get-
ting in harm’s way’” in mid-1981 to President Reagan’s gullible budget director.)
Caldwell, Hamlin. “The Empty Silo: Strategic ASW.” Naval War College Review (September–
October 1981): 4–14. (Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.)
Koburger, Capt. C. W., USCGR. “Pitts’ Choice: An Alternative NATO Strategy for the
USA.” Navy International (December 1981): 730–731. (Like that of Senator Hart, one
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of the very few real examples of a call for a “pure” national maritime strategy, a posi-
tion often falsely attributed to proponents of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy.)
Ikle, Fred Charles. “The Reagan Defense Program: A Focus on the Strategic Imperatives.”
Strategic Review (Spring 1982): 11–18. (By the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Especially good on administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to
fight on a variety of fronts.)
Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.). “Tailor Military Strategy to the Economy.” Phil-
adelphia Inquirer (26 May 1982): 25. (Sees the Reagan administration as building a
new maritime strategy on top of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far
East as the key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit.)
Record, Jeffrey, and Rear Adm. Robert J. Hanks, USN (Ret.). U.S. Strategy at the Cross-
roads. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. (Two differ-
ent arguments for a shift to a national maritime strategy, including one by a
prominent U.S. Navy strategist of the mid-1970s.)
Komer, Robert. “Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense.” Foreign Affairs (Summer
1982): 1, 124–131, 144. Also Adm. Stansfield Turner and Capt. George Thibault.
“Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy” (Fall 1982):
125–135; “Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies” (Winter 1982–
1983): 453–457. (The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs. Turner vs. Lehman.
Ambassador Komer had been a leading Carter administration Defense Department
official from 1977 to 1981.)
Vlahos, Michael. “U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and the Soviet Maritime Chal-
lenge.” In Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s, edited by William J. Taylor, Jr.,
et al. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984, 427–432. (1982 views of a former Naval
War College faculty member. Especially good on late-1970s internal U.S. Navy strat-
egy debates and as critique of tying U.S. naval strategy too closely to the Soviet naval
threat. See approach taken by McGruther, cited in section XI below. This volume also
contains some of Ambassador Komer’s early—and retrospectively, most lucid—argu-
ments, at 196–199.)
Vlahos, Michael. “Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment.” Orbis (Fall
1982): 583–589. (Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.)
Posen, Barry A. “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank.” In-
ternational Security (Fall 1982): 28–54. (Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the
Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.)
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Zakheim, Dov. “The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on Strategy.” Washington
Quarterly (Autumn 1982): 158–166. (Reagan administration maritime strategy in
overall military context, by a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.)
Lehman, John. “Support for Defense Is Still Strong.” Washington Post (16 December
1982): 23. (“The Navy is working to do its part in a team effort of forward-based air,
land, and naval power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of de-
terrence, not a substitute for it.”)
Cohen, Eliot A. “The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance.” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1982–
1983): 325–343. (A Naval War College faculty member argues for strengthening the
U.S. Navy, creation of a “Fifth Fleet,” global U.S. military focus, and increased Euro-
pean military responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the “Atlanticist vs. navalist”
debate.)
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Defense Policy, 1981–1982.” In The Reagan Presidency, An
Early Assessment, edited by Fred I. Greenstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1983, 82–116. (Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the context
of The Maritime Strategy.)
Glenn, Senator John, Barry E. Carter, and Robert W. Komer. Rethinking Defense and
Conventional Forces. Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy, 1983. (Two
ex-Army officers, Carter: 33–35, and Komer: 46–48, attack The Maritime Strategy and
the 600-ship Navy.)
Posen, Barry, and Stephen Van Evera. “Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Depar-
ture from Containment.” In Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s,
edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1983, 67–104. (Critical of all aspects of Reagan defense policy and strategy, in-
cluding offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval forces. “Overall, a
counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding mis-
sions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all . . .
a counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American conventional
forces—the control of escalation.” Advocates a ten-carrier force.)
Brown, Harold. Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Danger-
ous World. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983. (By the 1977–1981 Secretary of Defense.
Mildly critical of forward carrier operations; more strongly critical of the 600-ship
Navy buildup. See especially 100–101, 121–123, 171–187.)
Miller, Steven. “The Northern Seas in Soviet and U.S. Strategy.” In Nuclear Disengage-
ment in Europe, edited by Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee. London: Taylor and
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Francis, 1983, 117–137. (Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. na-
val strategy and Reagan administration policy.)
Staudenmaier, Col. William, USA. “One if by Land—Two if by Sea: The Continental-
Maritime Debate.” Army (January 1983): 30–37. (Opening salvo of the “Carlisle
School.” A leading Army War College faculty member contributes to the mis-
perceptions that the central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy vs.
Continental Strategy and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations.)
* U.S. House Armed Services Committee. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authori-
zation for FY84; Part 4. 98th Cong., 1st sess., 24 February 1983, 47–51. (Commodore
Dudley Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy’s “first cut” Maritime
Strategy, February 1983, published later that year.)
Tritten, Cdr. James J. “It’s Not Either Or.” Wings of Gold (Spring 1983): 49–52. (Argues
Mahanian concept of U.S. seapower is necessary to support U.S. forward defense con-
tinental strategy.)
Nunn, Senator Sam. The Need to Reshape Military Strategy. Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University CSIS (18 March 1983), 7. (Advocates choke point defense,
vice carrier-based airpower, vs. the Soviet homeland.)
Caldwell, Hamlin. “Arctic Submarine Warfare.” Submarine Review (July 1983): 4–13.
(Develops further the arguments in his 1981 article.)
Dunn, Keith A., and Col. William O. Staudenmaier, USA. “Strategy for Survival.” Foreign
Policy (Fall 1983): 22–41. Also Komer and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters (Winter
1983–1984): 176–178. (The “Carlisle School” again. Seeks to synthesize all points in
the maritime-continental debate.)
Arkin, William M. “Nuclear Weapons at Sea.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (October
1983): 66–81. (Sees U.S. Navy theater nuclear weapons under development as
destabilizing, despite Soviet theater nuclear naval programs.)
** Murray, Robert J., “A War-Fighting Perspective.” Proceedings (October 1983): 66–81. (By
a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War Col-
lege’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pages 70 and 74 on The Mari-
time Strategy and the role of the Naval War College. “You have to discard the term
‘naval strategy,’ and even the slightly more modern variant, ‘maritime strategy’ and
talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy. . . . Newport is not, of
course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers
get together and try to produce better ideas.”)
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Epstein, Joshua M. “Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme.” Interna-
tional Security (Winter 1983–1984): 19–31 and especially 23–25. Also reprinted in The
Use of Force, 2nd ed., edited by Raymond Art and Kenneth Waltz. Lanham, Md.: Uni-
versity Press of America, 1983. Updated as chapter 3 of Epstein’s Strategy and Force
Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987.
(Critique of “Horizontal Escalation,” not only as a counter to a Soviet invasion of Iran
but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global war with the Soviets.
Sees Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as unaffected by naval considerations, and
regards Soviet ground force numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible
Soviet air force redeployment, however.)
Record, Jeffrey. “Jousting with Unreality: Reagan’s Military Strategy.” International Secu-
rity (Winter 1983–1984): 3–18. Also “Correspondence.” (Summer 1984): 217–221.
(Echoes Komer’s and Turner’s stated positions.)
Kaufmann, William W. The 1985 Defense Budget. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1984, 29–34. (A snide critique of U.S. Navy strategy and force level requests. Na-
val power projection forces seen as needed only in Third World areas during a global
war with the Soviets. Unlike The Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented docu-
ment.) See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983 Brookings annuals edited
by Joseph Pechman, Setting National Priorities: 1983 and 1984, and his 1981 Defense in
the 1980s.
Record, Jeffrey. Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends. Washington,
D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984. (An argument for a national maritime strategy, but
without the offensive forward operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime
Strategy. See especially 83–86.)
Ullman, Cdr. Harlan, USN (Ret.). Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and
National Security. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown CSIS, 1984. (Pages 4–7 give a good
quick summary of the basic opposing viewpoint on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the
extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would-be analysts.)
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr. “From SLOC Protection to a National Maritime Strategy: The
U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977–1984.” In In Peace and War, 2nd ed., ed-
ited by Kenneth J. Hagan. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1984, 304–326. (Mostly on
operations and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman’s contribution as a reorientation
of national strategy rather than simply an enhancement of its maritime elements.)
Dunn, Keith A., and Col. William O. Staudenmaier, USA. Strategic Implications of the
Continental-Maritime Debate. Washington Paper 107. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1984.
(Expands arguments made in their Foreign Policy article.)
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Tritten, Cdr. James J. “Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?” Proceedings (January 1984): 90, 92.
(Argues for procuring anti-SSBN systems without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See
also his “Strategic ASW.” Submarine Review (January 1984): 52–55, and “The Con-
cept of Strategic ASW.” Navy International (June 1984): 348–350.)
Lehman, John F., Jr. “Nine Principles for the Future of American Maritime Power.” Pro-
ceedings (February 1984): 47–51. (Refinement of Secretary Lehman’s thought after
three years in office.)
Zakheim, Dov S. “The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy.”
Marine Corps Gazette (March 1984): 35–39. (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense ex-
plains Marine missions and programs in context of overall administration strategy.)
* Senate Armed Services Committee. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization
for FY85; Part 8. 98th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 March 1984. (Secretary of the Navy and
CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as a component of national military strategy,
March 1984. Further exposure of the Maritime Strategy presented by Commodore
Carlson a year earlier.)
Rivkin, D. B. “No Bastions for the Bear.” Proceedings (April 1984): 36–43. Also “Com-
ment and Discussion” (June 1984): 14–15; (July 1984): 14–20; (August 1974): 101;
(September 1984): 164; (October 1984): 97–100; (January 1985): 129. (The anti-SSBN
mission debate.)
Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.). “A Strategy for the 90s.” New York Times Magazine
(6 May 1984): 30–40, etc. (Argues for focus on USN Third World intervention role,
amphibious warfare, and more/smaller ships.)
Hamm, Manfred. “Ten Steps to Counter Moscow’s Threat to Northern Europe.”
Backgrounder. Heritage Foundation, no. 1356, 30 May 1984. (Calls for rather modest
U.S. and allied maritime counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat.)
Perry, Robert, Mark A. Lorell, and Kevin Lewis. Second-Area Operations: A Strategy Op-
tion. Publication R-2992-USDP. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, May 1984. (Pros, cons,
risks, and uncertainties associated with multitheater war and “horizontal escalation.”
Historical and analytical survey.)
Bond, Larry, and Tomas Ries. “Controversy: A New Strategy for the North-East Atlan-
tic?” International Defense Review (December 1984): 1803–1804. (USN and NATO
naval strategy.)
* Watkins, Adm. James D. “Current Strategy of U.S. Navy.” Los Angeles Times (21 June
1984): 22. (USN rebuttal to Robert Komer. “Carrier Heavy Navy Is Waste-Heavy.”
Los Angeles Times [16 May 1984], especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and
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Navy vs. Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins “Posture Statement” testimony before
Congress, 1983–1986.)
Komer, Robert. Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books,
1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim. Political Science Quarterly (Winter 1984–
1985): 721–722. (Ambassador Komer’s last salvo before November 1984 elections,
with administration retort.)
** Brooks, Capt. Linton F. “Escalation and Naval Strategy.” Proceedings (August 1984): 33–
37. Also “Comment and Discussion” (October 1984): 28–29; (November 1984): 18,
24; (December 1984): 174. (On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by an impor-
tant and articulate contributor to development of the strategy. Focus of public debate
begins to shift to the strategy as it actually is, rather than as it is alleged to be.)
* “Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive.” Navy Times (20 August 1984): 25–26.
(Commodore William Fogarty outlines The Maritime Strategy.)
Stewart, Maj. Richard A., USMC. “Ships That Can Deliver.” Proceedings (November
1984): 37–43. (Amphibious versus prepositioning issues.)
** George, James L., ed. The U.S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1980s. Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1985. (Papers delivered at a Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall
1984. See chapters by Dov Zakheim on “Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare,”
Robert S. Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on “The Maritime Role in the North Atlan-
tic,” and “Commentaries” by retired admirals Robert Long and Harry Train. Admiral
Long’s Pacific Command “Concept of Operations” and his Pacific Command Cam-
paign Plan were important building blocks for The Maritime Strategy.)
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew. “A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Bat-
tle.” Naval War College Review (November–December 1984): 4–12. Also “In My
View” (March–April 1985): 96–97; (July–August 1985): 83. (Mainstream U.S. Navy
thinking.)
Nagler, Vice Adm. Gordon, USN (Ret.), ed. Naval Tactical Command and Control.
Washington, D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1985. (See the articles in chapter III:
“Tactical Space Assets” and chapter IV: “EW: A Force Multiplier,” on how the U.S.
Navy uses space and electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational
problems inherent in implementing The Maritime Strategy.)
Kaufmann, William W. The 1986 Defense Budget. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1985, especially 32–35. (Another sarcastic Kaufmann budget-oriented critique,
including an unduly sanguine view of allied naval capabilities.)
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Jenkins, Ronald Wayne. “Coalition Defense versus Maritime Strategy: A Critical Exami-
nation Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical Analysis.” PhD diss., Pennsylvania
State University, 1985. (A political geographer’s take. Buys into categorization of
“Schools” popularized by Komer, Dunn, and Staudenmaier. Recognizes irrelevance of
much of the pre-1984 literature to “real-world” USN planning and programming
problems. Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers on geography
and Maritime Strategy.)
Thomas, Cdr. Raymond E. “Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: Matching Strategy and
Capability.” In Essays on Strategy, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1985, 39–51, especially 50. (Criticizes U.S. naval strategy for not addressing the-
ater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with forward carrier operations in high
threat areas.)
Collins, Col. John M., USA (Ret.). U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985. Washington,
D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985. (Compares strategy and policy as well as force levels.
See especially chapter 11. Also chapters 9, 12, and 16.)
Zimm, Lt. Cdr. Alan D. “The First Salvo.” Proceedings (February 1985): 55–60. Also
“Comment and Discussion” (April 1985): 16; (June 1985): 132; (July 1985): 106. (See
especially for timing of forward carrier battle group moves and for Soviet strategy
issues.)
Klare, Michael T. “Securing the Fire Break.” World Policy Journal (Spring 1985): 229–
247. (Sees forward offensive operations of ships with both nuclear and conventional
capabilities as eroding the firebreak between nuclear and nonnuclear combat and
raising the likelihood of nuclear war.)
Breemer, Jan S. “The Soviet Navy’s SSBN Bastions: Evidence, Inference, and Alternative
Scenarios.” RUSI Journal (March 1985): 18–26. (Includes useful review of literature.)
Ackley, R. T. “No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2.” Proceedings (April 1985): 42–47. Also
“Comment and Discussion” (May 1985): 14–17; (July 1985): 112. (More on the
anti-SSBN mission.)
* Watkins, Adm. James D. “Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward.” Baltimore Sun (16
April 1985): 15. (USN rejoinder to a variety of critics, especially Jeffrey Record, “Sanc-
tuary Warfare.” Baltimore Sun [26 March 1985]: 7.)
** Ullman, Harlan K., and Thomas H. Etzold. Future Imperative: National Security and the
U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1985. (See especially Ullman’s
critique of Maritime Strategy: 20–21, 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner,
Proceedings [January 1988]: 77.)
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Dunn, Keith A., and Col. William O. Staudenmaier, USA. “The Retaliatory Offensive and
Operational Realities in NATO.” Survival (May–June 1985): 108–118. (Shows Mari-
time Strategy similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offen-
sive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.)
Arkin, William M., and David Chappell. “Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes
in the Pacific.” World Policy Journal (Summer 1985): 481–500. (Forward operations in
the Northeast Pacific seen as “provocative and destabilizing.” Similar in tone and po-
litical coloration to Barry Posen 1982 critique of Norwegian Sea operations.)
“The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate.” Policy Review (Summer 1985): 12–27, es-
pecially 20–21. (Prominent conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy
and The Maritime Strategy, as they understand it.)
*/** U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials. Hearings: The 600-Ship Navy and The
Maritime Strategy. 98th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
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the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and
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the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement and related “Comment and Discussion” let-
ters, the most comprehensive public statement and discussion of the Navy’s official
views on The Maritime Strategy, although lacking in the in-depth discussion of uncer-
tainties that characterized internal Navy Maritime Strategy documents.)
Martin, Laurence. NATO and the Defense of the West. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1985, especially 30–35 (“Flanks”), 51–56 (“Warning, Mobilization and Re-
inforcement”), and 57–67 (“The Maritime Battle”). (Features graphics rivaling those
in the official U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power
and—often—their complexity.)
Holloway, Adm. James L., III, USN (Ret.). “The U.S. Navy: A Functional Appraisal.”
Oceanus (Summer 1985): 3–11. (Reformulation of pre–Maritime Strategy USN posi-
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nale for USN Maritime Strategy.)
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Maritime Strategy. Shows one component commander’s view of the strategy.)
Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.). “U.S. Naval Policy.” Naval Forces, no. 3 (1985): 15–
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(September 1985): 42–57. (USN/USMC global Maritime Strategy as applied to one re-
gion; comprehensive commentary on The Maritime Strategy debate.) Also “Comment
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ary 1986 (p. 19) letter discussing complementary Norwegian Navy operations; and
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* “NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea.” Virginian-Pilot (9 September 1985): 1ff.
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Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, on exercising and implementing Mar-
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** West, F. J. “Bing,” Jr. “Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence.” Naval War College Re-
view (September–October 1985): 5–19. (By a former Reagan administration Assistant
Secretary of Defense, naval strategic thinker, and principal author of “SEAPLAN
2000,” a 1978 progenitor of The Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of conven-
tional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the strategy.)
* McDonald, Adm. Wesley. “Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy.” Proceedings
(October 1985): 46–53. (By the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Actually on
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sis on mine warfare.)
** Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Lt. Cdr. Joseph Benkert. “Is That All There Is?” Proceed-
ings (October 1985): 32–37. (Surface combatants and The Maritime Strategy.)
** Powers, Capt. Robert Carney. “Commanding the Offense.” Proceedings (October 1985):
especially 62–63. (Central strike warfare theme of the strategy is criticized, along with
the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.)
** Watkins, Adm. James D. “The Greatest Potential Problem: Our National Willpower.”
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The Maritime Strategy.)
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American Naval View.” In The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, edited by Clive Ar-
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** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.). “The Pacific and U.S. Naval Policy.” Naval Forces,
no. 6 (1985): 36–48. (Sees U.S. Navy Pacific experience as primary driver of The Mari-
time Strategy. Especially good as the role of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet
commander, originator of the “Sea Strike” study, and Chief of Naval Operations.)
** U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Seapower
and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 600-Ship Navy. 98th Cong.,
1st sess., 18 November 1985. (The House Seapower Subcommittee endorses The Mar-
itime Strategy. Essentially the same report is in Rep. Charles E. Bennett, “The 600-Ship
Fleet: Is It Necessary?” Naval Forces, no. 21 [1986]: 26–38.)
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1985): 18–20. (The CNO on the role of The Maritime Strategy within the Navy and its
basic characteristics. “We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy
fleet commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into practice our naval
strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have
made for a robust dynamic strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of
strategic issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as viewed by a
parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington.”)
Bowling, Capt. R. A., USN (Ret.). “Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes.” Proceedings (December
1985): 92–98. (Argues for a return to SLOC protection focus for the U.S. Navy.)
Ball, Desmond. “Nuclear War at Sea.” International Security (Winter 1985–1986): 3–31.
(Argues against anti-SSBN operations and for more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory
dangers of theater nuclear war at sea. Not particularly accurate.)
Owens, Lt. Col. Mackubin Thomas, USMCR. “The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform.” In-
ternational Security (Winter 1985–1986): 98–111, especially 106–109. (Links the strat-
egy debate to the contemporaneous debate on JCS “reform”: “The JCS reorganization
debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine.” Cf. Best and Donatelli February
1987 articles, cited below.)
Martin, Ben L. “Has There Been a Reagan Revaluation in Defense Policy?” World Affairs
(Winter 1985–1986): 173–182, especially 175–176. (Sees Maritime Strategy as the ba-
sis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget
rationales. “The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to
find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine.”)
II. The Maritime Strategy Debate: 1986, the Watershed Year
In late 1985, Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Adm. James D. Watkins, and Gen. P.
X. Kelley—having ensured that The Maritime Strategy met their requirements and rep-
resented both their thinking and that of their superiors—submitted manuscripts con-
taining the strategy’s basic tenets, less its uncertainties and limitations, to the Naval
Institute. Following the publication of The Maritime Strategy, a special supplement to
the January 1986 Proceedings, public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisti-
cated tone, more relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision
making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, and others confirmed for the public that the strategy was consis-
tent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.
In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global warfare with the So-
viets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and crisis operations became
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suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of The Maritime Strategy. Much of the writ-
ing was now done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged ar-
ticles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared,
transcending narrow “unionism.” Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and histori-
ans also offered their cogent commentary on the strategy.
Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval War College Review,
Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, also broadened to include more news-
papers and popular magazines. The public affairs and national security journals redis-
covered The Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only
academics, pundits, and military retirees but also serving naval professionals. By 1987,
the uniformed naval officer corps once again—as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan
or the pre–World War II War Plan Orange—had captured the high ground and cata-
lyzed thinking about the Navy’s role in national and alliance strategy.
*/** Watkins, Adm. James D. “The Maritime Strategy”; Gen. P. X. Kelley and Maj. Hugh
O’Donnell. “Amphibious Warfare Strategy”; and John P. Lehman, Jr. “The 600-Ship
Navy.” Proceedings, The Maritime Strategy supplement (January 1986). Also Col. John
Collins, USA (Ret.), in “Comment and Discussion” (February 1986): 26–28; (March
1986): 18–21, raises twenty questions; (May 1986): 25; (June 1986): 83, questions nu-
clear aspects of the strategy; and Rear Adm. William Pendley: 84–89, answers Collins’s
questions and elaborates on the strategy; (July 1986): 24–27, posits significant Soviet
forward submarine operations; (August 1986): 10, still more questions from the insa-
tiable Col. Collins; (January 1987): 25–30, argues for new role for PHMs in The Mari-
time Strategy; and (April 1987): 22–27, another response to Colonel Collins by the
indefatigable Rear Admiral Pendley.
** Gordon, Michael R. “Officials Say Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms in Nonnuclear
War.” New York Times (7 January 1986): 1. See also (New York) Daily News (8 January
1986): C-10; Oregonian (9 January 1986): C10; Los Angeles Times (10 January 1986):
4; Boston Globe (11 January 1986); New York Times (12 January 1986): E-1; and The
Times (London) (26 February 1986). (Initial press comment on publication of “The
Maritime Strategy” by the Naval Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the
anti-SSBN operations debate.)
*/** Jervell, Sverre, and Kare Nyblom, eds. The Military Buildup in the High North: American
and Nordic Perspectives. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1986. (1985 Har-
vard conference. Eliot Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, Vice Adm. Henry
Mustin, and a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military officers,
and thinkers debate The Maritime Strategy and much else.)
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** Train, Adm. Harry, USN (Ret.). “Seapower and Projection Forces.” In American Defense
Annual 1986–1987. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986, 128–129. (This former
Sixth Fleet and Atlantic theater commander updates his views on The Maritime Strat-
egy. Book also contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More detailed—
and controversial—views by Admiral Train can be found in James L. George, ed. The
Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1986, 283–287.)
Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.). Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (By a Naval Postgraduate School faculty member.
Shot through with important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics.
See especially chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war ashore, and
chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and wartime naval missions.)
Connell, John. The New Maginot Line. New York: Arbor House, 1986, 71–81. (Another
journalist—this time British—for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secre-
tary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations.
Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four
years earlier.)
Archer, Clive, and David Scrivener, eds. Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues.
Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1986. (A series of survey papers focusing on the Nor-
wegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey Till on strategy, David Hobbs on military technol-
ogy, and Steven Miller on Reagan administration strategy. The Miller piece is
essentially an update of his 1983 paper cited in section I above.)
Oliver, James K., and James A. Nathan. “Concepts, Continuity, and Change.” In The Rea-
gan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, edited by Stephen Cimbala. Wilmington,
Del: Scholarly Resources, 1986, 1–22. (Sees Reagan administration naval strategy and
force planning as derived essentially from concepts and goals developed by the Navy
in the late 1970s.)
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the
U.S.–Soviet Contest. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. (Views role of the Navy as
one of “Sea Control” and projecting American power into “distant local conflicts,”
rather than carrier strikes on “Soviet home ports” or “strategic nuclear warfare.” See
183–184, 191–192.)
Clancy, Tom. Red Storm Rising. New York: Putnam, 1986. (Fiction. Wartime Maritime
Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and
some fanciful, to suit the storyteller’s needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure
leads to preemptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are
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somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe. Inherent flexibility and lethality
enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses. In this
vein, see reviews by Capt. David G. Clark in Naval War College Review [Winter 1987]:
139–141, and Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, USN [Ret.] in Proceedings [March 1987]:
164. Cf. Hackett and McGeoch et al., The Third World War: The Untold Story, cited in
section V below; and Hayes et al., American Lake, below, chapter 19, which addresses
the Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner with
which Captain Clark or Admiral Hayward would agree.)
** Hayes, Peter, Lyuba Zarsky, and Walden Bello. American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pa-
cific. New York: Penguin, 1986. (Thorough and extensive analysis of The Maritime
Strategy and much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially chap-
ters 8 and 16, and chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that “what ap-
peared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy.”)
Daniel, Donald C. Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability. Cham-
pagne: University of Illinois Press, 1986. (An excellent survey by a Naval War College
faculty member, concludes that “it seem[s] implausible the U.S. could so reduce the
number of Soviet SSBNs that the USSR might be pushed into using the remainder.”
See especially 151–157.)
** West, Francis J., Jr., et al. Naval Forces and Western Security. Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986. (Contains two essays: “U.S. Naval Forces and NATO
Planning,” by West: 1–9; and “NATO’s Maritime Defenses,” by Jacquelyn K. Davis,
James E. Dougherty, Rear Adm. Robert J. Hanks, USN [Ret.], and Charles M. Perry:
10–53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a profound di-
vergence between U.S. and West European perspectives on the purpose and potential
contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes
difficult to understand which Americans and Europeans he is talking about. The other
essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO
strategy.)
Kaufmann, William W. A Reasonable Defense. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1986, especially 72–92. (Kaufmann’s annual attack on his own highly personal inter-
pretation of The Maritime Strategy, ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous al-
lied naval forces but sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike The Maritime
Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions.)
Cohen, Eliot A. “Do We Still Need Europe?” Commentary (January 1986): 28–35. (A Na-
val War College faculty member views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing
importance; sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g., “Europe
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vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. prepar-
ing to engage the Red Army on the continent.”)
** “OCEAN SAFARI ’85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic.” All Hands (January
1986): 20–29. (Publicizes close-in convoy defense, coastal defense, and mine counter-
measures aspects of the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations.)
** Gray, Colin. “Maritime Strategy.” Proceedings (February 1986): 34–42. (Supportive com-
mentary by a top-ranking civilian geopolitician and strategist. Especially helpful in
untangling arguments regarding “horizontal escalation.”)
* “Message to Moscow: ‘Be My Guest’—The Navy.” Newsweek (3 February 1986): 16–17.
(Vice Adm. Henry C. Mustin on U.S. Second Fleet implementation of The Maritime
Strategy.)
* U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on the Department of Defense Au-
thorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 Feb-
ruary 1986, 82–83. (The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff testify on the budget and in response to questioning from Senator Nunn on
anti-SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the highest
Defense Department officials. See also George C. Wilson and Michael Weisskopf,
“Pentagon Plan Coldly Received.” Washington Post [6 February 1986]: A14; Caspar
Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy.” Foreign Affairs [Spring 1986]: 695; and Walter
Andrews, “Weinberger Warns of ‘Hollow Strategy.’” Washington Times [30 July
1986]: 4.)
* Lehman, John F. “The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the 600-Ship Fleet.” Naval
Forces, no. 1 (1986): 14–23. (Update of Lehman’s thought.)
* “Surface Warfare: What Does the Future Hold?” Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute
Professional Seminar Series Transcript (12 February 1986): 19–20. (Rear Adm. Den-
nis Brooks, ComCarGru 7, on The Maritime Strategy. Another admiral whom
Stansfield Turner never met.)
* U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on the Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 26 February
1986, 500–504 and 547–550. (Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman respond to
congressional questioning by Rep. Les AuCoin on The Maritime Strategy. “The deci-
sion to go after an SSBN in time of conflict would be a Presidential decision.”)
* Watkins, Adm. James D. “Power Projection—Maritime Forces Making a Strategic Dif-
ference.” NATO’s Sixteen Nations (February–March 1986): 102–106. (CNO discusses
Maritime Strategy within a NATO context. N.B; this annual special issue contains ar-
ticles signed by most of NATO’s naval chiefs.)
T H E M A R I T I M E S T R A T E G Y D E B A T E S 2 1 1
** Lapham, Lewis H. “Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition.” Harper’s (March 1986): 8–9.
(A bizarre, overwritten exposition on The Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the
U.S. Navy as incompetent.)
** Ausland, John. “The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be Broken.” International
Herald Tribune (12 March 1986): 25. (A critical look at naval theater nuclear weapons
and warfare and The Maritime Strategy.)
** Reed, Fred. “Soldiering: Navy’s Sensitivity Works against It.” Washington Times (27
March 1986): 2. (Criticizes U.S. Navy explanations of the strategy as lacking in “stra-
tegic substance,” a rather ironic criticism given the author’s own arguments.)
* Mustin, Vice Adm. Henry C. “The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea.”
Naval War College Review (March–April 1986): 2–6. (The NATO Striking Fleet Atlan-
tic commander on U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea. See also
“In My View,” Naval War College Review [Autumn 1986]: 101–102.)
Landersman, Capt. S. D., USN (Ret.). “Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?” Naval
War College Review (March–April 1986): 23–34. (By a member of the initial U.S. Navy
Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and
practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping [NCS] as well as Naval Protection of
Shipping [NPS], essential but too-little-discussed aspects of The Maritime Strategy
that are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See
also his “I am a . . . Convoy Commodore,” Proceedings [June 1986]: 56–63.)
Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.). “New NE Asian Geography?” Naval War College
Review (March–April 1986): 91–92. (An extreme view of the role of Pacific opera-
tions. Calls for North Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East from the
rest of the country at the Urals.)
** Doerr, Capt. P. J. “CWC Revisited.” Proceedings (April 1986): 39–43. (Organizing the
battle force to implement The Maritime Strategy. Contrast with Captain Powers’s Oc-
tober 1985 Proceedings views.)
** Watkins, Adm. James D. “Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent Peace.” Sea Power
(April 1986): 6–20, especially 9–10 on the rationale for publishing The Maritime
Strategy.
* Kelley, Gen. P. X. “The United States Marine Corps Today.” Sea Power (April 1986): 82–
97. (See especially 83–86 for an overview of The Maritime Strategy from the Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps perspective.)
Bagley, Adm. Worth H., USN (Ret.). “U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and
Prospects.” In National Security in Northeast Asia, edited by International Security
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Council. New York: CAUSA, April 13–15, 1986. (Reverses the usual argument by
treating NATO as a “second front threat” diverting the Soviets from the Far East.)
Liska, George. “From Containment to Concert.” Foreign Policy (Spring 1986): 3–23 and
“Concert through Decompression” (Summer 1986): 108–129. (U.S.-Soviet rivalry
seen as “fed primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asym-
metry between land and sea powers.” Argues, however, for a “land-sea power con-
cert” by the two. “The salience of sea-over land-based power has diminished as the
principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval
superiority.”)
** “The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave.” The Economist (19 April 1986): 49–
65. (Strategy and programs.)
** Hart, Senator Gary, with William S. Lind. America Can Win: The Case for Military Re-
form. Bethesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1986, 77–81. (Criticizes The Maritime Strategy
for its linkages to the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship
to current force structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of
the term “Maritime Strategy.”)
** Ausland, John C. Nordic Security and the Great Powers. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986.
(Comprehensive and detailed treatment of The Maritime Strategy in peace and war
within the overall context of Nordic military security. See especially chapter 20, “The
Battle for the Norwegian Sea,” the author’s “climax.”)
* Hughes, Vice Adm. Thomas J., Jr. “Logistics Became Legitimate.” Sea Power (May 1986):
17–24, especially 22. (By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. “The lo-
gistics of the Navy are matched to our maritime strategy.”)
** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.). “Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy Agenda Awaits the
Next CNO.” Sea Power (May 1986): 48–51. (Sees a need for the new Chief of Naval
Operations to examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions of
U.S. and foreign political and military leaders to The Maritime Strategy.)
** Wettern, Desmond. “Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay.” Navy International (May
1986): 304–308. (Endorsement of The Maritime Strategy by a prominent British naval
affairs writer. Questions, however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet
priority under Admiral Chernavin as it did under Admiral Gorshkov.)
** “Bridge over Troubled Waters.” Defense and Foreign Affairs (May 1986): 38–39. (On the
U.S. Navy’s efforts to link technology and weapons acquisition to The Maritime
Strategy.)
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“Sailing the Cold Seas.” Surface Warfare (May–June 1986): 6–8. (On the steps being ex-
amined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as re-
quired by The Maritime Strategy.)
Williams, Cdr. E. Cameron, USNR. “The Four ‘Iron Laws’ of Naval Protection of Mer-
chant Shipping.” Naval War College Review (May–June 1986): 35–42. (An argument
for convoying. Sees SLOC protection debate as between conveying and “sanitized
lanes.” Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and
forward defense, the more topical issue.) See also “In My View,” Naval War College
Review (Autumn 1986): 108–109 and (Spring 1987): 91–92.
* Pendley, Rear Adm. William. “Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy.” Pro-
ceedings (June 1986): 84–89. (This ostensible response to an earlier “Comment and
Discussion” item is actually an important official amplification of The Maritime Strat-
egy by the 1985–1986 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy [OP-60], the Navy’s
principal global strategist.)
** Mather, Ian. “NATO Row over Boundary Shift.” Sunday London Observer, 16 June 1986.
(Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s call for an expanded NATO reach beyond
Europe as derived from The Maritime Strategy.)
*/** Samuel, Peter. “State Dept., Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front in Case of War in Eu-
rope.” New York City Tribune (23 June 1986): 1. (State Department’s Director of Pol-
icy Planning espouses views congruent with The Maritime Strategy, especially
regarding global nature of war with the Soviet Union and early antisubmarine opera-
tions.) For an updated version of these views, see Solomon 1987 article cited below.
See also Paul Bedard, “Pacific Waters Boil with American and Soviet Warships.” De-
fense Week (23 June 1986): 1; and Frank Elliott, “U.S. Looks to Pacific Fleet to Help
Europe” and “Soviet Power Grows.” Navy Times (7 July 1986): 29 and 32.
** Epstein, Joshua M. The 1987 Defense Budget. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1986. (Brookings’s annual attack on The Maritime Strategy. Pages 13, 41–45, and 55–58
reject The Maritime Strategy as “inefficient and potentially escalatory” and recom-
mend U.S. Navy force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not requir-
ing significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from Kaufmann, Komer, Posen,
and the Congressional Budget Office. Unlike The Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-
driven document.)
** Gray, Colin S. “Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America.”
The National Interest (Summer 1986): 24–36. (Masterful discussion of the relation-
ships between geopolitics and The Maritime Strategy.)
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** Wood, Robert S., and John T. Hanley, Jr. “The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic.” At-
lantic Community Quarterly (Summer 1986): 133–144. (Latest incarnation of this
oft-reprinted article by two Naval War College faculty members.)
** Polmar, Norman. “The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea.” Proceedings (July 1966): 111–
113. See also “Comment and Discussion,” Proceedings (September 1986): 90. (“The
Maritime Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to deter
nuclear war at sea.”)
** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars. Washington, D.C.: Committee for
National Security, 1986. (The committee’s annual attack on The Maritime Strategy
and the 600-ship Navy. “There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk
missions close to Soviet shores.” Advocates a “return to a more sensible naval strat-
egy.” Unlike The Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study
achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former
Reagan administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy.)
** Stefanick, Tom. “Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever Feint or Foolhardy
Maneuver?” F.A.S. Public Interest Report (June–July 1986): 1–10. (The author seems
to lean more to the “foolhardy maneuver” persuasion. “The U.S. must reduce the cur-
rent emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet
Union.” But cf. his December article, below.)
** Truver, Scott C. “Can We Afford the 15-Carrier Battle Group Navy?” Armed Forces Jour-
nal International (July 1986): 74–81. (On the relationship between The Maritime
Strategy and carrier force levels.)
O’Rourke, Ronald. “Tomahawk: The U.S. Navy’s New Option.” Navy International (July
1986): 394–398. (Good coverage of the benefits and problems associated with inte-
grating sea-launched cruise missiles into The Maritime Strategy.)
Ryan, Capt. T. D. “SubDevRon Twelve: In the Global War Games.” Submarine Review
(July 1986): 39–40. (Good examples of uses of Naval War College Global War Games
to test The Maritime Strategy and to identify problems needing new technological and
tactical solutions.)
** Winkler, Philippa. “A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy.” Oakland Tribune (7 July
1986). (Decries the Navy’s “forward offensive strategy” for going “beyond legitimate
defense purposes.”)
Canby, Steven L. “South Korea’s Defense Requires U.S. Air Power, Not Troops.” Wall
Street Journal (17 July 1986): 24. (Sees limited utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war
with the Soviets. Advocates naval force level cuts.)
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** O’Shea, James. “U.S. to Sink Billions into New Attack Sub.” Chicago Tribune (20 July
1986): 1. (On the role of the SSN-21 Seawolf in the future Maritime Strategy.)
Smith, Lee. “How the Pentagon Can Live on Less.” Fortune (21 July 1986): 78–85. (See
especially page 87. Fortune and ex–Reagan administration official Richard DeLauer
oppose as misguided the “Lehman developed” “forward strategy,” construed as car-
rier strikes on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk. For more on DeLauer’s
negative views, see “Interview: Richard DeLauer on Defense,” Technology Review [July
1986]: 58–67.)
*/** “Maritime Strategy Seminar.” Proceedings (August 1986): 8–10. (Former SacLant/
CincLant Adm. Wesley McDonald, former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer,
former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West, and then–U.S. Second Fleet/NATO
Striking Fleet Atlantic commander Vice Adm. Henry Mustin debate The Maritime
Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime Strategy Seminar Transcript.
Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986.)
** Polmar, Norman. “600 Ships: Plus or Minus?” Proceedings (August 1986): 107–108. (The
author’s views on the relationship between the strategy and the 600-ship Navy force
level goals. “While some would argue with specific components of both the strategy
and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan . . . one that
Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services.”)
** Parry, Dan. “U.S. Navy’s Role in Space.” Navy International (August 1986): 477. (Quotes
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C3 and Space Ann Berman on the role of
space in The Maritime Strategy.)
** Hinge, Lt. A., RAN. “The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region: Naval Aspects.”
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute (August 1986): 31–50. (Poses important ques-
tions regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic theater and potential
naval roles of Pacific allies, China and ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western mar-
itime superiority in the Pacific.)
“Rust to Riches: The Navy Is Back.” U.S. News and World Report (4 August 1986): 28-37.
(Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s influence on naval strategy seen as paramount.)
Isherwood, Julien. “Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base.” Daily Telegraph (13 August 1986).
(Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in
the Norwegian Sea, “the so-called Lehman Doctrine.”)
“Aircraft Carriers Use Technology”; “Speed to Stage Vanishing Acts on High Seas.” Balti-
more Sun (17 August 1986): 16. (Discusses U.S. Navy countermeasures to Soviet intel-
ligence and targeting at sea, a key element in carrying out The Maritime Strategy.)
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Bunting, Glenn F. “Navy Warms Up to Idea of Presence in Cold Bering Sea.” Los Angeles
Times (31 August 1986): 3. (Maritime Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy
peacetime North Pacific presence.)
* Demars, Vice Adm. Bruce. “The U.S. Submarine Force.” Naval Forces, no. 4 (1986): 18–
30; and “Speech at the Submarine Symposium, Lima, Peru.” Submarine Review (Janu-
ary 1987): 5–12. (By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare.
See especially 20–21 of the former and 8–11 of the latter on the role of U.S. and allied
submarines in The Maritime Strategy: “We dare not go it alone.”)
** Drury, F. “Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle.” Naval Forces, no. 4 (1986):
46–52. (Sees The Maritime Strategy as merging the two concepts, which he feels had
grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat.)
** Tellis, Ashley J. “The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance.” Naval
Forces, no. 4 (1986): 54–60. (Endorses The Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic,
especially regarding forward operations.)
* Cropsey, Seth. “Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime Strategy and Its Alter-
natives.” Policy Review (Fall 1986): 40–46. (An excellent restatement of the Navy’s ar-
guments by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on
the historical background of The Maritime Strategy.)
* Mustin, Vice Adm. Henry C. “Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates.” Proceedings (Sep-
tember 1986): 33–37. (U.S. Navy Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic com-
mander’s positive views on the utility of The Maritime Strategy to an operational
commander. See also “Comment and Discussion” [November 1986]: 14.)
Hampton, Lt. Cdr. J. P. “Integrated Air Defense for NATO.” Proceedings (September
1986): 114–116. (On integrating U.S. Navy carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied
air force aircraft to counter the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an es-
sential component of The Maritime Strategy too often overshadowed in the public de-
bate by discussion of the Northwest Pacific and especially the Norwegian Sea.)
** Wood, Robert S. “Maritime Strategy for War in the North.” Journal of Defense and Diplo-
macy (September 1986): 17–20. (Development of this Naval War College faculty
member/strategist’s thought. Stress on combined arms.)
** Fouquet, David. “NATO Soldiers March into Autumn, Testing Tactics, Equipment, Sys-
tems.” Defense News (15 September 1986): 14. (The Allies test The Maritime Strategy
on the Northern Front.)
* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr. Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO. Washington, D.C.:
CSIS, 25 September 1986. (His 1986 views: “No maritime strategy can be a successful
T H E M A R I T I M E S T R A T E G Y D E B A T E S 2 1 7
strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe.” “The for-
ward strategy, articulated by the Reagan administration, is in fact orthodoxy of the
oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine.” “In summary we have a
maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime
forces of Europe and the United States.”)
** Gray, Colin S. Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West. New York: Na-
tional Strategy Information Center, 1986. (An extension of his classic 1977 work on
geopolitics, focusing on implications for U.S. national military strategy. The footnotes
include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador Komer. A new
classic.)
Mearsheimer, John. “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Eu-
rope.” International Security (Fall 1986): 3–57. (Despite its biases, distortions, and
misleading discussions of the development of The Maritime Strategy over time, proba-
bly the most important piece of writing critical of the strategy to date. Faults The Mar-
itime Strategy for its too “elastic quality,” actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as
one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and
former U.S. Air Force officer’s bottom line: “The key to deterrence is not the Navy,
but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces should be given
first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets.”)
** Brooks, Capt. Linton. “Naval Power and National Security: The Case for The Maritime
Strategy.” International Security (Fall 1986): 58–87. (One of the strategy’s contributors
definitively expands on its basic elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in dis-
cussing the rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the strategy’s inherent uncertain-
ties, integral aspects of The Maritime Strategy often slighted in public official U.S.
Navy discussions.)
* Schoultz, Vice Adm. Robert F. “Strikefleet: Cost-Effective Power.” Armed Forces (Octo-
ber 1986): 446–448. (Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and
former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the Carrier
Battle Group in The Maritime Strategy.)
** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr. “Topgun: Getting It Right.” Proceedings (October 1986):
141–146. (The Navy Fighter Weapons School seen as a key contributor to The Mari-
time Strategy’s execution, by the school’s training officer, one of the new generation of
naval officers for whom The Maritime Strategy was truly the cornerstone of the
profession.)
* Weinberger, Caspar. “The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore Roosevelt.” Defense Is-
sues 1, no. 76 (24 November 1986). (The Maritime Strategy as a component of
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national military strategy, by the Secretary of Defense. “The greatest value of Presi-
dent Reagan’s maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we can
best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the basic goal of deter-
rence—and deny the adversary his preferred warfighting strategy.”) Summarized in
George Wilson. “USS Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier.” Wash-
ington Post (26 October 1986): A21; and William Matthews, “Carrier Theodore Roose-
velt ‘Charges’ to Life.” Navy Times (10 November 1986): 33, 37.
** “U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s.” Security Digest (November 1986), published by
the Wilson Center. (Capt. Linton Brooks and Prof. John Mearsheimer debate The
Maritime Strategy.)
** Morring, Frank, Jr. “Navy Chief: ‘Forward Defense’ Doesn’t Mean Kamakazi Missions.”
Nashua (N.H.) Telegraph, 26 November 1986. (First reported public discussion of The
Maritime Strategy by the new CNO, Adm. Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings
Institution researcher Joshua Epstein.)
** Friedman, Norman. “U.S. Strategy and ASW.” Jane’s Defense Weekly (29 November
1986): 1269–1277. (An update of Dr. Friedman’s thought on The Maritime Strategy,
ASW, and the SSN-21.)
*/** “The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy.” Proceedings (December 1986): 11–12. (The direc-
tor of U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Programs, the Naval War College Professor of
Submarine Warfare, and two noted civilian naval analysts debate the role of the U.S.
submarine force in The Maritime Strategy. For more than this brief summary, see
“The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy.” Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Profes-
sional Seminar Series, 25 September 1986.)
** O’Neil, Capt. W. D., USNR. “Executing The Maritime Strategy.” Proceedings (December
1986): 39–41. (Recommends measures that the U.S. Navy must take to ensure the
continued executability of The Maritime Strategy by keeping the Soviets on the defen-
sive and improving defense penetration and strike effectiveness.)
** Stefanick, Tom A. “America’s Maritime Strategy—The Arms Control Implications.”
Arms Control Today (December 1986): 10–17. (Appears to favor The Maritime Strat-
egy more than he did in July. “The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile subma-
rines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the
U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea. . . . The likelihood of widespread escala-
tion of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on So-
viet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low.”)
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** “Dossier: U.S. Report.” Naval Forces, no. 6 (1986): 132. (Alleges there is current “indeci-
sion about what a U.S. maritime strategy should comprise.” A remarkable piece of re-
portage for October 1986. There’s always 10 percent who do not get the word.)
* Matthews, William. “Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO Attacked.” Navy
Times (1 December 1986). (Despite the misleading headline, a generally accurate ren-
dering of the views of the principal Marine Corps global strategist, Brig. Gen. Michael
Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway, as part of The Maritime
Strategy.)
** Halloran, Richard. “A Silent Battle Surfaces.” New York Times Magazine (7 December
1986): 60, 94–97. (On the antisubmarine warfare component of The Maritime
Strategy.)
** Elliott, Frank. “Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War.” Defense Week (8 Decem-
ber 1986): 16. (Senator Exon opposes the anti-SSBN aspects of The Maritime Strategy.
“There are good elements in that strategy, but much of it concerns me.”)
Greeley, Brendan M., Jr. “Third Fleet Increases North Pacific Operations to Counter So-
viet Activity.” Aviation Week and Space Technology (22 December 1986): 28–29. (On
Vice Adm. Diego Hernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific buildup, especially
joint and allied coordination.)
* “U.S. Navy Appears to Expand Operation in Pacific Ocean.” Jane’s Defense Weekly (27
December 1986): 1474–1475. (Interview with Vice Admiral Hernandez on new peace-
time measures to more successfully deter war or—should deterrence fail—conduct
wartime operations in the North Pacific in accordance with The Maritime Strategy.)
III. The Debate Continues: 1987 and Beyond
The first half of 1987 saw The Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an acknowledged vi-
tal element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary
Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
William Crowe all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr.
(John Lehman’s successor as Secretary of the Navy), Adm. Carlisle Trost (Admiral
Watkins’s successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided numer-
ous examples of the extent to which it had become the common strategic framework of
the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was, however,
the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings. Therein, The Maritime Strategy formed the base-
line for a wide range of discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and
warfighting issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and admi-
rals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners, and a Marine; and by
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officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet opera-
tions, and weapons system employment and development.
The second half of 1987 and 1988 promise to add yet another dimension to the discus-
sions: a number of book-length treatments of The Maritime Strategy and related sub-
jects are scheduled for publication. That the 1980s saw a long-needed burgeoning of
naval strategic thought, both in the United States and abroad, has become indisputable.
What remained to be seen was what use future generations of planners, policy makers,
and thinkers would make of this outpouring.
* Reagan, President Ronald. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington,
D.C.: The White House, January 1987. (The framework within which The Maritime
Strategy operated. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs.
the Soviets. See especially 19: “U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should
deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary”;
and 27–30: “Maritime superiority is vital. [It] enables us to capitalize on Soviet geo-
graphic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviets’ interests. It plays a
key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also per-
mits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protect-
ing Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet
homeland.”)
* Weinberger, Caspar W. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1988/
FY 1989 Budget and FY 1988–92 Defense Programs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1987, 165. (Reconfirms The Maritime Strategy as a component
of declared U.S. national military strategy.) See also Ed Offley and S. L. Sanger, “Back-
ing at Top for Home Port.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer (28 April 1987): 1. (SecDef, in Se-
attle, “agrees with the Navy’s controversial wartime strategy.” SecDef direction and
endorsement is no flash in the pan.)
* Crowe, Adm. William J. “Statement on National Security Strategy.” U.S. Senate. Com-
mittee on Armed Services. Hearings on National Security Strategy. 100th Cong., 1st
sess., 21 January 1987. (Solid concurrence in The Maritime Strategy by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “In recent years we have benefited from some excellent
conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy—how to phase oper-
ations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing mili-
tary resupply or reinforcement shipping, and use our carrier battle groups for either
offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece, and Tur-
key. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy
and that is exactly what we are doing.”)
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* Trost, Adm. Carlisle. “Looking beyond The Maritime Strategy.” Proceedings (January
1987): 13–16. Also “Comment and Discussion” (July 1987): 19–20. (Admiral
Watkins’s successor as CNO briefly reaffirms The Maritime Strategy’s fundamentals:
deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity, the global view, coexistence with other
vital components of our national military strategy, and—most important—flexibility.
Highlights antisubmarine warfare in particular.)
* U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on the Department of Defense Au-
thorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. 100th Cong. 1st sess.
(Prepared annual “posture” statement by SecDef, CJCS, Secretary of the Navy, CNO,
and other officials. Also hearing repartee, and responses to questions for the record.
Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget legislative process. In addition to
those just cited, see especially statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn
Paisley, CincLantFlt Adm. Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for
Surface and Air Warfare, Vice Admirals Joseph Metcalf and Robert Dunn.)
*/** U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on National Security Strategy. 101th
Cong., 1st sess., January–April 1987. (Testimony by administration civilian and mili-
tary officials and by government and nongovernment defense specialists. Includes
much discussion of The Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by Adm. Lee
Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Command.)
Hendrickson, David C. The Future of American Strategy. New York: Holmes and Meier,
1987. (A new and different perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental
and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in
Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but he would cut back on naval—and
air and ground—forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global oper-
ations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and
destroyers.)
** Brooks, Capt. Linton. “Conflict Termination through Maritime Leverage.” In Conflict
Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War, edited by Steven
Cimbala and Keith Dunn. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987, 161–172. (Actually written
a year before his 1986 International Security article for a 1985 Naval War College con-
ference on war termination.)
** Kaufmann, William W. A Thoroughly Efficient Navy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti-
tution, 1987. (The annual Kaufmann broadside, this time designed to influence the
congressional votes on carrier construction. See especially chapter 2, “The Maritime
Strategy.”)
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** Stefanick, Tom A. Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy. Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987.
** Luttwak, Edward N. Strategy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, 156–
164, and 268. (Cursory discussion of The Maritime Strategy as “nonstrategy.”)
** Van Cleave, William R. “Horizontal Escalation and NATO Strategy: A Conceptual Over-
view.” In NATO’s Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments, edited by E. F Gueritz
et al. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1987. (A leading conservative defense
thinker argues that “the Navy’s version of Horizontal Escalation”—The Maritime
Strategy—“fails because it does not come to grips with the nuclear factor—indeed, it
seems to attempt ignoring it.”)
** West, F. J. (“Bing”), Jr. “The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step.” Proceedings (January
1987): 40–49. (By a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Naval War College faculty
member, lead author of Seaplan 2000, and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most
important analyses of The Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to date. Develops
further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in “Contemporary Naval Strategy” and section
II above, on the relationships between the strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf.,
however, actual statements by allied military leaders in section V below.) See also
“Comment and Discussion” (March 1987): 14–15; (July 1987): 19–20; and (August
1987): 31–32.
** Gray, Colin S. “Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO.” Naval
War College Review (Winter 1987): 8–19. (A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often pro-
vocative article examining linkages, especially between continental and maritime power,
between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic and conventional
deterrence. The article is notable also for the contributions of Capt. Roger W. Barnett,
USN [Ret.], one of the foremost original architects of The Maritime Strategy.)
** Solomon, Richard H. “The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for American Security.”
Naval War College Review (Winter 1987): 36–43, especially 38–39. (The director of the
State Department Policy Planning Staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College
Current Strategy Forum lecture: “We must be prepared to open a second front in
Asia.”)
“From the Editor.” Submarine Review (January 1987): 3–5. (Challenges some of the basic
strategic concepts of The Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs.)
* Connors, Lt. Cdr. Tracy. “Northern Wedding ’86.” All Hands (January 1987): 18–26. See
also “Cape Wrath Feels Iowa’s Fury”; “Nimitz and Northern Wedding”; and “Alaska”
in same issue. (Vice Adm. Charles R. Larson, Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic:
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“We went north to test tactics designed to support NATO’s maritime strategy of for-
ward defense. I am proud to report those tactics worked.”)
** Thomas, Capt. Walter “R,” USN (Ret.). “Deterrence, Defense, Two Different Animals.”
Navy Times (26 January 1987): 23. (Critique of John Mearsheimer’s Fall 1986 Interna-
tional Security article.)
** Keller, Lt. Kenneth C. “The Surface Ship in ASW.” Surface Warfare (January/February
1997): 2–3. (“Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with
The Maritime Strategy.” Another of the new generation of naval officers gets—and
passes—the word.)
** Doerr, Capt. Peter J., USN (Ret.). “Comment and Discussion: Large Carriers: A Matter
of Time.” Proceedings (February 1987): 78. (On the “defense within an offense within
a defense” nature of the putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by implication,
other potential wartime operations implementing The Maritime Strategy globally.)
Tritten, Cdr. James J. “(Non) Nuclear Warfare.” Proceedings (February 1987): 64–70. (By
the chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate
School. On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and
ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and warfighting.)
** Best, Richard. “Will JCS Reform Endanger The Maritime Strategy?” National Defense
(February 1987): 26–30. (“The passage of JCS reform will provide a future adminis-
tration with a handle on defense policy that will allow it to override previous strategic
conceptions, including the Navy’s maritime strategy, [which] will come under heavy
criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems ana-
lysts.” Best decries this since “only the Navy has thought through the implications of
the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to
shrink in horror.”)
** O’Rourke, Ronald. “U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy.” Navy International (February
1987): 118–122. (Especially good on the “complex, interactive relationship” between
The Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy, and on “the issues.” Less useful—be-
cause occasionally inaccurate—in tracing the prehistory and history of the strategy,
probably because of deficiencies in the public record.)
** Donatelli, Thomas. “Go Navy.” The American Spectator (February 1987): 31–33. (On the
linkages between defense reorganization and the maritime elements of the national
military strategy. Supports The Maritime Strategy and fears for its future under the
new Defense Department setup.)
Matthews, William. “U.S. Navy’s Exercises in Aleutians Underscore Pacific Interest Con-
cern.” Defense News (9 February 1987): 25. Reprinted as “Marines, Navy Test
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Amphibious Skills in Aleutians.” Navy Times (16 February 1987): 27. (The Navy and
Marine Corps practice cold-weather operations to implement The Maritime Strategy
in the North Pacific.)
** Lynch, David J. “Maritime Plan a ‘Prescription for Disaster’ Educator Says.” Defense
Week (23 February 1987). (Professor Mearsheimer again, this time at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.)
** O’Rourke, Ronald. “Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and the
Navy’s Forward Maritime Strategy.” Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Congres-
sional Research Service, 27 February 1987. (Especially useful for Navy staff officer
views.)
Wood, Robert S. “The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval
War College.” Naval War College Review (Spring 1987): 4–16. (Further development
of the views of this Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus was now
on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. See also com-
mentary by Rear Adm. J. A. Baldwin, President of the Naval War College, 2–3.)
Piotti, Rear Adm. Walter T., Jr. “Interview.” Journal of Defense and Diplomacy 5, no. 2
(1987): 14–16. (The commander of the U.S. Military Sealift Command on global war-
time planning for sealift.)
** Pocalyko, Lt. Cdr. Michael. “Neutral Sweden Toughens NATO’s Northern Tier.” Pro-
ceedings (March 1987): 128–130. (By a 1985–1986 member of the Strategic Concepts
Group (OP–603.) On the interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strat-
egies and The Maritime Strategy.)
** Daskal, Steven E. “Added Sealift Protection in Time of War.” National Defense (March
1987): 38–41. (Recommends a variety of merchant ship self-protection measures for
wartime, given the realities of The Maritime Strategy and U.S./allied force levels.)
** “Analysis: U.S. Carriers.” RUSI (March 1987): 1ff. (Drags out yet again the false choice
between a continental or maritime strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany “would
object strongly if moves were made to convert The Maritime Strategy into the U.S.’s
general war strategy.” It is, in part, and they have not, at all. Cf. Bonn’s actual White
Paper 1985, cited in section V below.)
** Grove, Eric. “The Future of Sea Power.” Naval Forces, no. 2 (1987): 12–28. (Excellent
tour d’horizon, showing where The Maritime Strategy fits in the context of total world
sea power issues.)
* Dunn, Vice Adm. Robert F. “NANiews Interview.” Naval Aviation News (March–April
1987): 4. (The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on
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“today’s maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation”: “Tactical
commanders must deal with the strategy on a day-to-day basis. From that derives a
new tactical awareness.”)
Taylor, Rear Adm. R. A. K. “BBBG Power: Validated!” Surface Warfare (March–April
1987): 2–5. (Testing Battleship Battle Group warfighting concepts at sea, an impor-
tant element of The Maritime Strategy.) See also William Matthews. “Navy Leans to
Battleships with More Cruise Missiles.” Navy Times (13 April 1987): 37–38; and De-
fense News (13 April 1987): 35; and Richard Halloran. “Warship Cleared for Duty off
Iran.” New York Times (12 April 1987): 32.
** “Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged.” Defense Week (2 March 1987): 5. (Rear Adm. J. S.
Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on minesweeping “should go hand in hand
with the forward strategy” at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare.)
** Daggett, Stephen, and Jo L. Husbands. Achieving an Affordable Defense: A Military Strat-
egy to Guide Military Spending. Washington, D.C.: Committee for National Security,
10 March 1987. (The annual CNS attack, using the usual W. W. Kaufmann “data”
and arguments. Unlike The Maritime Strategy, solely designed to influence the U.S.
legislative budget process.) A summary is in Lawrence J. Korb and Stephen Daggett,
“A 15-Carrier Navy: Is it Really Necessary?” Defense News (30 March 1987): 27, re-
printed as “15 Carrier Navy Leaves Forces out of Balance.” Navy Times (6 April 1987):
32, and criticized by R. C. Mandeville in “Experts Only.” Navy Times (27 April 1987):
22.
** Wilson, George C. “600-Ship Navy Is Sailing toward Rough Fiscal Seas.” Washington Post
(16 March 1987): A1, A6. (Sees forward anti-SSBN operations as a “Watkins sce-
nario” and forward carrier battle group operations as a “Lehman scenario,” with little
backing in the officer corps. Cites a number of [unnamed] Navy officers as predicting
that the latter “aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman
leaves the Navy Department.” This seemed doubtful, given the primary role of the of-
ficer corps in drafting The Maritime Strategy; time would tell. See also retort by Rep.
Charles E. Bennett, “A 600 Ship Fleet Is What’s Needed.” Washington Post [22 April
1987]: 19.)
** Cushman, John H., Jr. “Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Warfare.” New York
Times (19 March 1987): 19. (Outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research:
“We are faced with a crisis in our antisubmarine warfare capability which undermines
our ability to execute maritime strategy.” For context, however, see actual Paisley
statements before congressional committees, 1987.)
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** Trainor, Lt. Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.). “Lehman’s Sea-War Strategy Is Alive, but for
How Long?” New York Times (23 March 1987): 16. (Another article in the
“Will-the-Strategy-survive-John-Lehman?” vein. General Trainor’s understanding of
the uniformed Navy, joint, and allied aspects of the strategy does not appear to be on
a par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects.)
* Dorsey, Jack. “NATO Navy Called ‘A Constant Source of Pride.’” Virginian Pilot (28
March 1987): 133. (Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV: It is “naive and
dangerous” to believe that strong naval forces are merely expensive competitors to
ground forces in Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for
critics of naval programs and maritime strategy.)
** Trainor, Lt. Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.). “NATO Nations Conducting Winter Maneu-
vers in Northern Norway.” New York Times (29 March 1987): 14. (Practicing the rein-
forcement of North Norway. Brig. Gen. Matthew Caulfield, USMC: “Marine
reinforcement is part of our maritime strategy.” Gen. Fredrik Bull-Hansen, RNA:
With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be defended.)
** Lessner, Richard. “Quick Strike: Navy Secretary’s Wartime Strategy Is Contested Legacy.”
Arizona Republic (29 March 1987): C1ff. (Comprehensive discussion of the issues, in-
cluding a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman, on the eve of his departure from
office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous
view—running throughout America journalism—that the strategy was solely his
creation.)
* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr., and Benjamin F. Schemmer. “An Exclusive AFJ Interview with
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost.” Armed Forces Journal International (April 1987): 76–84,
especially 79. (The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on The Maritime
Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the
NATO allies. “Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war.
That includes anything that is out there.”)
Liebman, Marc. “Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942 Revisited?” Armed Forces
Journal International (April 1987): 58–64. (On Pacific maritime operations during a
global war with the Soviets.)
Truver, Scott C., and Jonathan S. Thompson. “Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo
Vadis?” Armed Forces Journal International (April 1987): 70–74. (An adequate survey
of the problems and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S. mine
countermeasures concept of operations embedded in The Maritime Strategy—killing
minelayers far forward, in transit, and offshore, before they sow their mines.
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Illustrative of the dangers of discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the to-
tal strategy.)
** Brooks, Capt. Linton. “The Nuclear Maritime Strategy.” Proceedings (April 1987): 33–39.
(A major contributor to The Maritime Strategy thinks it through under the highly un-
likely conditions of nuclear war at sea. An important and prize-winning essay.) See
also “Comment and Discussion” (May 1987): 14, 17 and (August 1987): 27–28.
** Cross, Lt. Col. Michael J., USMC. “No More Carrier Debates, Please.” Proceedings (April
1987): 79–81. (Relates The Maritime Strategy’s requirements to the CVS-CVV
debate.)
* “Individual Human Beings and the Responsibilities of Leadership.” Sea Power (April
1987): 81–96. (Valedictory interview with Secretary Lehman. See page 85 for his part-
ing views on The Maritime Strategy.)
Bliss, Elsie. “Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat.” All Hands (April
1987): 30–31. (On USN efforts to “harden” its ships, aircraft, and equipment against
nuclear attack.)
** “Naval Strategy: America Rules the Waves?” Science (3 April 1987): 24. (Another journal-
istic attempt to summarize the debate. A little better than most.)
“Sea-War Plan All Wet?” Columbus Dispatch (7 April 1987): 10A. (A call for a “vigorous
review” by the Pentagon of “Lehman’s plan,” including “aircraft carrier battle
groups . . . sent to the . . . Barents, [a plan] never . . . formally approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO.” As has often been
the case with public journalistic commentary on The Maritime Strategy, no mention
was made of the extent to which the strategy reflects longstanding JCS, SecDef, or
NATO policy and strategy, or of its roots in the naval officer corps.)
* Smith, Lt. Gen. Keith A. “The Posture of Marine Aviation in FY 88–FY 89.” Marine Corps
Gazette (May 1987): 46ff. (U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation on
Marine aviation requirements to support the national, maritime, and amphibious
strategies. A reprint of earlier congressional testimony.)
** Beatty, Jack. “In Harm’s Way.” The Atlantic (May 1987): 37–53. (Having listened to na-
val leaders and to college professors, Beatty sides with the college professors. His criti-
cisms, however, pale beside Theo Rudnak’s sensationalist artwork.) See also (August
1987): 6–10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark Jordan, Bing West,
and Colin Gray, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, who apparently believes The Maritime
Strategy calls for carrier operations in the Black Sea.
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Matthews, William. “Webb Downplays ‘Forward Strategy’ Issue.” Navy Times (4 May
1987): 33. (A new Reagan administration Secretary of the Navy takes over. His first
publicly reported statements on The Maritime Strategy.)
** Korb, Lawrence J. “A Blueprint for Defense Spending.” Wall Street Journal (20 May
1987): 34. (“The Navy’s proper wartime job is . . . to secure the sea lanes necessary to
support a ground campaign and to take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily
by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy
should suffice.”)
*/** Cushman, John H., Jr. “A Dialogue: What Kind of Navy Does the U.S. Need?” New York
Times (31 May 1987): 4-3. (Vice Adm. Joseph Metcalf III vs. Dr. William W.
Kaufmann on The Maritime Strategy and other naval issues.)
* Webb, James H., Jr., “The Aircraft Carrier: Centerpiece of Maritime Strategy.” Wings of
Gold (Summer 1987): S-2, S-3. (The new Secretary of the Navy on the national mili-
tary strategy, The Maritime Strategy, and the role of the carrier. Continuity of the
Reagan-Weinberger-Lehman view of maritime strategy confirmed.)
** Barnett, Capt. Roger W., USN (Ret.). “The Maritime Continental Debate Isn’t Over.”
Proceedings (June 1987): 28–34. (Still more on the two famous alleged “mindsets,” by
one of the most prominent crafters of The Maritime Strategy.) Also, see “Comment
and Discussion” [August 1987]: 30.)
** George, Lt. James L., USN (Ret.). “INNF.” Proceedings (June 1987): 35–39. (A Center for
Naval Analyses staffer on the effect on the Navy and its Maritime Strategy should Eu-
ropean intermediate nuclear force arms control be achieved.)
** Stefanick, Tom. “The U.S. Navy: Directions for the Future.” F.A.S. Public Interest Report
(1 June 1987): 1ff. (Mostly about the budget, but some discussion of The Maritime
Strategy, most elements of which the author opposes.)
** “The Navy Sails on Rough Seas.” Newsweek (1 June 1987): 23–26. (A summary of the ar-
guments, pro and con, as influenced by reactions to the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark
in the Persian Gulf.)
* “Lehman on Sea Power.” U.S. News and World Report (15 June 1987): 28. (“The Mari-
time Strategy I’ve promoted is not new; it is NATO strategy that was never taken seri-
ously—a formula for holding Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two
high-threat areas.”) See also related articles on pages 36–43.
* “Trost Wants Flexibility in U.S. Thinking, Assessment of Soviets.” Aerospace Daily (22
June 1987): 462; and “Naval Strategy Must Change says Adm. Trost.” Jane’s Defence
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Weekly (27 June 1987): 1345. (The Chief of Naval Operations warns against rigid as-
sumptions about Soviet naval options.)
Rostow, Eugene V. “For the Record.” Washington Post (30 June 1987): A18. (Extract
from a Naval War College lecture by a former high Reagan administration arms con-
trol official: “I can imagine no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which
now characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting successful
applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet empire and shifting geograph-
ical points around its periphery. The Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a
peninsular strategy.”)
* “Interview: James A. Lyons, Jr. Admiral, U.S. Navy.” Proceedings (July 1987): 67.
(CincPacFlt on the importance of the Pacific in The Maritime Strategy, despite media
focus on Euro-Central Atlantic theater considerations.)
* Hernandez, Vice Adm. D. E. “The New Third Fleet.” Proceedings (July 1987): 73–76.
(Commander Third Fleet on the revitalization of his organization to implement its
share of carrying out The Maritime Strategy.)
** Nelson, Cdr. William H. “Peacekeeper at Risk.” Proceedings (July 1987): 90–97. (On ap-
plying The Maritime Strategy to the Persian Gulf region.)
** Peppe, Lt. P. Kevin. “Acoustic Showdown for the SSNs.” Proceedings (July 1987): 33–37.
(On the effects of “acoustic parity” on The Maritime Strategy. He makes similar points
in the July 1987 Submarine Review.)
** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr. “Fresh Claws for the Tomcat.” Proceedings (July 1987): 103–
107. (On the relationship between The Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and
hardware requirements. “The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a signifi-
cant enhancement of the CVBG’s ability to execute The Maritime Strategy. The air-
craft’s true worth is apparent only in this light.”)
** Newell, Lt. C. Clayton R. USA. “Structuring Our Forces for the Big Battle.” Armed Forces
Journal International (July 1987): 6. (Takes on both the U.S. Navy’s “vaunted mari-
time strategy” and the U.S. Army’s “large complex corps designed to fight the Soviets
in Western Europe.” Prefers force structures and strategies enabling the United States
to “apply its military power sparingly in small well-focused engagements in unex-
pected parts of the world.”)
** Prisley, Jack. “Submarine Aggressor Squadron: Its Time Has Come.” Submarine Review
(July 1987): 83–86. (A call for a “Top Fish” program to enable submariners to practice
better what they must do to implement The Maritime Strategy.)
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** Wilson, George. “Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with U.S.” Washington
Post (17 July 1987): A20. (Claims Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, “has never been enamored of the forward strategy” and that “other Defense De-
partment officials said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the
Pentagon.” On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited above. On the
latter, see Mark Twain’s cable from London to the Associated Press, 1897.)
** Truver, Scott. “Phibstrike 95—Fact or Fiction?” Armed Forces Journal International (Au-
gust 1987): 102–108. (A case study of how The Maritime Strategy has been used as a
framework by the Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of
future.)
IV. Sister Service Contributions to, and Views on, The Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Strategy fully incorporated U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air
Force, and Army contributions to the global maritime campaign. In fact, the case can
be made that more thought was given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to
problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codify-
ing The Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing their
own “cornerstone” publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions
to maritime warfare—such as air defense batteries based in islands and littoral areas—
was particularly weak.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Pub. 2. Washington, D.C.:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. (Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 [The
“Functions Paper”], JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of the U.S. armed forces.
See especially chapter 11, sections 1 and 2–3, charging each military department, in-
cluding the Navy, to “prepare forces . . . for the effective prosecution of war and mili-
tary operations short of war.” This responsibility [and not—as some critics charge—a
desire to usurp somehow the authority of the JCS or the unified and specified com-
manders] was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps de-
velopment, promulgation, and discussion of The Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy
Department’s framework for discharging its responsibilities to “organize, train, equip
and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained
combat incident to operations at sea.”)
U.S. Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 20 Au-
gust 1982. (The Army’s “keystone warfighting manual” and therefore a building block
of The Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army-Navy mutual support,
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however, e.g.: air defense and island/littoral reinforcement. On page 17-7 is a useful
discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the NATO northern
and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution restricted to
U.S. government agencies.)
U.S. Air Force. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, AFM 1-1. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 16 March 1984. (The “cornerstone” Air
Force doctrinal manual and therefore a building block of The Maritime Strategy.
Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the
Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on page 1-3, neglect-
ing projection operations, e.g., strike or amphibious warfare; and pages 2-15, 3-1, and
3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all
of them incorporated in The Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of
any concomitant naval role in enhancing “aerospace” operations, and the lack of dis-
cussion of Air Force AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key element of The
Maritime Strategy.)
Cooper, Bert H. Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation. Report 83-151F. Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 1 August 1983. (Analyzes
recent classified studies, identifies problems and issues, and discusses recent
USN-USAF initiatives.)
Wilkerson, Lt. Col. Thomas, USMC. “Two if by Sea.” Proceedings (November 1983): 34–
39. (On important role of the U.S. Air Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal
Marine Corps contributor to the strategy.)
Lewis, Kevin N. Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: Maritime Strategy and
Interservice Cooperation. RAND Paper 6999. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, April 1984.
(See especially for arguments on alleged unique “Navy Planning Style,” many of
which are belied by The Maritime Strategy.)
Killebrew, Lt. Col. Robert B., USA. Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing
NATO’s Strategic Options. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986. (Unique
among studies of NATO defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and
allied land, sea, and air forces. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. Advo-
cates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier “guarding” force. Sees a
potential role for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war.)
Atkeson, Maj. Gen. Edward, USA (Ret.). “Arctic Could Be a Hot Spot in Future Con-
flicts.” Army (January 1986): 13–14. (Fanciful proposal for expanded U.S. Army role
in helping implement The Maritime Strategy: “An Army air cavalry force, properly
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tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as
well as, if not better than, another submarine.”)
Alberts, Col. D. J., USAF. “U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike.” Naval Forces, no. 1 (1986):
62–75. (The strike warfare elements of The Maritime Strategy from an Air Force offi-
cer’s point of view.)
** Harned, Maj. Glenn, USA. “Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy.” Pro-
ceedings (February 1986): 26–28. (Argues that the U.S. Army suffers from lack of a
Maritime Strategy equivalent and from Navy reticence in explaining its operational
and tactical doctrines.)
* Pendley, Rear Adm. William. “The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and the Air-Land Bat-
tle.” In Emerging Doctrines and Technologies, edited by Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., et al.
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. (Official views of the Navy’s Director of
Strategy, Plans, and Policy [OP-60] as of April 1986. Argues that Maritime Strategy
and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and complementary. Sees both as essential
parts—along with nuclear deterrence—of an “essential triad” of U.S. defense strategy.
A short summary is on pages 15–16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implica-
tions for Global and Regional Political Military Balance: A Conference Report: April 16–
18, 1986. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986. Cf. Dunn
and Staudenmaier May–June 1985 Survival article; March–April 1986 views of Vice
Admiral Mustin on linkage between The Maritime Strategy and “Deep Strike,” cited
above; and West German government official views on lack of linkage, cited in sec-
tion V below.)
** Kennedy, Col. William V, USAR (Ret.). “There Goes the U.S. Navy: Steaming the Wrong
Way.” Christian Science Monitor (23 June 1986): 14. (Calls for the Navy to refocus on
Asia, crediting a U.S. Army “counterattack” with having turned The Maritime Strategy
from an alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts to drive
a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and alleges “only nominal mention of
the Army and the Air Force in the Proceedings’ “Maritime Strategy” Supplement,
charges belied by actually reading the supplement.)
** Grace, Lt. Cdr. James A. “JTC3A and The Maritime Strategy.” Surface Warfare (July–August
1986): 22–24. (On the role of the Joint Tactical C3 agency in fielding joint and allied
programs and procedures to ensure implementation of The Maritime Strategy.)
Yost, Adm. Paul, USCG. “The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today’s Coast Guard: Buffeted but
Unbowed.” Sea Power (August 1986): 8–24. (See especially pages 11–12 and 21–22 on
the Maritime Defense Zones, an important Navy–Coast Guard element of The Mari-
time Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard.)
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** Builder, Carl H. The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?
Bethesda, Md.: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, October 1986. (A study done
for the U.S. Army to “try to find out why the Army doesn’t seem to do very well in the
strategic planning process.” Analyzes Army, Navy, and Air Force strategic planning,
especially The Maritime Strategy. Looks for—and therefore “finds”—differences
rather than similarities. Revised and reissued as a RAND Corporation publication
in 1987. Revised and reissued yet again as the influential The Masks of War: American
Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1989.)
Prina, L. Edgar. “The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast Guard Give the Navy a
Helping Hand.” Sea Power (October 1986): 32–45. (Good update on tri-service con-
tributions to implementing The Maritime Strategy.)
** Fraser, Ronald. “MD . . . Z Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role.” Navy Times (20
October 1986): 27. (On the role of the maritime defense zones.)
** Breemer, Jan S., and Todd Hoover, SSG, USAF. “SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon.” Na-
tional Defence (February 1987): 41–45. (A history and an update.) Cf. Chipman and
Lay article cited in section XI below.
Ley, Capt. Michael USA. “Navy Badly Needs to Beef Up Land Operations Fire Support.”
Army (May 1987): 12ff. (Argues for more large-caliber naval guns to support Army
operations ashore.)
** Chipman, Dr. Donald D. “Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade.”
Armed Forces Journal International (August 1987): 82–88. (Argues for joint integrated
USN-USAF wartime operations in NATO’s Northern Region, the GIUK gap, and the
Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with The Maritime Strategy.)
** Estep, Col. James L., USA. “Army’s Role in Joint Global Military Strategy.” Army (August
1987): 11ff. (Decries “lack of a more global, jointly oriented strategy” by the U.S.
Army and applauds the Navy’s development of same.)
V. Allied Contributions to, and Views on, The Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s was heavily oriented
toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the Proceedings Janu-
ary 1986 Supplement, “The Maritime Strategy.” The postwar U.S. Navy had never been
“unilateralist.” Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years be-
fore and then had been continually updated in the drafting of allied war plans, memo-
randa of agreement, and other documents. They were routinely discussed at annual
navy-to-navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held between the U.S. Navy
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and each of its most important allied associates. Thus, most of the hard bargaining and
tradeoffs had already been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy com-
ponent of The Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once The Maritime
Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and planning staffs and to
NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions
to the strategy, and the process continued after its issuance.
Allied naval strategy—and its relationship to The Maritime Strategy—is well enough
documented. The NATO Information Service was prolific, and NATO commanders
wrote relevant articles frequently. Most allied defense ministries published occasional
or annual “Defense Reports” or “White Papers” that sometimes touch on naval strategy
as well as policy and procurement issues. As is evident from these and other writings,
U.S. Navy and allied military thought was generally congruent.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and subsequent editions.)
Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and subsequently. (The basic official pub-
lic document on NATO policy and strategy. See especially the 1984 edition, pages
108–111, 143–144, and 380. “The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command
Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the
sea-lanes and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear
operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried
out by SACEUR.” “NATO’s forces [have] roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear
submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines, and in general preventing the War-
saw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic.”)
Train, Adm. Harry. “U.S. Maritime Power.” In U.S. Military Power in the 1980s, edited by
Christopher Coker. London: Macmillan, 1983, 107–114. (SacLant provides details on
the 1981 NATO Maritime Concept of Operations [ConMarOps], one of the building
blocks of The Maritime Strategy.)
Wemyss, Rear Adm. Martin LaT., RN. “Naval Exercises 1980–81.” Jane’s Naval Annual
(1981): 151–158. (Highlights problems in interallied naval cooperation resulting from
U.S. Navy communication and intelligence systems advances.)
Wemyss, Rear Adm. Martin LaT., RN. “Submarines and Anti-submarine Operations for
the Uninitiated.” RUSI Journal (September 1981): 22–27. (Restatement of classic
Royal Navy arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat targets
instead of U.S. Navy–spearheaded forward operations.)
The North Atlantic Assembly. NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: Strategy Requirements and
the Need for Cooperation. Brussels: 1982. (Good survey of the issues, with a call for
resolution of the debate over mission priorities.)
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Hackett, Gen. Sir John, BA (Ret.), Vice Adm. Sir Ian McGeoch, RN (Ret.), et al. The
Third World War: The Untold Story. New York: Macmillan, 1982. (Fiction. Sequel to
The Third World War: August 1985 [1978]. A British vision, stressing the war at sea
and on the northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific.
“Swing” and carrier strikes on the Kola understood—as in 1978—as normal NATO
modus operandi. Cf. Clancy’s 1986 Red Storm Rising and Hayes et al.’s American Lake,
chapter 19, cited in section II above.)
Tonge, David. “Exposure Troubles NATO’s Northern Commanders.” Financial Times
(27 October 1982): 3. (Reports NATO Northern Region ground commanders’ con-
cerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough.)
Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN. “Defending the Atlantic Connection.” In The Future of Brit-
ish Sea Power, edited by Geoffrey Till. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984,
146–150. (See especially for frank overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic.)
British Atlantic Committee. Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: NATO’s Defense and New
Technology. London: February 1984. (A group of retired British generals and others
rail against the “practicality” and “very purpose” of the NATO reinforcement mis-
sion, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase in Europe and over-
whelming surface ship vulnerability. See also Mitchell, Lt. I. G., RN, “Atlantic
Reinforcement: A Re-emerging Debate.” Armed Forces [September 1986]: 399–400.)
Hunter, Robert, ed. NATO—The Next Generation. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984. (See
especially—and unexpectedly—for Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force role in clos-
ing off Far Eastern straits and protecting the western Pacific sea lines of communica-
tion, in chapters by Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka.)
Bouchard, Lt. Joseph, and Lt. Douglas Hess. “The Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes De-
fense.” Proceedings (March 1984): 88–97. (On the concurrent Japanese maritime strat-
egy debate. See also Lt. Col. Otto Lehrack, “Search for a New Consensus.” In the same
issue: 96–99.)
Toyka, Cdr. Viktor, FGN. “A Submerged Forward Defense.” Proceedings (March 1984):
145–147. (Complementary German maritime strategy for the Baltic.)
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cal endorsement.” Calls for a new NATO “strategic review,” one result of which he
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Mabesoone, Capt. W. C., RNLN, and Cdr. N. W. G. Buis, RNLN. “Maritime Strategic
Aspects of the North Sea.” RUSI (September 1984): 12–17. (Dutch navy view of
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ward defense by ground operations in the opponent’s territory,” which “NATO
strategy rules out.”)
Holst, Johan Jorgen, et al., eds. Deterrence and Defense in the North. Oslo: Norwegian
University Press, 1985. (See especially authoritative chapters by high Norwegian gov-
ernment officials and Kenneth Hunt. “The Security of the Center and the North.”
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Stavridis, Cdr. James. “The Global Maritime Coalition.” Proceedings (April 1965): 58–74.
Also “Comment and Discussion” (October 1985): 177. (On role of allies in The Mari-
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plementary contemporary Royal Navy northern Norwegian Sea strategy.)
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Crickard, Rear Adm. F. W., CN. “Three Oceans—Three Challenges: The Future of Can-
ada’s Maritime Forces.” Naval Forces, no. 5 (1985): 13–27. (On complementary Cana-
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Science Monitor [4 February 1987]: 9, for update of Sokolsky’s views.)
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Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986. (See especially Col. Jonathan Alford, BA [Ret.], “The
Soviet Naval Challenge”: 43–56; and Lt. Gen. Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA [Ret.],
“The Federal Republic of Germany’s Contribution to the Defense of Northern Eu-
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ise that the U.S. Navy would not be available, at least not in strength, in the Norwe-
gian Sea early in a war.)
Dibb, Paul. Review of Australia’s Defense Capabilities. Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1986. (Against Australian involvement with United States and
other allied contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agree-
ment “convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical
miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commit-
ment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our
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ter for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense College Norway, 1986. (See espe-
cially 18–22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts
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“Guardians of the Baltic Shore,” on Federal German Naval Aviation forward air-to-
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Okazuki, Hisahiko. Japan’s National Security Strategy. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books,
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Stryker, Russell F. “Civil Shipping Support for NATO.” NATO Review (February 1986):
29–33. (By a U.S. Maritime Administration official and member of the NATO
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SLOC.)
Margolis, Eric. “Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot Line?” Wall Street Jour-
nal (21 February 1986): 23. (A Canadian call for increased U.S.-Canadian ASW capa-
bilities in the Arctic.)
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time Strategy.)
Leenhardt, Adm. Yves, FM. “France: The Need for a Balanced Navy.” NATO’s Sixteen
Nations (February–March 1986): 41–46. (Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Au-
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Grimstvedt, Rear Adm. Bjarne, RNN. “Norwegian Maritime Operations.” Proceedings
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Secretary of State for Defence (UK). Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986: 1. London:
HMSO, 1986; see especially pages 29, 34, and 60–61. (“Enemy attack submarines are
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against these submarines would begin when they sailed”; “The availability of U.S.
ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed”; “U.S.
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between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack
on Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime Strategy was de-
veloped in full accordance with these concepts.)
Greenwood, David. “Towards Role Specialization in NATO.” NATO’s Sixteen Nations
(July 1986): 44–49. (Argues against a significant eastern Atlantic naval role for Bel-
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Armitage, Richard. “The U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Defense/86 (July–August 1986): 23–27.
(Reagan administration defense policy vis-à-vis Japan by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs. The context of The Maritime Strategy in
Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. See also his “Japan’s Defense Program: ‘No
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** Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN. “Editorial.” Naval Forces, no. 4 (1986): 7. (By a former top
Royal Navy and NATO commander in chief. “The New Maritime Strategy is to be
welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much-needed clarity into the field of mari-
time strategic thinking. But it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval offi-
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Tokinoya, Atsushi. The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective, Adelphi Paper 212.
London: IISS (Autumn 1986).
** Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA. NATO’s Northern Security. London: Institute for the
Study of Conflict, September 1976. (By the retired director of the NATO Interna-
tional Military Staff. “United States maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed
NATO strategy.” Good coverage of the 1981 NATO Concept of Maritime Operations,
a major building block of The Maritime Strategy.)
Howlett, Gen. Geoffrey, BA. “Interview.” Journal of Defense and Diplomacy (September
1986): 13–16. (NATO Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a
GIUK Gap maritime defense line. Advocates a forward defense on land and sea in
North Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and Baltic
Fleets in their home waters.)
** Grove, Eric. “The Maritime Strategy.” Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK) (Sep-
tember 1986): 5–6. (Regards the strategy as “self-consciously offensive” and “self-
consciously coalition-minded,” as “yet another example of the growing difference in
mood between the two sides of the Atlantic.” Challenges fellow Europeans to inject
amendments reflecting their own “interests and fears.” The “difference in mood” he
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** Ausland, John C. “The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas.” International Herald Tribune, 16
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** Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA. “The Threat from the North: Defense of Scandinavia.”
NATO’s Sixteen Nations (October 1986): 26–32. (The former NATO International
Military Staff director’s endorsement of The Maritime Strategy as “making a more ef-
fective contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any adventurism in
the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in general,” with the caution that it “not go
beyond what is essential for deterrence and defense.”)
Boerresen, Capt. Jacob, RSN. “Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy.” Naval Forces,
no. 6 (1986): 14–15. (By the military secretary to the Norwegian minister of defense.
(“During the 1970s, NATO and the USA expressly limited their carrier operations . . .
to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap[;] Norway . . . found this situation rather
uncomfortable. . . . The official Norwegian reaction [to forward deployment of
CVBGs] has been positive, [but] Norway is . . . sensitive to all developments that it
fears may threaten the low level of tension.”)
“Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses.” Washington Times (1 December 1986): 6. (On the
wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force.)
Cremasco, Maurizia. “Italy: A New Definition of Security?” In Evolving European Defense
Policies, edited by Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1987, 257–272. (On the Italian military policy debate and Italian
Navy views on strategy.)
Gann, L. H., ed. The Defense of Western Europe. London: Croom Helm, 1987. (Surveys all
the defense forces of all the Western European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de
Lee’s “The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces,” 58–94, which examines in some
detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Bal-
tic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated
into The Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: “Plans for naval action
are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defence.” Particu-
larly useless is the highly parochial chapter by Col. Harry Summers, USA [Ret.], alleg-
edly on “United States Armed Forces in Europe,” which should have been styled “The
U.S. Army in Germany.”)
Secretary of State for Defence (UK). Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987: 1. London:
HMSO, 1987. (See especially 25 for reaffirmation of previous year’s policy
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statements and commitment to Royal Navy “forward deployment operations in the
Norwegian Sea.”)
** Nakanishi, Terumasa, “U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan.” Washington Quarterly (Winter
1987): 81–97, especially 84–85 and 90. (The Maritime Strategy in the context of the
overall military situation in Northeast Asia. “The new ‘Full-Forward’ strategy of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet . . . is certainly in the interest of Japan’s conventional security.” He is
less sanguine regarding Japan’s nuclear security.)
Newman, Peter C. “Business Watch: About-Face in Defense Strategy.” Maclean’s (12 Jan-
uary 1987): 28. (Naval aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publica-
tion of the 1987 white paper.)
Ebata, Kensuke. “Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style.” Proceedings (March 1987): 98–101.
(On Japanese AAW concepts and programs, essential elements of The Maritime Strat-
egy in the Pacific.)
** Till, Geoffrey. “Maritime Power: The European Dimension.” Naval Forces, no. 11 (1987):
83–104. (Excellent and comprehensive survey by a European of how European naval
power complements The Maritime Strategy in supporting overall NATO Maritime
Strategy. A partial antidote to Bing West’s concerns.)
Auer, Cdr. James, USN (Ret.), and Cdr. Sadao Seno, JMSDF (Ret.). “Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defence Force.” Naval Forces, no. 11 (1987): 178–190. (Stress on the division of
labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in the
Northwest Pacific and on the deterrent value of same.)
** Crickard, Rear Adm. Frederick. “The Canadian Navy: New Directions.” Naval Forces, no.
11 (1987): 78–87. (Sees The Maritime Strategy as forcing hard choices on Canadian
naval planners. Cf. his views of a year earlier, cited above.)
Longbottom, Squadron Leader S. P., RNAF. “Maritime Strike Strategy for the Royal Aus-
tralian Air Force.” Defense Force Journal (March–April 1987): 5ff. (Argues for in-
creased RAAF attention to mine warfare.)
Department of Defence (Australia). The Defence of Australia: 1987. Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Service, 19 March 1987. (The first official Australian Defense
“White Paper” since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within The Maritime
Strategy. “In the remote contingency of global conflict. . . . [O]ur responsibilities
would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protec-
tion and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirements in our own area, the
Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield. . . . [F]or
example, our FFGs . . . are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle
group well distant from Australia’s shores.”)
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** Sokolsky, Joel. “The U.S. Navy and Canadian Security: Trends in American Maritime
Strategy.” Peace and Security (Spring 1987): 10ff. (Sees The Maritime Strategy as creat-
ing problems for Canada. Advocates a Canadian naval buildup.)
** Mackay, Cdr. S. V., RN. “An Allied Reaction.” Proceedings (April 1987): 82–89. (Con-
cludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with con-
comitant “greater commitment from Norway,” and “a firm and agreed-upon line . . .
on ROEs.” “There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strat-
egy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a
600-ship Navy. . . . [T]he supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead.
[But] We in Europe must be sure that The Maritime Strategy is a genuine U.S. policy
for the future and not just a product of the current administration.”) See also “Com-
ment and Discussion” (July 1987): 19–20.
** Urban, Mark. “New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs near Bases.” Independent (London),
14 April 1987. (Commander in chief of the British Fleet, Admiral Hunt, on forward
Royal Navy and NATO submarine—including anti-SSBN—operations.)
Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1987. (June 1987 official Canadian Ministry of Defense white paper,
the first since 1971. Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and
future plans. See especially maps on pages 13, 52, 64, and discussion of proposed
changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the requirements for USN and USMC
forces in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere but should help improve other elements
needed to carry out the strategy.)
Nishihara, Masashi. “Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and Its
Partners.” Naval War College Review (Summer 1987): 37–41. (“The U.S. strategy of
horizontal escalation by which the United States would open up armed tensions in
different parts of the world in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces may
not meet Japanese interests.”)
Arkin, William M., and Steve Shallhorn. “Canada Even More under U.S. Thumb in Sub
Plan.” Globe and Mail (Toronto) (17 July 1987): 7. (Decries The Maritime Strategy,
the new Canadian defense policy, and the linkage between the two.)
VI. Soviet Strategy and Views
U.S. and allied Maritime Strategy was not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat—along
with U.S. national and allied interests and geopolitical realities—was one of the funda-
mental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount
the considerable literature on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works
listed below is how the Soviets viewed their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and
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how correctly we divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they saw as pri-
mary and which they saw as secondary for their navy and for those of the West, and
whether these priorities would change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be
found in other entries in this bibliography.
Gorshkov, Rear Adm. Sergei G. The Sea Power of the State. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1979. See especially 290 and 329. (“The employment of naval forces against
the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to
disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore.”)
Yashin, Rear Adm. B. “The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy.” International Affairs
(Moscow), no. 2 (1982). (Sees “new U.S. Naval Strategy” of Secretary Lehman as de-
riving from the “ocean strategy” of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner.)
Rumyantsev, Rear Adm. A. “The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon’s ‘New Military
Strategy.’” Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye (June 1982): 59–64. (Soviet public in-
terpretation of Reagan administration naval policy, including Norwegian Sea battle
group operations and Arctic SSN anti-SSBN operations. Soviets fully expected a USN
anti-SSBN campaign.)
Sturua, G. M. “The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy.” USA: Economics, Politics
and Ideology (November 1982). (A prominent Soviet civilian defense analyst’s views
on the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy. He sees it as primarily a nuclear counterforce
strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons.)
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authori-
zation for FY84: Part 6. 98th Cong. 1st sess. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983, 2935 and 2939. (Rear Adm. John Butts, new Director of Naval
Intelligence, gives authoritative U.S. Navy view of Soviet navy strategy, April 1983. See
also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985.)
McConnell, James M. The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional. CRC
490. 2 vols. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, June 1983. (Includes alterna-
tive views of Soviet naval strategy.)
Strelkov, Capt. First Rank V. “Naval Forces in U.S. ‘Direct Confrontation’ Strategy.”
Morskoy sbornik no. 5 (1983): 78–82. (Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister
services as well as USN.)
Stalbo, Vice Adm. K. “U.S. Ocean Strategy.” Morskoy sbornik, no. 10 (1983): 29–36. (The
Soviet Navy’s leading theoretician writes in its official journal. Reaction to the Pro-
ceedings October 1982 issue on the Soviet Navy and to statements by the Secretary of
the Navy. Criticizes the “new U.S. Naval Strategy” for its geopolitical roots, its global
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scope, and its aims of “isolating countries of the Socialist community from the rest of
the world.”)
Leighton, Marian. “Soviet Strategy towards Northern Europe and Japan.” Survey
(Autumn–Winter 1983): 112–151. (Sees “striking and disquieting similarities” be-
tween recent “patterns of Soviet coercion against northern Europe and Japan.”)
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments. 5th
ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. (Latest in a series of
official U.S. Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman
in Proceedings [November 1985]: 88–89.)
Sturua, G. “Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare.” USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology
(February 1985). (Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.)
“Soviet Naval Activities: 1977–1984.” NATO Review (February 1985): 17–20. (A series of
charts reflecting recent Soviet exercise activity in the North Atlantic.)
Bystrov, Rear Adm. Yu. “U.S. Games in the World Ocean.” Literaturnaya gazeta (4 Sep-
tember 1985): 14. (Soviet public reaction to exercise OCEAN SAFARI ’85 and other for-
ward exercises.)
Tritten, Cdr. James J. Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment
and Policy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986. (By the acting chairman of the National
Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination of
Soviet naval missions, including implications for U.S. naval strategy. Anticipates So-
viet navy wartime bastion defense, anticarrier warfare, strategic antisubmarine war-
fare, and—controversially—anti-SLOC operations. See also his “Defense Strategy and
Offensive Bastion.” Sea Power [November 1986]: 64–70.)
Watson, Cdr. Bruce W., and Susan M. Watson, eds. The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Lia-
bilities. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986. (See especially chapters by Richard Fisher,
“Soviet SLOC Interdiction,” and Keith Allen, “The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic
Naval Operations,” which see SLOC interdiction as more likely than most other
knowledgeable experts expect, since they see Soviet thinking as evolving toward
greater consideration of protracted conventional conflict.)
** George, James L., ed. The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the
Mid-1980s. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. (An outstanding collection of
papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored conference of top experts in the field, including
several references to The Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes’s discussion
of the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative judgments of Rear
Adm. William Studeman, Rear Adm. Thomas Brooks, and Mr. Richard Haver, the
nation’s top naval intelligence professionals; and the contrasting views of Adm.
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Sylvester Foley and Adm. Harry Train, two former “operators.” Wayne Wright’s “So-
viet Operations in the Mediterranean” is especially good on the interplay of Soviet
and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War
College and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the for-
mer in National Interest [Spring 1986]: 17–29; the latter in National Defense [February
1986]: 38–44.)
Trofimenko, Ginrikh. The U.S. Military Doctrine. Moscow: Progress, 1986. (See especially
34–36 on Mahan, geopolitics, and restraining Russia; and 193–201 on the alleged
“Blue Water Strategy” of the day.)
Fitzgerald, Capt. T. A. “Blitzkrieg at Sea.” Proceedings (January 1986): 12–16. (Argues So-
viets may use their navy as a risk fleet for a “Blitzkrieg” and not for sea denial. A view
shared by many U.S. Navy operators.)
** Falin, Valentin. “Back to the Stone Age.” Izvestia (23/24 January 1986): 5/5. (A top
Kremlin spokesman takes The Maritime Strategy to task as “remarkably odious”: “It is
hardly possible to imagine anything worse.” Highlights opposing arguments by Barry
Posen.) See also commentary by Capt. William Manthorpe, USN (Ret.). “The Soviet
View: The Soviet Union Reacts.” Proceedings (April 1986): 111.
Petersen, Charles C. “Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval Exercise.” National
Defense (February 1986): 32–36. (A leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval
Analyses sees Soviets’ strategy as threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to de-
fending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting, mine war-
fare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to “carrying the fight to the
enemy.”)
** Friedman, Norman. “Soviet Naval Aviation.” Naval Forces, no. 1 (1986): 92–97. (Sees So-
viet naval aviation as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO navies.)
** Balev, B. “The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on the World Ocean.” World
Economics and International Relations (April 1936): 24–31. (A Soviet perspective on
The Maritime Strategy—the “novaya morskaya strategiya.” The three notional phases
restyled as “Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War,” “Seizing the Initiative,” and
“Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory.”)
** Komenskiy, Capt. First Rank V. “The NATO Strategic Command in the Atlantic” and
“Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO Forces in 1985.” Zarubezhnoiye
voyennoiye obozreniye (April 1986): 47–53; and (August 1986): 45–51. (Includes dis-
cussion of roles and missions of NATO naval forces in the context of The Maritime
Strategy.) See also Colonel V. Rodin, “The Military Doctrines of Japan” (August
1986): 3–9.
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Ries, Tomas, and Johnny Skorve. Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satel-
lite Photos. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1986. (See especially 21–49 on the
place of Fenno-Scandia and adjacent waters in the context of overall Soviet strategy.)
MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.). “Soviet Military Objectives.” World Policy Journal
(Fall 1986): 667–695. (Adapted from his book, cited below. Much that goes against
the grain of contemporary informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet inten-
tions, including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as particularly important. See
especially 676–680.)
** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret). “The Soviet View: RimPac-86.” Proceedings (Oc-
tober 1986): 191. (The Soviets see linkages between The Maritime Strategy and allied
exercises.)
van Tol, Robert. “Soviet Naval Exercises 1983–1985.” Naval Forces, no. 6 (1986): 18–34.
(Most useful in its discussion of the interactions between NATO and Soviet strategies
and between NATO and Soviet exercises.)
MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.). Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987. (Individualistic, iconoclastic, and
debatable.)
Schandler, Herbert Y. “Arms Control in Northeast Asia.” Washington Quarterly (Winter
1987): 69–79. (Wide-ranging article that gives the context within which The Maritime
Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights “the ever-looming nightmare of a
two-front war” as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. “This two-front threat is
enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a
major pressure point on Soviet leaders.”)
** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr. “For Security on Sea Routes.” International Affairs (Moscow), no.
1 (1987): 77–84, 103. (See especially 83 on The Maritime Strategy as “an unprecedent-
edly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington
today.”)
** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.). “The Soviet View: More than Meets the Eye.”
Proceedings (February 1987): 117–118. (Sophisticated analysis of 3–4 October 1986
Red Star article on potential changes in Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking, and plan-
ning that, if adopted, would have important implications for Soviet response to The
Maritime Strategy.)
* Weinberger, Caspar. Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, March 1987. (More extensive analysis of Soviet strategy and opera-
tional concepts than in previous five editions.)
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* U.S. Navy. Office of Naval Intelligence. Current Intelligence Issues. Washington, D.C.: De-
partment of the Navy Office of Information, March 1987. (See especially 1–4 on the
anticipated employment of Soviet naval forces in wartime.)
** Breemer, Jan. “U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-Appraisal.” Naval Forces, no. 2 (1987): 4–
76. (Discusses the background behind and the issues surrounding current U.S. Navy
thinking on Soviet naval strategy.)
** Elliott, Frank. “Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy before Lehman, Watkins Publicized
It.” Defense Week (4 May 1987): 5. (Reports on important seminar on Soviet views of
The Maritime Strategy. See also seminar transcript, Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Insti-
tute, 1987.)
** Daniel, Donald C. F. “The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea.” Survival (July/
August 1987): 138ff. (The then director of the Naval War College’s Strategy and Cam-
paign Department concludes, inter alia, that Soviet decision makers would use nu-
clear weapons at sea only if they had already been used ashore or if NATO used them
at sea first.)
VII. Peacetime, Crises, and Third World Contingencies
Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in general war. What fol-
lows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy
in peacetime, crises, and “small wars” (the “violent peace” of The Maritime Strategy).
Many of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval
mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early
1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U.S. Navy thought on peacetime presence opera-
tions began about five years prior to that on forward global wartime operational con-
cepts. Both bodies of thought, however, built on the earlier literature of the late 1950s
and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy in limited war.
While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, there was a significant lit-
erature on the peacetime/crisis/“small war” activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet
Navy as well, some of the most important elements of which have been included here.
In addition, certain of the white papers and defense reports published by various de-
fense ministries around the world routinely highlighted the peacetime operations of
their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard were the annual British “Defense Es-
timates” and Canadian “Annual Reports.”
Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee. Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Car-
rier. 91st Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970,
162–165. (Listing of uses of USN in wars/near-wars 1946–1969; takes negative view
of same.)
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Cable, James. Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. New
York: Praeger, 1970. (First of a spate of useful books seeking to list, classify, and de-
scribe peacetime uses of navies. Surveys twentieth-century activities of all major na-
vies. Updated in 1981.)
Howe, Cdr. Jonathan. Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971. (The 1967 Mideast crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and
the effectiveness of conventional naval forces as foreign policy instruments, by a fu-
ture flag officer and political-military affairs subspecialist. Argues for a strong global
naval posture, especially in the Mediterranean.)
Bull, Hedley. “Sea Power and Political Influence.” In Power at Sea: I. The New Environ-
ment. Adelphi Paper Number 122. London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1974, 1–9. (“The period we are now entering will be one in which opportuni-
ties for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely
circumscribed.”)
Moore, Capt. J. E., RN. “The Business of Surveillance.” Navy International (June 1974):
9–10. (Rationale for peacetime surveillance operations at sea.)
McGruther, Lt. Cdr. Kenneth. “The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy.” Naval War
College Review (September–October 1974): 3–20. (Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner
new look at USN “Naval Presence” mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a
“cookbook.” By a future OP-603 staffer.)
McNulty, Cdr. James. “Naval Presence: The Misunderstood Mission.” Naval War College
Review (September–October 1974): 21–31. (Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-
Turner focus on presence.) See also Stansfield Turner, “Challenge”: 1–2 in the
same issue.
Luttwak, Edward N. The Political Uses of Sea Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1974. (Short treatment sponsored by Vice Admiral Turner. Typology and anal-
ysis based on concept of “suasion.” Focus on the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean.)
Young, Elizabeth. “New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the
Sea.” Survival (November–December 1974): 262–267. (Forecasts the demise of naval
diplomacy.)
Hill, Capt. J. R., RN. “Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea.” Survival (March–April
1975): 69–72. (Takes issue with Young’s article. Suggests that “in the turbulent future,
maritime forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home
and away.”)
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MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.). “Changing Naval Operations and Military Interven-
tion.” In The Limits of Military Intervention, by Ellen P. Stern. Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage, 1977, 151–178 and reprinted in Naval War College Review (Spring 1977): 3–25.
(Sees numerous constraints now in place on the “almost casual use of force which
used to be the norm” in military intervention by sea.)
MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), and John McDonnell, eds. Soviet Naval Influence:
Domestic and Foreign Dimensions. New York: Praeger, 1977. (See especially chapters
by MccGwire, Booth, Dismukes, and Kelly.)
Booth, Ken. Navies and Foreign Policy. London: Croon Helm, 1977. (Magisterial
treatment.)
Mahoney, Robert B., Jr. “U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises,
1955–1975.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. (Survey of USN cri-
sis operations and summaries of incidents and responses.)
Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. “The Evolution of International Order and the
Future of the American Naval Presence Mission.” Naval War College Review (Fall
1977): 37–59. (Sees political and technological changes as necessitating revision to
contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking had begun to
solidify.)
Eldredge, Capt. Howard S. “Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for
Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations.” In Arms Transfers to the Third
World, edited by Uri Ra’anan et al. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978, 21–64. (Argues
that growing sea-denial arsenals of littoral nations were complicating the risk calcula-
tions of the superpowers in using naval forces to further their interests. Focus on
antiship missiles and submarine torpedoes.)
Blechman, Barry M., and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a
Political Instrument. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978. (Utility of USN
vs. other U.S. armed forces.)
Congressional Budget Office. U.S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission. Wash-
ington, D.C.: 1978. (How it could allegedly be done with fewer CVs.)
Zakheim, Dov S. “Maritime Presence, Projection, and the Constraints of Parity.” In
Equivalence, Sufficiency and the International Balance. Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University, August 1978, 101–118. (Argues for a combined-arms approach,
vice solely naval focus, for U.S. maritime presence.)
Dismukes, Bradford, and James M. McConnell, eds. Soviet Naval Diplomacy. New York:
Pergamon, 1979. (Comprehensive surveys and analyses.)
T H E M A R I T I M E S T R A T E G Y D E B A T E S 2 5 1
Madison, Cdr. Russell L. “The War of Unengaged Forces: Superpowers at Sea in an Era
of Competitive Coexistence.” Naval War College Review (March–April 1979): 82–94.
(Thoughtful piece seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into
one framework—a “Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare.”)
Smith, Edward Allen. “Naval Confrontation: The Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion
in Times of Crisis.” PhD diss., American University, 1979. (Examination of U.S. and
Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily influenced by Luttwak’s con-
cept of “naval suasion.”)
Allen, Capt. Charles D., Jr. USN (Ret.). The Uses of Navies in Peacetime. Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology.
(Focus on postwar U.S. Navy and on escalation.)
Kaplan, Stephen S. Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981. (Does for the Soviets what Blechman
and Kaplan did for the United States.)
Cohen, Raymond. International Politics: The Rules of the Game. London: Longman, 1981.
41–48. (One of the few general works on international relations by an academic polit-
ical scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy
force movements seen as part of the “vocabulary of international politics.”)
Truver, Scott C. “New International Constraints on Military Power: Navies in the Politi-
cal Role.” Naval War College Review (July–August 1981): 99–104. (Sees regular em-
ployment of major naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable
in Third World areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons.)
Neutze, Cdr. Dennis R., USN (JAGC). “Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination
of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy.” JAG Journal
(Summer 1982): 81–158. (By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the law-
fulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international
law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expand-
ing in the future.)
Wright, Christopher C., III. “U.S. Naval Operations in 1982.” Proceedings/Naval Review
(May 1983). Excellent survey and analysis. (Includes general introduction to USN
concepts of operations, deployment patterns, and tempo of operations, as well as re-
view of actual deployments. See also annual updates in subsequent Naval Reviews.)
Hickman, Lt. Cdr. William J. “Did It Really Matter?” Naval War College Review (March–
April 1983): 17–30. (By a future OP-603 staffer. On limitations and misuses of U.S.
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Navy naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to
McGruther article a decade earlier, above.)
Barnett, Capt. Roger W. “The U.S. Navy’s Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism.” Ter-
rorism 6, no. 3 (1983): 469–480. (A primary architect of The Maritime Strategy argues
that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and installa-
tions, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities
“cannot be suggested to be a large one.”)
Zelikow, Philip D. “Force without War, 1975–82.” Journal of Strategic Studies (March
1984): 29–54. (Updates Blechman and Kaplan book. Also provides listing of incidents
when U.S. Navy was used.)
Cable, Sir James. “Showing the Flag.” Proceedings (April 1984): 59–63. (The utility of ship
visits.)
Luttwak, Edward N. The Pentagon and the Art of War. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984, 222, 247–248. (Sees diminishing value of peacetime deployments.)
Howe, Rear Adm. Jonathan T. “Multicrisis Management: Meeting an Expanding Chal-
lenge.” In Security Commitments and Capabilities: Elements of an American Global
Strategy, edited by Uri Ra’anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.. Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1985, 125–137. (Reflections on America’s ability to manage “multicrises,”
through naval as well as other means, by the U.S. naval officer who popularized the
term fifteen years earlier.)
Martin, Laurence. “The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime.” Naval War College Review
(January–February 1985): 4–14. (A lecture summarizing many contemporary themes
on the subject.)
* U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authori-
zation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, Part 8. 99th Cong. 1st sess. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, 4409–4448. (Vice Adm. James A. Lyons
on “Global Naval Commitments.” 18 February 1985. The official policy enunciated by
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations [OP-06].)
Arnott, Cdr. Ralph E., and Cdr. William A. Gaffney. “Naval Presence: Sizing the Force.”
Naval War College Review (March–April 1985): 13–30. (Seeks to develop a rational
structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as
to achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations.)
Lehman, John F., Jr. “An Absolute Requirement for Every American.” Sea Power (April
1985): 13. (Secretary of the Navy argues that the high USN peacetime operating
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tempo is partly self-generated. See also Washington Post [6 October 1985]: A12, and
Virginia Pilot/Ledger Star [27 October 1985]: A1.)
Daniel, Donald C., and Gael D. Tarleton. “The Soviet Navy in 1984.” Proceedings/Naval
Review (May 1985): 90–92, 361–364. (Snapshot of one year’s Soviet global peacetime
activity. See subsequent Naval Reviews for updates.)
Etzold, Thomas H. “Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low-Intensity Conflict.” In Fu-
ture Imperative: National Security and the U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s, by Harlan K.
Ullman and Thomas H. Etzold. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1985. (Argues that low-
intensity U.S. Navy contingencies and peacetime operations were on the increase.)
Levine, Daniel B. Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime
CRM 85–77. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1985. (Concerns
much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis
response, and surveillance operations. Analyzes them by ocean area, frequency, and
number/types of combatants used.)
Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Lt. Cdr. Joseph Benkert. “Is That All There Is?” Proceed-
ings (October 1985): 32–37. (Contrasts peacetime and global war strategy require-
ments, with focus on surface combatants.)
Booth, Ken. Law, Force, and Diplomacy at Sea. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985.
(Peacetime naval strategy and the law of the sea, and much more. Rebuts Elizabeth
Young arguments of a decade earlier: 66–68.)
Hill, Rear Adm. J. R., RN. Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1986. (Chapter 6, “Normal Conditions”: 88–110, describes the various
roles of navies, especially those of medium-sized countries, in peacetime. Chapter 7,
“Low Intensity Operations”: 88–131, covers operations somewhat higher up on the
scale of violence.)
Parritt, Brigadier Brian. Violence at Sea: A Review of Terrorism, Acts of War and Piracy,
and Countermeasures to Prevent Terrorism. Paris: ICC, 1986. (See especially Paul
Wilkinson’s “Terrorism and the Maritime Environment”: 35–40, on the role of navies
in combating terrorism and the kinds of naval force required.)
Mandel, Robert. “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy.” International Studies Quar-
terly (March 1986): 59–76. (“The most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a defini-
tive, deterrent display of force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in
the victim’s region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to
the victim.”)
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** Elliott, Frank. “Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties.” Navy Times (31 March 1986):
25, 28. (Role of battleships vis-à-vis carriers in the presence mission.)
Vlahos, Michael. “The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning.” Orbis (Spring 1986): 133–
148. (By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has re-
cently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against
the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different
Third World contingencies.)
Cable, Sir James. “Gunboat Diplomacy’s Future.” Proceedings (August 1986): 36–41.
(Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Deni-
grates those who have said otherwise.)
Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé. “The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy.” Naval Forces,
no. 6 (1986): 36–43. (By probably the most important contemporary French writer on
naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an
English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples.)
“Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas.” Washington Times (24 No-
vember 1986): 4-D. (On adjustments to U.S. Navy routine forward presence posture
to enhance Navy flexibility and reduce individual ship operating tempo.)
James, Lawrence. “Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat Diplomacy Today.” Defense
Analysis (December 1986): 324–327. (On its limitations, past and present.)
Bush, Ted. “Sailors Spending More Time at Home under PersTempo.” Navy Times (Feb-
ruary 1987): 3. (On naval presence and morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance con-
flicting requirements.) See also Tom Philpott and John Burlage, “Stepped Up
Operations May Cut Home Port Time.” Navy Times (22 June 1987): 1, 8; and John
Burlage, “CNO Trost: No Retreat on OpTempo.” Navy Times (13 July 1987): 1, 26.
Cable, Sir James. “Showing the Flag: Past and Present.” Naval Forces, no. 3 (1987): 38–49.
(Update of Cable’s thought on this particular aspect of peacetime naval operations.)
Cf. his views in the April 1934 Proceedings cited above.
Jordan, Col. Amos A., USA (Ret). “A National Strategy for the 1990s.” Washington Quar-
terly (Summer 1987): 15. (The president of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies sees Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by “gunboat diplomacy
and other similar kinds of hollow threats.”)
VIII. Fleet Balance: Atlantic vs. Pacific vs. Mediterranean
Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet the U.S. Navy’s
global posture after World War II often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater
commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. The articles
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and letters below illustrate the problems of implementing a balanced global maritime
strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They
were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding
fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing re-
gional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.
Booth, Ken. “U.S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability, and Credibility.”
Naval War College Review (Summer 1978): 11–28. (Argues for withdrawal of Sixth
Fleet.)
McGruther, Lt. Cdr. Kenneth R. “Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the
U.S. Pacific Fleet.” Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1979): 126–141. (On reorienting
the Pacific Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and secondarily west-
ward, for peacetime presence. By a former OP-603 staffer.)
Etzold, Thomas. “From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in American Strategy
since World War II.” Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1981): 66–77. (On the need to
make hard strategic choices, especially between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.)
Cole, Cdr. Bernard. “Atlantic First.” Proceedings (August 1982): 103–106. Also “Com-
ment and Discussion” (December 1982): 86–87.
Deutermann, Capt. Peter. “Requiem for the Sixth Fleet.” Proceedings (September 1982):
46–49. Also “Comment and Discussion” (November 1982): 14; (January 1983): 17–
20; (February 1983): 80–81; (March 1983): 12–17; (July 1983): 89.
Breemer, Jan S. “De-Committing the Sixth Fleet.” Naval War College Review (Novem-
ber–December 1982): 27–32.
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew. “Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom.” Proceedings (July
1983): 22–28. Also “Comment and Discussion” (December 1983): 26. (On refocusing
the Atlantic Fleet from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic.)
Ortlieb, Cdr. E. V. “Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation.” Proceedings (De-
cember 1983): 36–40. Also “Comment and Discussion” (February 1984): 22. (On re-
ducing the Sixth and Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third.)
Maiorano, Lt. Alan. “A Fresh Look at the Sixth Fleet.” Proceedings (February 1984): 52–
58. Also “Comment and Discussion” (July 1984): 28–33. (On reducing the U.S. Navy
Mediterranean commitment, with U.S. Air Force and allied forces filling any gaps.)
Dismukes, Bradford, and Kenneth G. Weiss. “Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater.”
In The U.S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1980s, edited by James L. George. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview. (On timing reductions in U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces.)
Sestak, Lt. Cdr. Joseph. “Righting the Atlantic Tilt.” Proceedings (January 1986): 64–71.
2 5 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Kolodziej, Edward A. “The Southern Flank: NATO’s Neglected Front.” AEI Foreign Pol-
icy and Defense Review 6, no. 2 (1986): 45–56, especially: 48–50. (A leading political
scientist endorses Captain Deutermann’s views on reorienting U.S. naval concentra-
tion from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.)
** Lee, Ngoc, and Lt. Cdr. Alan Hinge, RAN. “The Naval Balance in the Indian-Pacific
Ocean Region.” Naval Forces, no. 2 (1987): 150–175. (Views the U.S. Navy as
understrength for warfighting in the Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and overly
strong in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge’s August 1986
article cited in section II above.)
IX. War Gaming
As is well discussed in previous sections, the U.S. and allied navies, other services, and
joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test
the wartime validity of aspects of The Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion.
They participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and “real world” peace-
time and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war
games. These avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one—gam-
ing. There were in those years over a half-dozen commercial board and computer
games available that could provide players with insights into maritime strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance play-
ers’ understanding of The Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, each had its
limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out.) Thus
they could not by themselves legitimately be used to “prove” validities or demonstrate
“outcomes.” Nevertheless, playing them was the nearest many students and theorists of
maritime strategy could ever come to actually “being there.”
A. Commentary
** Perla, Peter P. “Wargaming and the U.S. Navy.” National Defense (February 1987): 49–
53. (By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war gamer. “The Navy is continuing a
process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major is-
sues for which they are best suited. . . . [A] classic example of this process can be seen
at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting
point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO
Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A war game was held at the Naval War College to
explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues
raised by the game. Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed
some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was
capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues.” See also his “What
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Wargaming Is and Is Not,” co-authored by Lt. Cdr. Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War
College Review [September–October 1985]: 70–78, as well as “In My View” commen-
tary—Naval War College Review [Autumn 1986]: 105–108.) See also “War Games,
Analyses, and Exercises.” Naval War College Review (Spring 1987): 44–52 (and en-
dorsement from former CNO Adm. Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret.) in August 1987
Proceedings.
Connors, Lt. Cdr. Tracy D., USNR. “Gaming for the World.” Proceedings (January 1984):
106–108. (On the Naval War College’s Global War Game series, a principal research
tool for identifying critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues.) See also
Robert J. Murray, “A War-Fighting Perspective. Proceedings (October 1983): 66–81;
and Cdr. James Eulis, “War Gaming at the U.S. Naval War College.” Naval Forces, no.
5 (1985): 96–103.
B. Games
Grigsby, Gary. North Atlantic ’86. Mountain View, Calif.: Strategic Simulations, Inc.,
1983 (Apple computer game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael Markowitz.
Proceedings (July 1984): 116–117. (Entering premise is the initial failure of NATO,
United States, and The Maritime Strategy: “The great war in Europe is over. As ex-
pected, Russia won; it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next plan: com-
plete domination of the North Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain.”)
Nichols, W. J. Grey Seas, Grey Skies. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada,
1983, 1987 (Apple computer game). Reviewed by John Gresham and Michael
Markowitz. Proceedings (July 1984): 116–117. (Seven “prebuilt” scenarios, including
Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines in the Kurile Islands, a Soviet amphibi-
ous group versus West German forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle
groups off the North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the Medi-
terranean. Focus is more tactical than in the other games listed here.)
Nichols, W. J. Fifth Escadra. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1984 (Apple
computer game). (Soviets versus NATO in the Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict
ranging from rising tensions to global nuclear war.)
Nichols, W. J. Seventh Fleet. Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1985 (Apple
computer game). (Soviets versus United States and Japan. Includes Sea of Okhotsk,
Sea of Japan, and South China Sea operations.)
** Balkoski, Joseph. Sixth Fleet. New York: Victory Games, 1986 (board game). Reviewed by
U.S. Naval Historical Center historian Michael A. Palmer. Strategy and Tactics (Janu-
ary–February 1986): 51–52. (“The inclusion of random elements into the system, the
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addition of logistic rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet
game an excellent operational level naval wargame.”)
Balkoski, Joseph. Second Fleet. New York: Victory Games, 1986 (board game). Reviewed
by U.S. Naval Historical Center historian Michael A. Palmer. Proceedings (March
1987): 160–162. (“Those of us without access to the War College’s computers can test
the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain
insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of The Mari-
time Strategy.” Could be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted
from one set of maps to the other, in a simulation of war in both northern and south-
ern European waters and adjacent areas.)
Herman, Mark Aegean Strike. New York: Victory Games, 1986 (board game). Reviewed
by U.S. Naval Historical Center historian Michael A. Palmer. Strategy and Tactics
(1987). (The eastern Mediterranean. “Few, if any, games . . . better integrate the
strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets.”)
X. Antecedents
The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is pre-
sented here are only books that describe earlier strategies—conceptualized, planned, or
implemented—that are analogous to key aspects of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy.
The materials are generally listed chronologically by historical period covered.
Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s,
1984. (Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.)
Callwell, Maj. C. E., BA. The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since
Waterloo. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897 (especially 178–182 and
196–197); Barker, A. J. The War against Russia, 1854–1856. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1970; John Shelton Curtiss. Russia’s Crimean War. Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1979; and Norman Rich. Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary
Tale. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1985 (especially 124–126,
136–137, 158–159, 178, 201–202, 206–209). (Successful maritime global forward co-
alition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and
Black Seas, and off the Kuriles and Kamchatka. Component of a larger military strat-
egy, which blocked subsequent Russian expansion for over twenty years.)
** Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer. “The Problem of Asia.” In his The Problem of Asia and Its
Effect upon International Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: University Press, 1900, 1–146.
(Mahan on “restraining Russia,” the central problem of The Maritime Strategy: “The
Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon, and from, the flanks . . . that restraint, if
needed, must come” [p. 26]; “Hence ensues solidarity of interest between Germany,
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Great Britain, Japan and the United States” [p. 63].) See also Trofimenko, in section
VI above; and Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian.” In
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, 444–477, especially 477. (A Naval
War College professor emeritus asserts The Maritime Strategy is antithetical to
Mahan’s teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a book that other-
wise—and to its detriment—pays scant attention to makers of modern maritime
strategy. Trofimenko gets the linkage between Mahan and The Maritime Strategy
right. Crowl gets it wrong.)
Schilling, Warner R. “Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913–1919.” Ph.D. diss., Yale Uni-
versity, 1954. (“Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s was not the first time this century the
U.S. Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.)
Palmer, Alan. The Gardeners of Salonika. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965: especially
226–247. (Southern Flank Maritime Strategy in action. World War I allies advance to
the Danube from beachhead in Greece in 1918, knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
and Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.)
Roskill, Stephen W. Naval Policy between the Wars, vol. 1, The Period of Anglo-American
Antagonism, 1919–1929. New York: Walker, 1968: esp. chap. 3, “The War of Interven-
tion in Russia, 1918–1920”; and Christopher Dobson and John Miller, The Day They
Almost Bombed Moscow: The Allied War in Russia, 1918–1920. New York: Atheneum,
1986. 42–47, 72–73, 247–266, and 274–276. (Poorly devised global, allied, forward
maritime operations against the Soviets seventy years ago, which, however, did
achieve independence for the Baltic States.)
** Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange, 1897–1945: The Naval Campaign through the Central
Pacific. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. (History’s most successful prewar
plan, with lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the 1980s.)
See also Vice Adm. George C. Dyer, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of
Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Ret.). Washington, D.C.: Naval History Division,
Department of the Navy, 1973: chap. 14, “War Plans”; and Cdr. Michael W. Shelton,
CEC, “Plan Orange Revisited.” Proceedings (December 1984): 50–56, and “Comment
and Discussion” (March 1985): 73 and 79. (Draws false parallels between the western
Pacific in 1941 and the Norwegian Sea of the 1980s—that is, between a purely naval,
unilateral, theater problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advo-
cates ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad history and
worse strategy.)
** Vlahos, Michael. “Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919–1942.” Naval War
College Review (March–April 1986): 7–22. (By a former Naval War College faculty
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member. How war gaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941 and how it was
doing so again in 1986, including linkage between gaming and planning.)
** Reynolds, Clark G. “The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some Implications?” Naval
War College Review (May–June 1986): 43–50. (By a former Naval Academy faculty
member. Gleans lessons and implications for today’s Maritime Strategy from that of
World War II.)
** Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.). “Victory at Sea: Bull Halsey at Leyte Gulf.” Wash-
ington Post Book World, 15 December 1986: 1 and 13. (Review of E. B. Potter’s Bull
Halsey. Draws analogies to contemporary military problems, especially regarding “the
offense and the defense.” Of a piece with Turner’s other writings.)
Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad (vol. 1) and The Road to Berlin (vol. 2). Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 1983. See especially vol. 1: 14, 55–57, 218, 237–240, 271–272, 295;
vol. 2: 43, 132, 156. (Effect of Far East operations—or lack thereof—on the Central/
East Europe Front in World War II.)
Spykman, Nicholas John. The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944.
(Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, 50–54.)
Love, Robert, B., Jr., ed. The Chiefs of Naval Operations. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval In-
stitute Press, 1980. (See sections on post–World War II CNOs’ views on strategy, es-
pecially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh Burke.)
Rosenberg, David. “American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experi-
ence.” In Air Power and Warfare, by A. F. Hurley, R. C. Ehrhart, et al. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970. (Antecedent naval postwar air strike
strategies by a leading historian of U.S. Navy postwar strategy.)
Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester. “Future Employment of Naval Forces.” Vital Speeches (5
January 1948): 214–217. (Also, in Brassey’s Naval Annual [1948] and Shipmate [Feb-
ruary 1948]: 5–6ff, as “Our Navy: Its Future.” Argues for a projection strategy and a
Navy capable of land attack early in a war.)
Cave Brown, Anthony, ed. Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III against Russia
in 1957. New York: Dial, 1978. (1949 JCS study: good example of early post-war stra-
tegic thinking. See especially 161–165, 206–211, 225–235. Not to be read without ex-
amining the review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, Naval War College
Review [Fall 1978]: 103–106.)
** Palmer, Michael A. Origins of The Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First
Postwar Decade. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1988. (An important dis-
cussion of the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought between the
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first and fifth postwar decades, the two postwar eras most characterized by U.S. Navy
concern with problems of naval warfighting vis-à-vis the Soviet Union itself.)
** Friedman, Norman. The Postwar Naval Revolution. London: Conway Maritime, 1986.
See especially chapter 10, “Epilogue,” 212–218. (On allied naval developments in the
first post–World War II decade, including relationships to The Maritime Strategy de-
veloped three decades later.)
Huntington, Samuel P. “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.” Proceedings (May
1954): 483–93. (Clearly foreshadows the basic outline of The Maritime Strategy. An
analysis generally as relevant in the 1980s as then.)
Marolda, Edward J. “The Influence of Burke’s Boys on Limited War.” Proceedings (Au-
gust 1981): 36–41. (By a prominent Navy Department historian on the influence of
the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. “Between 1956 and 1960,
the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within the na-
tional defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy.”)
Wylie, Capt. J. C. “Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor.” Proceedings (August 1957): 811–
817. (By the Navy’s leading public strategist of the 1950s and ’60s. Remarkably similar
to the views expressed in The Maritime Strategy a generation later.)
** Rosenberg, David. U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical Perspective. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
Wylie, Rear Adm. J. C. Military Strategy. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
1967. Reprinted with an intoduction by John B. Hattendorf and a postscript by Wylie
in the Classics of Sea Power Series. Naval Institute Press, 1989. (Codification of views
of U.S. Navy’s most prominent postwar strategic theorist.)
Gray, Colin S. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technolog-
ical Revolution. New York: Crane Russak, 1977. (Analyzes and updates geopolitical
grand theory. Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature of
Western security problems.)
Comptroller General of the United States. Implications of the National Security Council
Study “U.S. Maritime Strategy and Naval Force Requirements” on the Future Naval
Ship Force. PSAD-78-6A. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 7 March
1978. (Discusses in detail—and in highly unsympathetic terms—the classified Na-
tional Security Council study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as
triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force levels.) See also Donald
Rumsfeld. “Which Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?” Proceedings (February 1977):
18–25.
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Lehman, John. Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978. (Codi-
fication of Lehman’s thought on naval strategy before becoming Secretary of the
Navy. Much more than carriers, especially chapter 2.) See also his March 1980 testi-
mony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Hearings on National Defense: Alter-
native Approaches to the U.S. Defense Program. 96th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, 208–253.
U.S. Navy. Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (unclassified executive summary).
Washington, D.C.: 28 March 1978. (A progenitor of The Maritime Strategy. Whereas
the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets,
the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses
of naval power.)
Ryan, Capt. Paul, USN (Ret). First Line of Defense. Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1981.
(Mainstream USN perspectives on postwar defense policies through the Carter
administration.)
XI. Making Modern Naval Strategy: Influences
Snyder, Jack. The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of
1914. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984, chap. 1. (On how military strategy
gets made, and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. Views military
as predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies.) See also his “Per-
ceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914.” In Psychology and Deterrence, edited by
Robert Jervis et al. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985, 162–164. (Sum-
marizes the literature on the alleged “Military Bias for the Offensive.”)
Sagan, Scott D. “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability.” International Security
(Fall 1986): 151–175. (An excellent piece. Takes issue with literature on the alleged
“Military Bias for the Offensive”: “Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by
states with expansionist war aims but also by states that have a strong interest in pro-
tecting an exposed ally.”) See also Jack Snyder and Scott D. Sagan, “Correspondence:
The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce” (Winter 1986–1987):
187–198.
Bartlett, Henry C. “Approaches to Force Planning.” Naval War College Review (May–
June 1985): 37–48. (By a Naval War College faculty member. Provides eight ap-
proaches to Force Planning, but each such “approach” can—and does—apply to the
drafting of strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alter-
natives, but in actual practice [for example, in the development of The Maritime
Strategy] their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous, to a greater or lesser
degree. His list of approaches: “top-down,” “bottom-up,” “scenario,” “threat,”
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“mission,” “hedging,” “technology,” and “fiscal.” The first four were probably the
most important influences on The Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s–early 1950s and
the 1980s; “mission” and “hedging” were relatively more important from the late
1950s through the mid-1970s. “Threat” influences tended to be driven more by per-
ceived capabilities in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived intentions in
the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on “technology” and “budget” influences. There is ac-
tually also a ninth approach, a “historical/academic” approach, which tends to focus
the strategist on “lessons of history” or the great classics of military thought. All these
approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war plan-
ning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples
drawn primarily from The Maritime Strategy debates.)
Johnson, Capt. W. Spencer. “Comment and Discussion.” “Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs.”
Proceedings (September 1984): 107. (One of the initial drafters of The Maritime
Strategy elaborates on the necessity, utility, and existence of a national military
strategy from which The Maritime Strategy is derived. The “top-down” view of
strategy-building written in response to McGruther’s “threat-based” approach, cited
below. See also “Comment and Discussion,” Proceedings [April 1984]: 31.)
Hughes, Capt. Wayne, USN (Ret.). “Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy.” Na-
val War College Review (January–February 1986): 2–17. (The strategy-tactics interface.
The “bottom-up” view of strategy-building.) See also his Fleet Tactics Theory and
Practice, cited in section II above; and Rear Adm. C. A. “Mark” Hill, Jr., USN (Ret.).
“Congress and the Carriers.” Wings of Gold (Spring 1987): 6–8. But cf. “In My View:
Tactical Skills.” Naval War College Review (May–June 1986): 91—“The best plans are
not those developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and tac-
ticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning is a two-way, not a one-
way, thoroughfare.”
Jampoler, Capt. Andrew. “A Central Role for Naval Forces? . . . to Support the Land Bat-
tle.” Naval War College Review (November–December 1984). (By a member of the
1983–1984 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a “sce-
nario” approach. See also fictional treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al.,
and Hayes et al., cited in sections I and II, above.)
McGruther, Cdr. Kenneth R. “Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs.” Proceedings (February 1984):
339–344. (By a former member of the Strategic Concepts Group [OP-603.] Calls for a
strategy based on defeating Soviet strategy, a “threat-based” approach. Unlike Bartlett,
however, McGruther’s approach is rooted in intentions as well as capabilities. Cf.
Vlahos chapter, cited in section I above.)
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Holloway, Adm. James L., III, USN (Ret.). “The U.S. Navy: A Functional Appraisal.”
Oceanus (Summer 1985): 3–11. (Focus on “mission” by the 1974–1978 CNO: “The
organization of fleet battle strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deploy-
ment of the U.S. Navy.”) See also Cdr. John A. “Jay” Williams, USNR. “U.S. Navy
Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Reappraisal.” Armed Forces and Society
(Summer 1981): 499–528; and Cdr. John Byron. “Sea Power: The Global Navy.” Pro-
ceedings (January 1984): 30–33. (Alternative views of the Navy’s “missions” by two of-
ficers who later contributed to The Maritime Strategy’s development. Also see
“Commentary,” Armed Forces and Society [Summer 1982]: 682–684 for official Navy
response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy development, and Williams’s
rejoinder. Williams’s updated views are in “The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and
Forces.” Armed Forces and Society [Summer 1984]: 507–528.)
Moodie, Michael, and Alvin J. Cottrell. Geopolitics and Maritime Power. Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage, 1981. (A good example of a “hedging” focus. Regards Lehman’s “major
change” as not enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Caribbean, periodic
visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific, and continuing
large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited in section X
above.)
** Froggett, Cdr. S. J. “The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk’s Role.” Proceedings (February
1987): 51–54; Rear Adm. J. W. Williams, Jr. “In My View: Cross Training,” Naval
War College Review (March–April 1985): 96–97; and Dr. Donald D. Chipman and
Maj. David Lay, USAF. “Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress.” Air University Review
(January–February 1986): 45–50. Good examples of the “technology” approach to
strategy. Focus is on one system—the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the
land-based heavy bomber; arguments on strategy are built around it. But cf. Philip A.
Taylor, “Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and Tactics.” Naval
Forces, no. 6 (1986): 44–55. (“The consensus among senior military officers is that
technology . . . has not, nor is it likely to, determine military strategy.”)
** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.). “Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal Pearl Harbor.” Naval
Forces, no. 11 (1986): 10–11. (Congressional budget actions seen as potentially disas-
trous for both the 600-ship Navy and The Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all the pitfalls of
a solely “fiscal” approach.) See also Harlan Ullman, U.S. Conventional Force Structure
at a Crossroads. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University CSIS, 1985; and the an-
nual volumes issued by the Brookings Institution and the Committee for National Se-
curity, cited in sections I–III above.
Neustadt, Richard S., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Deci-
sion-Makers. New York: Free Press, 1986. (Seeks to focus decision makers/users of the
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“historical” approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a subcategory of “decision
makers.” For example, the “cases” highlighted in section X above and in its predeces-
sor—the Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc.—can all be
profitably examined using the Neustadt-May methodology.)
XII. Makers of Modern Naval Strategy: People and Institutions
The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily—although certainly not exclu-
sively—by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national,
joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as funda-
mental “building blocks,” but great importance was also attached to long-held views of
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet
commanders in chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve)
at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.
Much of The Maritime Strategy was hardly new and would have been directly recogniz-
able to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the
late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers
and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s—for example, the 1976 National Security Coun-
cil Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman’s 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and
the Navy’s 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP 1 (Rev.
A)—were also evident in The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.
Much of what was new in The Maritime Strategy was the linked, coherent discussion of
global warfare—rather than separate service and theater operations; warfare tasks—
such as antisubmarine, anti-air, antisurface, strike, amphibious, mine, and special war-
fare—as opposed to traditional “platforms” or “unions”; the specific geopolitical prob-
lems facing the U.S. Navy—and other maritime elements—of the 1980s; and the
contemporary conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and intentions.
This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the strategy to satisfy
current global operational requirements of fleet and other force commanders over the
future requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering
common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially
junior officers, was soon felt.
While much of the robustness of The Maritime Strategy derived from its roots through-
out the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and elsewhere, both over space and over time, it
owed a high degree of its utility to its initial approval and promulgation by successive
Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs
(OPNAV.) These included especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations
for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), directors of the Strategy, Plans and Policy
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Division (OP-60), heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers
in that branch. OPNAV was the one organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy,
and to view it not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of ac-
tual current national military planning parameters.
OPNAV’s capabilities in this endeavor were due in part to the existence of the Navy
Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty education, screening, and utilization
system. This personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, had identified, trained, and
used naval officers in a network of strategists—in Washington, Newport, the fleet, and
elsewhere—for over a decade and a half by the 1980s.
Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of The Maritime Strategy and its
codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the
national security affairs community, a number of publications appeared decrying a
lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or
misunderstanding the critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff po-
sitions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.
A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos
Brooks, Captain Linton F. “An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers
as Reflected in their Professional Journal.” Naval War College Review (January–February
1980): 46–56. (A future primary contributor to the development and articulation of
The Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy profes-
sional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and
an internal professional view of the Navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited-
war fire brigade, but the period did see the publication of Rear Adm. J. C. Wylie’s
Military Strategy, Rear Adm. Henry Eccles’s Military Concepts and Philosophy, and
Adm. Joseph J. Clark’s coauthored Sea Power and Its Meaning.)
Buell, Cdr. Thomas B., USN (Ret.). “The Education of a Warrior.” Proceedings (January
1981): 40–45. Also “Comment and Discussion” (February 1981): 21; (March 1981):
15; (April 1981): 21–23; (June 1981): 77–79; (July 1981): 78–80; (August 1981): 71–
75; (November 1981): 84–87; (January 1982): 76; (March 1982): 27; (April 1982): 20.
(Posed the question: “Where will we get our future strategists?” Implied that the Navy
had no real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight “commenters
and discussants” chosen for publication by the Proceedings, only one of whom was fa-
miliar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public visibility
of true U.S. Navy strategic thought before 1981–1982.)
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Woolsey, R. James. “Mapping ‘U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s.’” International Security
(Fall 1981): 202–207. (By the 1977–1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. “The other side
of the coin.” A call to bring the “American academic intellectual establishment” and
the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of
the former on the actual “defense policy” problems of the latter, vice exclusively on
“(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear
and arms control theology.”) For similar disconnects that have occurred even within
the field of “nuclear theology” itself, see David Rosenberg, “U.S. Nuclear Strategy:
Theory vs. Practice.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1987): 20ff. (“Theorists
and consultants have had little impact on the development of nuclear weapons poli-
cies. Rather, strategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out
largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats.”)
Bruins, Berend D. “Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?” Proceedings (January 1982):
52–56. Also “Comment and Discussion” (March 1982): 27; (April 1982): 20; (May
1982): 17. (The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-
strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plans staffs, the Strategic Studies
Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers—six with
Ph.Ds.—assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for The
Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic
thinkers before 1982–1983.)
Hanks, Rear Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.). “Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?” Strategic Review
(Summer 1982): 16–22. (An outstanding OP-60 director of the 1970s challenges the
U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as
the article was published.)
Lehman, John F., Jr., “Thinking about Strategy.” Shipmate (April 1982): 18–20. (Secre-
tary of the Navy’s charge to the officer corps.)
Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr. “Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval
War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought.” National Defense (April 1983):
27–30. (Covers the resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing
the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in Washington,
through which Naval War College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strat-
egy elements.) Also see 1983 Murray article cited in section I above.
Milsted, Lt. Cdr. Charles E., Jr. “A Corps of Naval Strategists.” Master’s degree thesis.
Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. (Based on the somewhat skewed open litera-
ture available during this period. As with Bruins, above, “strategy” and “long-range
planning” not well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of specifically
educated and trained naval strategists responsible for long-range planning. Following
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his own model, Milsted was assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985; there he became a
key contributor to the codification of The Maritime Strategy. Cf. U.S. Navy. First An-
nual Long Range Planners’ Conference cited in section I above.)
Hattendorf, John et al. Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War
College. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984. (Chronicles the important sup-
porting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U.S.
Navy strategic thought. See especially 201–202, 237, 312–319.)
Crackel, Lt. Col. Theodore J., USA (Ret.). “On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels.”
Public Interest (Summer 1984): 18–30. (“The services have produced no strategic
thinkers at all.” He is especially hard on war college faculties, including the Naval War
College: “None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of development in any of
the military disciplines they teach.” Actually, no group was more in the “forefront of
development” in the “discipline” of Maritime Strategy [Secretary of the Navy, the
CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside] than the Naval
War College faculty, as evidenced by their prominence in this bibliography. Crackel is
a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy—or
policy making, and with an almost exclusively U.S. Army–oriented academic and op-
erational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategists, he has apparently
self-fulfilled his prophecy and “discovered that the think-tanks in and around Wash-
ington are a more congenial environment.”)
“413 Named as Proven Subspecialists.” Navy Times (9 September 1985): 58. (The Navy
system for identifying the “pool” of naval strategists. Results of the seventh biennial
U.S. Navy selection board that identifies “proven” subspecialists for further middle
and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval political-military/strategic plan-
ning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of the
builders of The Maritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the
“Corps of Naval Strategists” but also the Navy’s Politico-Military and Regional Affairs
experts.)
** Stavridis, Lt. Cdr. Jim. “An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval War College.” Ship-
mate (November 1985): 8. (On the role of the Naval War College in contributing to
OP-603’s codification of The Maritime Strategy and in “getting the word out” to
mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member.)
* Marryott, Rear Adm. Ronald F. “President’s Notes.” Naval War College Review (Novem-
ber–December 1985): 2–4. (By the 1985–1986 President of the Naval War College and
1983–1984 director of Strategy, Plans and Policy [OP-60], the Navy’s principal global
strategist. On development of The Maritime Strategy and the Naval War College’s vital
supporting contribution.)
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** CNA Annual Report: 1985. Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986: especially 7–
12 and 29–30. (On CNA’s contribution to the development of The Maritime Strategy
and on its use of that strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts’
views on Soviet maritime strategy.)
Davis, Capt. Vincent, USNR (Ret.). “Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some
of the Results.” In The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, edited by
Stephen Cimbala. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1986, 23–62. (A somewhat
anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with “too few thinkers,”
riven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. “Rancorous disputes
simmer among its ‘big three unions’—the carrier, submarine, and surface-warfare
admirals.” Thus the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic
politics of the ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-’80s—
despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development
of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Cf. articles by Vice Admirals Demars, Schoultz,
and Dunn—leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities—and by Lieu-
tenants Winnefeld, Peppe and Keller—the rising generation—cited in sections II and
III above.)
** Bush, Ted. “Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy.” Navy Times (10 February
1986): 45–46. (OPNAV strategists illuminate a variety of aspects of The Maritime
Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing
strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however,
that they are somehow less important.)
** Leibstone, Marvin. “U.S. Report.” Naval Forces, no. 2 (1986): 94. (Alleges “an unusually
large number of naval officers do not recognize fully the switch from ‘defense’ to ‘of-
fense’ that the Navy’s high command believes is necessary.” But cf. “The United States
Navy: On the Crest of the Wave.” The Economist [19 April 1986]: 49, cited above:
“What is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers
now believes that the first wartime job of the navy would be to sail north and fight the
Russians close to their bases.”)
** Burdick, Capt. Howard “Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval War College Faculty.”
Naval War College Review (May–June 1986): 81–89. (On the Naval War College, its
faculty, and The Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War
College.)
** Wirt, Robert T. “Strategic ASW.” Submarine Review (July 1986): 50–56. (Calls for a com-
prehensive ASW plan, driven by submariners, to support The Maritime Strategy.
Unionism was not quite dead.)
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** Metcalf, Vice Adm. Joseph. “Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy’s New Offense, Ship De-
sign and Archimedes.” Navy News and Undersea Technology (18 July 1986): 2. (The
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare views maritime strategy as of
little concern to Navy junior officers. Not a common view.)
** Gallotta, Capt. Richard USN (Ret.), et al. Assessment of Maritime Strategy Education and
Training in the Department of the Navy. McLean, Va.: BDM, 31 December 1986. (A
comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations.)
Murray, Williamson. “Grading the War Colleges.” National Interest (Winter 1986–1987):
12–19. (Antidote to Crackel. “The best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at
Newport, sets the standard by which the other war colleges should be measured.”
“The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the pre-
mier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the examination of
strategy. So high is the Naval War College’s reputation that over the course of the past
few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political
scientists in national security affairs to Newport.”)
** Clark, Charles S. “In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course for the Navy’s De-
bates.” National Journal (21 February 1987): 435. (On the role of the Proceedings in
orchestrating “some heated forensics over the Navy’s trumpeted Maritime Strategy
[while] similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official re-
straints.” The institute had come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval
War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceed-
ings were clearly at the cutting edge of The Maritime Strategy debate.)
** Tritten, Cdr. James. “New Directions.” Naval War College Review (Spring 1987): 94. (By
the chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department
and a former OP-60 staffer. On the revitalization of naval history and strategy studies
at the “PG School.”)
** Hearding, Lt. Cdr. David. “A Requiem for the Silent Service.” Submarine Review (July
1987): 73–78. (An important article, stressing the need for broader integration of U.S.
Navy submarine officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of
The Maritime Strategy.)
B. The Public Record: OP-603
The primary U.S. Navy organization charged (in 1982) with codifying, refining, and ar-
ticulating the consensus in the Navy regarding The Maritime Strategy was the OPNAV
Strategic Concepts Group, OP-603. Organized by Vice Adm. William J. Crowe (then
OP-06) and Rear Adm. Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into
an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator-
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strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence
Agency officers.
Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics—espe-
cially in comparison to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06
and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval
War College—these officers were principally responsible for the development of The
Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and al-
lied naval vision.
Like war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output was largely classified.
Nevertheless, they—and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B—often also achieved re-
spectable open-publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to
OP-60/603 reflected their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements;
their publications during and after their assignments as strategists usually reflected
their work on The Maritime Strategy. (For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this
bibliography by Rear Admirals Hanks, Marryott, and Pendley; Captains Barnett,
Brooks, Johnson, McGruther, and Swartz; Commanders Hickman, Kalb, and Milsted;
and Lieutenant Commanders Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries
below, which represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, the products of offi-
cers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify The Maritime Strategy.
These were generally the OP-603 “branch heads” and “Maritime Strategy action offi-
cers” serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breadth
of experience and depth of thought that members of the U.S. Navy’s “corps of naval
strategists” brought with them when they reported for duty.)
Weeks, Lt. Cdr. Stanley B. United States Defense Policy toward Spain, 1950–1976. Unpub-
lished PhD diss. American University, 1977; and Lt. Cdr. William S. Johnson. “Naval
Diplomacy and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East, 1921–1935,” and “De-
fense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal Navy.” Naval War
College Review (February 1972): 67–88 and (May–June 1973): 12–30. (Operators and
international relations specialists as future strategists. By the OP-60 codrafters of the
initial 1982–1983 U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony.)
Barnett, Capt. Roger W. “Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy.” In The Soviet
Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political Affairs in the 1980s, by Maj. Kenneth M.
Currie and Maj. Gregory Varhall. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1985, 581–605. (The operator and Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper
by the 1983–1984 OP-603 Branch Head.) See also his “Their Professional Journal”
(with Dr. Edward J. Lacey). Proceedings (October 1982): 95–101.
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Seaquist, Cdr. Larry. “Memorandum for the Commander. Subject: Tactical Proficiency,
and Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency.” Proceedings (July 1981): 58–61 and
(February 1983): 37–42. (The operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member
of the 1983–1984 Strategic Studies Group and 1984–1985 OP-603 branch head.)
Parker, Lt. Cdr. T. Wood. “Thinking Offensively.” Proceedings (April 1981): 26–31; “The-
ater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy.” Naval War College Review (January–February
1982): 3–16; and “Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom, and Naval Warfare.” Proceed-
ings (April 1983): 29–35. (The operator and Naval War College student as future
strategist. Three prizewinning essays by the 1984–1985 principal OP-603 Maritime
Strategy action officer.)
Daly, Capt. Thomas M., and Cdr. Albert C. Myers. “The Art of ASW.” Proceedings (Octo-
ber 1985): 164–165. (Operators and warfare specialists as strategists. The 1985–1986
OP-603 Branch Head and his primary Maritime Strategy action officer discuss their
primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq War, July
1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-bomb tests, July 1986.)
Epilogue: 1987–2003
This Epilogue is new for the fifth edition of the bibliography. It includes a short selec-
tion of the most important works on The Maritime Strategy to appear after mid-1987,
the cutoff time for entries to the third edition.
The listing of entries in the new epilogue is nowhere near as comprehensive in its cov-
erage as the listing of entries in the earlier editions of this bibliography. Also, the epi-
logue includes a few important but narrowly focused entries that in earlier editions
would have been subsumed under specialized sections of the publication rather than
listed with the more general works.
Ellmann, Ellingsen, ed. NATO and U.S. Maritime Strategy: Diverging Interests or Coopera-
tive Effort. Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1987. (Contains an important set of
graphics used by SacLant to explain The Maritime Strategy and its ties to NATO
strategy.)
Kalb, Commander Richard W. “United States Maritime Strategy: Strengthening NATO’s
Deterrent Capability.” Atlantic Community Quarterly, no. 25 (Spring 1987): 98–103.
(By one of The Maritime Strategy’s many conceptualizers in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations [OP-603].)
Friedman, Norman. The US Maritime Strategy. London and New York: Jane’s, 1988. (An
initial comprehensive look by a naval analyst close to the staffs of the Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations.)
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Palmer, Michael A. Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First
Postwar Decade. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy,
1988. (Finds roots of the thinking behind The Maritime Strategy in the immediate
post–World War II years.)
Lehman, John F. Jr. Command of the Seas. New York: Scribner’s, 1988. (Memoirs of the
Secretary of the Navy who catalyzed the Navy’s Maritime Strategy efforts and much
else. A second edition, published by the U.S. Naval Institute in 2001, contains a pref-
ace and an afterword with his post–Cold War views.)
Hattendorf, John B. “The Evolution of The Maritime Strategy: 1977–1987.” Naval War
College Review 41, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 7–28; reprinted with corrections in
Hattendorf, Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays. Malabar, Fla.:
Krieger, 2000, 201–228. (How the Maritime Strategy was created, by a preeminent
historian of naval strategy. Extracted for open publication from the more comprehen-
sive classified study, originally commissioned by the Office of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations [OP-603] to record the process.)
Gray, Colin S., and Roger W. Barnett, eds. Seapower and Strategy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1989. (A textbook on maritime strategy heavily influenced by The
Maritime Strategy.)
Chernavin, Fleet Adm. Vladimir Nikolayevich. “Chernavin Responds.” Proceedings (Feb-
ruary 1989). The commander in chief of the Soviet Navy presents his views on The
Maritime Strategy to a largely Western naval audience.
Winnefeld, Lt. Cdr. James A., Jr. “Winning the Outer Air Battle.” Proceedings (August
1989): 37–43. (An example of the influence of The Maritime Strategy on thoughtful
middle-grade U.S. naval officers of the period.)
Hartmann, Frederick H. Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1990. The Maritime Strategy and its context from the point of
view of the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins.
Perla, Peter P. The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1990. (This book, by the dean of naval war-game thinkers,
culminates years of analysis of war gaming—one of the chief tools the Navy used to
validate The Maritime Strategy.)
Grove, Eric. The Future of Sea Power. London: Routledge, 1990. (Heavily influenced by
the author’s exposure to and analysis of The Maritime Strategy.)
Golightly, Lieutenant Neil L. “Correcting Three Strategic Mistakes.” Proceedings (April
1990): 32–38. (As the world changes, a thoughtful junior officer challenges The
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Maritime Strategy and its premises. A good example of the high level of internal de-
bate that The Maritime Strategy had engendered by then in the fleet [and of
eye-catching photography].)
FitzGerald, Mary C. “The Soviet Navy: Roles, Doctrines and Missions.” In The U.S. Stake
in Naval Arms Control, by Barry M. Blechman et al. Washington, D.C.: Henry L.
Stimson Center, October 1990, 109–192. (An American Sovietologist describes and
analyzes the public Soviet reaction to The Maritime Strategy.)
Oswald, Adm. Sir Julian. “NATO’s Naval Forces Must Endure.” Proceedings (November
1990): 35–38. (The Royal Navy’s Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord—a longtime
advocate—weighs in heavily for the maintenance of a forward allied maritime
strategy.)
Tamnes, Rolf. The United States and the Cold War in the High North. Aldershot, U.K.:
Dartmouth, 1991. (An excellent analysis of the evolution of U.S. naval strategy on the
northern flank of NATO.)
Grove, Eric, with Graham Thompson. Battle for the Fiords: NATO’s Forward Maritime
Strategy in Action. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991. (Exercising The Mari-
time Strategy and NATO’s Concept of Maritime Operations [ConMarOps] in the
Norwegian Sea.)
Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett, III, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank
B. Kelso, II, and Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps General A. M. Gray. “The Way
Ahead.” Proceedings (April 1991): 36–47. (The first formal and public attempt by the
U.S. Navy’s leadership to replace The Maritime Strategy with a concept more in keep-
ing with the times, noting that “The Maritime Strategy . . . remains on the shelf.” With
The Maritime Strategy as precedent, the Naval Institute also published this article as
an individual supplement.)
Hegmann, Richard. “Reconsidering the Evolution of the U.S. Maritime Strategy 1955–
1965.” Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (September 1991): 299–336. (Demonstrates that
offensive forward operations characterized U.S. Navy strategic thinking throughout
the Cold War, not just at its beginning and its end.)
O’Rourke, Ronald. “The Future of the U.S. Navy.” In Fifty Years of Canada–United
States Defense Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg, edited by Joel J. Sokolsky
and Joseph T. Jockel. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1992, 289–331. (An informed as-
sessment of the U.S. Navy at the end of The Maritime Strategy era by the leading con-
gressional staff naval analyst of the period.)
T H E M A R I T I M E S T R A T E G Y D E B A T E S 2 7 5
Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York:
Dell, 1992. (A leading U.S. Army thinker argues that The Maritime Strategy prepared
the Navy well for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.)
Rosenberg, David A. “Process: The Realities of Formulating Modern Naval Strategy.” In
Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian
Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, edited by James Goldrick and John B.
Hattendorf. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993, 141–175. (Analyzes the
various strands that made up The Maritime Strategy efforts of the 1980s.)
Brooks, Ambassador Linton F. Peacetime Influence through Forward Naval Presence. Alex-
andria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, October 1993. An analysis of the element of
the Cold War Maritime Strategy that would emerge as the centerpiece of immediate
post–Cold War U.S. Navy strategic thought.
Crowe, Adm. William J. Jr. (Ret.), with David Chanoff. The Line of Fire. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1993, 279–287. (A former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff—and only a tepid supporter of The Maritime Strategy—recounts the great fear
of U.S. Navy offensive capabilities engendered by 1988 in Marshal of the Soviet Union
Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff.)
Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994. (A leading Naval War College historian and
strategist sees The Maritime Strategy as a culmination of a century of American naval
thought.)
Jan S. Breemer, “The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of
American Naval Power.” Strategic Review 22 (Spring 1994): 40–53. (Sees The Mari-
time Strategy as the high-water mark of blue-water Mahanian thinking.)
Vistica, Gregory L. Fall from Glory: The Men Who Sank the U.S. Navy. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1995. (Full of useful details on the evolution of The Maritime Strategy,
largely misinterpreted by the author.)
Brooks, Rear Adm. Tom (Ret.), and Capt. Bill Manthorpe (Ret.). “Setting the Record
Straight: A Critical Review of Fall from Glory.” Naval Intelligence Professionals Quar-
terly, no. 12 (April 1996): 1–2. This ostensible book review is a brief but important de-
scription of the role played by intelligence analysis in shaping The Maritime
Strategy—a role seldom discussed in public.
Small, Admiral William N. (Ret.). Oral History: Interview by David F. Winkler. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Oral History Program, Naval Historical Center, 1997. (Candid accounts of
naval policy and strategy making by one of the major architects of The Maritime
Strategy.)
2 7 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Gaffney, H. H., et al. U.S. Naval Responses to Situations, 1970–1999. Alexandria, Va.: Cen-
ter for Naval Analyses, December 2000. (Shows that while the focus of U.S. Navy
Maritime Strategy plans and exercises may have been in the North Atlantic and North
Pacific during the 1980s, the focus of its actual operations in response to real-world
crises and situations was in the Middle East.)
Cote, Owen R., Jr. The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Strug-
gle with Soviet Submarines. Newport Papers 16. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
Press, 2003. (The best public analysis to date of U.S. Navy forward submarine strat-
egy, plans, and operations—a key element of The Maritime Strategy.)
Swartz, Capt. Peter M. (Ret.). “Preventing the Bear’s Last Swim: The NATO Concept of
Maritime Operations (ConMarOps) of the Last Cold War Decade.” In NATO’s Mari-
time Power 1949–1990. Piraeus, Greece: European Institute of Maritime Studies and
Research (INMER), 2003: 47–61. (Traces the development and dissemination of
NATO’s complementary maritime strategic concept.)
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Time Line
The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime
Strategy in the Context of Major Political
and Military Events of the Cold War,
1964–1991
Yuri M. Zhukov
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SOVIET UNION UNITED STATES
1964 14 January: The project 1123 helicopter-
carrying antisubmarine cruiser Moskva is
launched; her sister ship, Leningrad, is
laid down several months later in the
Nikolayev Shipyard on the Black Sea.
25 July: Soviet Navy commander in chief
Sergei Gorshkov announces that Soviet
SSNs have operated in distant ocean re-
gions, including equatorial waters and
beneath the Arctic ice.
2 August: President Lyndon Johnson or-
ders immediate retaliation for the attack
on U.S. destroyers Maddox (DD-731)
and Turner Joy (DD-951) in the Gulf of
Tonkin, allegedly by North Vietnamese
forces.
15 October: Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei
Kosygin replace Nikita Khruschev as Gen-
eral Secretary of the Communist Party
and Soviet Prime Minister, respectively.
16 October: The People’s Republic of China detonates its first atomic bomb.
3 November: Johnson is elected
President.
1965 17 February: Former Chief of General
Staff, Marshall Vasilii Sokolovskii, declares
that the Soviet Union has achieved “vir-
tual parity” with U.S. in nuclear-powered
submarines and (for the first time) a
smaller overall strength of armed forces:
2,423,000 Soviets vs. 2,690,000 Ameri-
cans in uniform.
18 February: Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara reveals plans to terminate
Atlantic and Pacific radar barrier patrols
in an annual report to Congress.
February–May: Operation SILVER LANCE,
one of the largest-ever peacetime joint
Naval/Marine Corps training exercises, is
launched off the California coast, testing
the mobility and strike capabilities of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet; over 50 ships and
65,000 personnel participate.
15 April: U.S. Naval and Marine Corps
aircraft join the U.S. Army and Air Force,
and the South Vietnamese Air Force in
bombarding Viet Cong positions in
South Vietnam.
21–26 June: The Warsaw Pact War
Game of 1965 is held; recently declassi-
fied documents show that its planners
had access, through Warsaw Pact spies,
to NATO’s top-secret plans for war; the
plans also presumed the destruction of
Budapest and other Eastern European
cities by NATO nuclear bombs, and dis-
played a preparedness to ignore the neu-
trality of Austria on the assumption that
NATO would ignore it as well.
16 December: The R-36 Mod-3 inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM),
known in the West as the SS-9 Scarp/
FOBS, is flight-tested; the missile had
been allegedly developed to strike U.S.
Minuteman ICBM Launch Control Cen-
ters, then the “Achilles heel” of the
Minuteman system.
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SOVIET UNION UNITED STATES
1966 21 January: The state TASS news
agency announces that a Soviet fishing
flotilla has entered the Gulf of California
for an experimental fishing expedition.
21 January: Two U.S. 6th Fleet destroy-
ers conduct training exercises in Black
Sea; Moscow condemns activities as
“suspicious muscle flexing.”
10 March: French President Charles de
Gaulle announces his country’s intention
to withdraw from NATO.
1 May: The Office of Naval Material and
the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and
Medicine are placed under the direct
command of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), as the Department of the
Navy is reorganized into a unilinear
framework.
31 July: The project 1123 helicopter car-
rier Leningrad (Moskva-class) is launched.
1967 27 January: The Outer Space Treaty, signed by the U.S., USSR, and 60 other nations,
limits military uses of space.
2 February: Navy Secretary Paul Nitze
announces that all strategic naval war-
fare activities have been placed under
the authority of the Office of the CNO.
5 June: The “Six Day” Arab-Israeli War begins as Israel launches a massive air strike
against air bases in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan; an Israeli ground offensive into Sinai,
Gaza, and the Golan Heights immediately follows.
June: Soviet naval force strength in the
Mediterranean reaches 70 ships, includ-
ing 2 cruisers, 15 destroyers, and 10 sub-
marines, in support of Egypt and Syria
during the “Six Day” Arab-Israeli War;
the Soviet 5th Eskadra (Mediterranean
Squadron) is formally established by the
end of the month.
June: Significant U.S. Navy (USN) forces
deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean
and Red Sea in support of Israel during
“Six Day” Arab-Israeli War.
July: The helicopter-carrying project
1123 antisubmarine cruiser Moskva en-
ters into service.
1 September: Paul R. Ignatius is sworn
in as Secretary of the Navy.
1 August: Admiral Thomas Moorer is
appointed as CNO.
October: Admiral Gorshkov is promoted
to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet
Union, a rank corresponding to that of
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
16 October: A new NATO political
headquarters is formally opened in
Brussels.
5 November: The Soviet Navy commis-
sions the first of 34 project 667A SSBNs
(Yankee-class), the K-137; this is the So-
viet Union’s first “modern” strategic mis-
sile submarine, fitted with 16 SS-N-6
Serb ballistic missiles.
December: The NATO Defense Planning
Committee approves the Standing Naval
Force Atlantic, to be implemented in
January 1968.
1968 22 January: North Korean patrol boats
fire upon the U.S. intelligence collection
ship Pueblo (AGER-2) and imprison its
crew, after the latter had entered the
country’s territorial waters.
April: The Soviet Navy signs a five-year
basing agreement with Egypt.
1 July: The Non-proliferation Treaty on Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is signed by represen-
tatives from over 60 countries.
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August: Warsaw Pact forces invade
Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague
Spring, a socialist reform movement led
by Czechoslovak President Alexander
Dubcek.
1969 20 January: Richard Nixon is inaugu-
rated as the 37th President of the
United States; Melvin R. Laird is sworn in
as Secretary of Defense on 22 January,
and John H. Chafee is sworn in as Secre-
tary of the Navy on 31 January.
March: The U.S. and South Vietnamese
bombing of Cambodia begins.
28 May: NATO establishes the Naval
On-Call Force Mediterranean.
20 July: Neil Armstrong and Edward
“Buzz” Aldrin walk on the moon.
August–September: Joint Soviet-
Egyptian-Syrian naval exercises in the
southeastern Mediterranean coincide
with a successful military coup in Libya,
led by Muammar Khadaffi.
4 October: Admiral Moorer establishes
the Underwater Long-range Missile Sys-
tem, later renamed the Trident missile
program.
1970 5 March: The NPT goes into force.
20 March: The first NATO military com-
munications satellite, NATO 1, is
launched from Cape Kennedy, Florida.
16 April: The U.S. and Soviet governments begin Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ne-
gotiations in Vienna.
April: Worldwide OKEAN exercises are
held, the largest peacetime naval opera-
tion in history; over 200 surface ships
and submarines and hundreds of
land-based aircraft take part. Exercises
include anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
anti-carrier, amphibious assault, and
other operations in Northern, Pacific, and
Mediterranean Fleet areas, and in the In-
dian Ocean.
29 April: U.S. and South Vietnamese
ground invasion of Cambodia begins.
1 July: The incoming CNO, Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, claims that the U.S. has
only a 45–55% chance of winning a
conventional war with the Soviet Union.
3 August: USS James Madison
(SSBN-627) carries out the first under-
water launch of a Poseidon C-3 missile.
September: The project 1143 Kiev air-
craft carrier, the largest Soviet warship
yet, at a displacement of 43,000 tons, is
laid down in the Nikolayev Shipyard.
23 September: Admiral Zumwalt estab-
lishes the CNO Executive Panel, assigned
with task of providing a “clear under-
standing of the navy’s mission.”
1971 11 February: U.S. and Soviet representatives sign the Seabed Arms Control Treaty,
banning the intentional placement of nuclear weapons on ocean floor.
5 March: Admiral Zumwalt establishes
the posts of Deputy CNO for Air, Sur-
face, and Submarine activities.
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18 March: Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard tells the House Appropri-
ations Defense subcommittee that the
USSR has achieved “rough overall par-
ity” with the U.S. in strategic nuclear
weapons.
19 April: Moscow launches the world’s
first orbiting space research station, the
unmanned Salyut 1.
March–May: The USS James Madison
SSBN holds its first patrol.
August: The Minuteman III ICBM, with
a multiple warhead capacity, enters ser-
vice in United States.
September–December: Full-endurance
trials are held on the first titanium-hulled
submarine, the project 661 cruise missile-
equipped K-162 (Papa-class); the boat
achieves a world-record underwater
speed of 44.7 knots.
15 September: President Nixon alleg-
edly authorizes the U.S.-backed coup in
Chile.
November: The Soviet Diplomatic Lexi-
con, edited by Foreign Minister Alexei
Gromyko, demands that the Baltic Sea
be closed to naval units of all non-Baltic
powers.
2 November: The first U.S. Defense Sat-
ellite Communications System Phase II
(DSCS II) satellites are launched.
15 November: The People’s Republic of China joins the United Nations (UN).
December: The first high-speed,
deep-diving project 705 nuclear subma-
rine (Alfa-class) is completed; the proto-
type has extensive technical problems.
1972 February: Admiral Gorshkov publishes
the first in a series of eleven articles in
Morskoi Sbornik, bearing the earmarks
of a new naval doctrine; he emphasizes
Russia’s destiny as a maritime power, the
primarily defensive role of navy, the role
of deterrence in wartime, the protection
of SSBNs, and “coercive naval
diplomacy.”
4 May: John W. Warner is sworn in as
Secretary of the Navy.
22 May: Nixon arrives in Moscow, becoming the first U.S. President to visit the USSR.
25 May: Admiral Gorshkov and U.S. Navy Secretary John Warner sign the Incidents
at Sea Agreement in Moscow, seeking to reduce the number of accidents between
the two navies.
26 May: An interim Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement on the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems is signed in Moscow, restricting ABM develop-
ment and freezing the numbers of ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) in commission for a period of five years.
29 May: The “Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and the USSR” agree-
ment is signed by Nixon and Brezhnev, recognizing the Soviet Union as the primary
military-political policeman of Eastern Europe, widening economic relations between
the two countries, and marking the beginning of a new bilateral policy of “détente.”
18 July: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
orders the immediate withdrawal of So-
viet military advisers from Egypt and
places Soviet air bases under exclusive
Egyptian control.
17 June: The Watergate burglars break
into the Democratic Party’s National
Committee offices.
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September: NATO conducts its largest
land, sea, and air exercise to date, Oper-
ation STRONG EXPRESS, involving more
than 50,000 personnel and 300 ships
from eleven nations, including NATO
nonmember France.
14 October: The U.S. and USSR sign a three-year agreement to open 40 ports in
each nation to visits by civilian-manned ships from each country.
November: The Yak-36M Vertical/Short
Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft is
tested on the Moskva cruiser, marking
the first time a plane successfully lands
aboard a Soviet ship; the Yak-36 and its
successor, the Yak-38, were designed to
support submarines against NATO ASW
operations after sea-based helicopters
were deemed unfit for the task.
15 November: U.S.-Soviet SALT II talks begin in Geneva.
26 December: The Kiev aircraft carrier is
launched; another ship of its class, the
Minsk aircraft carrier (project 1143) is
laid down in the Nikolayev Shipyard.
17–31 December: The U.S. launches
the Linebacker II bombing of Hanoi and
North Vietnam.
1973 27 January: The U.S.-Vietnamese
cease-fire goes into effect.
11 May: The NATO Standing Naval
Force Channel is activated, later re-
named Mine Countermeasures Force
Northern Europe.
17 May: Formal diplomatic relations are opened between East and West Germany.
2 July: James R. Schlesinger is sworn in
as Secretary of Defense; he will become
an advocate of a 575-ship naval force.
3–7 July: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is opened
in Helsinki.
10 August: The last USN submarine in
the Atlantic-Mediterranean area fitted
with the Polaris missile, the USS Robert E.
Lee (SSBN-601), is transferred to the
Pacific.
17 August: Schlesinger announces that
the Multiple Independently Targetable Re-
entry Vehicle (MIRV) warhead system, sim-
ilar to those of the United States, has been
successfully tested by the Soviet Union.
6 October: Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack against Israel on two fronts, in-
citing the “Yom Kippur” Arab-Israeli War.
October–November: Soviet 5th Eskadra
(Mediterranean Squadron) force strength
grows to 96 ships during “Yom Kippur”
Arab-Israeli War, as the Soviet Navy con-
ducts massive air and sea-lift operations
in support of Egypt and Syria.
13 October: The U.S. Air Force begins
an airlift of munitions to Israel to offset
the Soviet resupply effort to Egypt and
Syria during “Yom Kippur” Arab-Israeli
War.
24 October: Brezhnev threatens unilat-
eral Soviet intervention in the Middle
East to enforce a UN-brokered Arab-
Israeli cease-fire, prompting Washington
to place its armed forces on global nu-
clear alert.
24 October: Nixon orders a heightened
readiness posture for the U.S. armed
forces worldwide to Defense Condition
Three (DEFCON 3) in response to Soviet
threats of intervention in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
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25 October–3 November: The 5th
Eskadra launches intense anti-carrier ex-
ercises in Mediterranean, using actual
U.S. ships as live targets.
19 November: The Department of De-
fense announces that the U.S. 6th (Med-
iterranean) Fleet has been taken off
alert.
1974 10 January: Secretary Schlesinger an-
nounces plans to improve the accuracy
of long-range missiles and to retarget
them against select Soviet military, in-
dustrial, and civilian targets.
9 April: The first Soviet supertanker, the
150,500 deadweight ton Krym, is
launched in the Black Sea.
8 April: J. William Middendorf is sworn
in as Secretary of the Navy.
24 April: Anwar Sadat announces that
Egypt will stop relying on Soviet arms in
the interest of curtailing Soviet influence
over his country’s domestic politics.
21 July: Brezhnev proposes a withdrawal
of all U.S. and Soviet nuclear-armed na-
val forces from the Mediterranean.
29 June: Admiral James L. Holloway III is
appointed CNO.
9 August: Nixon resigns, hands presi-
dency over to Vice President Gerald Ford.
14 August: Greece withdraws its armed
forces from the integrated military struc-
ture of NATO.
September: A compilation of Admiral Gorshkov’s 1972–1973 Morskoi Sbornik arti-
cles is published in translation by the Naval Institute Press, titled Red Star Rising at
Sea.
23 November: During a conference with
Gerald Ford in Vladivostok, over the
course of which the U.S. and USSR sign
an agreement placing limits on ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers, Brezhnev
announces the construction of the
Tayfun-class strategic missile submarine
as a response to the U.S.Trident subma-
rine program.
1975 22 January: President Ford signs the
Geneva Protocol, prohibiting use of
chemical weapons in war.
April–May: First factory tests of the pro-
ject 1143 Kiev aircraft carrier are held;
two Yak-36M VSTOL planes land on its
deck.
April: Greece and the U.S. agree to
close the U.S. Air Force base near Ath-
ens and end an agreement providing
home port facilities to U.S. 6th Fleet.
April: Worldwide OKEAN 75 exercises are
held, involving 220 ships in antisubmarine
maneuvers, sea-lane interdiction, convoy
escort, amphibious landings, and long-
range aviation missions.
May: The project 1143 Minsk aircraft
carrier is launched.
3 May: The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier
(CVN 68), the first nuclear-powered attack
carrier designated for series production, is
placed in commission in Norfolk, Va.
7 May: The first U.S.-Soviet warship visits are held in Leningrad and Boston.
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14 June: Vice Admiral Thomas Hayward
is appointed Commander of the U.S. 7th
Fleet (Western Pacific); over next two
years, he develops the Sea Strike Strat-
egy, promoting a central role for the Pa-
cific Fleet in offensive naval war plans
designed to distract the Soviets from the
European front.
29 May: Beijing claims that Moscow has
asked Saigon for use of the former U.S.
naval base in Cam Rahn Bay in compen-
sation for the Soviet aid delivered during
the Vietnam War.
2 July: Schlesinger announces that the
U.S. might consider a nuclear first-strike
against select Soviet targets in some war
scenarios.
1 August: The United States and Soviet Union sign the CSCE Helsinki Accords,
pledging to accept European borders, protect human rights, and promote freer trans-
national trade and cultural exchanges.
November: The project 1143
Novorossiisk aircraft carrier is laid down
in the Nikolayev Shipyard.
20 November: Donald H. Rumsfeld is
sworn in as Secretary of Defense; he will
set the long-term naval force goal at
600 ships.
2 December: Ex-CNO Zumwalt accuses
the USSR of gross violations of the 1972
strategic arms limitation agreement in a
testimony to the House Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence.
December: The USSR and Cuba increase
assistance to rebel forces in Angola with
military advisers, equipment, and troops.
1976 Admiral Gorshkov’s Sea Power of the
State book is published by Voenizdat in
the USSR this year; an English translation
is published in the West by Oxford’s
Pergamon Press in 1979.
24 January: The U.S. agrees to with-
draw its Poseidon submarines from
Rota, Spain, by 1979; the submarine
support facility begins moving to King’s
Bay, Ga., on 1 January 1979.
16 February: The House Intelligence
Committee learns that U.S. SSBNs have
collided with nine Soviet vessels in So-
viet territorial waters over preceding
decade.
26 March: U.S. agrees to give Turkey
$1 billion in military aid in exchange for
basing rights; a similar agreement is
signed with Greece on15 April.
April: Anwar Sadat cancels Soviet Navy
access to Egyptian ports.
April: The keel of the first Trident stra-
tegic missile submarine, USS Ohio (SSBN
726), is laid down in Groton, Conn.
28 May: U.S. and Soviet officials sign the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET),
limiting underground explosions and allowing U.S. inspections of some Soviet nuclear
tests.
July: Moscow cancels further U.S. port visits by sail training ships, following alleged
poor treatment of crews in Newport, RI.
July: Kiev’s first tour of duty begins in
the Mediterranean Sea after it passes
through the Turkish Straits despite
Montreux Treaty restrictions on aircraft
carriers; it is subsequently reassigned to
the Northern Fleet.
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27 September: Secretary Rumsfeld an-
nounces at a press conference that the
Soviet nuclear buildup reflects an inten-
tion to win, not deter, a nuclear war.
FY1976: Total U.S defense spending for
this fiscal year is 24.8% of federal total;
the lowest since 1940.
1977 January: A new National Intelligence
Estimate, prepared with the participa-
tion of ex–Navy Secretary Paul Nitze,
states that the USSR is striving for mili-
tary superiority, not parity, with the
United States.
14 January: The 6th and 7th Fleets be-
come home to all-nuclear-propelled task
groups for the first time.
20 January: Jimmy Carter is sworn in as
the 39th U.S. President; Harold Brown is
sworn in as Secretary of Defense the fol-
lowing day; he will set the long-term
U.S. naval force goal at 425–500 ships.
14 February: W. Graham Claytor, Jr., is
sworn in as Secretary of the Navy.
14 April: A Tu-20 Bear naval surveillance
plane flying near Charleston, S.C. carries
out the closest flight by a Soviet aircraft
to the U.S. East Coast ever recorded.
June: U.S.-Soviet talks on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean begin in Moscow.
17 August: The Soviet nuclear ice-
breaker Arktika becomes first surface
ship to ever break through the ice to the
North Pole.
7 September: President Carter and Pan-
amanian President Omar Torrijos sign
treaties guaranteeing the neutrality of
the Panama Canal in event of war, and
agree to hand control of Canal over to
Panama by 31 December 1999.
3 October: The SALT I agreement expires.
27 October: The USN admits to the
highest desertion rate in its history dur-
ing FY1977: 31.7 desertions per 1,000
enlisted personnel.
13 November: Somalia cancels Soviet
use of its naval facilities, orders Soviet
advisers to leave the country, and breaks
off relations with Cuba.
1978 February: The project 1143.4 Baku air-
craft carrier is laid down in the Nikolayev
Black Sea shipyard.
1 February: The first successful Toma-
hawk missile launch by a submerged
submarine is carried out by the USS Barb
(SSN-596) off the Californian coast.
March: The Sea Plan 2000 study com-
pleted; it predicts substantial constraints
on U.S. naval power and flexibility over
next 30 years; prescribes a shift to offen-
sive mode to draw Soviet resources
away from threatening Western sea-
lanes; the U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice will criticize Sea Plan 2000 in 1979
for being short-sighted and based on
unrealistic funding assumptions.
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30 May: Signaling an end to détente,
Carter recommends to NATO to mod-
ernize and increase the alliance’s military
forces.
1 July: Admiral Thomas B. Hayward is
appointed CNO.
17 August: Carter vetoes the FY1979
$36.9 billion defense bill, citing the in-
clusion in the bill of a $2 billion nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier as the motive
for the veto; Congress overrides the veto
on 7 September.
31 August: The 1978–1979 Military
Balance, published by the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, states that
NATO no longer has the capacity to ex-
ert sea control in all areas of importance
to the alliance at the start of a NATO–
Warsaw Pact war.
29 September: The Baltimore Sun re-
ports that a floating drydock, built by a
Japanese shipyard to service Kiev-class
aircraft carriers, is set for delivery to
Vladivostok.
17 September: The Camp David Peace
Accords are signed by Presidents Carter
and Sadat and by Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin, calling for the return
of Sinai to Egypt and the withdrawal of
Israeli troops and settlements.
20 October: Carter signs the 1979 De-
fense Authorization Act, making the
Commandant of the Marine Corps a full
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS).
17 November: The first Soviet warship
to visit Turkey in 40 years, the project
70-E cruiser Dzerzhinskii docks at Istan-
bul with the Black Sea Fleet Commander
aboard.
14 November: GulfEx 79, an Atlantic
Fleet exercise involving 20,000 Air Force,
Navy, and Coast Guard personnel and
almost 300 aircraft, begins in the Gulf of
Mexico and western Caribbean.
December: The project 1143
Novorossiisk aircraft carrier is launched.
1979 1 January: The United States and the
People’s Republic of China restore full
diplomatic relations.
January: Admiral Hayward and his Ex-
ecutive Assistant, Captain William
Cockell, circulate the CNO Strategic
Concepts memo, promoting greater
force levels as part of a worldwide
strategy capitalizing on Moscow’s de-
fensive mentality; Hayward briefs Con-
gress, JCS, and others on his strategic
concepts.
16 January: The Shah of Iran, Mohammed
Reza Pahlevi, flees his country as ten-
sions there escalate.
22 January: Carter allocates $6.1 billion
from his FY1980 budget for 15 new
Navy ships, including a $1.5 billion con-
ventional aircraft carrier (which is ulti-
mately never built).
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March: Soviet warships arrive at former
U.S. bases of Da Nang and Cam Rahn
Bay, Vietnam; two Tu-20 Bear reconnais-
sance aircraft land at Cam Rahn Bay the
following month.
10 April: The first submerged launch of
a Trident C-4 missile is carried out off
the Floridian coast by the USS Francis
Scott Key (SSBN 657).
15 May: Two Soviet maritime patrol
planes fly dangerously close to the USS
Midway aircraft carrier (CV 41) in the
Arabian Sea, prompting U.S. protests un-
der the Incidents at Sea Agreement.
12 May: The Solid Shield 79 exercise
unfolds in the Atlantic with the partici-
pation of over 19,000 Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marine Corps personnel;
Dawn Patrol 79, an eight-nation NATO
Allied Southern Command exercise be-
gins with nonmembers Greece and
France taking part.
18 June: The SALT II agreement is signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, al-
though it will be rejected by the U.S. Congress.
1 September: U.S. Department of State
confirms intelligence reports that 2,000–
3,000 Soviet troops remain in Cuba.
8 September: Soviet general intelligence
vessels (AGIs) operate some 35 nautical
miles off the California coast, the closest
distance in years.
September: Two major NATO exercises
begin: Display Determination 79 in the
Mediterranean and Ocean Safari 79 in
the Atlantic; Kernel Potlatch, a joint
U.S.-Canadian exercise, begins in the
northeastern Pacific, involving an am-
phibious landing on Vancouver Island.
10 September: Moscow signs an agree-
ment with Greece for repairs of Soviet
merchant and naval auxiliary vessels at
the state-owned Neorion Shipyard; the
first ships arrive for repairs at the Greek
Island Siros on 6 October.
1 October: Carter announces the cre-
ation of the Caribbean Joint Task Force
Headquarters in Key West, Fla., as a re-
sponse to the continuing Soviet troop
presence in Cuba; 1,800 U.S. Marines
land in Guantánamo Bay two weeks
later as a show of force.
20 October: USS Francis Scott Key be-
gins its first deterrent patrol with Trident
C-4 missiles.
24 October: Edward Hidalgo is sworn in
as Secretary of the Navy.
4 November: Iranian student revolu-
tionaries storm the U.S. Embassy in Iran,
taking 66 hostages.
November: CrisEx 79, a joint U.S.-Spanish
exercise, is held, involving a Marine
landing on the Spanish coast on 4 No-
vember; Canus Marcor 79, a joint U.S.-
Canadian exercise begins in the North
Atlantic on 8 November.
1 December: The U.S. Department of
Energy reveals that 75% of Polaris A-1
ballistic missiles would not have func-
tioned in the mid-1960s due to a me-
chanical defect.
12 December: The deployment of hun-
dreds of Pershing II launchers and ground-
launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to
Western Europe is announced by NATO
ministers, as a response to domestic de-
ployments of SS-20 intermediate-range
nuclear missiles by Moscow.
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27 December: Soviet Speznaz comman-
dos begin invasion of Afghanistan with a
strike on the presidential compound in
Kabul; in light of the invasion, the U.S.
responds with sanctions, a grain em-
bargo, decreased scientific and cultural
exchanges, and a boycott of the 1980
Moscow Olympic Games.
1980 1 January: The NATO Airborne Early
Warning Force is established under
Allied Command Europe.
January: Admiral Hayward establishes
the Long Range Planning Group
(OP-00X) as a permanent fixture on
CNO’s staff; the group’s primary mission
is to assess resource limitations on fu-
ture naval capabilities.
February: Somalia, Kenya, and Oman
agree to permit U.S. access to their na-
val and air bases.
26 February: RimPac 80, the first of the
year’s many major naval exercises be-
gins, this one a joint exercise with Can-
ada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan
in the Pacific; Display Determination 80,
a seven-nation NATO exercise involving
nonmember France, begins in the Medi-
terranean on 29 September; Beacon
Compass, a joint Ango-American exer-
cise, begins in the Indian Ocean on 20
October.
7 April: U.S. breaks off diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran; the Maritime Preposition-
ing Ship concept is launched the same
day with Secretary Brown’s announce-
ment that seven U.S. ships will be de-
ployed to the Indian Ocean with military
equipment for contingency use by the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.
29 May: The JCS announce that
Carter’s FY1981 defense budget is insuf-
ficient to counter Soviet advances.
July: The announcement of increases in
meat prices sparks a wave of protests in
Poland.
28 August: A memorandum from the
Central Committee of the Soviet Com-
munist Party orders the Soviet Army to
“requisition up to 100,000 military re-
servists and 15,000 vehicles from the ci-
vilian economy” and to place all regular
units in military districts and Groups of
Forces adjoining Poland on “full combat
alert.”
22 August: Secretary Brown announces
major developments in stealth aviation
technology.
4 September: Iran-Iraq war begins.
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22 September: Solidarity, an indepen-
dent and popularly-based trade union
that would come to rival the Communist
Party for political power, is formed in Po-
land under the leadership of Lech
Walesa.
12 October: In testimony to Congress,
Navy Under Secretary Robert Murray
states that the USN is projected to suffer
a severe shortfall in submarine officers
in the following year.
9 December: In response to a Soviet
troop buildup in Poland, four U.S. Air
Force E-3A Airborne Warning and Con-
trol System aircraft are deployed to West
Germany.
30 December: The project 1144 nuclear-
powered missile cruiser Kirov, the largest
nonaircraft/helicopter carrier warship
built since World War II, is
commissioned.
1981 20 January: Ronald Reagan is sworn in
as the 40th President of the United
States; Caspar Weinberger is sworn in as
Secretary of Defense; Iran frees 52 Em-
bassy hostages after 444 days.
26 January: Lech Walesa leads Polish
workers in a week-long illegal strike.
5 February: John Lehman is sworn in as
Secretary of the Navy, declares in testi-
mony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the U.S. must reestab-
lish maritime superiority over the USSR,
calling for a 600-ship navy with 15 air-
craft carriers; Test Gate 81, a NATO ex-
ercise, begins the same day in the
western Mediterranean.
4 March: Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger announces a $57.8 billion
defense budget for FY1981 and a $70.8
billion budget for FY1982, with propos-
als for extensive navy shipbuilding
programs.
April: Admiral Hayward announces
plans for a Center for Naval Warfare
Studies (CNWS) at the Naval War Col-
lege (NWC), to serve as the center for
strategic naval planning; the CNWS is
established on 1 July.
12 April: The space shuttle Columbia
carries out its maiden orbital flight and
successfully lands on a flight strip, thus
obviating the need for ocean recovery of
manned spacecraft by the USN.
1 May: The Solid Shield 81 exercise be-
gins in the Atlantic with the participa-
tion of over 27,000 personnel.
16 May: The U.S. Seventh Fleet Com-
mander accuses the Soviet cruiser
Petropavlovsk of slicing through the
nets of a Japanese fishing vessel,
following Japanese claims that the dam-
age was inflicted by U.S. ships in a joint
U.S.-Japanese exercise.
17 June: The U.S. General Accounting
Office, in a report to the House Appro-
priations Committee, calls for a higher
budget priority for naval mine warfare
programs.
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7 July: An amphibious troop landing in
Syria occurs as part of a Soviet Mediter-
ranean Squadron training exercise, the
first such landing in the eastern Mediter-
ranean known at that time to have
occurred.
August: The CNO Strategic Studies
Group (SSG) I is assembled at CNWS.
1 September: A Soviet task group, in-
cluding a Kara-class missile cruiser, two
frigates, and a replenishment ship, comes
within 230 nautical miles of the Oregon
coast.
August–October: Ocean Venture 81,
the largest U.S.-led naval exercise in
years, takes place in the South Atlantic,
Caribbean, and Baltic Seas; forces from
fourteen nations take part, comprising
250 ships, 1,000 aircraft and some
120,000 personnel.
4–12 September: ZAPAD 81 exercises are
held in the Baltic Sea, involving the Kiev
aircraft carrier and the RSD-20 medium-
range strategic missile complex.
6 October: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is assassinated.
October–November: The CNO SSG I
holds two war games, emphasizing the
idea of preventing Soviet escalation by
prolonging the conventional phase of
war, part of a “long war” strategy.
November: Bear reconnaissance aircraft
begin nearly continuous use of airfields
in San Antonio de los Banos, Cuba.
11 November: The first Ohio-class Tri-
dent submarine, the USS Ohio (SSBN
726), is placed in commission at Groton,
Conn.
19 November: Reagan proposes the
“zero option” to Moscow, proposing
the elimination of an entire class of
weapons—intermediate-range nuclear
missiles.
13 December: In an attempt to quell the
Solidarity movement, martial law is im-
posed in Poland by the Military Council
for National Salvation, led by Prime Min-
ister General Wojciech Jaruzelski.
November: An Interagency Intelligence
memorandum on Soviet Intentions and
Capabilities for Interdicting Sea Lines of
Communication in a War with NATO is
completed; the memo argues that in the
event of war, the majority of Soviet na-
val forces would be deployed closer to
USSR to defend the country’s SSBN
force.
1982 17 January: The first submerged launch
of a Trident C-4 missile is carried out by
the USS Ohio submarine off the Florida
coast.
16 March: Brezhnev announces a mora-
torium on the deployment of mid-range
SS-20 missiles in the eastern Soviet Union,
contingent in a move similar to the U.S.
regarding the Pershing II missiles.
2 April–14 June: The Falklands War be-
gins when Argentine forces land in the
Falkland Islands in an initially successful
invasion; the Argentineans surrender to
British troops ten weeks later.
9 May: President Reagan outlines the
U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) proposal, with which to reach a
verifiable bilateral agreement to reduce
ICBMs and other strategic nuclear weap-
ons on both sides.
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6 June: The 6th Fleet goes on alert as Is-
raeli troops cross into southern Lebanon
to root out some 15,000 Palestinian Lib-
eration Army (PLO) militants, eventually
encircling and blockading Beirut; the
U.S. Embassy in Beirut comes under
rocket attack on 7 June.
30 June: The U.S.-Soviet START negotiations are opened in Geneva.
30 June: Admiral James Watkins is ap-
pointed CNO.
25 August: 6th Fleet amphibious ships
facilitate a landing by the 32nd Marine
Amphibious Unit in Beirut to help with-
draw the families of some 12,000 PLO
members.
August: During the academic year
1982–83 at NWC, the CNO SSG II
adopts tenets of forward defense as the
foundation of deterrence in peacetime
and applies these concepts to Southern
European and Pacific theaters.
August: Vice CNO Admiral William
Small signs a memorandum sent to all
four flag officers concerned with prepa-
ration of the Program Objective Memo-
randum (POM), calling on an integration
of analyses into a coherent war-winning
strategy; action on the memo is passed to
the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603),
to be carried out by Lt. Commander
Stanley Weeks and Commander W.
Spencer Johnson.
29 September: 1,200 Marines join
2,200 French and Italian troops on the
ground in Lebanon to preserve order.
26–29 October: Admiral Watkins con-
venes an annual conference of Navy
commanders in chief at NWC, stressing
“deterrence to the last” as the naval ob-
jective during periods of rising tensions;
the Weeks-Johnson Maritime Strategy
briefing is presented to the conference.
10 November: Leonid Brezhnev dies; he
is succeeded two days later by Yuri
Andropov as General Secretary of the
Communist Party.
1983 January: The first full-deck Soviet air-
craft carrier, the project 1143.5 Tbilisi
(later renamed Admiral Kuznetsov), is
laid down in the Nikolayev shipyard.
1 January: The commander in chief U.S.
Central Command replaces the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force in the Mid-
dle East; will draw on forces from U.S.
Atlantic and Pacific Commands as
needed.
1 February: USN ships participate in the
joint U.S.-Honduran Ahuas Tara exercise
in Honduras.
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23 March: Reagan addresses the nation
in support of the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative (SDI), an anti-strategic missile de-
fense also known as the “Star Wars”
program.
February: The Maritime Strategy brief-
ing presented in full to the Subcommit-
tee on Seapower and Strategic and
Critical Material of the House Armed
Services Committee.
20 April: Deputy CNO Vice Admiral
Robert Walters testifies to the House
Appropriations Committee that Navy
programs to counter the Soviet threat in
mine warfare are dangerously
underfunded.
21 July: Martial law is lifted in Poland. 26 July: In response to Soviet arms ship-
ments to Nicaragua, the USS Ranger
(CVA 61) carrier attack group deploys
off that country’s Pacific coast.
August: In the academic year 1983–84 at
NWC, the CNO SSG III expands forward
defense strategy to include employment
of naval forces in handling outlying So-
viet client states before a NATO–Warsaw
Pact war, focusing on cases of Libya,
Cuba, and Southwest Asia.
1 September: A Su-17 Flagon fighter jet
shoots down a Korean Airlines airliner
over the Kamchatka Peninsula, killing all
269 aboard, including 61 U.S. citizens.
September: The Maritime Strategy, as
modified by new Action Officer Com-
mander Peter Swartz, is presented to
Admiral Watkins and six former CNOs in
Newport.
1 October: Navy Secretary John Lehman
announces the creation of a Navy Space
Command to support existing Navy
space programs.
23 October: 241 U.S. servicemen are
killed in a truck bombing of the U.S.
Marine compound in Beirut; Secretary
Weinberger announces a month later
that the attack had been executed by
Syrian-backed Iranian nationals.
24 October: Operation URGENT FURY, un-
der the command of Vice Admiral Joseph
Metcalf III, USN, and his deputy, Maj.
Gen. Norman Schwartzkopf, USA, be-
gins in Grenada to overthrow the coun-
try’s new Communist government; the
goals are accomplished within days.
October: The Maritime Strategy, with
added discussion on the USN’s role in
peacetime, is presented to CNO Execu-
tive Panel.
22 November: The U.S. deploys
Pershing II missiles to West Germany af-
ter a protracted political fight.
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December: Moscow suspends the
START negotiations.
December: Exchanges of fire between
artillery positions in Syrian-occupied Leb-
anon and locally deployed U.S. 6th Fleet
ships intensify after surface-to-air mis-
siles (SAMs) are launched against U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft on 3 December.
1984 19 January: Navy Secretary John
Lehman and Admiral Watkins present
the Maritime Strategy briefing to Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger.
9 February: Soviet General Secretary
Yuri Andropov dies; he is succeeded by
Konstantin Chernenko on 13 February.
2 February: Amidst the withdrawals of
Italian and British ground forces from
Lebanon, USN ships launch the heaviest
bombardment yet of Syrian artillery posi-
tions near Beirut; the U.S. Marine with-
drawal occurs on 21 February, after
which only the French contingent re-
mains in significant numbers.
21 March: A Soviet Victor-class SSN col-
lides with the carrier USS Kitty Hawk in
the Sea of Japan.
9 April: Marking a new phase in anti-
submarine warfare, a new submarine
detection system supplementing the ex-
isting seafloor Sound Surveillance Sys-
tem (SOSUS)—the Surveillance Towed
Array Sensor System (SURTASS)—goes
into service in the Military Sealift Com-
mand, fitted on the surveillance ship
USS Stewart (DE 238).
2 May: The first of 84 USN Landing
Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC), a new type
of high-speed amphibious ship, is
launched.
May: A quarter to a third of the North-
ern Fleet’s SAM stockpile is destroyed
when a week-long series of fires and ex-
plosions ravages weapons magazines in
Severomorsk.
4 May: Admiral Watkins signs the final
FY1984 version of The Maritime Strat-
egy for publication in classified and un-
classified forms.
29 June: Moscow issues a statement calling for the resumption in September of
U.S.-Soviet negotiations on anti-satellite, strategic, and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons reductions; Washington agrees to hold talks.
2 July: Cobra Gold 84, a joint U.S.-Thai
naval exercise in the Gulf of Thailand,
begins, involving 10,000 personnel in
minelaying, minesweeping, and amphib-
ious landing operations.
August: The Soviet Navy joins the U.S.,
U.K., Italy, France, the Netherlands, and
Egypt in a mass de-mining operation in
the Suez Gulf, after mines allegedly laid
by the Islamic Jihad inflict damage to
passing Soviet merchant ships; mines
subsequently discovered by a U.K. ship
are determined to be of Soviet manufac-
ture and laid by a Libyan freighter.
August: In the academic year 1984–85,
the CNO SSG IV examines deterrence in
the context of the Maritime Strategy,
recommending demonstrations of NATO
solidarity, interoperability, and sustain-
ability in forward defense to aggravate
Soviet fears of prolonged conventional
war.
24 September: Reagan proposes a broad “umbrella” framework for U.S.-Soviet
arms talks to the UN General Assembly.
5 November: The first-ever joint
U.S.-Egyptian naval exercise begins in
the eastern Mediterranean.
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22 November: President Reagan’s National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, an-
nounces that Washington and Moscow have agreed to hold new negotiations on nu-
clear and space issues.
26 November: Washington resumes
diplomatic ties with Iraq for the first
time since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
1985 10 March: General Secretary Konstantin
Chernenko dies; Mikhail Gorbachev suc-
ceeds him on the following day.
12 March: The U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) open in Geneva, based on
the START proposals of 1983.
9 April: The Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command is established in the
Navy as the Naval Material Command is
disestablished, eliminating a bureau-
cratic layer above the naval systems
commands.
20 May: The most significant case of es-
pionage involving USN personnel is un-
raveled as retired Chief Warrant Officer
John Walker, Jr., is arrested for having
spied for Moscow since 1968.
5 July: Operation BRIGHT STAR 85, the
largest U.S. training exercise to date in
the Middle East, is held in Egypt, Jordan,
and Somalia; OCEAN SAFARI ’85, the larg-
est NATO exercise ever held, begins on
29 August, involving 157 ships and
70,000 personnel from ten nations.
August: In the academic year 1985–86,
the CNO SSG V focuses on the employ-
ment of naval forces in support of
peacetime foreign policy objectives.
30 September: Moscow presents a
START proposal, which accepts the prin-
ciple of deep reductions in strategic of-
fensive forces for the first time.
November: Admiral Watkins formally
signs the third version of the Maritime
Strategy.
21 November: At the Geneva Summit, Reagan and Gorbachev issue a joint state-
ment on cooperation in arms reductions, setting the goal at 50% reduction of nu-
clear arms.
December: The Tbilisi carrier is
launched; the Varyag aircraft carrier, also
known as project 1143.5, is laid down in
the Nikolayev Shipyard.
5 December: Gorshkov is replaced as
commander in chief of the Soviet Navy
by Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir
Chernavin, a former nuclear submarine
commander; Gorshkov had held the post
since 1956.
1986 15 January: Gorbachev proposes the
elimination of all nuclear weapons by the
year 2000, contingent on Washington’s
cancellation of SDI; Reagan does not
change his position.
24 March: Operation PRAIRIE FIRE begins
with strikes on Libyan missile ships and
shore-based missile installations after
several SAMs are launched against U.S.
aircraft operating near Libyan territorial
waters.
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11 April: Admiral Watkins becomes the
first U.S. Navy CNO to visit the People’s
Republic of China.
15 April: 6th Fleet carrier groups launch
strikes against ground targets in Libya,
ten days after a U.S. soldier is killed in a
Libyan-backed bombing of a West Berlin
discotheque.
26 April: Fire and an explosion at reactor
no. 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant contaminate large areas of Ukraine
and Belarus.
1 July: Admiral Carlisle Trost is ap-
pointed CNO.
6 October: The project 667-AU nuclear
submarine K-219 (Yankee-class), on pa-
trol with 15 nuclear-tipped SS-N-6 mis-
siles, sinks east of Bermuda, 40 hours
after a missile propellant explosion.
1 October: The Goldwater-Nichols De-
fense Reorganization Act is passed into
law, adding the post of Vice Chairman
of the JCS at the four-star level, and
placing the Chairman of the JCS in the
chain of command between the Secre-
tary of Defense and the unified
commanders.
11–12 October: At the Reykjavik Summit, U.S.-Soviet arms talks stall over Reagan’s
refusal to limit SDI research and testing to the laboratory.
5 November: The first U.S. Navy ship
visits to China since 1949 take place.
23 November: Frank Carlucci is sworn
in as Secretary of Defense.
22 December: The Peacekeeper ICBM
becomes operational.
1987 1 January: Gorbachev addresses Soviet
citizens on the dangers of the arms race;
on the same day, President Reagan uses
Voice of America to announce to Soviet
citizens the unprecedented imminence of
a bilateral nuclear arms reduction
agreement.
January: President Reagan delivers to
Congress a public and unclassified state-
ment of the National Security Strategy
of the United States, developed by Rear
Admiral W. A. Cockell.
1 May: James Webb is sworn in as Sec-
retary of the Navy.
5 May: Nationally televised hearings on
the Iran-Contra scandal open before the
House and Senate; Colonel Oliver North,
former National Security Adviser John M.
Poindexter, and Iranian-American arms
dealer Albert Hakim are indicted 15 March
1988 on charges of diverting Iranian arms
sales proceeds to Nicaraguan Contras.
26 August: West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announces Germany’s intention
to destroy its Pershing missiles given that the United States and Soviet Union agree to
destroy their own intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
15 September: The U.S. and USSR sign the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agree-
ment, promoting communication and confidence-building measures.
8 December: Gorbachev and Reagan sign the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) treaty in Washington, eliminating a full class of weapons and granting an un-
precedented level of access to inspectors of sites in both countries.
1988 January: The project 1143.5 Varyag air-
craft carrier is launched.
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5 January: A Soviet nuclear submarine is
transferred to another nation for the first
time, as a project 670 (Charlie I-class)
cruise missile submarine is leased by
Moscow to the Indian Navy.
22 February: Navy Secretary Webb re-
signs in protest of Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci’s lack of support for a
600-ship Navy.
28 March: William L. Ball is sworn in as
Secretary of the Navy.
15 April: After seven years of peace
talks, Moscow agrees to withdraw all its
forces from Afghanistan by 15 February
1989.
18 May: Soviet troops begin withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
29 May–1 June: At the Moscow Summit, Reagan and Gorbachev reaffirm their com-
mitment to concluding the START treaty.
28 June: Gorbachev reports to the 19th
All-Union Conference of the Communist
Party that key elements of Communist
doctrine are outdated, defending his
proposals for Perestroika reforms.
3 July: USS Vincennes (CG 49) mistak-
enly shoots down an Iran Air commercial
airliner, killing 290.
16 August: Pro-Solidarity strikes in Po-
land demand the granting of a legal sta-
tus to the union.
20 August: A cease-fire ending the Iran-Iraq War is announced.
7 December: Gorbachev announces a
unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet
troops from Eastern Europe and a 10%
reduction in the Soviet armed forces.
1989 1 January: Remaining Soviet troops in
Afghanistan cease fire a day after Mos-
cow announces that it will halt arms
shipments to the Kabul government.
20 January: George Bush is sworn in as
the 41st President of the United States.
7 February: Deputy Foreign Minister
Igor Rogachev announces a complete
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Af-
ghanistan by 15 February as another offi-
cial announces that 15,000 Soviet
servicemen had been killed since the
start of the conflict.
21 March: Richard Cheney is sworn in
as Secretary of Defense.
5 April: Poland grants legal status to the
Solidarity union.
7 April: 42 submariners die after a fire
sinks the project 685 Komsomolets nu-
clear submarine (Mike-class) near the
Norwegian coast.
15 May: Henry L. Garrett III is sworn in
as Secretary of the Navy.
3 June: After the occurrence of seven
aircraft mishaps in the first half of the
year, the U.S. Marine Corps announces
a two-day operational stand-down for
all Marine aviation units.
3–4 June: The Chinese army attacks students protesting in Tiananmen Square, killing
hundreds.
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21 July: Three Northern Fleet ships un-
der the flag of Vice Admiral I. V.
Kasatonov, the First Deputy commander
in chief of the Northern Fleet, dock in
Norfolk, Va., in the first such naval port
visit since 1975; two USN ships recipro-
cate by visiting Black Sea Fleet headquar-
ters in Sevastopol two weeks later.
22–23 September: The U.S. and USSR sign the “Reciprocal Advance Notice of Major
Strategic Exercises Agreement” as part of the Wyoming Ministerial, pledging to pre-
vent inadvertent conflict caused by provocative military exercises.
1 November: Admiral Kuznetsov/Tbilisi
(the country’s first full-deck carrier and
the largest Soviet warship ever built)
goes to sea; aboard the carrier, the first
conventional aircraft landing on a Soviet
ship is carried out by test pilot Viktor
Pugachev.
14–21 November: The Berlin Wall is dismantled.
2–3 December: Speaking at the Malta Summit, President Bush proposes to acceler-
ate START negotiations.
20 December: Operation JUST CAUSE is
launched by 24,000 U.S. troops against
the government of Panamanian presi-
dent General Manuel Noriega.
1990 12 February: NATO and Warsaw Pact officials meet in Ottawa to discuss the “Open
Skies” concept of inspection of countries by reconnaissance aircraft.
29 June: Admiral Frank Keslo III is ap-
pointed CNO.
2 August: The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait begins.
August–November: Operation SHARP
EDGE, a mass evacuation of U.S. and
other citizens from war-torn Liberia, is
launched.
7 August: Operation DESERT SHIELD be-
gins as President Bush orders U.S. forces
to Saudi Arabia to protect that country
from Iraqi invasion.
9 September: Gorbachev and Bush meet in Helsinki and declare unconditional sup-
port for UN sanctions against Iraq.
12 September: The Two-Plus-Four Treaty is signed by U.S., Soviet, British, and French
representatives, recognizing the creation of a united post–Cold War German state.
1 October: U.S. forces formally end
their presence in West Berlin.
12 December: Lech Walesa is elected
President of Poland.
14 December: Navy Secretary H. Lawrence
Garrett III signs a memorandum estab-
lishing Air, Surface, Undersea, and Com-
mand, Communications, and Ocean
Surveillance Warfare Centers, and reor-
ganizing the Navy’s research, develop-
ment, test, and evacuation activities.
1991 4 January: Operation EASTERN EXIT be-
gins as two USN amphibious ships con-
duct an evacuation of U.S. citizens from
Somalia, during that country’s escalating
civil war.
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7 January: The development of the
Navy’s long-range strike aircraft ends
with the cancellation of the planned
A-12 Avenger carrier-based attack plane.
17 January: Operation DESERT STORM begins as U.S. and coalition aircraft launch
strikes against Iraqi targets.
21 January: The Tbilisi aircraft carrier
enters naval service.
27 February: Bush announces the suspen-
sion of all offensive combat operations by
U.S. and coalition forces in the Persian Gulf.
3 March: Iraq accepts cease-fire terms and the Gulf War is over.
31 July: Bush and Gorbachev sign the START treaty, pledging to destroy thousands
of strategic nuclear weapons.
18 August: Gorbachev is placed under
house arrest by the KGB in his Yalta da-
cha, as hard-line coup conspirators an-
nounce a state of emergency in the Soviet
Union; Boris Yeltsin and other leaders of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Re-
public (RSFSR) demand Gorbachev’s re-
lease a day later as armed citizens take up
positions to defend the Parliament build-
ing against tanks and troops deployed by
coup supporters; mass anti-coup demon-
strations erupt in Leningrad and Moscow;
troops withdraw from Moscow on 21 Au-
gust, following the deaths of three civilian
protestors; Gorbachev’s bodyguards arrest
coup plotters on the same day and
Gorbachev calls President Bush, reaffirm-
ing his control of the country.
24 August: Gorbachev resigns as General
Secretary of the Communist Party, effec-
tively ending 74 years of Communist rule.
2 September: The Soviet Union is voted
dissolved by the Congress of People’s
Deputies, an act Gorbachev denounces
as betrayal; power shifts to Russian Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin.
11 September: Gorbachev announces
that Moscow will hold talks with Cuba
over the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from that country.
27 September: A missile misfires on a
project 941 (Typhoon-class) SSBN carry-
ing several nuclear weapons.
27 September: Bush proposes sweeping
nuclear reductions, including the unilat-
eral cancellation of MX rail-garrison and
short-range attack missile (SCRAM II) pro-
grams, the worldwide withdrawal of all
Army ground-based tactical nuclear
weapons and Navy tactical nuclear weap-
ons, and an end to the 24-hour alert sta-
tus of B-1B and B-52 bombers; he urges
Gorbachev to reciprocate.
5 October: Gorbachev announces the
removal of all tactical nuclear weapons
from warships and the abolition of
short-range Soviet nuclear weapons.
6 October: Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary express a desire to join NATO.
27 December: Gorbachev hands nuclear
codes to Russian Federation President
Yeltsin; he resigns on 30 December, de-
claring the USSR to be defunct.
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